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The Christian Message in a Postmodern World: 
A Critical Re-Appropriation of Hendrik Kraemer's Theology of Religions 
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Abstract 
This thesis is a critical re-appropriation of Hendrik Kraemer's theology of religions. Part I 
introduces theology of religions through the now familiar threefold typology: Kari Barth represents 
'exclusivism,' Kari Rahner, 'inclusivism,' and John Hick, 'pluralism' (Chapter 1). It then argues that 
the typology implicitiy represents non-pluralist approaches as theologically deficient and ethically 
insensitive while masking problems in pluralist positions (Chapter 2). It thus releases Kraemer 
from the typology and from the more emotive charges directed against 'exclusivism.' Part II 
chronologically and tiiematically surveys Kraemer's theology of religions, describing his 
missiological and theological contexts (Chapter 3) and summarising his major works (Chapter 4). 
The crux of the argument comes in Part III . First, a survey of the contemporary 
philosophical climate is offered through a summary and critique of Jean-Frangois Lyotard's 
interpretation of the postinodem conditioa Subsequentiy, three theological responses are assessed 
with Mark C. Taylor's a/theology and John Milbank's theology presented as avoidable extremes 
while the work of Hans Frei and George Lindbeck is offered as a mediating position which is 
dubbed 'posonodem orthodoxy' (Chapter 5). Second, after reviewing key themes in Kraemer's 
position, theological and phenomenological criticisms are outiined and evaluated. Though they do 
not seriously threaten the position, these criticisms prohibit extreme interpretations of, and lead to 
slight modifications in, Kraemer's work (Chapter 6). Finally, when re-read through the lenses of 
posdnodem orthodoxy, Kraemer's thought is shown to offer to contemporary theology of religions 
avenues of theological creativity which are nevertheless faithful to the Christian tradition (Chapter 
7). The thesis concludes that Hendrik Kraemer's theology of religions is worthy of critical re-
appropriatioa 
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Introduction 
The question of Christianity's attitude and relationship to the religions of the world will not 
go away - and ndtiier should it.'' So Gavin D'Costa opens what is now a major collection of essays 
among the increasing amount of literamre falling under the rubric of Christian theology of religions. 
Despite their expanding number, the various books and articles usually fall into one of three related 
but distinct methods of approaching the problem: historical, philosophical/theological and ethical.^ 
This study is a contribution to the second dimension, for it is a theological argument for the critical 
re-appropriation of Hendrik Kraemer by contemporary Christian theology of religions. In order to 
property introduce the smdy, the remaining paragraphs limit its scope, outiine its argument, and 
summarise its aims. 
1. The Scope of the Study 
The study's scope is confined explicitly to Christian theology of religions. It is not 
therefore a phenomenological study of specific religions or cenain beliefs and practices. Though 
the value of careM investigation into the lives of diverse religious communities is not denied, such 
an activity is not undertaken here.^  Second, neither is the study an example of comparative 
1. Gavin D'Costa, "Preface' in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered, ed. Gavin D'Costa, (MaryknoU: Orbis, 
1990), p. viii. 
2. This deliberately parallels the 'three bridges' used by the contributors to The Myth of Christian 
Uniqueness to 'cross the Rubicon,' from the 'shores of exclusivism or inclusivism to pluralism.' They are 
'The Historico-Cultural Bridge,' 'The Theologico-Mystical Bridge,' and The Ethico-Practical Bridge.' See 
Paul F. Knitter, 'Preface,' in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions. (Mar>knoll: Orbis, 1987), pp. ix - xii. 
3. See, for example, George Alfred James, Interpreting Religion: The Phenomenological Approaches of 
Pierre Daniel Chantepie de la Saussave. W. Brede Kristensen. and Gerardus van der Leeuw. (Washington, 
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1995). 
tiieology, which is to say 'the detailed consideration of religious traditions odier than one's own' 
which sometimes leads to innovative dieological construction within the home tradition.'' Finally, it 
is not an exercise in apologetics, eidier as a defence of the truth-claims of Christianity or as a 
challenge to the truth-claims of other religions.^  Rather, the smdy attempts to understand, to assess, 
and to redeem the contribution of one member of the Christian community, Hendrik Kraemer, to 
the Christian imderstanding of other religions. 
It is thus an example of Christian systematic theology: it is a critical and ordered reflection 
arising out of and remaining linked to a particular community of Christian faith. Explicitly and 'un-
apologetically' confessional in nature, die study is written by a Christian and is intended for 
Christians. It is not and does not purport to be a metacritical dieory of religion to which Muslims, 
Buddhists, or others should subscribe. It is incumbent upon Uiem to construct dieir own theologies 
or atheologies of religions. So to summarise, subsequent chapters comprise a systematic reflection 
on the contribution of Hendrik Kraemer to Christian theology of religions in order to show that it 
continues to offer insights to Christians wresding with die problem of religion particulariy in the 
context of posunodemity. 
2. The Argument of the Study 
Part I of the study provides an overview Christian theology of religions, thus setting the 
stage for an introduction to the life and work of Hendrik Kraemer. Chapter 1 explores die 
convention of die 'direefold typology' which organises Christian theology of religions into the 
following types. First, 'exclusivism' has been conventionally defined as diat type which confines 
salvation widiin die borders of Christianity; second, 'inclusivism' holds diat the salvation which 
occurs diroughout die world is always die salvation of Christ; finally, 'pluralism' argues diat die 
great religions are independendy audientic contexts of salvationAiberation.* Each is explored 
dirough die contribution of one widely recognised representative, respectively Kari Bardi, Kari 
4. Francis X. Clooney, 'Comparative Theology: A Review of Recent Books (1989 - 1995),' in Theological 
Studies, 56 (1995), p. 521. 
5. For a defense of apologetics undertaken in an interreligious context, see Paul J. Griffiths, An Apology 
for Apologetics. rMarvknoll: Orbis. 1991). 
6. See for example John Hick, 'Review of Glyn Richards' Towards a Theology of Religions.' in Religious 
Studies. 29 (1990), p. 175. 
Rahner, and John Hick. Chapter 2 then offers a suspicious reading of the threefold typology as a 
polemical device carica;turing acmal exclusivist and inclusivist theories while masking serious 
problems in pluralist ones. First, an examination of its genealogy shows that the typology conceals 
a thesis about the inevitability of pluralism. Second a comparison of the definitions set out above 
with actual exclusivist, inclusivist and pluralist theories shows them to be reductionist. Finally, an 
attempt to rescue the typology by redefining the types in relation to questions of truth rather than 
related but distinct questions of salvation is shown to create more problems than it solves. This 
analysis is undertaken in order to liberate exclusivist and inclusivist approaches from the highly 
emotive, negatively charged baggage attiibuted to tiiem in part through the typology. The typology 
cannot and should not be used therefore, to prohibit reflection on openly traditional theologies of 
religions. Part I is a piece of conceptual analysis; its chapters amount to investigations of, rather 
than in, theology of religions. 
Part I I moves from these general remarks to the contribution of Hendrik Kraemer to the 
debate. Chapter 3 situates Kraemer in his historical context in three stages. It opens with a brief 
biography, from his birth in Amsterdam in 1888 to his death in Dreibergen in 1965, and a 
chronological introduction to his major publications. The second section sketches the eariy history 
of ecumenical Protestant missiology and its first three international conferences: the World 
Missionary Conference held in Edinburgh, 1910, the Jerusalem Meeting of the International 
Missionary Council, 1928, and the Tambaram Meeting of the International Missionary Council in 
1938. Particular attention wiU be given to Kraemer's contribution to the latter two conferences. 
His own theological development is set out in the third section, focusing specifically on his student 
arxl missionary years, his encounter with Karl Barth and EmU Brunner, and finally, his reaction 
against the American philosopher of religion, William Hocking. A direct encounter with Kraemer's 
theology of religions takes place in Chapter 4. It presents a systematic exposition of Kraemer's 
theology of religions as it is found in his more widely read works: The Christian Message in a Non-
Christian Worid written in preparation for the Tambaram meeting; 'Continuity or Discontinuity,' 
his contribution to the post-Tambaram discussion, as reprinted in The Authoritv of the Faith: and 
finally Religion and the Christian Faith, the largest and most nuanced articulation of his positioa^ 
7. Hendrik Kraemer, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World. (London: Edinburgh House, 
1938); 'Continuity or Discontinuity' in The Authority of the Faith, ed. William Paton, G-ondon: Oxford 
University Press, 1939); and Religion and the Christian Faith, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1965). 
Part n , dien, constitutes a chronological and diematic survey of one position in dieology of 
religions. 
Part III argues diat Kraemer's dieology of religions not only stands up well to 
contemporary criticism, but suggests a position which is 'oodi philosophically and dieologically 
sophisticated Chapter 5 opens widi a brief, two-step assessment of die current philosophical and 
dieological climate. The first skteches postinodemism and postmodcmity, centering specifically on 
die work of die French philosopher Jean-Fran?ois Lyotard. It contends diat while his prescriptive 
response to die end of modernity is deeply problematic, diere is no reversing die postinodem mm. 
The second then considers tiieological responses to die postinodem mm. The a/dieology of Mark 
C. Taylor and die dieology of John Milbank are presented as extremes which can and should be 
avoided, while the work of Hans Frei and George Lindbeck is proposed as a more fruitfiil 
mediating position, which I call 'postinodem orthodoxy.' The stage is set for die critical re-
appropriation of Hendrik Kraemer's dieology of religions. 
Chapter 6 begins die rehabilitation in diree sections. In die first, four key diemes are set 
out to summarise Kraemer's overall positioa After expositions of bibhcal realism, die totalitarian 
approach, adaptation and die point of contact, die second dien considers five dieological criticisms. 
The first of these, attacking Kraemer's view of Scripture, bodi misunderstands diat view and is 
itself deeply problematic. The remaining four, aldiough more or less accurate, fail to consider 
Kraemer's historical context, his habit of rhetorical overemphasis, and die more subde articulation 
of later woiic. Though diey provide important boundaries against extreme readings, diey do not 
therefore seriously undermine Kraemer's position. The final section considers two 
phenomenological criticisms: diat Kraemer can account neidier for intrareUgious nor interreligious 
development. Though die validity of diese objections is uncontested, I argue here diat they can lead 
to a slight but not inconsequential modification in Kraemer's phenomenology radier than a 
wholesale rejection of it. 
In diree sections, die final chapter draws togedier die posunodem ordiodoxy of chapter 5 
and die key themes of chapter 6 in order to show diat Kraemer's dieology of religions continues to 
suggest ways of faidiftd dieological creativity for Christians wresding widi die problem of religions 
in a postmodern worid. The first shows diat for postmodern dieology of religions, biblical realism 
entails both that it recognise tiie expUcitiy Christian nature of Uieology of religions and that it 
appreciate religious diversity as part of the Christian metanarrative. The second contends that the 
totalitarian approach brings to a postinodem Uieology of religions a suspicion of universal and 
neuti-al evaluative criteria, a resistance to the metacritical quest for a common religious 'core,' and 
an allowance tiiat otiier religions are successful in bringing 'salvation' to tiieir adherents. Finally, 
tiie third shows how the tiieme of adaptation rules out a strict incommensurability thesis by 
underscoring the need for botii comparative tiieology and apologetics and how, through Kraemer's 
dialectical point of contact, legitimate but incomplete communication between tradtions is possible. 
3. The Aims of the Study 
I f this argument is successful, it makes a strong case, first of all, for the reintroductim of 
Hendrik Kraemer's tiieology of religions to contemporary discussioa Remembering his 
contribution is more often tiian not restricted to tiie missiological wing of tiie World Council of 
Churches, where his pioneering spirit, i f not his tiieology, is honoured; Gavin D'Costa is perhaps 
the only contemporary theologian seriously to consider and criticise Kraemer at lengtii. This study 
assesses and responds to tiie major criticisms in order to show tiiat his contribution is not as easily 
dismissed as some might think. Second, tiie stiidy seeks also to re-appropriate critically Kraemer's 
theology of religions. In so doing, it presents a defensible position aware of contemporary 
philosophical and theological difficulties and how tiiey impinge upon tiie theology of religions. This 
study is thus a tiieological argument for tiie critical re-appropriation of Hendrik Kraemer by 
contemporary Christian tiieology of religions. 
P A R T I 
T H E T H R E E F O L D T Y P O L O G Y AND BEYOND 
Chapter 1 
The Threefold Typology 
Introduction: 
The classification of different approaches to Christian tiieology of reMgions according to 
type has become commonplace over tiie last decade.' For John Hick, 'tiie now fairly standard 
tiireefold division into exclusivism (salvation is confined to Christianity), inclusivism (salvation 
occurs tiiroughout tiie worid but is always the work of Christ), and pluralism (tiie great worid faitiis 
are different and independentiy autiientic contexts of salvation/liberation)...' remains 'tiie simplest 
and least misleading classificatioa...'^ That tins dvision is 'fairly standard' is undisputed; that it is 
tiie 'simplest and least misleading' is debatable. The following two chapters argue tiiat tiiis typology 
is useful for introductory, pedagogical purposes, but when pressed t)eyond tiiese basic goals, it 
becomes a hindrance. 
In order to demonstrate tiie first objective,, tiiis chapter uses tiie typology to introduce 
readers to Christian tiieology of religions. It centres on tiiree tiieologians, each epitomising one 
1. See for example, Alan Race Christians and Religious Pluralism. (London: SCM, 1983; second edition, 
1993); John Hick, 'A Philosophy of Religious Pluralism,' in The Worid's Religious Traditions: Essavs in 
Honour of Wilfred Cantwell Smith, ed. Frank Whaling (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1984); Gavin D'Costa, 
Theology and Religious Pluralism. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Jacques Dupuis, Jesus Christ at the 
Encounter of World Religions, trans. Robert R. Barr, (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1989); Chester Gillis, A Question 
of Final Belief: John Hick's Pluralistic Theory of Salvation. (New York: St. Martin's, 1989) and Pluralism: 
A New Paradigm for Theology. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, n.d.). 
2. John Hick, 'Review of Glyn Richards, Towards a Theology of Religions.' in Religious Studies. 26 
(1990), p. 175. See also John Hick, ed. Problems of Religious Pluralism (New York: St. Martin's, 1985), 
chapters 3 and 4. 
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type: Karl Barth represents exclusivism, Kari Rahner, inclusivism, and John Hick, pluralism. This 
representational approach should not obscure die fact diat each type is in reality a loose cluster of 
positions: diough adherents may be united in die presuppositions from which diey address die 
relationship between Christianity and odier religions, die solutions advocated often vary. I have 
nevertheless chosen this approach for two reasons. First, by focusing on well-known, widely-
recognised spokespersons, I hope to avoid accusations of bias. Second, the limited space limits me 
eidier to a broad examination of several exponents or a more diorough analysis of one; in order to 
give die reader a sufficiendy detailed introduction, 1 have opted for die latter strategy. Widi diese 
caveats in mind, I turn now to exclusivism and its representative, Kari Bardi. 
1.1 Exclusivism: Karl Barth 
Caution is required when looking to Bardi as a spokesman for exclusivism for diree 
reasons. First, while Bardi is commonly and correcdy cited as an exclusivist, he does not represent 
all exclusivists; moreover despite his status in Reformed thought, neither does he speak for all 
Reformed exclusivists. This difficulty is compounded for in die vast majority of die literature, no 
contemporary exclusivist is extensively engaged. As S. Mark Heim observes, 'This eidier 
represents a failure in dialogue or, more likely, an inherent difficulty widi a typology in which one 
type is hard to populate widi actual representatives or exists simply to be condemned.'^  Second, 
unlike Rahner and to a lesser extent Hick, Bardi never produced a proper dieology of religions.'' 
One must dierefore avoid die danger of forcing him to answer a question he never addressed 
Finally, die Bardiian corpus is extensive, and records significant development in Earth's diought. 
Consequendy, one cannot simply confine the analysis to his eariy writings. Ignoring diese dangers 
can only result in a misrepresentation of Barth and of exclusivism; however, awareness of diem 
should yield an accurate exposition of bodi. 
3. S. Mark Heim, 'Criscrossing the Rubicon: Reconsidering Religious Pluralism,' in The Christian 
Century. 108 (1991), p. 689. I will explore diis observation (urther in chapter 2. 
4. J.A. Veitch, 'Revelation and Religion in the Theology of Karl Bardi,' in Scottish Joumal of Theology. 
24 (1971), pp. 1 - 22, suggests diat Bardi intended to devote his attention to diis problem after completing 
Volume V of die Dogmatics. According to Veitch (p. 20), Bardi 'would probably have recognised odier 
religions as occupying a place in die dialectic between Revelation and Religion which is synon>Tnous widi 
religiosity.' 
11 
The exposition opens witii a brief reminder of Earth's tiieological metiiod. Second it 
considers 'The Revelation of God as tiie Abolition of Religion,' his only extended u^tment of 
•Religion' in tiie Church Dogmatics.^  FinaUy, tiiis consideration is supplemented by a brief look at 
botii his doctrine of election and his views on tiie possibility of extra-Christian revelation in order to 
show tiiat the Divine 'No!' to religion, witii which many of Bartii's critics are preoccupied is 
balanced by his Divine 'Yes!' to humanity.* 
For Bartii, Christian tiieological metiiod should be and inevitably is confessional. He 
unpacks tiiis metiiodolpgy in Fides Ouaerens Intellecmm.^ which argues against dominant 
philosophical and tiieological opinion tiiat Ansclm was not a rationalist, but sought to bring reason 
into the service of faitii On tiiis view, tiie ontological argument is not Anselm's attempt to prove 
God's existence but his endeavour better to understand tiiat which has been revealed by God and 
apprehended by faitii. Bartii summarises his position in tiiese words: 'We must be consistent here 
and confess that it is not possible to speak undogmatically about tiie confessional attittide of 
dogmatics, instead of standing ourselves witiiin tiie confessional attitude.'^  Whetiier or not tiiis 
interpretation of Anselm is correct is, at tiiis point, irrelevant; it nonetiieless remains tiie most 
important statement of Bartii's tiieological metiiod. 
To leave tiie matter here, however, would beg tiie questions, What has been given? What is 
confessed? Bartii answers tiiat the sole source of all Christian tiieology is a message beyond 
human anticipation; one which 'is not tiie right human tiioughts about God... but tiie right divine 
5. Karl Bartii, The. Revelation of God as tiie Abolition of Religion,' in The Church Dogmatics, Volume 
1.2, The Doctrine of die Word of God, u-ans. G.W. Bromiley (Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1978), pp. 280 -
361. Cited hereafter as CDI.2. 
6. These can be found in Church Dogmatics. Volume 11.2, The Doctrine of God. Pan 2, u-ans. G.W. 
Bromiley, (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1957); and Volume IV.3, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, trans. 
G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1961), respectively. Cited hereafter as 
CDII.2 and CDIV.3. Though this section follows die Dogmatics clo.selv. it is important to note tiiat the 
problem of religion is also a major theme in his commentary. The Epistle to the Romans, sixth edition, 
trans. Edwin C. Hoskyns, (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), especially pp. 42 - 49, 65 - 70, 229 -
270. 
7. Karl Bartii, Anselm: Fides Quacrcns Intcllectum. uans. Ian W. Robertson, (London: SCM, 1960). 
8. CD1.2, p. 825. 
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dioughts about mea'' It is the direefold Word of God: die Church's proclamation of die gospel (die 
Word of God preached), die Scriptural wimess to die gospel (die Word of God written), and die 
gospel event itself, Jesus Christ (die Word of God revealed).'° 'We are speaking of diree different 
forms of die Word of God and not of diree different Words of God hi diis direefold form and not 
odierwise - but also as die one Word only in diis direefold fonm - die Word of God is given to us.... 
There is no distinction of degree or value between die diree forms.' 
The revealed Word of God we know only from die Scripture adopted by 
Church proclamation or die proclamation of die Church based on Scripture. 
The written Word of God we know only Uirough die revelation which ftilfils 
proclamation or die proclamation fulfilled by revelation. 
The preached Word of God we know only dirough die revelation attested in 
Scripture or die Scripture which attests revelation.'' 
Thus, "The possibility of knowledge of God's Word lies in God's Word and nowhere else.''^  
Negatively spieaking, diis grounding in God's Word results in a firm rejection of aU natural 
dieology, i.e. die demonstration of certain trudis concerning God's existence and nattire, operating 
from premises knowable by any rational person independendy of revelation. Barth writes. 
Christian natural dieology very respccifrilly and in all humility re-casts revelation into a 
new form of its own devising. But for all diat its behaviour is so respecdiil and 
forbearing, for all diat it subordinates itself so consciously and consistendy, natural 
dieology has already conquered it at die very outset, making revelation into non-
revelation. This will certainly show itself in what it does widi the revelation diat has 
been absorbed and domesticated by it. ' ' 
Positively speaking, because it accepts diat humans are in diemselves unable to know God, diis 
grounding affirms dial any and all knowledge of God must be revealed For Barth, diis revelation 
takes place in Jesus Christ: 'die eternal God is to be known in Jesus Christ and not elsewhere.'"* 
9. Bardi, The Episde to die Romans, p. 1. 
10. Karl Bardi, The Church Dogmatics. Volume 1.1, The Doctrine of die Word of God, ed. G.W. 
Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, ffans. G.W. Bromiley, (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1975), pp. 88 - 120 
Cited hereafter as CDI.l. 
11. CDI.l,pp. 120-121. 
12. CDI.l,p.222. 
13. Karl Bardi, Church Dogmatics. Volume I I . l , The Doctfine of God, Part 1, Q-ans. T.H.L. Parker 
(Edinburgh: T. and T.Clark, 1957), pp. 139 - 140. 
14. Karl Bardi, CDII.2, pp. 191 - 192. 
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Thus, the entire Bartiiian corpus is at bottom, a christological exercise. This must be kept in mind 
as I now move to consider tiie most extended treattnent of religion in tiie Dogmatics. 
The Revelation of God as the Abolition of Rehgion' falls into tiiree sections, tiie first 
addressing tiie problem of rehgion for theology. As Bartii describes it, tiie possibility and reaUty of 
revelation are no less tiian tiie being and acting of God. 'We could not, tiierefore, regard tiie event 
of revelation as an interplay between God and man, between grace and namre.''^  Revelation stands 
over all human activity, including religion. At tiie same time, however, revelation encounters 
humans and must tiiercfore have tiie aspect and character of an human phenomenoa The human 
form of revelation is tiie Christian religion. 'It is somctiiing which may be grasped historically and 
psychologically. We can inquire into its nature and value as we can in tiie case of all otiiers. We 
can compare it with otiier phenomena of a more or less similar type.''* Thus, tiie problem of 
retigion in theology is not whether tiie non-Christian enjoys salvation, but how an historical, human 
rehgion has txxxime tiie vehicle for tiie revelation of God's Word - Jesus Christ.'^ 
This problem immediately raises a question of precedence: 'Does it mean tiiat what we 
think we know of the natijre and incidence of rcHgion must serve as a norm and principle by which 
to explain tiie revelation of God; or vice versa, does it mean tiiat we have to interpret tiie Christian 
religion and all otiier rehgjons by what we are told by God's revelation?''* Whereas tiie Reformers 
15. CDI.2. p. 280. See also his remarks against Emil Brunner's so-called 'natural tiieology,' in Natural 
Theology: Comprising 'Nature and Grace' bv Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and tiie Reply 'No!' by Dr. Karl 
Banh, trans. Peter Fraenkel, (London: GefTorey Bles, 1946), pp. 65 - 128 and his 1937 - 38 Gifford 
Lectures, The Knowledge of God and tiie Service of God According to tiie Teaching of tiie Reformation: 
Recalling tiie Scottish Confession of 1560. trans. J.L.M. Haire and Ian Henderson, (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1938). See especially "Lecture I : "Natural Theology" and tiie Teaching of tiie Reformation,' pp. 
3-12. 
16. CDI.2, p. 281. 
17. He writes. The revelation of God is actually tiie presence of God and tiierefore tiie hiddenness of God 
in the world of human religion. By God's revealing of Himself the divine particular is hidden in a human 
universal, tiie divine content in a human form, and tiierefore dial which is divinely unique in sometiiing 
which is humanly only singular. Because and in so far as it is God's revelation to man, God Himself, and 
tiie outpouring of tiie Holy Spirit, and tiicrcfore tiie incarnation of die Word, can be seen from tiiis side, in 
tiie hiddenness which is obviously given to it along witii its u-ue humanity as a religious phenomenon, as a 
member of tiiat series, as a particular concept witiiin general observation and experience, as one content of 
a human form, which can have otiicr contents and in which die divine uniqueness of tiiat content cannot be 
perceived directiy.' CDI.2, pp. 282 - 283. 
18. CDI.2, p. 284. 
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sought to interpret the world (and hence religion) in light of revelation,'' beginning in the 
seventeenth century, Protestant theology reversed the priority, subsuming revelation under 
religion.^ Consequently, 'theology lost its object, revelation in all its uniqueness. And losing that, 
it lost the seed of faith with which it could move mountains, even the moimtain of modem 
humanistic culmre. That [Neo-Protestantism] really lost revelation is shown by the very fact that it 
could exchange i t and with i t its own birthright for the concept, "reHgioa'"^' Barth believes that he 
can solve the problem of religion in theology by restoring revelation to its proper place: the starting-
point of all Christian theological reflection.^ Thus reoriented, Barth can now discern how God's 
revelation is present in the world of human religion: 'Our basic task is so to order the concepts of 
revelation and religion that the connexion between the two can again be seen as identical with that 
event between God and man in which God is God, i.e., the Lord and Master of man, who Himself 
judges and alone justifies and sanctifies, and man is the man of God, i.e., man as he is adopted and 
received by God in His severity and goodness.'^ The study, then, is not one based on the 'essence' 
19. CDI.2,pp.292. 
20. It 'fell prey to the absolutism with which the man of that period made himself the centre and measure 
and goal of all things. It was its duty to participate in this trend and lovingly to investigate it. But it was 
certainly not its duty to co-operate in it, which is what it did when in the time of Buddeus it openly turned 
"religionistic." But is was not what theology did that was really serious. It was what it did not do: its 
weakness and vacillation in the very substance of faith. In fact and in practice it ceased to regard the 
cardinal statements of the Lutheran and Heidelberg confessions as definite axioms. Originally and 
properly the sin was one of unbelief. It was that belittling of Christ which begins the moment He is no 
longer accepted as our One and All and we are seactly dissatisfied with His lordship and consolation.' 
CDI.2, pp. 293 - 294. 
21. CDI.2, p. 294. 
22. "There can, therefore, be no question of a systematic coordination of God and man, of revelation and 
religion. For neither in its existence, nor in its relation to the first, can the second be considered, let alone 
defined, except in the light of the first. The only thing we can do is to recount the history of the 
relationships between the two: and even that takes place in such a way that whatever we have to say about 
the existence and nature and value of the second can only and exclusively be made plain in the light of the 
first, i.e., in the course of God's sovereign action on man. It is man as he is revealed in the light of 
revelation, and only that man, who can be seriously ueated theologically. Similarly, the problem of 
religion in theology is not the question how the reality, religion, which has already been defined (and 
usually uniheologically), can be now brought into an orderly and plausible relationship with the theological 
concepts, revelation, faith, etc. On the contrary, the question is uninterruptedly theological: What is this 
thing which from the standpoint of revelation and faith is revealed in the actuality of human life as 
religion?' CDI.2, pp. 296 - 297. 
23. CDI.2, p. 297. 
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or 'evolution' of religion, but a theological one, starting from the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.^ 
He turns to this task in the chapter's remaining sections, 'Religion as Unbelief,' and True Religioa' 
With these preliminaries in mind, I may now unpack Earth's view of religion, summarised 
as follows, 'religion is unbelief. It is a concern, indeed,... the one great concern, of godless maa'^ 
Despite the abrasive appearance of these sentences, Earth intends no negative value judgement. It 
is ratiier, simply a repetition of the judgement of God: 
this proposition is not in any sense a negative value-judgment. It is not a judgment of 
religious science or philosophy based upon some prior negative judgment concerned 
- with the nature of religion. Above all it affects ourselves also as adherents of the 
Christian religion. It formulates the judgment of divine revelation upon all religion. It 
can be explained and expounded, but it cannot be proved by any phenomenology or 
history of religion. Since it aims only to repeat the judgment of God, it does not involve 
any human renunciation of human values, any contesting of the Uue and the good and 
the beautiful which a closer inspection will reveal in almost all religions, and which we 
naturally expect to find in abundant measure in our own religion, if we hold to it with 
any conviction. What happens is simply that man is taken by God and judged and 
condemned by God. That means, of course, that we are struck to the very roots, to the 
heart. Our whole existence is called into question.^ ^ 
That religion is unbelief is tiie inevitable conclusion of an evaluation conducted from the standpoint 
of the revelation recorded in Scripture. 
First of all, tiierefore. Earth sees revelation as extrinsic, coming to humanity from God. 
•Revelation encounters man on the presupposition and in confirmation of the fact that man's 
attempts to know God from his own standpoint are wholly and entirely futile; not because of any 
necessity in principle, but because of a practical necessity of fact.'^^ Since revelation necessarily 
24. CDI.2, pp. 297 - 298. 
25. CDI.2, pp. 299 - 300. 
26. CDI.2, p. 300. Moreover, this starting point requires a tolerance which neither arises from a sloppy 
indifference toward religion, nor masks a condescending belief in one's superior knowledge or in one's 
religious scepticism. It demands one bom of humility. 'Self-evidently, this kind of tolerance, and therefore 
a theological consideration of religion, is possible only for tliose who are ready to abase themselves and 
their religion together with man, with every individual man, knowing that they first and their religion, 
have need of tolerance, a sffong forbearing tolerance.' CDI.2, p. 299. 
27. CDI.2, p. 301. 
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tells humanity someUiing completely new, any human attempt to speak of God which takes no 
account of God's revelation is unbelief. "From tiie standpoint of revelation religion is clearly seen to 
be a human attempt to anticipate what God in his revelation wills to do and does do. It is the 
attempted replacement of tiie divine work by a human manufacture. The divine reality offered and 
manifested to us in revelation is replaced by a concept of God arbitrarily and wilfully evolved by 
maa '^ Through religion humanity tries to replace what God offers in revelatioa 'In religion, man 
bolts and bars himself against revelation by providing a substitute, by taking away in advance Uie 
very thing which has to be given by God.'^' 
Not only is revelation extrinsic, but in tiie light of tiie human sinfulness just described, it is 
also utterly gracious. Here, Earth argues tiiat 'revelation is tiie act by which in grace He [God] 
reconciles man to Himself by grace,'^° and concludes tiiat revelation necessarily contradicts religion 
just as religion opposes revelation. 'For what is tiie purpose of the universal attempt of religions to 
anticipate our own images of the One who is known only where He gives Himself to be known, 
images which are first spirimal, and tiien religious, and then acttiaUy visible?'^' In revelation, God 
acts to save humanity; in religion humanity attempts to save itself. This is especially true of tiie 
'pious elements' in the various religions. 'It is tiie characteristically pious element in tiie pious effort 
to reconcile Him to us which must be an abomination to God, whetiier idolatry is regarded as its 
28. CDI.2, p. 302. 
29. CDI.2, p. 303. 
30. CDI.2, p. 307. He elaborates: 'Jesus Christ does not fill out and improve all the different attempts of 
man to think of God and to represent Him according to his own standard. But as the self-offering of and 
self-manifestation of God He replaces and completely outbids those attempts, putting them in the shadows 
to which they belong.... The revelation of God in Jesus Christ maintains that our justification and 
sancufication, our conversion and salvation, have been brought about and achieved once and for all in 
Jesus Christ. And our faith in Jesus Christ consists in recognising and admitting and affirming and 
accepting the fact that everyUiing has actually been done for us once and for all in Jesus Christ. He is the 
assistance that comes to us. He alone is the Word of God that is spoken to us. There is an exchange of 
status between Him and us: His righteousness and holiness are ours, our sin is His; He is lost for us, and we 
for His sake are saved. By this exchange... revelation stands or falls. It would not be the active, redemptive 
self-offering and self-manifestation of God, if it were not ccnually and decisively the satisfatio and 
iniercessio Jesu Christi.' p. 308. 
31. CDI.2, p. 308. 
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presupposition or its result or perhaps as both.'^^ For these reasons, wherever revelation graciously 
confrcffits religion, rehgion is revealed to be unbelief. 
These observations sharpen Uie question posed above to read, 'How can an historical, 
human religion become die vehicle for die revelation of God given that aU religion is unbelief?' 
Barth answers this question in the third section of the chapter by contending that 'we can speak of a 
"true" religion only in the sense in which we speak of a "justified sinner.'"^^ 
The abolishing of religion by revelation need not mean only its negation: the judgment 
that religion is unbelief. Religion can just as well be exalted in revelation, even though 
the judgment still stands. It can be upheld by it and concealed in it. It can be justified 
by it, and - we must at once add - sanctified. Revelation can adopt human religion and 
mark it off as true religion. And it not only can. How do we come to assert that it can, 
i f it has not aheady done so? There is a u^ ue religion: just as there are justified sinners. 
If we abide stricUy by that analogy - and we are dealing not merely with an analogy, but 
in a comprehensive sense with the thing itself - we need have no hesitation in saying 
that the Christian religion is the true religion.^" 
Before this contention can be explored further however, it must be made clear that Barth is 
neither assuming nor proving die superiority of die Christian religion. For as a religion, i t is also 
unbelief. 'We must insist, therefore, tiiat at die beginning of a knowledge of die trudi of die 
Christian religion, tiiere stands die recognition Uiat diis religion, too, stands under the judgment Uiat 
religion is unbelief, and that it is not acquitted by any inward worthiness, but only by die grace of 
God, proclaimed and effectual in His revelation.'^^ Christianity is also judged by revelation. 'It is 
the same self-exaltation of maa... But diis time it is in place of and in opposition to die self-
manifestation and self-offering of God,... it is in disregard of die divine consolations and 
admonitions Uiat great and small Babylonian towers are erected....'^* Yet i f the Christian religion is 
unbelief, wherein hes its truth? It ties, says Bardi, solely in its fourfold relationship to Jesus Christ. 
First, the relationship between Christianity and Christ is an act of divine creation: Christianity is 
32. CDI.2, p. 310. 
33. CDI.2, p. 325. 
34. CDI.2, p. 326. 
35. CDI.2, p. 327. 
36. CDI.2, p. 327. 
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grounded in tiie reality of Jesus Christ.^' Second, it is tiie result of divine election. Though tiie rise 
of Christianity may be attributed to many social, religious, and political factors. Earth says tiiese 
are secondary. The rise of Christianity results primarily from tiie gracious election of God in Jesus 
Christ.^^ Third, it is an act of divine justification. ' I f tiie Christian religion is tiie right and true 
religion, tiie reason for it does not reside in tiie facts which might point to itself or its own adherents, 
but in the fact which as tiie righteousness and tiie judgment of God confronts it as it does all other 
religions, characterising and differentiating it and not one of tiie otiiers as tiie right and true 
r e l i g i o a R a t i i e r , it 'is only as forgiveness tiiat tiie trutii adopts tiie Christian religioa It is only as 
forgiveness that it can be known as a definition which in tiie last resort is inalienably peculiar to tiie 
Christian religion.'^ Finally, it is an act of divine sanctification. Christianity's holiness and 
authority is always and only the holiness and autiiority of Jesus Christ. It is not justified because it 
is holy, but because it is justified, it becomes holy. And tiiis act of sanctifrcation takes place only as 
Christianity proclaims Jesus Christ."' Thus, Earth answers the question, 'How can an historical. 
37. CDI.2, p. 346. He writes. The Christian religion is the predicate to tiie subject of the name of Jesus 
Christ. Witiiout him it is not merely something different, it is nothing at all.... It was and is and shall be 
only in virtue of tiie act of creation indicated by this name. And it is because of this act of creation that 
along witii its existence it also receives its Uutii. Because it was and is and shall be through the name of 
Jesus Christ, it was and is and shall be the uiie religion.,..' p. 347. 
38. That it pleased God at tiiat time and place and in that way to reveal Himself in the name of Jesus 
Christ, is something which had its necessity in itself, and not in circumstances and conditions prior to that 
name. From tiiat day to this it is election by tiie free grace and compassion of God if in virtue of tiie name 
of Jesus Christ the Christian religion is a reality and noi a nothingness. As tiiere is a creatio continua so 
also there is an electio continua, better described, of course, as God's faitiifulness and patience.' CDI.2, p. 
349. 
39. CDI.2, pp. 353 - 354. 
40. CDI.2, pp. 354 - 355. He continues, 'It means tiiat tiie Christian religion is snatched from tiie world of 
religions and the judgment and sentence pronounced upon it, like a brand from the burning, l l is not that 
some men are vindicated as opposed to others, or one part of humanity as opposed to other parts of the 
same humanity. It is that God Himself is vindicated as opposed to and on behalf of all men and all 
humanity. That it can receive and accept tiiis is the advantage and pre-eminence of Christianity, and tiie 
light and glory in which its religion stands. And as it does not have tiiis light and glory of itself, no one 
can take it away from it. And it alone has the commission and the autiiority to be a missionary religion, 
i.e., to confront tiie world of religions as tiie one Uue religion, with absolute self-confidence to invite and 
challenge it to abandon its ways and to start on tiie Christian way.' CDI.2, pp. 356 - 357. 
41. The Christian religion is tiie sacramenuil area created by the Holy Spirit, in which the God whose 
Word became flesh continues to speak through the sign of His revelation. And it is also tiie existence of 
men created by the same Holy Spirit, who hear tiiis God continually speaking in His revelation. The 
Church and tiie children of God do actually exist. The actuality of tiicir existence is quite unassuming, but 
it is always visible and in its visibility it is significant. It is an actuality which is called and dedicated to the 
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human religion become die vehicle for die revelation of God given diat all religion is unbeUef?' quite 
simply: it is only through Uie creating, electing, justifying and sanctifying grace of God in Jesus 
Christ that this can and does occur. 
The phrase, 'Religion as Unbelief dius characterises what in Earth's view is die Divine "No' 
to human religioa Let us now briefly consider die Divine 'Yes' as it is found first in his doctrine of 
electioa As widi all his dieology. Earth's doctrine of election is Christocentric. In Jesus Christ, die 
elect one, God damns and elects all humanity: The rejection which all men incurred, die wradi of 
God under which all men Ue, die deadi which all men must die, God in his love for men transfers 
from all eternity to Him in whom He loves and elects diem, and whom He elects at dieir head and in 
their place."^^ Unlike traditional Reformed dieology, diere is no 'terrible decree' whereby God elects 
some to salvation, passing over the rest to His judgement.''^ Radier, in Christ, all humanity is at 
once damned and elect: 'in die election of Jesus Christ which is die eternal will of God, God has 
ascribed to man... election, salvation and life; and to Himself He has ascribed... reprobation, 
perdition and deadi'** As has been seen, Eardi maintains diat Christianity alone has die divine 
mandate to be a missionary religion.''^ He picks up diis dieme again when he writes diat, for 
Christians, trudi is not a possession but a vocation: 'The essence of dieir vocation is diat God makes 
them His wimesses."^ The Church is to proclaim to all that Jesus Christ has lived, died and hves 
again for diem, diat diey ab-eady stand in die hght of Hfe. 'In each and every man to whom it is 
directed it is concerned, not widi an acuial, but certainly widi a virtual or potential Christian, widi a 
christianus designatus, with a christianus in spe. It is concerned widi a creature ordained to know 
and realise Ms membership of die body of Christ.'^^ Whether or not diis amounts to a 
declaration of die name of Jesus Christ. And diat is die sancdficauon of die Christian religion.' CDI.2, p. 
359. 
42. CDII.2, p. 123. 
43. See, for example, John Calvin, Institutes of die Christian Religion, Volume 2, ed. John T. McNeill, 
trans. Ford Lewis Baldes, (Philadelphia: Wesmiinster, 1960), Book I I I , chapter 23, pp. 947 - 964. 
44. CDII.2, p. 167. 
45. CDI.2, p. 359. 
46. CDIV.3, p. 575. 
47. CDIV.3,p. 810. 
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Christocentric universahsm, Barth is quite clear diat humanity's unbehef is nulhfied by God's 
electioa"* 
Consider finally Bardi's view of extra-Christian revelation, or 'odier words' of God Once 
more, he opens die discussion widi a question: 'Are diere really due words, parables of die 
kingdom,... which are not spoken in die Bible or die Church, but which have to be regarded as true 
in relation to die one Word of God, and dierefore heard like diis Word, and togedier widi it[?]'^' 
His answer, quite simply, is yes: 'diere are such words and... [the Church] must hear diem too, 
notwidistanding its life by diis one Word and its commission to preach i t . ' ^ Of course, diese 
'words' stand in harmony widi die Word and it is by diis agreement diat diey are recognised. 
We do not refer to words which might tempt [die Church] irom its task or make it 
unwilling or incompetent to discharge it. We refer simply to Uiose which make it 
apparent diat die war in which it is engaged has already been fought to a finish by its 
Lord, diat die wodd in which it has to work has not been abandoned by Him..., dial [die 
world] is not wholly destitute of die Word which die community has been set among it 
to proclaim. We refer, then, to die words in which die community, when it hears diem, 
can find itself lightened, gladdened, and encouraged in die execution of its own task.'' 
Jesus Christ, who has reconciled die worid to God, can speak and has spoken 'parables of die 
Kingdom' not only dirough die Church, but dirough secularism and, by extrapolation, odier 
rehgions.^^ 
48. Bardi remained cryptic about die universal salvation implied by his docffine of election, saying only ' I 
do not teach it, but I also do not not teach it.' Quoted by Ebcrhard Jungel in Karl Bardi: A Theological 
Legacy, trans. Garrett E. Paul, (Philadelphia: Wesuninsier, 1986), pp. 44 - 45. For Bardi's direct 
statements on apokastasis and universalism, see CDII.2, pp. 417 - 418 and his The Humanity of God, 
trans. Thomas Wieser and John Thomas, (Richmond: John ICnox, 1970), pp. 61 - 62. To diis day, die 
question remains unsetded. For a universalist interpretation of Bardi see Hans Urs von Baldiasar, The 
Theologv of Karl Bardi. trans. John Drury, (New York, Chicago, San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1971), p. 163 and IVIichael Barnes, Chrisdan Identity and Religious Pluralism: Religions in 
Conversation. (Nashville: Abingdon, 1989), pp. 29 - 34. For a non-universalist interpretation, see John 
Colwell, "The Contemporaneity of die Divine Decision: Reflections on Bardi's Denial of "Universalism",' 
in Universalism and die Docffine of Hell, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron, (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1992), pp. 
139 - 160. 
49. CDIV.3, p. 114. 
50. CDIV.3,pp. 114- 115. 
51. CDIV.3, p. 115. 
52. CDIV.3, p. 117. 
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This is not to smuggle naniral tiieology into tiie Dogmatics for Eartii is adamant tiiat 'we 
have no need to appeal eitiier for basis or content to the sorry hypotiiesis of a so-called "natural 
tiieology".... Even i f tiiis were tiieologically meaningful or practicable (which it is not), i t could not 
provide us witii what is required.'^^ Uninterested in 'abstract impartations concerning God's 
existence... and man's responsibility towards Him,' which is at most all nauiral tiieology can 
accomplish, Earth remains estabUshed in 'the sure ground of Christology... and tiie Christian 
community established and living by tiie Gospel....'^ His thesis is 
simply tiiat tiie capacity of Jesus Christ to create these human wimesses is not resfficted 
to His working on and in prophets and what is thus made possible and actual in His 
community. His capacity uanscends the limits of this sphere. We may tiius expect, and 
count upon it, tiiat even among tiiose who are outside this sphere and its particular 
orders and conditions He wU use His capacity to make of men, quite apart from and 
even in face of their own knowledge or volition, sometiiing which tiiey could never be of 
tiiemselves, namely. His wimesscs, speaking words which can seriously be called true.^ ^ 
Earth's version of exclusivism can now be summarised as follows: First, it is 
epistemologically exclusive. The 'trutiis' of Religion, as human creations, are contradicted by the 
Trutii of God's revelation - Jesus Christ. Though there are true 'parables of tiie Kingdom' to be 
found in aU spheres of life including religions, tiiese can be recognised only by tiieu" harmony witii 
tiie threefold Word of God. Second, it is soteriologically inclusive. Al l humanity is caught up into 
God's salvation which has been accompUshed once and for aU in Jesus Christ. Moreover, tiiis 
salvation is realised despite any and all religion, uicluding Christianity. As J.A. Veitch has written, 
'In volume one the negative side of tiie dialectic (between Revelation and Religion) emerges as a 
dominant factor and in volume four tiie positive side emerges to redress tiie balance.'^ * Having 
completed tiie survey of Bartii, let us now move to Rahner and inclusivism. 
53. CDIV.3,p. 117. 
54. CDIV.3,p. 117. 
55. CDIV.3,p. 118. 
56. Veitch, 'Revclafion and Religion,' p. 20. 
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1.2 Inclusivism: Karl Rahner 
While inclusivism is by no means a solely Roman Catholic px)sition in tiieology of 
religicHis;^ ' since Vatican I I , it has dominated otiier positions in Roman Catiiolic tiiought.^^ 
Therefore, I have chosen tiie 'chief engineer'^' of tiie Coundl's position to represent inclusivism. In 
tiie following paragraphs, I consider Kari Rahner's 'Anonymous Christianity,' as developed 
57. It is also a tiieme in Protestant missiology. See, for instance, tiie classic exposition of mainsffeam 
Protestant inclusivism: John Farquhar, The Crown of Hinduism. (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint 
Corporation, 1971, [London: Oxford University Press, 1913]). Yet, inclusivist approaches are not limited 
to mainstteam Protestantism. Though evangelical Protestantism is often caricatured as the most exclusive 
of exclusivisms, inclusivism has been a recurring if minority position tiiroughout its history. It can be 
found in one of its earliest forms: Mctiiodism. See for example, John Wesley, 'On Living Without God,' in 
The Works of John Wesley, tiiird edition, 14 volumes (Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson, 1986), 
volume 7, p. 353; 'Walking by Sight and By Faith,' volume 7, p. 258; 'The General Spread of the Gospel,' 
volume 6, p. 286; 'On Faith,' volume 7, pp.197 - 199. A mid-twentietii century advocate was C.S. Lewis. 
See his God In tiie Dock, ed. Walter Hooper, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970), pp. 102, 111 - 112, 160; 
Mere Christianity. (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 54,65, 176. Lewis' inclusivism is also found in his 
Chronicles of Narnia. See especially The Last Battle. (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 143 - 148, 152 -
153. A contemporary exponent of evangelical inclusivism is Canadian theologian, Clark Pinnock. See, 
for example, 'Why is Jesus the Only Way?' Eternity, in December, 1976, pp. 14 - 15, 34; The Finality of 
Jesus Christ in a World of Religions,' in Christian Faith and Practice in the Modem World, ed. Mark Noll 
and David WeUs, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), pp. 152 - 168; 'Inclusive Finality or Universally 
Accessible Salvation,' paper presented at the 1989 annual meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society; 
Toward and Evangelical Theology of Religions,' in Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society. 33 
(1990), pp. 359 - 368; 'Acts 4:12: No Other Name under Heaven,' in Through No Fault of their Own? The 
Fate of those who Never Heard, ed. William V. Crockett and James G. Sigountos, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
1991), pp. 107 - 116; and A Wideness in God's Mercy: The Finality of Jesus Christ in a World of 
Religions. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992). 
58. For example, some Roman Catholic tiieologians lean toward exclusivism: for example Jean Danielou, 
'Religion and Revelation,' in Prayer as a Poliucal Problem. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967); Cardinal 
Joseph Ratzinger, 'ChrisUanity and tiie World Religions,' in One. Holy. Catholic, Apostolic, ed. H. 
Vorgrimler, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), pp. 297 - 336; and Hans Urs von Baltiiasar, 'Catiiolicism 
and tiie Religions,' in Communio. 5 (1978), pp. 6 - 14; while others advance a more pluralistic position: 
see Paul Knitter, No Otiier Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World Religions. 
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 1985), Part I I I , 'A More Authentic Dialogue,' pp. 169 - 232; Toward a Liberation 
Theology of Religions,' in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, 
ed. John Hick and Paul F. Knitter, (Maryknoil: Orbis, 1987), pp. 178 - 202; 'Hans Kung's Theological 
Rubicon,' in Toward a Universal Theology of Religion, ed. Leonard Swidler, (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1987); 
Leonard Swidler, 'Interreligious and Interideological Dialogue: The Mauix for all Systematic Reflection 
Today,' in Toward a Universal Theology of Religion, pp. 5 - 50; and Rosemary Radford Ruethcr, 
Feminism and Jewish-Christian Dialogue: Particularism and Universalism in the Search for Religious 
Truth,' in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, pp. 137 - 148 
59. B.R. Brinkman, Theology Present to Itself: A Tribute to Karl Rahner,' in The Heythrop Journal. 25 
(1984), p. 258. 
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diroughout his Theological Investigations, following an oudine based on 'Christianity and die Non-
Christian Religions,' and referring to odier essays where appropriate.** 
Before proceeding, however, I must unpack Rahner's notion of die 'supemamral 
existential,' a proper understanding of which is necessary for not only a correct interpretation of his 
dieology of religions, but his entire theological project. Offered as a mediating position between 
extremes he calls 'extiinsicism' (which holds diat divine self-communication imposes itself upon 
humans) and 'intrinsicism,' (which holds diat it arises nauirally widiin diem),^' die 'supemauiral 
existential' argues diat divine self-communication is bodi an act of free grace and a constitutive 
element in every person. Rahner dius affirms divine self-communication bodi as extrinsic (coming 
to humans from God and hence supernatural) and as intrinsic (a formative part of human nature 
and hence existential).^^, God's communication is a result of universal and prevenient grace.^ It is 
extended to all persons at all times in all places prior to any human activity. Consequendy, 
die religions which de facto do exist outside Christianity and die Old Testament are not 
merely die outcome of human speculation, human wickedness or a self-vtdlled decision 
on man's part to devise a religion for himself instead of accepting it from God. Instead 
of diis die "supernatural existential", die dynamic impulse present in man by die power 
of grace and impelling him towards die uiune God, is at work in all diese religions and 
plays a decisive part in determining die forms in which diese religions are objectively 
expressed.*^ 
60. See, Karl Rahner, 'Christianity and die Non-Chrisdan Religions,' in Theological Invesdgadons. 
Volume V, trans. Karl-H. Kruger, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966), pp. 115 - 134. Cited 
hereafter as TIV. 
61. For his attack on extrinsicism, see Karl Rahner, 'Nature and Grace,' in Theological Investigadons. 
Volume rv, trans. Kevin Smydi, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966), pp. 165 - 188. For his 
attack on intrinsicism, see KarlRahner, Hearers of die Word, trans. Michael Richards, (New York: Herder 
and Herder, 1969), pp. 112-114. 
62. For a full account of die 'supernatural existential,' see Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faidi: An 
Introduction to die Idea of Chrisdanity. trans. William V. Dych, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 
1978), chapter IV, 'Man as die Event of God's Free and Forgiving Self-Communicauon,' pp. 116 - 137; 
and especially IV.3, The Offer of Self-Communicauon as "Supernatural Existendal",' pp. 126 - 132. 
63. See Karl Rahner, 'Church. Churches and Religions.' in Theological Invesugadons. Volume X. trans. 
David Bourke, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973), p. 36 where Rahner writes, '"revelation 
history" is always and everywhere taking place because of God's act of supernatural self-bestowal 
considered as diat which raises and re-orientates die transcendental dimension of die human spirit by die 
power of grace....' Cited hereafter as TIX. 
64. T K , p. 46. 
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Widi diis in mind, let us now consider 'Anonymous Christianity.' 
For Rahner, reflection on religious plurahty is not only academic exercise; it is primarily a 
pastoral problem for four reasons. First, after two diousand years of Christian mission, different 
religions continue to exist.*^ Second, all religions today face die widespread and well-organised 
denial of religions in general. 'This denial, organised on die basis of a State, represents itself as the 
religion of the fumre - as the decided, absolute secularization of human existence excluding all 
mystery."^ Third, cultural interpeneu-ation, by bringing people of diverse religions togedier, has 
made religious plurality an existential question not only for dieologians, but for everyone .The 
most provocative reason, however, lies in the very nature of Christianity. "For no odier religion -
not even Islam - maintains so absolutely diat it is the religion, die one and only valid revelation of 
die one living God as does die Christian religion.'^ 
While Rahner admits diat such reflection could be undertaken in a variety of disciplines, 
from many different angles, he cleariy sets forth a 'Catholic dogmatic interpretation of die non-
Christian religions,' and continues, 'we wi l l pose our question not as empirical historians of religion 
but out of die self-understanding of Christianity itself, i.e. as dogmatic dieologians.'* Having dius 
articulated his starting-point, he dien oudines four dieses wherein he argues diat it is indeed 
possible to suppose diat God is savingly present in die non-Christian religions. 
65. TIV, p. 116. See also 'Anonymous Christians,' in Theological Investigauons. Volume VI , trans. Karl-
H. and Boniface Kruger, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1969), p. 390. Cited hereafter as TJVI. 
66. I I V , p . 116. 
67. TIV, pp. 116-117; see also TIX, p. 30. 
68. TIV,p . 116. 
69. TIV, pp. 117 - 118. See also 'Jesus Christ in die Non-Chrisuan Religions,' in Theological 
Investigations. Volume XVII , trans. Margaret Kohl, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1981), p. 39; 
and also TIX, p. 32 where Rahncr writes, 'what we arc looking for, dicrefore, is an answer which we 
cannot, in any sense, attempt to find a basis for in die history or philosophy of religion, or from some 
position in which we remain uncommitted to the creed of a specific religion. On die contrary, we are 
seeking for an answer which die Cadiolic Christian must give on die basis of his own Christianity and 
according to die principles proper to diis.' 
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The first tiiesis states tiiat 'Christianity understands itself as the absolute religion, intended 
for all men, which cannot recognise any otiier religion beside itself as of equal right.'™ This is self-
evident and basic to Christianity's self-understanding; it is to be asserted, not argued 
Valid and lawful religion for Christianity is... God's action on men, God's free self-
revelation by communicating himself to man. It is God's relationship to men, freely 
instituted by God himself and revealed by God in this institution. This relationship of 
God to man is basically the same for all men, because it rests on tiie Incarnation, deatii 
and resurrection of tiie one Word of God become flesh. Christianity is God's own 
interpretation in his Word of this relationship of God to man founded in Christ by God 
himself." 
This immediately raises tiie problem of history for Christianity 'has not always and 
everywhere been the way of salvation for men - at least not in its historically tangible ecclesio-
sociological constitution and in tiie reflex fruition of God's saving activity in, and in view of, tiie 
Cross.'^ From tiiis it follows that Christianity must confront individuals in an historical way, 
facing tiiem as the absolute and final religion. 'It is tiierefore a question of whetiier tiiis moment 
when tiie existentially real demand is made by tiie absolute religion in its historically tangible fomi, 
takes place really at tiie same chronological moment for all men, or whetiier tiie occurrence of tiiis 
moment has itself a history and tiius is not chronologically simultaneous for all men, cultures and 
spaces of history.''^ According to tiie former view, the validity of Judaism, and hence all religions, 
was abolished by the aposties' preaching after Pentecost, while tiie latter holds tiiat Christianity 
abolishes a religion only when it becomes 'a real historical factor in an individual history and 
culture - a real historical moment in a particular culttire,''" Though Rahner does not show the 
former to be inadequate, he believes the latter better 'corresponds to tiie real historicity of 
Christianity and salvation-history.'^^ 
70. H V , p. 118. See also TIVI , p. 390; TIX, p. 31 and pp. 40 - 41 where Rahner writes, The Catholic 
Church cannot tiiink of herself as one among many historical manifestations in which the one and the 
same God-man Jesus Christ is made present, which are offered by God to man for him to choose whatever 
he likes. On tiie conu-ary she must necessarily tiiink of herself as the one total presence in history of the 
one God-man in his uuth and grace, and as such as having a fundamental relationship to all men.' 
71. TIV,p. 118. 
72. U V , p. 118. 
73. U V , p. 119. 
74. TIV,p. 119. 
75. TIV, p. 120; see also H X , p. 48. 
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This leads him to qualify die first diesis in the following way: 'we maintain positively only 
that, as regards destination, Christianity is die absolute and hence the only religion for all mea We 
leave it, however, an open question (at least in principle) at what exact point in time die absolute 
obligation of die Christian religion has in fact come into effect for every man and culmre, even in 
the sense of die objective obligation of such a demand.''*' h i so doing, he introduces die second: 
Until the moment when die gospel really enters into die historical situation of an individual, a 
non-Christian religion... does not merely contain elements of a natural knowledge of God, 
elements, moreover, mixed up widi human depravity which is die result of original sin and later 
aberrations. It contains also supernatural elements arising out of die grace which is given to men 
as a gratuitous gift on account of Christ. For diis reason a non-Christian religion can be 
recognized as a lanfiil religion (aldiough only in different degrees) widiout diereby denying die 
error and depravity contained in it.^' 
Thus, a non-Christian religion is valid only until Christianity becomes a real historical factor in an 
individual history or culUire. Again, though the question of chronology remains open, this thesis 
points toward die view diat Christianity becomes absolute only when it confronts specific histories, 
cultures, and peoples at specific times, in specific places. 
h i so arguing, Rahner implies 'that it is a priori quite possible to suppose diat diere are 
supernatural, grace-filled elements in non-Christian rcMgions.'^ ^ This, however, is not to say, first 
of aU, diat the various conceptions of die Ultimate, ediics and metaphysics found in die religions 
'may be treated as harmless eidier in dieory or in practice.'^' Moreover, because die implication is 
not concerned widi an a posteriori history of religions, neidier does it mean diat one can discern 
between diose aspects in die various religions which are willed by God and diose which are not. 
'We are here concerned widi dogmatic dicology and so can merely repeat die universal and 
tmquaMed verdict as to die unlawfulness of die non-Christian religions right from die moment 
76. TIV, p. 120. Still, 'It can and must be said diat diese non-Christian religions are in principle, and in 
themselves, overtaken and rendered obsolete by the coming of Christ and by his death and resurrecuon.... 
This means diat die historical expansion of Christianity, which even today has not yet simply been 
concluded, coincides widi a progressive abrogation of die legitimacy of diese religions.' TIX, p. 47. 
77. U V , p. 121. 
78. TIV, p. 121. . 
79. TIV,p . 122. 
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when" tiiey came into real and historically powerful contact witii Christianity.'^ In tiiis tiiesis, 
Rahner simply asserts tiiat God's grace is active in tiie non-Christian religions. 
His reasons for doing so rest 'ultimately on tiie fact tiiat, if we wish to be Christians, we 
must profess belief in tiie universal and serious salvific purpose of God towards all men which is 
true even witiiin the post-paradisean phase of salvation dominated by original sin.'^' Yet tiiis fact 
cannot stand alone for Christians must also affirm tiiat 'tiiis salvation willed by God is the salvation 
•won by Christ.'^ It is tiie dynamic tension created by tiiese two prima facie opposing beliefs which 
leads Rahner to tiie above implication for 'tiiese two aspects cannot be reconciled in any otiier way 
then [sic] by stating tiiat every human being is really and truly exposed to tiie influence of divine, 
supernatural grace which offers an interior union witii God and by means of which God 
communicates himself whetiier tiie individual takes up an attitude of acceptance or of refusal 
towards tiiis grace.'^ 
Furthermore, it is botii cruel to suppose tiiat tiie millions of human beings living in exu-a-
Christian history are so sinful tiiat tiie offer of grace should be withheld from them and callous to 
tiiink tiiat grace is extended, but remains ineffective.^ 'For as far as the gospel is concerned, we 
80. H V , p. 122. 
81. TIV,p. 122 (my emphasis); see also I K , p. 33. 
82. TIV, p. 122 (my emphasis); see also 'Jesus Christ in the Non-Christian Religions,' and TIX, pp. 38 -
39 whae Rahner writes, 'we do not intend to assert tiiat tiie salvation history and revelation history of God 
is identical witii tiiat particular area in tiie religious history of mankind which is confined to the Old and 
tiie New Testaments or to tiiose who have had an explicit faith in Jesus Christ.... [We intend to say] tiiat 
tiie whole salvation history and revelation history of mankind is coexistent with tiie history of mankind as 
personal and spiritual and witii all that is morally good in tiiis. And inasmuch as it is coexistent in this 
sense witii the history of the human spirit tiie whole of it is sustained in being by tiiai u-anscendcntal sclf-
besiowal of God which is grace-given and which finds its supreme and irreversible manifestation in 
history, and the same time its free acceptance on the part of humanity, in tiie God-man Jesus Christ.... The 
God-man, tiien, is tiie supreme and climactic point in God's bestowing of himself upon mankind, such tiiat 
he supplies meaning to tiie whole of tiiis divine self-bestowal right from its incepuon.... [To] postulate a 
salvation and revelation history of tiiis kind is no sense to deny tiie absolute character of Christ himself, of 
Christianity as an explicit faith, or of tiie Church as tiie visible expression of the abiding presence of 
Christ.' 
83. TIV,p. 123.SeealsoI]VI,p.391;IIX,p.31. 
84. TIVI, p. 391. 
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have no really conclusive reason for diinking so pessimistically of men.'*^ On die odier hand. 
Christians have every reason to be optimistic about die salvific vvill of God: 
However litde we can say m\h certitude about die final lot of an individual inside or 
outside the officially constituted Christian religion, we have every reason to think 
optimistically - i.e. truly hopefully and confidendy in a Christian sense - of God who has 
certainly the last word and who has revealed to us that he has spoken his powerful word 
of reconciliation and forgiveness into the world.... Christ and his salvation are not 
simply one of two possibilities offering diemselves to man's free choice; they are the 
deed of God which bursts open and redeems die false choice of man by overtaking it. In 
Christ God not only gives die possibility of salvation, which in diat case would still have 
to be effected by man himself, but die actual salvation itself, however much diis includes 
also die right decision of human freedom which is itself a gift from God. Where sin 
afready existed, grace came in superabundance. And hence we have every right to 
suppose diat grace has not only been offered even outside die Christian Church... but 
also diat, in a great many cases at least, grace gains die victory in man's free acceptance 
of it.** 
On diis basis, Rahner concludes diat grace is at work and is being accepted 'in die spiritual, 
personal life of the individual, no mader how primitive, unenhghtened, apadietic and earth-bound 
such a Mfe may at first sight appear to be.'" I f Christians truly believe in die universal salvific will 
of God and that this salvation was won by Christ, 'it need not and cannot really be doubted diat 
gratuitous influences of property Christian supernatural grace are conceivable in die life of all 
mea.. and diat diese influences can be presumed to be accepted in spite of die sinful state of men 
and in spite of dieir apparent estrangement from God.'^* 
From here, Rahner's second diesis goes on to imply diat 'die actual religions of "pre-
Christian" humanity too must not be regarded as simply illegitimate from die very start, but must 
also be seen as quite capable of having a positive significance.'^' h i differing ways and to varying 
degrees, non-Christian religions are lawful reli^ons; dieir use by people at certain points in time 
'can be regarded on die whole as a positive means of gaining die right relationship to God and dius 
for attaining salvation, a means which is dierefore positively mcludcd in God's plan of salvation.''" 
85. TIV, p. 123. 
86. TTV, pp. 123- 124. 
87. TIV, p. 125. 
88. H V , p. 125. 
89. TIV, p. 125. 
90. TIV, p. 125. 
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The prime example of tiiis implication for Rahner is tiie Old Covenant, which, despite its mixttire of 
God-wiUed and corrupt elements, was 'wtiled by God, providential for tiie Israelites and indeed tiie 
lawful religion for them.'" Consequentiy, one can assume neitiier tiiat a lawful religion must be 
free from corruption or aU-too-human elements, nor tiiat it contains criteria which would enable one 
to discern tiiose elements which are God-willed from tiiose which are not. 'We must tiierefore rid 
ourselves of tiie prejudice that we can face a non-Christian religion witii tiie dilemma tiiat it must 
eitiier come from God in everything it contains and tiius correspond to God's will and positive 
providence, or be simply a purely human construction.''^ I f God's grace is active in all aspects of 
his creation, i f i t is active in a supematurally existential way in human life, tiien it will inevitably 
become a 'formative factor of life in tiie concrete, even where... tiiis fife turns the relationship to the 
absolute into an explicit tiieme, viz. in religion.''^ 
Furthermore, it must be possible for every individual in tiiis life to partake in a saving 
relationship witi i God; otiierwise, one cannot say tiiat God's salvific wUl is universal ui scope. And 
the social namre of humanity leads Rahncr to conclude tiiat human beings will rarely, i f ever, enter 
into tiiis relationship in an entirely interior and private manner. On tiie contrary people will do so 
through tiie religious environment in which tiiey find themselves. 
If man had to be and could always and everywhere be a homo religiosus in order to save 
himself as such, tiien he was this homo religiosus in the concrete religion in which 
"people" lived and had to live at that time. He could not escape this religion, however 
much he may have and did take up a critical and selective attitude towards tiiis religion 
on individual matters, and however much he may have and did put different stresses in 
practice on certain tilings which were at variance with the official theory of his religion. 
If, however, man can alwa>'S have a positive, saving relauonship to God, and if he 
always had to have it, tiien he has always had it witiiin that religion which in practice 
was at his disposal by being a factor in his sphere of existence.'" 
In stmimary, tiie second tiiesis may be stated as follows: Fu-st, i f grace is active in tiie 
worid generally and in tiie lives of human beings specifically, then it will be present when tiiese 
human beings turn tiieu- tiioughts toward tiie absolute, i.e. in tiieir religions. Accordingly, human 
91. H V , p. 127. 
92. U V , p. 127. 
93. TIV,p. 127. 
94. TIV,p . 128. 
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beings who encounter and employ these gracious elements in their religions can and do enter into a 
saving relationship with God. This means neither that all elements of a religion are lawful nor that 
every religion is lawful. It especially does not mean that the Old Covenant is not somehow unique 
as the historical predecessor to the New, but that like all religions, it is a mixture of divine and 
human elements. The thesis states simply that 'by the fact that in practice man as he really is can 
live... [in] relationship to God only in society, man must have had the right and indeed the duty to 
live this relationship to God within the religious and social realities offered to him in his particular 
historical situation.''^ 
I f this is correct, then Rahner's third thesis logically follows. He writes, 'Christianity does 
not simply confixjnt the member of an extra-Christian religion as a mere non-Christian but as 
someone who can and must already be regarded in this or that respect as an anonymous 
Christian.'^ The non-Christian is not someone in whose life grace has not been active. On the 
contrary, grace, 'understood as the a priori horizon of aU his spiritual acts, accompanies his 
consciousness subjectively, even though it is not known objectively.''^ Therefore, when the 
Christian revelation comes through proclamation, it does not come as something absolutely 
unknowa Though this thesis cannot be formulated dogmatically, Rahner believes that 
if it is true that a person who becomes the object of the Church's missionary efforts is or 
may be already someone on the way towards his salvation, and someone who in certain 
95. HV, p. 131. 
96. TIV, p. 131 (my emphasis). See also 'Observations on the Problem of Anonymous Christianity,' in 
Theological Investigations. Volume XIV, trans. David Bourke, (London: Darion, Longman and Todd, 
1976), pp. 280 - 294 and TIVI, p. 391 where he writes, 'But this means in its turn that there must be 
degrees of membership of the Church, not only in ascending order from being baptised, through the 
acceptance of the fullness of the Christian faith and the recognition of the visible head of the Church, to the 
living community of the Eucharist, indeed to the realisation of holiness, but also in descending order from 
the explicimess of baptism into a non-ofTicial and anonymous Christianity which can and should be called 
Christianity in a meaningful sense, even though it cannot and would not describe itself as such.' It must 
also be noted that while Rahner did not particularly like the term 'anonymous Christianity,' because of its 
often and all-too-easy misinterpretation, he failed to find a better one. In an effort to avoid fiirther 
misunderstanding, he offers this definition: 'anonymous Christianity' and 'anonymous Christians' 'signify 
nothing else than the fact that according to the docffine of the Church herself an individual can already be 
in possession of sanctifying grace, can in other words be justified and sanctified, a child of God, an heir lo 
heaven, positively orientated by grace towards his supernatural and eternal salvation even before he has 
explicitiy embraced a credal statement of the Christian faith and been baptized,' in 'Anon>'mous 
Christianity and the Missionary Task of the Church,' in Theological Investigations. Volume XII, ffans. 
David Bourke, (London: Darion, Longman and Todd, 1974), p. 165. Cited hereafter as TTXIl. 
97. I I V , p . 13I;seealsoIIVI,pp.392-394. 
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circumstances finds it, wiihoui being reached by ihe proclamaiion of the Church's 
message - and if it is at the same time true that this salvation which reaches him in this 
way is Christ's salvation, since there is no other salvation - then it is possible to be not 
only an anonymous theist but also an anonymous Christian.'* 
In this way, the proclamation of the gospel may be seen as the vehicle which brings the anonymous 
Christian to explicit Christianity and into its socially constituted form, the Church. Hence, 
anonymous Christianity is part of Christian development, is thus willed by God, and does not 
render the proclamation of the gospel and the missionary work of the church superfluous.^ It is 
simply a reminder that God's grace goes before all mission and evangelism."* 
So, on the one hand religious plurality persists (and there is no reason to assume after two 
thousand years of Christian mission that it will not), and on the other, Christianity can and should 
continue seek converts through mission (as Rahncr implies in his third thesis). The tension thus 
created gives rise to his fourth and final thesis: 'If both these statements are true, then the Church 
wiU not so much regard herself today as the exclusive community of those who have a claim to 
salvation but rather as the historically tangible vanguard and the historically and socially 
constituted explicit expression of what the Christian hopes is present as a hidden reality even 
98. TIV, p. 132; see also 'Anonymous and Explicit Faith,' in Theological Investigations, trans. David 
Morland, O.S.B., (London: Darion, Longman and Todd, 1979), pp. 52 - 59. The title 'anonymous theist,' 
and even 'anonymous Christian,' may be extended not only to the religious person who has responded to 
God's grace as it is active in his or her religion, but also to the 'non-culpable atheist' who re.sponds to God's 
grace by making moral decisions foIlov»ang the dictates of his or her conscience. See 'Atheism and Implicit 
Christianity,' in Theological Investij;ations. Volume IX, trans. Graham Harrison, (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1972), pp. 145 - 164; see alsoTIXII, p. 167. 
99. See TIVI, p. 396 - 397, where Rahner writes, 'Knowledge about the anonymous Christian does not in 
any way dispense [a Christian] from caring and troubling about those who do not yet know the one 
necessary truth in its explicit affirmation in the gospel message. But this knowledge will keep him from 
panic and will give him the strength to practice that patience which - according to the Lord's saying -
brings salvation to life, his own as much as that of his brother.... It would be quite foolish to think that this 
talk about "anonymous Christianity" must lessen the importance of mission, preaching, the Word of God, 
baptising and so on. Anyone who wants to interpret our remarks about anonymous Christianity in this 
way, has not merely fundamentally misunderstood them, but has not read our exposition of them with 
sufficient attention.'; and TIXII, p. 161 where he continues, 'In speaking of the universal missionary task of 
the Church as a right and a duty of the Church herself this is taken to include the basic duly of every man 
to become a Christian in an explicitly ecclesiastical form of Christianity, because it is quite impossible to 
separate these two entities from one another.' Indeed, we surely say that in order to be possible or to have 
any hope of success missionary preaching nccessiirily presupposes that which we may call by the name 
anonymous Christianity or some other name.' TIXII, p. 169. 
100. UVI , p. 395 - 397. 
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outside the Church.''"' In other words, Christians must work and pray to unite the human race in 
one Church while expecting plurabty to continue. 
This plurality entails that die Church must always expect and be prepared to face 
opposition. Though it may vary in degree from time to time and from place to place, there is every 
reason to believe that opposition to Christianity will persist until die eschaton. 
• If this Christianity, thus always faced with opposition and unable to expect seriously that 
.this will ever cease, nevertheless believes in God's universal salvific will - in other 
words, believes that God can be victorious by his secret grace even where the Church 
does not win the victory but is conu-adictcd - then this Church cannot feel herself to be 
just one dialectic moment in the whole of history but has already overcome this 
opposition by her faith, hope and charity. In other words, the others who oppose her are 
merely those who have not yet recognized what they nevertheless really already are (or 
can be) even when, on the surface of existence, they really are in opposition; they are 
already anonymous Christians, and the Church is not the communion of those who 
possess God's grace as opposed to those who lack it, but the communion of those who 
can explicitiy confess what they and the others hope lo be. Non-Christians may think it 
presumption for the Christian to judge everything which is sound or restored (by being 
sanctified) to be the fruit in every man of the grace of his Christ, and to interpret it as 
anonymous Christianity, they may think it presumption for the Christian to regard the 
non-Christian as a Christian who has not yet come to himself reflectively. But the 
Christian cannot renounce this "presumption" which is really the source of the greatest 
humility both for himself and for the Church. For it is a profound admission of the fact 
that God is greater than man and the Church. The Church will go out to meet the non-
Christian of tomorrow with the attitude expressed by St. Paul when he said: What 
therefore you do not know and yet worship (and yet worshipl) that I proclaim to you (Ac 
17.23). On such a basis one can be tolerant, humble and yet firm towards all non-
Christian religions.'"^ 
In summary, Rahner's inclusivLsm prima facie resembles Bartii's exclusivism in two 
important ways: they are botii epistemologically exclusive and soteriologically inclusive. This is 
not to say, however, that they are identical; upon closer inspection, important episiemological and 
soteriological differences are revealed. Earth's epistemology is grounded (to use his terminology) in 
the revelation of the Word of God, Jesus Christ while Rahner's is rooted in dogmatic Roman 
Catiiolicism, which is to say Scripture as it has been inteipretcd by tiie Magisterium. So, while 
tiiey are botii confessional, their 'Confessions' differ. Also, Earth's soteriology rejects religions as 
playing any role in salvation; God Uirough Christ saves apart from any and aO human religion. 
101. mp-133. 
102. TIV, p. 134. Rahner is also quite clear that the docuine should not be seen as anything more than a 
peripheral one. See TIVI, pp. 396 - 397. 
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Rahner, on the other hand stresses that while salvation is indeed foimd only in God through Christ, 
it is mediated through socially constituted forms: explicitly in Christianity and anonymously 
through other religions. Whereas in Earth, God saves despite other religions, with Rahner, God 
saves through other religions. With our survey of inclusivism thus concluded, let us move finally 
to the pluralist hypothesis and its representative, John Hick. 
1_3 Pluralism: John Hick 
John Hick's contribution to the philosophy and theology of religions generally and to the 
question of religious pluralism specifically cannot be overestimated. Paul Knitter does not 
exaggerate when he writes that 'Hick is the most radical, the best known, and therefore the most 
controversial of the proponents of a theocentric model for Christian approaches to other 
religions.''"' Yet, his contribution did not develop in a theological vacuum: though his most 
contemporary influence is Islamicist, Wilfred Cantwell Smith,'°^ Hick's ideas are heirs of a liberal 
Protestant tradition descending from Smith, through Otto's and Hocking's concept of common 
mystical essence, Trocltsch's idea of historical relativity, to Schleiermacher's analysis of human 
subjectivity."*^ It is important also to note that Hick's preoccupation with pluralism is existential: 
personal experience is the motivation behind his academic interest.'"^ Unfortunately, space 
103. Paul F. Knitter, No Other Name?, p. 147. 
104. Wilfred Cantwell Smith's enormous bibliography cannot be listed exhaustively here. His more 
important works include: The Meaning and End of Religion. (New York: Macmillan, 1964); The Faith of 
Other Men. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972); Religious Diversity: Essays by Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith, ed., Willard G. Oxoby, (New York: Harper and Row, 1976); and Towards A World Theology. 
(London: Macmillan, 1980). 
105. See Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the 
Divine and its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W. Harvey, (Hammondsworlh: Penguin Books, 1959 
[1917]); William Hocking, Living Religions and a World Faith. (New York: Macmillan, 1940), Rg: 
thinking Missions: A Layman's Inquiry after One Hundred Years. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1932), and The Meaning of God in Human Experience: A Philsophic Study of Religion. (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1912); Ernst Troellsch, The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of 
Religions. (Richmond: John Knox, 1971), esp. chapters 3 and 4, Christian Thought: Its History and 
Application. (London: University of London Press, 1923), 'The Place of Christianity among the World 
Religions,' in Christianity and Other Religions. John Hick and Brian Hebbclthwaiie, eds., (Philadelphia: 
Forffess, 1980), pp. 11 - 31; and Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Critics, 
frans. Terrence N. Tice, (Richmond: John Knox, 1969), The Christian Faith, second edition, u-ans. HR 
Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart, (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1928). 
106. Good summaries of Hick's existential encounter with pluralism can be found in biographical 
accounts in a number of his writings. See for example, John Hick, God Has Many Names. (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1982) chapter 1, cited hereafter as GMN; Di.sputed Ouestions in Theology and the 
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prohibits further exploration of tiiese interesting contextual avenues. I must tiierefore hmit my 
exposition to two areas: the philosophical foundation for his plurahst hypoUiesis and the hypotiiesis 
itself.^ '^  
Hick's philosophical foundation is threefold, comprising arguments for die 'post-axial' 
nature of religions, the 'religiously ambiguous' nature of Uie universe, and the rationality of religious 
belief. The first divides the reUgious history of humankind into 'pre-axial,' 'axial' and 'post-axial' 
ages.'"' Pre-axial religion was cyclical, its goal being to preserve order and prevent change."" 
This structure of human religious life altered during 'die axial age.' During die centuries between 
Philosophy of Religion. (London: Macmillan, 1993), chapter 8, cited hereafter as DQ; and 'A Pluralist 
View,' in More Than One Wav? Four Views on Salvation in A Pluralistic World, ed. Dennis L. Okholm 
and Timothy R. Phillips, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1995). Hick's biography is summarised in chapter 2. 
Without a doubt, though, the most thorough correlation of Hick's personal background with his pluralist 
hypodiesis is Gavin D'Costa's John Hick's Theology of Religions: A Critical Evaluation. (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1987), chapter I . 
107. By placing Hick in his theological context, one understands that he is a very specific type of pluralist. 
His pluralism is, in the words of S. Mark Heim, 'a metatheory of religious reality and experience, an idea 
of what is behind all the conditional forms of particular traditions and individuals.' This pluralism is most 
unlike the approach of, for instance, Raimon Panikkar. His pluralism, if it can truly be called that, is 
rooted in an 'absolute human inability to form adequate concepts of the divine.... The difference between 
these two,' Heim argues, 'is the difference between those who know the religious object is equally well 
expressed in the various faiths and those who assert that the religious object is so utterly unknowable that 
we have no grounds for preferring one inadequate description to another.' Hick is also distinct from those 
pluralists who 'conclude that appropriate judgments about various forms of faith can be made only on the 
basis of their historical and social effects.' S. Mark Hcim, 'Criscrossing the Rubicon: Reconsidering 
Religious Pluralism,' in The Christian Century. 108 (1991), pp. 688 - 689. See also Raimon Panikkar, 
"The Jordan, The Tiber and the Ganges: Three Kairological Moments of Christie Self-Consciousness,' in 
The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluaralistic Theology of Religions, ed. John Hick and Paul 
Knitter, (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1987), pp. 89 -116; and his The Unknown Christ of Hinduism, second edition, 
(London: SCM, 1981); Rosemary Radford Ruether, Teminism and Jewish Christian Dialogue: 
Particularism and Universalism in the Search for Religious Truth;' Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, 'In Search of 
Justice: Religious Pluralism from a Feminist Perspective;' Aloysius Pieris, S.J., The Buddha and the 
Christ: Mediators of Liberation;' and Paul F. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions.' All are 
found in Part HI of The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, pp. 137 - 201. • -
108. In what follows, I shall parallel the structure of Hick's magnum opus, An Interpretation of Religion: 
Human Responses to the Transcendent. (London: Macmillan, 1988), cited hereafter as lOR. 
109. lOR, pp. 21 - 69; GMN, pp. 40 - 59. This division is not unique, but draws explicitiy from Karl 
Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, uans. Michael Bullock, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1953) and Trevor Ling, A History of Religion East and West: An Inuoduction and Interpretation. 
(London: Macmillan, 1968). 
110. IQR, pp. 23-28. 
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800 and 200 BCE, 'significant human individuals appeared through whose insights - though always 
within the existing setting of their own culture - human awareness was immensely enlarged and 
developed, and a movement began from archaic religion to die religions of salvation or 
liberation.'"' Following \hds era of intense innovation, die religious life of humanity settled into its 
present 'post-axial' form. 
The post-axial religions - the great worid religions of today - agree diat somediing is 
fundamentally wrong witii humanity and aim to correct it by offering 'salvation/liberation' to their 
adherents."^ While die religions advance diverse models of 'salvation/Uberation,' Hick maintains 
that they 
are variations within different conceptual schemes on a single fundamental theme: the 
sudden or gradual change of the individual from an absorbing self-concern to a new 
centring in the supposed uniiy-of-rcality-and-value that is thought of as God, Brahman, 
die Dharma, Sunyata or the Tao... [or] the gradual uansformalion of human existence 
from self-cenuedncss toReality-cenuedness."^ 
The post-axial religions tiius embody 'cosmic optimism' which 'affirms die ultimate goodness from 
our human point of view, or to-be-rejoiced-in character, of die uraverse.'"" Though it expresses a 
111. lOR, p. 29. The obvious exceptions to this argument are Jesus and Muhammad (!). According to 
Hick, these exceptions stand in the tradition of the axial Semitic prophets who brought Judaism from its 
pre-axial existence into its post-axial present form, p. 31. 
112. lOR, p. 32; 36 - 55. 
113. lOR, p. 36. In Hindu religions, 'spiritual liberation requires a uanscending of die ego either (in the 
dualist sffands) in self-giving to the divine head, die Supreme Person, or (in the monist suand) in union 
with the ultimate transpersonal Absolute.' On the other hand, the Buddhist faiths express it through the 
docffine of 'no-self,' wherein 'the salvific human u-ansformation is understood as liberation from the 
powerfiil illusion of "me" or "self'.' For Jews, 'salvation/liberation is a corporate historical hope finding 
expression in messianic expectation and Jewish apocalyptic. And for Muslims 'salvation/liberation' is 
equated with being in the state of islam - complete submission to God. In conuasi, the official Christian 
view of salvation sees die transformation from self-cenuedness as 'a result of salvation rather than as itself 
constituting salvation.' Hick believes this results from the juridical theory of atonement advanced by St. 
Paul which is absent both from die teachings of Jesus and the practical life of Christians. He wiles, 'Both 
in die teachings of Jesus... and in die practical consciousness of Christians die reality of salvation is the 
transition from ego-domination to a radically God-ccnu-ed life. The function of the ofiicial theories of 
salvation according to which Jesus' deadi constituted an atonement for human sin, has been to provide a 
dieoretical framework widiin which to understand diis profound consciousness. But the reality of 
Christian salvation is no juridical absuaction but an actual concrete change from sinfiil seif-cencredness to 
self-giving love in response to die divine grace.' He argues diat Christian mystics better articulate die 
Christian expression of salvation/liberation. lOR, pp. 37,41,47 - 48,49 - 50,44,45 - 46. 
114. lOR, p. 56. 
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'widespread sense of hollowness, transitoriness and unsatisfactoriness of ordinary human 
existaice,'"^ cosmic optimism presents a hmitiessly better alternative on the basis of experiential 
insights of die great reUgious figures and traces a paUi to its reahsation. 'And so die cosmic 
optimism of the post-axial reUgions is a vision of the ultimately benign character of die universe as 
it affects human beings, and an anticipation in faidi diat die limiUessly good possibiUties will be 
finaUy reahsed.'"* Thus, 
whedier conceived as a fulfilment or enlightenment attained through a long 
development, or as a sudden completion bestowed by divine grace or by final self-
discovery, die religious n-aditions point to an ultimate state which is 'no longer a waiting 
for being' and which imparts to our present existence die positive character of 
movement towards a final fulfilment - whedier in time or beyond time - which gives 
value and purpose to die hard pilgrimage of samsaric existence."^ 
In summary then, die great religions as tiiey now exist are 'post-axial' in character. They present 
humanity as fundamentally flawed by self-ccniredness and offer 'salvation/liberation' diat is, die 
move from self-centredness to Reality-centredness, to Oicir adherents; this focus salvation embodies 
a cosmic optimism which affirms die ultimately benign nahire of die universe. 
Hick's second argument seeks lo show diat die universe may rationaUy be interpreted eidier 
religiously or naturalisticaUy, dieistically or adicistically, 'by showing die inconclusiveness of die 
various philosophical arguments' for and against die existence of God."* Both types of argument 
are indecisive for 'die special evidences to which dicy appeal are also capable of being understood 
in tenms of the contrary woridview.'"' After an extensive examination of various tiieistic and 
adieistic proposals,'^ " Hick concludes 
It seems, then, that the universe maintains its inscrutable ambiguity. In some aspects it 
invites whilst in odiers it repels a religious response. It permits both a religious and 
naturalistic faith, but haunted in each case by a conffary possibility dial can never be 
exorcised. Any realistic analysis of religious belief and experience, and realistic defence 
115. lOR. p. 57. 
116. lOR. p. 57. 
117. I0R.p.61. 
118. IOR,p. 12. 
119. IOR,p. 12. 
120. lOR, pp. 75 - 124. 
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of die rationality of religious conviction, must dicrefore start from diis situation of 
systematic ambiguity.'^ ' 
The ambiguous nature of die universe does not imply, however, dial religious belief stems 
from an arbitrary choice between opposed interpretations; die decisive element is die phenomenon 
of religious experience. This introduces Hick's diird argument: diat it is rational to trust religious 
experience and to interpret the universe religiously on this basis.Everyday activity presupposes 
trust in experience: while we cannot prove die existence of die external worid, 'we cannot help 
believing and hving in terms... [of its] objective reality....''^ Hick offers a parallel account of 
religious experience which 'grants diat it is no more possible to prove die existence of die material 
world but claims that theistic belief arises, like perceptual belief, from a natural response of die 
human mind to its experiences.''^ Consequendy, 'It is as reasonable for diose who experience dieir 
lives as being lived in die presence of God, to believe in die reaUty of God, as for all of us to form 
beliefs about our environment on die basis of our experience of i l . ' ' ^ 
While arguments and appeals to evidence wiU not setde die question of die nature of die 
universe, diose who have religious experiences may rationally interpret die universe rebgiously. 
For instance, on die basis of his experience, Jesus rationally believed in God; indeed, he would have 
been irrational had he not. But very few have experiences as intense. Are diey dien prohibited 
from religious belief? Not at all, says Hick: die records of intense experiences in turn support die 
beliefs of diose whose experiences are not as fervent. This is not justification for rationally 
believing anydiing; on die contrary. Hick insists 'diat a rational person will only be open to 
accepting odiers' religious experience reports as veridical, and indeed will only trust his or her own 
121. IOR,p. 124. 
122. lOR, p. 221; John Hick, 'Rational Theistic Belief WiUioul Proofs,' in A John Hick Reader, ed. Paul 
Badham. (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 49 - 67; 'Religious Pluralism and die Rationality of Religious 
Belief,' in Faidi and Philosophy. 10 (1993), pp. 242 - 249. 
123. IOR.p.213. 
124. lOR. p. 214. 
125. IQR, p. 210. See also 'Religious Faidi as Experiencing-as,' in A John Hick Reader, pp. 34 - 48; DQ, 
pp. 17 - 32; God and die Universe of Faidis. (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1993 [1973]), pp. 37 - 52, 
cited hereafter as GUF. 
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religious experience, i f die beliefs to which diey point are such as one judges may be true.''^ Thus, 
it is rational for diose who experience in a religious manner to beUeve and behave on die basis of 
this experience and this beUeving and behaviour will be corrected and enlarged by future 
experience. If only one religion or one type of religious experience existed, die argument could be 
dius concluded. However, diere are many religions and diverse reUgious exp)eriences and tiiis raises 
die problem of reUgious pluraUsm. 
In an eariy articulation of die pluraUst hypodiesis, God and die Universe of Faidis. Hick 
contended diat any reUgious beUever regardless of tradition, 
only has to stand back in diought from die arena of competing systems, surveying die 
scene as a whole, to see somediing dial is hidden from die Ptolemaic believer. This is 
the fact dial die particular standpoint of a Ptolemaic dieology normally depends upon 
where die believer happens to have been born. And having seen diis one can hardly 
help wondering whether it provides a sufficient basis for a conviction which involves an 
assessment of odier men's convictions.'" 
Having 'stood back,' Hick concluded dial 'die different encounters widi die transcendent widiin 
different reUgious traditions may all be encounters widi die one infinite reality, diough widi partially 
differing and overiapping aspects of diat reality.''^ He dien went on to call Protestants to abandon 
'christocentrism' and CadioUcs lo reUnquish 'ecclesiocentrism' and to move widi him to 
'theocentrism' - die beUef diat God was at die centre of die universe of faidis. 
Seminal articles by Duncan Forrester and JuUus Lipner, charging diat die God at Hick's 
cenfre was recognisably Christian, forced Hick to enunciate more cleariy his pluraUst hypodiesis.'^° 
The clarified hypodiesis maintains diat 
126. IOR.p.219. 
127. GiiF, p. 132. 
128. GUF. p. 139. 
129. GUF, pp. 131 -132; 133 - 147. 
130. See Julius Lipner, 'Christians and die Uniqueness of Christ,' in Scottish Journal of Theology. 28 
(1975), pp. 359 - 368; 'Trudi Claims and Inier-Rcligious Dialogue,' in Religious Studies. 12 (1976), pp. 
245 - 258; and Duncan Forrester, 'Profes.sor Hick and die Universe of Faidis,' in Scottish Journal of 
Theology. 29 (1976), pp. 65 - 72. Hick's initial reformulation was published as God Has Many Names. 
Gavin D'Costa was die fust lo comment in any detail on diis development in Hick's dioughi. See Gavin 
D'Costa. John Hick's Theology of Religions: A Critical Evaluation, pp. 153 - 187; 'The Pluralist Paradigm' 
in Theology and Religious Pluralism. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), chapter 2; and 'The Pluralist Paradigm in 
die Christian Theology of Religions,' in Scoiiish Journal of Theology, 39 (1985), pp. 211 - 224. Whedier 
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the great world faiths embody different perceptions and conceptions of, and 
correspondingly different responses to, the Real from within the major variant ways of 
being human; that within each of them the u-ansformation of human existence from 
self-centredness to Reality-centredness is taking place. These traditions are accordingly 
to be regarded as alternative soteriological 'spaces' within which, or 'ways' along which, 
men and women can find salvation/liberation/ultimate fulfilment.'^' 
Hick has thus moved from theocentrism to what Gavin D'Costa calls "Realocentrism'.'^ ^ By 
replacing 'God' with 'the Real' or 'Ultimate Reality,' Hick believes he evades charges similar to those 
of Forrester and Lipner because the titles are 'used within the major theistic and non-theistic 
fraditions and yet [are] neutral as between their very different ways of conceiving, experiencing and 
responding to that which they affirm in diverse ways.''^ ^ 
Hick bases this move on an extension of Kantian epistemology,'^ which contends that 
'since the properties of something experienced "def)end upon the mode of intuition of the subject, 
this object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as an object in itself.'"'^ ^ This is 
expressed in Kant's distinction between the unknowable noumenon - a thing in itself (ding an sich) 
and a knowable phenomenon - a thing as experienced. By analogy. Hick argues that 
the noumenal Real is experienced and thought by different human mentalities, forming 
and formed by different religious ttadilions, as the range of gods and absolutes which 
the phenomenology of religion reports. And these diverse personae and metaphysical 
impersonae ... are not illusory but are empirically, that is experientially, real as 
authentic manifestations of the Real.'^ ^ 
this clarification involved another revolution - this time a Kantian one - or was simply a refining of the 
original hypothesis is a matter of debate. Compare, for example, Gavin D'Costa, 'John Hick and Religious 
Pluralism: Yet Another Revolution,' in Problems in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Harold Hewitt, Jr., 
(New York: St. Martin's, 1991), pp. 3 - 18, with John Hick, 'Sfraightening the Record: Some Response to 
Critics,' in Modem Theology. 6 (1990), pp. 187 - 195. 
131. m p. 240. 
132. Gavin D'Costa. 'John Hick and Religious Pluralism,' p. 5. 
133. IOR,p. l l . 
134. The Kantian epistemology which Hick employs should not be confused with Kant's religious 
epistemology, which would fall to Hick's critique of the various moral arguments for the existence of God. 
Hick writes, 'God for [Kant] was not a reality encountered in religious experience but an object postulated 
by reason on the basis of its own practical functioning in moral agency.' lOR, p. 242. See also Kant, 
Criuque of Practical Reason, trans. L.W. Beck (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956), 11:2:5, p. 129; 
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (London: Macmillan, 1958), pp. 559 - 560. 
135. JOR, p. 241 citing Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 88. 
136. IOR.p.242. 
40 
His support, however, extends beyond Kant to include the religious traditions. For example, in 
classical Hindu philosophy, a distinction is made 'between nirguna Brahman, Brahman without 
attributes, exceeding the grasp of human language, and saguna Brahman, Brahman v*aih attributes, 
known within human religious experience as Ishvara, the personal creator and governor of the 
universe.''" Similariy, Mahayana Buddhism sfx;aks of the unknowable 'Dharmakaya' and the 
knowable 'Sambhogakaya' while Pure Land Buddhism distinguishes the 'dharmata dharmakaya' 
from the 'upaya dhamakaya.'^^^ Even in Christianity, one finds the distinction 'between God asem 
God's infinite self-existent being, beyond the grasp of the human mind, and God pro nobis, revealed 
in relation to humankind as creator and redeemer.''^ ' 
Thus, the Real an sich is posited as the ground of all legitimate religious experieiice, but 
this experience is indirectly mediated through 'the cognitive structure of our consciousness, with its 
capacity to respond to the meaning or character of our environment, including its religious meaning 
or character.''""* Through these cognitive filters, the Real is 'experienced-as' both personae (God, 
Shiva, Allah...) and impersonae (Brahman, Nirvana, Sunyata...). Ultimate Reality is such that it 
can be authentically experienced as both. It is comparable to 'the two ways of conceiving and 
registering light, namely as waves and particles.'"" Though the true nature of light is unknowable, 
under certain conditions, it behaves like a particle while under others, like a wave. 
Analogously, the divine reality is not directly known an sich. But when human beings 
relate themselves to it in the mode of I-Thou encounter they experience it as personal. 
Indeed in the context of that relationship it is personal, not It but He or She. When 
human beings relate themselves to the Real in the mode of non-personal awareness they 
experience it as non-personal, and in the context of this relationship it is non-
personal.'"^ 
137. lOR, p. 236. 
138. lOR. p. 236. 
139. lOR. p. 237. 
140. lOR, p. 244. 
141. lOR. p. 245. 
142. IQR, p.'245. 
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Some may be tempted to conclude on diis basis diat Hick beUeves die Real to be ultimately 
impersonal, diat die impersonae are quaUtatively superior conceptions of the Real. Indeed, diis 
seems to be the case in God and die Universe of Faiths, where he writes: 
The question can be perused bodi as a matter of pure dieoiogy and in relation to 
religious experience. Theologically, die Hindu distinction between Nirguna Brahman 
and Saguna Brahman is important and should be adopted into western religious 
dioughL... [We] may say that Nirguna God is the eternal self-existent divine reality 
beyond the scope of all human categories, including personality; and Saguna God is 
God in relation to his creation and with the attributes which express this relationship, 
such as personality, omnipotence, goodness, love and omniscience}^^ 
Though Hick goes on in the same paragraph to write diat 'the one ultimate reaUty is bodi Nirguna 
and non-personal and Saguna and personal, in a duaUty which is in principle acceptable to human 
understanding,'''" his 'Nirguna God' cleariy parallels die 'die Real an sich' of later writings. 
Therefore, it would appear dial eariy on. Hick granted die impersonae (and denied die personae) a 
privileged access to Ultimate Reality. 
This is certainly is not so in An Inicrpretation of Religion. Hick does not contend diat die 
various impersonae are somehow ontologically superior to die personae, but diat bodi groups 
represent equaUy limited human conceptions. While one cannot say the Real is personal, neidier 
can one say diat the Real is impersonal.'"^ Radicr, because die Real is always mediated dirough 
ciUturaUy conditioned reUgions, very Utde can be said about it - except perhaps St. Anselm's 
definition: die Real is 'diat dian which no greater can be conceived.''"^ 
It follows from diis distinction between die Real as it is in itself and as it is diought and 
experienced dirough our religious concepts dial we cannot apply to die Real an sich die 
characteristics encountered in its personae and impersonae. Thus it cannot be said to 
be one or many, person or diing, substance or process, good or evil, purposive or non-
purposive. None of die concrete descriptions dial apply widiin die realm of human 
experience can apply literally to die unexpcrienceable ground of dial realm. We cannot 
even speak of diis as a tiling or an entity.'"^ 
143. GUF. p. 144 (my emphasis). 
144. GUF, p. 144. 
145. IQR, pp. 252 - 295; Disputed Ouestions. pp. 164 - 179. 
146. lOR. p. 246. 
147. lOR, p. 246. remarks such as diis have led Hick's opponcnis to change dieir accusation from 'covert 
dieist' (as did Forrester and Lipner) to 'covert agnostic' See D'Cosla, 'John Hick and Religious Pluralism,' 
pp. 7 -15. John Hick's Theology of Religions, pp. 17 -183. 
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Still, Hick maintains diat die Real an sich is die ground for the attributes ascribed to he/shcAl by die 
many traditions: 'the Real is so rich in content diat it can only be finitely experienced in the various 
partial and inadequate ways which the history of reUgions describes.''''* Thus, divine attributes 
'represent die Real as both reflected and refracted widiin human diought and experience. But 
nevertheless die Real is die ultimate ground or source of diose quaUties which characterise each 
persona and impersona in so far as diese are audicntic phenomenal manifestation of die Real.''"' 
Hick's pluraUst hypodiesis posits an Ultimate ReaUty or Real an sich which is die ground 
of aU reUgious experience. Thus stated, the hypodiesis begs criteriological questions, die first 
being, 'On what basis can one distinguish between audientic and inaudientic manifestations of die 
Real?' The basis, in Hick's view, is soteriology. ReUgions "have greater or less value according as 
diey promote or hinder die salvific transformation' from self-ccntredness to ReaUty-centredness.'^ " 
This, however, only begs a second question: 'How do we know when such a transformation has 
taken place?' To diis. Hick.responds diat die criteria lie in the spiritual and moral fruits found in 
die lives of exemplary beUevers widiin die respective traditions - 'saints.' Those who are truly 
centred in ReaUty exhibit certain quaUties: compassion, joy, inner peace, strengdi of soul and 
serenity.'^' 
The production of saints, bodi contemplative and practical, individualistic and political, 
is dius one valid criterion by which lo identify a religious ffadition as a salvific human 
response to die Real. In die light of diis criterion we can readily see diat each of die 
great worid faidis constitutes a context Ibr salvation/liberation: for each has produced its 
own harvest of saints.'" 
And again. 
The salvation/liberation which it is die function of religion to facilitate is a human 
ffansformation which we see most conspicuously in die saints of all ffadiuons. It 
consists, as one of its aspects, in moral goodness, a goodness which is latent in die 
solitary contemplative and active in die saint who lives in society, serving his or her 
fellows eidier in works of mercy or, more characteristically in our modem 
148. lOR, p. 247. 
149. lOR, p. 247. 
150. lOR. D. 300. 
151. IOR.pp. 301 -302. 
152. lOR. p. 307. 
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sociologically-conscious age, in political activity as well, seeking to change die 
structures widiin which human life is lived.'^ ^ 
As has been seen, central to die pluraUst hypodiesis articulated above is that a reUgious 
interpretation of die universe can be, and often is, rational. Yet, Hick's hypodiesis proper argues 
that several different and even prima facie opposing reUgious interpretations may be vaUd 
manifestations of, and responses to, die Real. Therefore, Hick must finally account for die 
epistemological status of reUgious trudi-claims and point to a resolution of die problem brought 
about by dieir conflict. He begias his account by arguing not for 'a doctrine of rehgious knowledge 
but... a doctrine of reUgious ignorance.''^ Drawing primarily from die Buddha's doctrine of die 
avyakata, the undetermined or unresolved questions,'^ ^ and also from Thomas ^ Kempis and JuUan 
of Norwich,'^ Hick argues diat some reUgious questions are eidier unanswered or unanswerable. 
The unanswered questions 'are in diemselves legitimate and admit of true answers.''^ ^ We do not 
know these answers, but we may hypodiesise about them and at a future time, come to know diem. 
Nevertheless, salvation/Uberation 'does not depend upon such knowledge; and... for people holding 
different views to treat agreement about diem as essential for salvation is a dangerous because 
soteriologicaUy counter-productive error.''^ * The unanswerable questions, on die odier hand, Ue 
completely beyond die scope of human finitudc. One should 'refer to dieir subject matter as 
mysteries, reaUties diat are beyond human comprehension and expression.''^' They point to 
reaUties which cannot be expressed in human terms. Whereas in response to die unanswered 
153. lOR, p. 309. For an account of criteriologica! difficulties inherent in Hick's diesis, see Paul GrifRdis 
and Delmas Lewis, 'On Grading Religions, Seeking Trudi, and Being Nice to People - A Reply to 
Professor Hick,' in Religious Studies. 19 (1983), pp. 75 - 80. Though written widi Hick's early dieory in 
mind, dieir argument can also apply to his later work. A criteriological critique written after lOR is 
Rebecca Pentz's article, 'Hick and Saints: Is Saint-Production a Valid Test?' in Faidi and Philosophy. 8 
(1991), pp. 96 - 103. 
154. lOR. p. 343. 
155. IQR, pp. 343-345; see also DQ, pp. 105-118. 
156. IOR.p. 345. 
157. IOR.p.345. 
158. lOR, p. 345. 
159. IOR.p. 347. 
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questions, we may formulate theories, in response to the unanswerable ones, we develop myths. 
'But neither are necessary for salvation/liberation. .160 
Mythical propositions, therefore are not subject to theoretical verification or falsification, 
but can only be evaluated practically or existentially. 'For the conformity of myth to reality does 
not consist in a literal conformity of what is said to the facts but in the appropriateness to the myth's 
referent of the tiehavioural dispositions that it tends to evoke in the hearer.'" '^ Of such propositions, 
there are two types; the first being 'expository myths. These say something that can also be said 
non-mythologically, though generally with markedly less impact.''^ ^ More importantly are those 
myths which arise in the face of the unaaswerable questions. For instance, aU descriptions of the 
Real - as personae or impersonae - fall into this categon,'. Such language may be seen as true if it 
evokes in us an appropriate dispositional response. 'True religious myths are accordingly those that 
evoke in us attitudes and modes of behaviour which are appropriate to our situation vis-d-vis the 
Real.''^ 
• Both the unanswered and unanswerable questions can result in 'conflicting trans-historical 
truth-claims.''" On one hand, unanswered questions lead to conflicting claims which can in 
principle be Uterally tnie or false, but which cannot be established by appeals to historical or 
160. IOR,p.347. 
161. IOR.p.348. 
162. "For example, the Hebraic story of the fall of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden can be seen - and 
is today very commonly seen by Jews and Christians - as a mythic story which expresses, and thereby 
engraves in the imagination, the fact that ordinary human life is lived in alienation from God and hence 
from one's neighbours and from the natural environment. Again, the story of the Buddha's flight through 
the sky to Sri Lanka can be seen as a mythological way of affirming the authenticity of the ancient 
Buddhist fradition of that island. The belief that the suras of the Qur'an were dictated by the archangel 
Gabriel can be seen as a mythological way of affirming that the Qur'an constitutes an autoritative divine 
revelation. The idea of the transsubstantiauon of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ in 
the eucharist can be seen as a mythological way of making the communicant's reception of them an 
occasion of special openness to God as known through Christ. The doctrine of reincarnation is seen by 
some as a mythological way of making vivid the moral truth that our actions have inevitable future 
consequences for good and ill , this being brought home to the imagination by the thought that the agent 
will personally reap those consequences in a future earthly life.' lOR. p. 349. 
163. lOR. p. 351. 
164. lOR, p. 365. 
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empirical evidence. Examples here include disagreements over whether or not the universe has a 
temporal beginning or the fate of human individuals after death.'^ Concerning such issues, Hick 
suggests 
(a) that they should be frilly and freely recognised as matters on which directly opposed 
views are often held; (b) that - although by no means everyone ranged on either side of 
these disagreements will be able to accept this - the questions are ones to which 
humanity does not at present know the answers; (c) that this ignorance does not hinder 
the process of salvation/liberation; and (d) that we should therefore learn to live with 
these differences, tolerating contrary convictions even when we suspect them to be 
mistaken.'** 
On the other, unanswerable questions lead to conflicting claims only in so far as the mythological 
nature of these claims is not recognised: 
Thus the dogma of the deity of Christ - in conjunction with the aggressive and predatory 
aspect of human nature - has confributed historically to the evils of colonialism, the 
destruction of indigenous civilisations, anti-Semitism, desffuctive wars of religion and 
the burnings of heretics and witches. But on the other hand it is also possible to 
understand the idea of incamauon in the life of Jesus Christ mythologically, as 
indicating an exffaordinary openness to the divine presence in virtue of which Jesus' life 
and teachings have mediated the reality and love of God to millions of people in 
successive centuries. Thus, whereas understood literally the doctrine of a unique 
incarnation in Christ has divided humanity and has shrunk the image of God to that of 
the tribal deity of the West, understood mythologically it can continue to draw people to 
God through Christ without thereby sundering them from the rest of the human 
family'*' 
, Finally, there are truth-claims which fall neither within the 'unanswered' nor 'unanswerable' 
categories which Hick calls 'conflicting historical truth-claims.''^ These arise both within rebgious 
fraditions (i.e. between Protestant and Roman Catholic Christians over the institution of the Papacy 
or between Sunni and Shia Muslims over the succession of Ali to Muhammad) and between them 
(i.e. between Jewish and Islamic accounts of Abraham's sacrifice on Mount Moriah). Such 
conflicts, says Hick, are theoretically capable of resolution through 'an unbiased assessment of the 
historical evidence.' Practically, however, such 'rational resolutions have generally proved 
165. lOR, pp. 366 - 368. 
166. lOR, p. 370. 
167. IQR, p. 372. 
168. IOR,p.363. 
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elusive/® Because of these practical difficulties, these differences 'should simply be acknowledged 
and tolerated.''™ 
To summarise, Hiclc's pluralism may be seen as epistemologically exclusive and 
soteriologically inclusive. Hick, in his generous argument for the salvific validity of the great 
religions appears to have transcended empistcmological exicusiveness. But has he? He holds the 
Real an sich to be unknowable: a trulh-claim which necessarily recasts all alternatives, as is shown 
by his reduction of classical Christology from metaphysics to mythology. His hypothesis is thus 
epistemologically exclusive. Also, because Hick grants himself a privileged insight into the nature 
of salvation/liberation which is at best obscured in the other religious traditions, he is a 
soteriological inclusivist. Salvation/liberation does not occur within each religion according to its 
own understanding, but only insofar as it conforms to his description of salvation/liberation as the 
transition from self-centredness to Reality-ceniredncss. 
Conclusion: 
To conclude this chapter and in preparation for the next, two important insights may be 
drawa First, epistemologically, all three representatives are exclusive: each reserves for himself a 
privileged vantage point from which he can assess the nature of religion. Of course in each case, 
the vantage point is different. In Earth's version religion, as a human creation, is contradicted by 
God's revelation. Though there are 'parables of the Kingdom' to be found in all spheres of life 
including religions, these can be recognised only by their hannony with the threefold Word of God. 
Rahner's inclusivism on the other hand, is rooted in dogmatic Roman Catholicism and in his 
'supernatural existential.' Hick, finally, is grounded in traascendental agnosticism: his starting-point 
is the unknowable nature of the Real an sich. So, each position, or cluster of positions, is 
confessional but Uiat which is confessed is different. 
Second, all three are soteriologically inclusive. Barth sees all humanity caught up into 
God's salvation which has been accomplished once and for all in Jesus Christ. Moreover, this 
salvation is realised despite any and all religion, including Christianity. Banh's soteriology rejects 
169. lOR, p. 364. 
170. lOR.p. 14. 
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religions as playing any role in salvation; God through Christ saves apan from any and all human 
religion. Rahner, on the other hand stresses that while salvation is indeed found only in God 
through Christ, it is mediated through socially constituted forms: explicitly in Christianity and 
anonymously through other religions. Finally, for Hick, salvation/liberation does not occur within 
each religion according to its own tmderstanding, but only insofar as it conforms to his description 
of salvation/liberation as the transition from self-centredness to Reality-centredness. 
This concludes the survey of the threefold typology. The reader has been introduced to the 
theologies of religion of Barth, Rahner and Hick specifically and to the exclusivist, inclusivist and 
pluralist types generally. Now we must consider whether the paradigm is helpful beyond this very 
introductory point, or i f it actually becomes a hindrance. This consideration will be addressed in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Beyond the Threefold Typology 
Introduction: 
The previous chapter introduced readers to the problem of religion and religions in 
Christian theology through the familiar threefold typology. Yet, in conclusion, it wondered 
whether the typology became a hindrance when pressed beyond this preparatory level. This 
question is now addressed in three steps. The first offers a brief sketch of the typology's 
history and a quick summary of three previous criticisms. Its primary concern, however, is to 
consider whether the typology functions as more than an organisational framework. Through 
a suspicious analysis of its genealogy, it shows the typology to be a polemic against non-
pluralist theologies of reUgion. I f this contention is correct, it would follow that there are 
inaccuracies in the accounts of exclusivism and pluralism, more often than not the typological 
villain or hero. The second section, therefore, compares actual exclusivist and pluralist 
proposals to the definitions offered by John Hick as cited in the previous chapter in order to 
show that exclusivist accounts are more nuanced while pluralist ones are more problematic 
than the typology indicates. Finally, the third section asks, whether the typology could be 
rescued by shifting the axis from questions of salvation to related but distinct questions of 
truth, from soteriology to epistemology. Through an examination of the confusion created by 
Alan Race's, definitions. I will show that such a shift threatens the internal boundaries of the 
typology. 
2.1 The Genealogy of the Typology 
The exclusivist/inclusivist/pluralist arrangement is said to have been inaugurated in 
1983 by Alan Race in the first edition of Christians and Religious Pluralism.' with these 
words: 'In this study I adopt the headings Exclusivism, Inclusivism and Pluralism as a broad 
typological framework within which most of the current Christian theologies of religions can 
1. S. Mark Heim, Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion. (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1995), p. 4 
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be placed.'^ Subsequent chapters, following an historical and analytical method, chose several 
theologians to represent each position in order to show their internal diversity. Thus, Hendrik 
Kraemer, Karl Barth and Emil Brunner epitomised exclusivism, that position which 'counts 
the revelation in Jesus Christ as the sole criterion by which all religions... can be understood 
and judged.'^ Similarly, predominantly Roman Cathofic theologians, notably Hans Kiing, 
Kari Rahner, and the eariy Raimon Panikkar, represented inclusivism. 'To be inclusivist,' 
Race wrote, 'is to believe that all non-Christian religious truth belongs ultimately to Christ and 
the way of discipleship which springs from his way.'" Finally, Paul Tillich, John Hick and 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith were summoned to champion pluralism which held that "knowledge of 
God is partial in all faiths, including the Christian. Religions must acknowledge their need of 
each other i f the full truth about God is to be available to mankind.'^ As the ordering of the 
materia] suggests, Race defended a version of pluralism. 
In 1986, Gavin D'Costa's TTieology and Religious Pluralism used the typology again, 
contending 'that three dominant paradigms [exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism] emerge 
from the recent history of theological reflection, usefully providing a conceptiJal matrix within 
which the theological issues are highlighted.'^ Like Race, D'Costa employed representatives 
to highlight key themes in each position; unlike Race, he centi^d on one theologian in each 
instance, namely Hick, Kraemer, and Rahner. D'Costa also deviated in his arrangement and 
definitions of the positions: whereas Race used the typology to describe a shift from 
exclusivism to pluralism, D'Costa offered an inclusivist navigation through the extiiemes of 
pluralism and exclusivism.' Also, as his definitions show, Race was concerned with religious 
epistemology, but D'Costa wondered 'whether salvation is possible outside Christianity.'* His 
definitions reflect this concern: pluralism 'maintains that other religions are equally salvific 
paths to the one God,' while for exclusivism, 'other religions are marked by humankind's 
fundamental sinfulness and are therefore erroneous,' and inclusivism 'affinms the salvific 
2. Race, Christians and Reiipious Pluralism, p. 7. 
3. Race. Christians and Religious Pluralism, p. 11. 
4. Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, p. 38. 
5. Race, Christians and Reiipious Pluralism, p. 72. 
6. D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, p. 6. 
7. D'Costa. Theology and Religious Pluralism, pp. 117 -139. 
8. D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, p. 4. 
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presence of God in other religions while still maintaining that Christ is the definitive and 
authoritative revelation of God.'' 
In the subsequent decade, the threefold typology became the standard arrangement of 
Christian approaches to theology of religions.'" It is found in a number of contemporary 
works seeking to defend and develop each position. For example, Indian theologian Ramesh 
Richard employs i t in a recent defense of a version of exclusivism entitled The Population of 
Heaven." Likewise, it is implemented in Jacques Dupuis' inclusivist proposal, Jesus Christ at 
the Encounter of Worid Religions.'^ Finally, Race defends and expands his use of the 
typology in 'Ten Years Later: Surveying the Scene.''^  There is no more certain sign, however, 
of the typology's popularity than its citation in several theological dictionaries and 
encyclopedias encompassing a variety of Christian traditions.'"* 
None of this is to say that the typology has been without detractors who have 
criticised it for three reasons. First, several contend that their proposals do not fit the 
9. D'Costa. Theology and Religious Pluralism, pp. 22. 52, 80. 
10. This is not to say that it is the only arrangement on offer. Paul Knitter's early writing, for 
instance, prefers to distinguish four Christian attitudes toward religious pluralism: conservative 
evangelicalism, mainline protestantism, Catholicism and theocentrism. See Paul F. Knitter, No 
Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Altitudes Toward the World Religions. (Maryknoll: 
Orbis, 1985). Peter Schniller has also advanced a unique fourfold typology: Ecclesiocenuic 
universe, exclusive christology; Christocenu-ic universe, inclusive christology; Theocentric universe, 
normative christology; and Theocenu-ic universe, nonnormaiive christology. See Peter Schniller, 
'Christ and the Church: A Spectrum of Views,' in Theological Studies. 37 (1976), pp. 545 - 566. 
While Schniller appears to avoid the confessionalism blatant in Knitter, his language continues to 
locate the discourse within Christian theology. Though the threefold typology has been used to 
distinguish different Christian positions, it is not necessarily bound to one religious tradition over 
others. 
11. Ramesh P. Richard, The Population of Heaven: A Biblical Response to the Inciusivist Position 
on who will be Saved. (Chicago: Moody Press, 1994). As the title implies, Richard sidesteps 
pluralists to dialogue with inclusivists in general. More specifically his apologetic is aimed at Clark 
Pinnock's inclusivist proposals as found in A Wideness in God's Mercy. Nevertheless, use of the 
typology is evident throughout the work. 
12. Dupuis. Jesus Christ at the Encounter of World Religions, see especially pp. 104 - 110. Dupuis, 
however, also acknowledges Schniller's arrangement (p. 104). 
13. Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, pp. 149 - 167. 
14. See for example, Mariasusai Dhavamony, 'X. Theology of Religions,' in Dictionary of 
Fundamental Theology, ed. R. Latourelle and R. Fisichella, (Slough: St. Paul's, 1994), pp. 887 - 896, 
esp. pp. 888 - 889; D.A. Hu, "Religions, Theology of,' in New Dictionary of Theology, ed. S.B. 
Ferguson and D.F. Wright, (Downer's Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1988), pp. 576 - 577; and Gavin 
D'Costa, 'Other Faiths and Christianity,' in The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Modem Christian 
Thought, ed. AHster E. McGrath, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 411 - 419, esp. pp. 412 - 416. 
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threefold structure, among them Schubert Ogden, Ian Markham, and Michael Barnes.'^  In 
their view, the typology is artificial and restrictive and as the title of Markham's piece 
suggests, they seek to 'shatter' it with positions which they believe it caimot co-opt. The 
second, launched by Ken Surin, is wholly different. It sees the typology as a socio-political 
attempt by Western theologians, especially pluralists, to dominate and destroy the 'intractable 
otherness' of non-Western religions and cultures.'^ Thus, Surin wants not to shatter the 
typology, but to abandon it along with all modem, metacritical typologies. Finally, the most 
ironic attack comes from D'Costa who, after a decade of popularizing and defending the 
typology, has come to see it as redundant.'' As I show in the remaining paragraphs, these 
criticisms can only be strengthened through a three-step unmasking of the typology's true aim. 
First, I show that its gestation parallels John Hick's spiritual pilgrimage from exclusivism to 
pluralism; hence second, that the typology was introduced not by Race in 1983, but by Hick 
in his first account of the pluralist hypothesis a decade earlier;'* and third, that a suspicious 
analysis of Hick's language reveals the purpose of the typology. Thus I argue that the 
typology, far more than a simple organisational grid, is designed to be, as J.A. DiNoia has put 
it, 'a trajectory away from exclusivism.'" I turn first to Hick's autobiography as it is found in 
two recent essays.^ 
15. See Schubert Ogden, Is there One Religion or Are there Many?. (Dallas: SMU, 1992); Ian 
Markham, 'Creating Options: Shattering the "Exclusivist, Inclusivist, and Pluralist" Paradigm,' in 
New Blackfriars. January (1993), pp. 33 -41; and Michael Barnes, Christian Identity and Religious 
Pluralism: Religions in Conversation. (Nashville: Abingdon, 1989). 
16. Kenneth Surin, Towards a "Materialist" Critique of "Religious Pluralism": A Polemical 
Examination of the Discourse of John Hick and Wilfred Cantwell Smith,' in The Thomist. 53 
(1989), 655 - 73. He writes, 'Traditional liberal intellectuals pride themselves on acknowledging 
heterogeneity and plurality, but this acknowledgement is always fatally compromised by a 
deployment of homogeneous logic - a, logic which irons out the heterogeneous precisely by 
subsuming it under the categories of comprehensive and totalizing global and world theologies.' 
Kenneth Surin, 'A "Politics of Speech" Religious Pluralism in the Age of the McDonald's 
Hamburger,' in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, ed. Gavin D'Costa, (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1990), p. 210. 
17. Gavin D'Costa, 'The Impossibility of a Pluralist View of Religions,' unpublished paper supplied 
by the author. 
18. In 1972, Hick gave a series of public lectures at the Carrs Lane Church Cenue, Birmingham 
which eventually became chapters 8,9 and 10 in GUF. See GUF. p. xvi. 
19. J.A. DiNoia, The Diversity of Religions: A Christian Perspective. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1992), p. 50. 
20. John Hick, 'A Personal Note,' in DQ, pp. 139 - 145 and John Hick, 'A Pluralist View,' in More 
than One Way?, pp. 29 - 55. 
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Hick came to Christian faith, and to 'Calvinist orthodoxy of an extremely 
conservative kind,' in 1941.^' In two following decades, though he 'spent many months in 
Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, and a short time in Palestine' he had virtually no contact with other 
religious traditions^ and 'shared tiie general assumption that humanity was in fact slowly but 
surely becoming Christian.'^ By his own admission then. Hick was an exclusivist. 'How, 
then,' he asks, 'have I come to adopt a "pluralist" understanding of the relation between 
Christianity and the otiier great worid faiths? And what is this "pluralist" understanding? / 
can only answer these questions by continuing the narrative.'^ The watershed came in 1967 
with Hick's move to Birmingham, where he became involved in a variety of inter-faith 
organisations, most notably 'All Faiths for One Race.'" In the course of this activity, he 
attended synagogues, mosques, gurdwaras and temples and was impressed by the spirituality 
of his non-Christian colleagues. Later visits to India, Sri Lanka and Japan confinmed these 
experiences. 'Thus it was not so much new thoughts as new experiences that drew me [Hick] 
as a philosopher, into die issues of religious pluralism.'^ It is important to note that Hick 
does not mention in either account a sudden conversion to pluralism. Rather, the impression 
is one of a gradual process tiirough various inclusivist stages based on his inter-faiUi 
experiences. He hints at this when describing the appeal of inclusivism: 'The attraction... is 
that it negates the old missionary compulsion and yet is still Christocentric and still leaves 
Christianity in an uniquely cenu-al and normative position.'^ Eventually, however. Hick 
'rejected this inclusivism as an unsatisfactory compromise. [He] moved to a plurahsm which 
sees the other great world faiths as authentic and valid contexts of salvation/liberation not 
secreUy dependent on the cross of Christ.'^ He thus links what we now know as the threefold 
typology to his own personal narrative. 
Because of this deliberate linkage, when examining the typology's history and 
purpose, one needs to begin not with Race or D'Costa, but with Hick's 1972 essay, "The 
21. DQ.p. 139. 
22. DQ,p. 139. 
23. Hick, 'A Pluralist View,' p. 37. 
24. Hick, 'A Pluralist View,' p. 37 (emphasis mine). 
25. DQ, p. 140. 
26. DQ,p. 141. 
27. DQ.p. 143. 
28. DQ,P- 143. 
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Copemican Revolution in Theology.'^' Here the original typology, substantially i f not 
nominally, is found. It opens by describing the 'Ptolemaic view' which centrally assumes 'that 
outside the church, or outside Christianity, there is no salvation.'^ Again, notice Hick's 
personal language: 'Certainly this view, or rather this assumption, was present in my own 
mind for at least twenty-five years. I assumed it to be a central christian position that 
salvation is through Christ alone, and therefore that those who do not respond to God through 
Christ are not saved but, presumably, damned or lost.'^' But this 'humanly repugnant 
conclusion'^^ denies boUi the universal love and salvific will of God: 'Can we then accept the 
conclusion that die God of love who seeks to save all mankind has nevertheless ordained that 
men must be saved in such a way that only a small minority can in fact receive this salvation? 
It is the weight of this moral cono-adiction that has driven christian thinkers in modem times 
to explore otiier ways of understanding the human religious situation.'^^ Witii these words, 
Hick introduces several tiieological 'epicycles' which seek to preserve the uniqueness of Christ 
or Christianity while extending the borders of salvation. They are, however, 'fundamentally 
weak arguments for the sake of an intuitively accepted conclusion until better arguments are 
found.'^ 
Hick uses astronomical language ('Ptolemaic,' 'epicycle') to label his theological 
survey because it is 
so powerfully reminiscent of the epicycles that were added to the old Ptolemaic 
picture of the universe, with the earth at the cenu-e, to accommodate increasingly 
accurate knowledge of the planets. The stars, including the sun and the planets, 
were all supposed to move in conccnuic circles round the earth. This was at that 
time a feasible theory as regards the stars; but the planets moved in paths which 
did not fit such a scheme. But instead of abandoning the scheme, the ancient 
asu-onomers added a series of smaller supplementary circles, called epicycles, 
revolving with their cenues on the original circles. If a planet was thought of as 
moving on one of these smaller circles whilst it was in turn moving round the great 
circles, the resulting path was more complex and nearer to what was actually 
observed; and Uiis complication of the system made it possible to maintain the 
basic dogma that the earth is the hub of the universe. Looking back we can see 
that it was theoretically possible to stick indefinitely to the conviction tiiat the earth 
is the centre, adding epicycle upon epicycle as required to reconcile the dogma 
witii the facts. However, the whole thing became increasingly artificial and 
burdensome; and the time came when people's minds were ready for the new 
. Copemican conception that it is the sun and not the earth that is at the cenue. 
29. GUF, pp. 120 - 132. 
30. GUF, p. 121. 
31. GUF, p. 121. 
32. GUF, p. 122. 
33. GUF, p. 122- 123. 
34. GUF, p. 124. 
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Then the old Ptolemaic system was thrown aside and appeared in retrospect uuerly 
antiquated and implausible. And much the same, I cannot help thinking applies to 
what I shall call the Rolemaic theology whose fixed point is the principle that 
outside the church, or outside Christianity, there is no salvation. When we find 
men of other faiths we add an epicycle of theory to the effect that although they are 
consciously adherents of a different faith, nevertheless they may unconsciously or 
impliciUy be Christians. In theory, one can carry on such manoeuvres indefinitely. 
But anyone who is not firmly committed to the original dogma is likely to find the 
resulting picture artificial, implausible and unconvincing, and to be ready for a 
Copemican revolution in his theology of religions.^' 
As discussed in die previous chapter, Hick then initiates this 'Copemican revolution' by 
calling Christians to recognise tiiat God (or after 1982, Ultimate Reality) is at the centi? of 
die universe of faiths. 
To disclose the purpose of this eariy version, it is important to consider first the 
historical context from which its language arises: die most infamous instance of the Church's 
scrutiny of natural science. On February 19, 1616, the Holy Office in Rome submitted the 
following propositions to theologians for evaluation: 
1. The sun is the center [sic] of the worid and hence immovable of local motion. 
2. The earth is not the center [sic] of the world, nor immovable, but moves 
according to die whole of itself, also with a diurnal motion.^ * 
The experts deemed both propositions philosophically absurd and theologically heretical and 
on March 5, the General Congregation of the Inquisition declared: 
It has... come to the knowledge of die said Congregation that the Pythagorean 
docu-ine - which is false and altogether opposed to die Holy Scripture - of the 
motion of the Earth, and to Uie immobility of the Sun, which is also taught by 
Nicolaus Copernicus in De revolulionibus orbium coelestium, and by Diego de 
Zuniga (in the book) on Job, is now being spread abroad and accepted by many.... 
Therefore, in order diat this opinion may not insinuate itself any further to the 
prejudice of the Catholic faith, die Holy Congregation has decreed Uiat die said 
Nicolaus Copernicus' De revolutionibus orbium, and Diego Zuniga's On Job, be 
suspended until diey be corrected.... In wimess whereof the present decree has 
been signed and sealed with the hands and with the seal of the most eminent and 
Reverend Lord Cardinal of St. Cecilia, Bishop of Albano, on the fifdi day of 
March, 1616. '^ 
In accounts of the controversy surrounding Galileo, Christian theology and its defenders are 
often presented as die great inhibitors of natural human reason on its quest to unravel the 
secrets of die universe. Through his use of cosmological terms like 'Ptolemaic' and 'epicycle'. 
Hick hints that the arguments of his opponents are as unenUghtened as diose of the 
35. GUF. pp. 124- 125. 
36. Nicholas Wolierstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion, second edition, (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1984),p. 15. 
37. Wolterstorff, Reason widiin the Bounds of Religion, p. 16. 
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seventeenth century Cardinals. Once more, die conclusions of Christian Uieology must be set 
aside in order to discover truth. 
Furthermore, i t is also clear tiiat the analogy suggests the inevitability of progress 
toward a Copemican theology of religions. This inevitability is mirrored in Hick's own 
journey which he characterises as a proti-acted attempt to intellectually appropriate Christian 
faith.^* Thus, tiiose who are willing to think theologically will abandon Ptolemaic theology 
and forsake its epicycles just a those who were wUhng to look through Galileo's telescope 
abandoned Ptolemaic cosmology. The only restraint on progress to a Copemican view is the 
firm but un-intellectual commitment to die uniqueness of Christ or Christianity. Particularty 
telling in this instance is Hick's unqualified use of 'fundamentalist' and its cognates to place 
his opponents.^' Fundamentahsm's noble dieological heritage has in recent years been 
eclipsed by its constant linking by Western media to terrorist activity. Its indiscriminate use, 
therefore, portrays one's opponents as at best anti-intellectual and at worst, violentiy so. 
There is, therefore, no reason to regard Hick's initial articulation of the threefold paradigm as 
more than an attempt to deflate traditional positions as obscurantist. 
The change from Ptolemaic/epicyclic/Copemican to the more familiar 
exclusivist/inclusivist/pluralist language only mutes this polemical puipose. RecaU Hick's 
definitions cited in the previous chapter: exclusivism - salvation is confined to Christianity; 
inclusivism - salvation occurs throughout the worid but is always the work of Christ; 
pluralism - die great worid faiths are different and independentiy authentic contexts of 
salvation/liberation. The labels are different but the underiying soteriological axis is 
imchanged. The debate, as Ramesh Richard observes, continues to centre on the question, 
'Are the masses of die worid condemned to endless conscious punishment, even diough they 
cannot be faulted for not having heard Uie gospel of Christ during Uieir earthly life?''" 
Exclusivists, who beUeve tiiis is in fact die case, are both immoral and anti-intellecttial. 
38. See Hick, 'A Pluralist View,' pp. 32 - 33 where he writes, ' I have recounted Uiis piece of 
autobiography to help conservative readers to appreciate that I have some understanding of Uieir 
position because it was once my own. My departure from it was gradual and was partly the result of 
further reflection prompted by a philosophical training, pardy or reading the works of die New 
Testament scholars, and parUy of U^ing to preach the gospel in a way that made sense to ordinary 
twentieth-century men and women, both young and old. My conversion experience, with its 
powerful awareness of a divine presence that was both profoundly challenging and at the same time 
profoundly creative and life-giving, remains basic; but the particular fundamentalist intellectual 
package Uiat came with it has long since crumbled and disappeared.... It can in many cases be good 
to undergo a "fundamentalist" conversion, so long as one later sorts out the intellectually acceptable 
and unacceptable and is able to discard the latter.' 
39. See, for example, DQ, pp. 139, 142; 'A Pluralist View,' pp. 29, 33. 
40. Richard, The Population of Heaven, p. 9. 
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Inclusivists are wiUing to struggle witii die moral crisis, but in so far as die salvation they 
proclaim is still Christian salvation, their reason remains fettered by dogma. Only the 
pluralist can morally and reasonably offer salvation/liberation to all. The polemic is 
preserved, the purpose hidden, but unchanged. 
Thus, die intention of die threefold typology is exposed. Its history begins not widi 
D'Costa or Race, but a decade previously widi John Hick's 'Copemican Revolution.' An 
examination of this earlier work reveals that in addition to being an organisational framework, 
the typology is constructed in such a way as to blunt die edge of non-pluralist arguments and 
show the inevitability of die pluralist position. Let us now turn to actual exclusivist and 
pluralist proposals to see i f the contention holds. 
2.2 Whose Exclusivism? Which Pluralism? 
As we have seen, exclusivism is defined by its limiting of salvation to those witiiin the 
boundaries of the Christian community. In order for Uiis definition to hold, it must embrace 
all who eidier situate diemselves or have been situated within die exclusivist position. An 
examination of several prominent exclusivists reveals that diis is not always the case. This is 
not to say tiiat such a definition is wholly inaccurate for many do find it acceptable. Take, for 
example, diree senior Nordi American evangelicals. Cart Henry writes, 'no man who has 
never heard of Christ is condemned for rejecting Christ; all men are condemned for rejecting 
the Ught they have.... In a real sense, a man who has never heard the name of Christ rejects 
him every time he sins against whatever light he has.'"' R.C. Sproul agrees: ' if a person in a 
remote area has never heard of Christ, he will not be punished for that. What he will be 
punished for is the rejection of the Father of whom he has heard and for the disobedience to 
the law that is written in his heart.'"^ Lorraine Boettiier concurs but softens the 
pronouncement: 'this, of course, does not mean that all of die lost shall suffer die same degree 
of punishment.... While the headiens are lost, diey shall suffer relatively less dian diose who 
have heard and rejected die Gospel.'"' 
41. Cad F.H. Henry, Giving a Reason for Our Hope. (Boston: W.A. Wilde, 1949), pp. 40 - 42. See 
also Carl F.H. Henry, 'Is It Fair?' in Through No Fault of Their Own? The Fate of Those Who Have 
Never Heard, ed. William V. Crockett and James G. Sigountos, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 
pp. 245 - 255. In this essay, his argument proceeds as follows: 1) no one will be condemned for not 
responding to an unknown offer of grace; 2) Everyone will be judged according to 'available and 
accusing light,' (p. 248); 3) All have received and rebelled against this general knowledge of God; 4) 
God through Christ has made an offer of reconciliation; Uierefore 5) God is just in condemning all 
who have not u^ usted Christ, whether or not they have heard. 
42. R.C. Sproul, Reason to Believe. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1982), p. 56. 
43. Lorraine Boettner, The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), 
p. 120. 
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Moreover, it is not only limited to evangelicalism's older generations: R. Douglas 
Geivett and W. Gary Phillips have offered a lucid apology for traditional exclusivism in 'A 
Particularist View: An Evidentiahst Approach.''^ The diesis is simple: 'except perhaps in very 
special circumstances, people are not saved apart from explicit faidi in Jesus Christ, which 
presupposes that they have heard about his salvific work on dieir behalf.'''^ So is the 
argument. Beginning widi natural dieology, tiiey seek to show first Uiat dieism is a worldview 
superior to non-theism or adieism and second that Christianity is die superior form of theism 
and its claim to revelation, uniquely true. They dien turn to die record of diat revelation, the 
Bible, to assess die data concerning die nature and scope of salvation. 'Christianity is 
uniquely true,' they conclude, 'and explicit faidi in Jesus Christ is a necessary condition for 
salvation.'''* My complaint, therefore, is not diat die definition does not apply - it cleariy does. 
Rather, it is that die definition docs not encompass many finding diemselves placed in die 
exclusivist camp. 
Though united in dieir desire to extend die boundaries of Christian salvation beyond 
explicit Christian practice, die proposals of diis group are disparate. Nevertheless, the 
solutions can be grouped into one of two sorts. Some advance arguments for die likelihood of 
someone "being saved by Christ apart from die knowledge of Christ,' tempered by die behef 
that eschatological destiny is 'known only to God.'"' Typical of diis approach is LessUe 
Newbigin, an exclusivist according to Race and D'Costa,"* and a label widi which he is 
'delighted.''" For him, die question. Can die good non-Christian be saved? is misleading 
because it 'is a question to which God alone has die right to give die answer'; because it 
abstracts die soul from die historical nature of human beings; and, fundamentally, because it 
'starts with the individual and his or her need to be assured of ultimate happiness, and not widi 
44. R. Douglas Geivett and W. Gary Phillips, 'A Parucularist View: An Evidentialist Approach,' in 
More Than One Way?, pp. 213 - 245. 
45. Geiveu and Phillips, 'A Particularist View,' p. 214. 
46. Geivett and Phillips, 'A Particularist View,' p. 243. 
47. Paul Helm, 'Are They Few That Be Saved?' in Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell, ed. Nigel 
M. de S. Cameron, (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1992), p. 281. 
48. Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, pp. 152 - 155; and D'Costa, Theology and Religious 
Pluralism, p. 15. 
49. Lesslie Newbigin, 'Mission in the World Today,' in A Word in Season: Perspectives on 
Christian Worid Missions, ed. Eleanor Jackson, (Edinburgh and Grand Rapids: St Andrew Press and 
Eerdmans, 1994), p. 127. 
58 
God and his glory.'^ He dierefore concludes tiiat 'it is arrogant presumption on die part of 
theologians to suppose that it is dieir business to answer it.'^' It can be greeted only widi 
reverent sdence.^ ^ 
It should also be noted that this eschatological agnosticism contains a spectrum of 
opiiuons. Newbigin, for instance, is hopeful about die destiny of much of humanity. 'The 
Bible, then,' he writes, 'is concerned widi God's purpose of blessing for all die nations. It is 
concerned widi die completion of God's purpose in die creation of the worid and of man 
widiin the worid. It is not - to put it crudely - concerned widi offering a way of escape for die 
redeemed soul out of history, but widi die action of God to bring history to its true end.'^ ' He 
continues, 'we cannot rightiy interpret die work of Christ as exclusively concerned widi die 
destiny of individual souls after death and apart from God's purpose for history as a whole. 
Otherwise how could we account for the fact that Paul, who certainly affirms die absolute 
centiality and finality of die work of Christ also affirms that die Jews who have rejected 
Christ will be saved in the end?'^ While refusing to debate individual destinies, he hopes for a 
renewed creation and within it a redeemed humanity. Odiers who follow Newbigin's 
agnosticism are decidedly less confident. Timodiy R. Phillips is one of diese. In an essay 
entitied 'Hell: A Christological Refiection,' he takes issue widi 'revisionist eschatology,' (die 
relocation of heaven and hell to diis Ufe); 'universalism,' (die exri'/?ye.^ >^od's mercy and love 
50. Lesslie Newbigin. The Gospel in a Pluralist Society. (London: SPCK) pp. 177 - 180. 
51. Newbigin. The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, p. 180. 
52. This agnosticism has been harshly criticised. In On Being A Christian, trans. Edward Quinn, 
(London: Collins, 1977), p. 99, Hans Kiing is particularly scathing: 'Here it is not enough to make 
assertions.... The problem [cannot]... be dismissed - as it is by odier Protestant theologians - with a 
supercihous "we don't know," as if it were no concem of theirs. If Christian theologians have no 
answer to the question of the salvation of the greater part of mankind, diey cannot be surprised when 
people react as diey have done in the past.... It is all to easy to reverse die assertion of "dialectical 
dieology," that the world religions are merely human projections, and declare that Christianity itself 
is a pure projection, the expression of absolutist-exclusive wishful thinking.' Similarly, Wesley 
Ariarajah excoriates such 'theology of neuu-ality,' insisting that it 'is becoming a very pragmatic 
question when people are called to pray togedier for peace, to work together.... Theological 
neuu-alily just will not do anymore.' Quoted in Jean Su-omberg, 'Christian Wimess in a Pluralistic 
Worid,' in The International Review of Mission. 78 (1988), p. 420. Newbigin responds: '1 find this 
way of thinking among Christians astonishing in view of die emphatic warnings of Jesus against 
diese kinds of judgments which claim to preempt the final judgment of God.... Surely theologians at 
least should know that the judge on the last day is God and no one else.' Newbigin, The Gospel in a 
Pluralist Society, p. 177. 
53. Lesslie Newbigin, The Open Secret: An Intfoduction to the Theology of Mission, revised 
edition, (London: SPCK, 1995), pp. 33 - 34. 
54. Lesslic Newbigin, 'Mission in die World Today,' in A Word in Season, pp. 127 - 128. 
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necessarily and eternally to all); and 'annihilationism' (die equation of hell widi die cessation 
of existencc).^^ He prefers die classical view of heU as etemal conscious punishment, for die 
others minimise die saving work of Christ.^ He then asks. What of diose who have never 
heard? and answers not unlike Newbigin: 'The quandaries we sense must be left to Christ. He 
alone is the final Judge who determines die fate of die lost. In fact, it is only because we 
personally know God himself in Jesus Christ that we can trust him and totally commit diis 
decision to him. For we know that no sentence will be pronounced except by God himself, 
who has endured our condition and suffered to save every person.'" Yet, where Newbigin is 
hopeful, Phillips is not: 'Consistent widi die overwhelming data of Scripture,' he writes, 'we 
must be pessimistic about diose who have never heard.'^ * 
The second sort prefers to be more speculative. For instance, George Lindbeck 
(another of D'Costa's exclusivists^') envisions a post-mortem encounter widi Christ. He 
argues that Christian language has been understood exclusively eidier as 'cognitive,' or 
'experiential-expressivist;' the former focusing on its cognitive content, die latter on its 
symbolic expression of religious experience. Against both, he proposes a 'culttiral-linguistic' 
model which regards such language as enabUng people to religiously experience die worid. 
When applied to Christian doctrines of salvation, diis results in an interesting dilemma for i f 
Lindbeck is correct, one must be fluent in die Christian language in order to experience either 
salvation or judgment. Thus, extra ecclesiam nulla salus is balanced by extra ecclesiam 
nulla damnatio.^^ This is not to say, however, diat diose unacquainted widi Christian 
language are confined to Umbo, for all wUl be evangehzed at deadi. 'The proposal is diat 
dying itself be pictured as die point at which every human being is ultimately and expressly 
confronted by die gospel, by die crucified and risen Lord. It is only dien diat die final 
decision is made for or against Christ.... AH previous decisions, whether for faidi or against 
faidi, are prehminary.'^^ Thus, 'It is only dirough explicit faidi that men and women are 
55. Timodiy R. Phillips, 'Hell: A Christological Reflection,' in Through No Fault of Their Own?, 
pp. 47 - 53. 
56. Phillips, 'Hell: A Christological Reflection,' pp. 53 - 58. 
57. Phillips, 'Hell: A Christological Reflection,' p. 59. 
58. Phillips, 'Hell: A Christological Reflection,' p. 58. 
59. Gavin D'CosUi, 'Theology of Religions,' in The Modem Theologians, volume 11, ed. David Ford, 
(London: Oxford, 1989), p. 277. 
60. George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. 
(London: SPCK, 1984). 
61. Lindbeck. The Nature of Docuine. p. 59. 
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redeemed; and i f diis does not happen during fife, dien die beginning of salvation must be 
diought of as occurring tiirough an encounter widi the risen Lord in or after death.' 
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Still others hope for a.universal yet distinctively Christian salvation, the most obvious 
representative being Kari Bardi. In die previous chapter, it was shown that his doctiine of 
election seems to entail some kind of Christocentric universal salvation, even diough he 
reftised to spell out its logical implications. For him, God's judgment on humanity -
rejection and death - has been transferred from all eternity to Jesus Christ. Likewise, in and 
dirough Jesus Christ, God has given salvation and life to all.*" (ConsequenUy, Paul Knitter is 
wrong to use him to speak for what he calls 'The Conservative Evangelical View,' which holds 
that 'without an encounter widi Christ, eternal life is not possible.'^) Thus, die exclusivist 
concem that Christian salvation is found only in Christ, is preserved and at die same time, 
whether dirough agnosticism, post-mortem evangelization, or Christocentric universalism, 
salvation is extended to diose outside Christianity. The popular definition of exclusivism 
cleariy is inapplicable. 
In die light of diese nuances, one option might be simply to co-opt Newbigin, 
Lindbeck, Barth and others into inclusivism.^ This, however, overiooks die key disagreement 
between those typically called exclusivists and inclusivists. To develop diis point, I return to 
die distinctions drawn between Barth and Rahner at die close of die previous chapter. First, 
since botii conceive of salvation in Christian terms, heartily affirming that any and all 
salvation is that salvation won by Christ, die quarrel is not over die nature of salvation. 
Second, since Barth and Rahner expressed hope in die universal salvific wdl of God, it is also 
clear that die difference is not over its scope. The dispute lies in dieir conceptions of die role 
62. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 59. 
63. George Lindbeck, 'Unbelievers and the Sola Christi,' in Dialog. 12 (1973), p. 182. See also his 
'Fides ex audiiu and die Salvation of Non-Christians,' in The Gospel and the Ambiguity of the 
Church, ed. Vilmos Vajta, (Minneapolis: Foruess Press, 1974), pp. 92 - 123 and The Nature of 
Doctrine, pp. 46 - 72. 
64. CDII.2,pp. 123, 167. 
65. Paul Knitter, No Other Name?, pp. 79, 75 - 96. 
66. Race uies to draw Barth into inclusivism as a result of David Lochhead's The Dialogical 
Imperative: A Christian Refiection on Interfaith Encounter. (London: SCM, 1988). Unlike many of 
Earth's critics, Lochhead balances the early Barthian cridque of religion with the later Banhian 
expectation of 'secular parables of the Kingdom' (pp. 31 - 39). On this reassessment. Race writes, 
'This is in interesting conuadiction to the usual interpretation placed on Barth, but in die typology 1 
have adopted, it just as easily draws him into the inclusivist band.' Race, Christians and Religious 
Pluralism, p. 151. 
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of religion in salvation. Whereas Barth insisted that die Christian God saved despite 
religions, Rahner held that God did so dirough religions. In so far as Newbigin, Lindbeck, 
and others follow Barth in dieir reluctance to ascribe a saving role to reUgions diey remain 
exclusivists. 
Shifting the debate between exclusivism and inclusivism away from die number of the 
saved to die role of religion in salvation in diis way direatens die exclusivistAnclusivist 
boundary as usually articulated by die direefold typology. According to Hick, inclusivists are 
driven away from die morally wicked notion that exclusivist approaches to odier religions 
reserve redemption for a few and damnation for the rest. Yet die dieologians mentioned 
above, by retaining dieir distincdy exclusivist flavour widiout limiting die scope of salvation, 
undermine this contention. Ironically, close scmtiny may uncover some exclusivists extending 
die scope of salvation beyond diat of many inclusivists, dius rendering die labels non-
sensical.*' Thus, whde it involves rhetorical flourish to denounce one's opponents for 
consigning most of humanity to hell, it is often untrue and always sensationahst. I dierefore 
conclude diat more often than not, die typology's account of exclusivism is deficient. 
The polemical character of die typology is confinmed further by examining arguments 
for pluralist pxDsition. As we have seen, pluralism purports to offer die greatest possibility of 
salvation to die greatest number of people by arguing that die great religions are 
independendy authentic avenues of salvation/Uberation. The remaining paragraphs of diis 
section explore one ediical and one philosophical argument for pluralism. In bodi cases, I will 
show that die position each advances is not pluralism but a version of (post-)Christian 
inclusivism.** 
67. William Lane Craig astutely observes that because 'salvation is available to more people under 
inclusivism.... does not imply that more people actually avail themselves of salvation.... It is 
perverse to call a view inclusivistic if it docs not actually include any more people in salvation' dian 
does exclusivism. William Lane Craig, 'Politically Incorrect Salvation,' in Christian Apologetics in 
die Postmodern Worid. ed. Timodiy R. Phillips and Dennis Okholm, (Downer's Grove: InterVarsity, 
1995). p. 84. 
68. Criticising the pluralist position as implicitly exclusivist or inclusivist is not new. In addition to 
D'Costa's article cited above, see for example, John V. Apczynski, 'John Hick's Theocenuism: 
Revolutionary or Implicidy Exclusivist?' in Modem Theology. 8 (1992), pp. 39 - 52; Gavin D'Costa, 
'The New Missionary: John Hick and Religious Plurality,' in International Bulletin of Missionary 
Research. 15 (1991), pp. 66 - 69; J.A. DiNoia, The Diversity of Religions, pp. 34 - 64; S. Mark 
Heim, 'Salvations: A More Pluralistic Hypothesis,' in Modem Theology. 10 (1994), pp. 341 - 360, 
Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion, 13-43, esp. pp. 23 - 43; Ted Peters, 'Pluralism as a 
Theological Problem,' in The Christian Century. 100 (1983), pp. 843 - 845; and Kathryn Tanner, 
'Respect for Other Religions: A Christian Antidote to Colonialist Discourse,' in Modem Theology. 9 
(1993), pp. 1-18. 
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An ethical argument for a pluralist position can be found in Paul Knitter's 'Toward a 
Liberation Theology of Religions' which begins with a familiar pliiralist rallying cry: 
only through the vision, the motivation, the empowerment coming from the 
religious symbols and experience will human kind be able to overcome its innate, 
warring selfishness; only through the hope and self-sacrificing love bom of 
religious experience will humans be able to "muster the energy, devotion, vision, 
resolution, capacity to survive disappointment that will be necessaiy - that are 
necessary - for the challenge" of building a better and more just world. ' 
In order to avoid the charge of relativism where '"many" means "any" and no one can make 
any evaluative judgments,'™ Knitter proposes that such evaluations be made on the basis of 
liberation theology: 'both basic humanitarian concerns as well as the soteriologies of most 
religions would seem to dictate that a preferential option for the poor constitutes both the 
necessity and the primary purpose of interreligious dialogue.'^' 
Liberation tiieology enables pluralism without relativism in three ways. First, it 
brings the "hermeneutics of suspicion' into theology of religions. 'Why, really, have Christians 
been so insistent on maintaining die doctrine of extra ecclesiam nulla salus..., or the claim 
that Christ has to be the final norm for all other religions?' Knitter asks, 'Certainly it cannot be 
denied that in the past such doctrines and such christology have been used to justify the 
subordination and exploitation of other cultures and religions.'^ Traditional positions 
supporting the economic oppression by 'Christendom' of others must be forsaken. Second, it 
provides a common context for dialogue. Noting the move away from positing a rehgious 
common ground or essence, he wonders how interreligious dialogue can occur. 'This is where 
a liberation theology of religions may be of great help. I f there is no preestabhshed common 
ground or common essence that we can invoke before dialogue, perhaps tiiere is a common 
approach or a common context with which we can begin dialogue...'^ This common 
approach or context is Soteria - justice for the poor and oppressed.''^  Finally, it gives 
69. Paul F Knitter, Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' in The Myth of Christian 
Uniqueness, ed. John Hick and Paul F. Knitter, (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1987), p. 179, citing Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith, The Faith of Other Men. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 127. 
70. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' p. 181. 
71. Knitter,'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,'p. 181. 
72. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' p. 182. 
73. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' p. 185. 
74. Knitter, Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' p. 187. He continues, For Christians, that 
which constituted the basis and goal for interreligious dialogue, that which makes mutual 
understanding and cooperation between the religions possible..., that which unites the religions in 
common discourse and praxis is not how they are related to Christ..., nor even how they respond to 
and conceive of God, but rather, to what extent they are promoting Soteria... - to what extent they 
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theology of religions a 'general criteria that a variety of religions could agree to work with as a 
basis for grading themselves.'^ ^ Such criteria would be rooted in a common 'feeling of 
obligation to stand on the side of the poor and oppressed against the rich and oppressor.'^ * 
They need not lead to a new 'ethical Archimedean point outside the praxis of liberation and 
dialogue.... The criteria - what elements contribute to authentic, full liberation - can be known 
only in the actual praxis of struggling to overcome suffering and oppression, and only in the 
praxis of dialogue.'^ 
Furthermore, liberation theology enables Christians to affimi Christ without 
accepting orthodox chrisiology.^^ First, it holds that whether or not Christ is God's final 
revelation is unknowable. I f 'praxis is both the origin and the confirmation of theory or 
doctrine,'^^ everything known about Jesus must originate in and be continually be confirmed, 
clarified and corrected by the praxis of his teachings. Thus his normativity will only be 
discovered in the 'praxis of Christian dialogue with other religions - following Christ, 
applying his message, within the dialogue with otiier believers....'^ As such praxis is only 
beginning, i t is now impossible to know i f Jesus is God's final revelation. Second, it reveals 
that knowledge of Christ's uniqueness unnecessary. It is 'subordinate to carrying out the 
preferential option for the poor and nonpersons. Orthodoxy becomes a pressing concern only 
when it is necessary for orthopraxis - for carrying out the preferential option and promoting 
the kingdom.'^' Nevertheless, Christ's 'message is a sure means for bringing about liberation 
from injustice and oppression, that it is an effective, hope-filled, universally meaningful way 
of realizing Soteria and promoting God's kingdom.'*^ This knowledge alone is sufficient. 
Third, it grades religions: 'from their ethical, soteriological fruits we shall know them - we 
are engaged in promoting human welfare and bringing about liberation with and for the poor and 
nonpersons.' p. 187. 
75. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' p. 189. 
76. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' p. 189. 
77. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' pp. 189 - 190. 
78. That the ontological baggage must be dropped is inevitable: 'In order to avoid preesiablished 
absolutist positions that prevent a genuinely pluralistic dialogue. Christians must, it seems, revamp 
or even reject their u-aditional understanding of Jesus Christ as God's final, definitive, normative 
voice.' Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' p. 191. 
79. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' p. 191. 
80. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' p. 192. 
81. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' p. 192. 
82. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' pp. 192 - 193. 
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shall be able to judge whether and how much other religious paths and their mediators are 
salvific.'^ By applying Soteria, Christians may one day find that Jesus is in fact unique, but 
we may otiierwise discover tiiat he is one among several mediators. And yet, 'whetiier such 
discernments about uniqueness and finality are eventually made or not is... not Uiat important 
- as long as we, with all peoples and religions are seeking first the kingdom and its justice 
(Matt. 6:33).'^ Finally, it can mediate non-absolutist christologies to the faitiiful by removing 
any perceived threat while bringing deeper commitment to Christ and by leading beUevers into 
a better understanding and practice of the language of die New Testament.^ 
Whether or not Uiis position is actually 'pluralist' according to the accepted definition 
can be explored by asking die following question. Given die different religious and cultural 
conceptions of justice, which is absolute? According to the above argument, it is die justice 
which liberates die poor and oppressed. But diis dismisses a priori rival conceptions of 
justice. Consider a 'justice' rooted in karma: it may argue tiiat die poor and oppressed are 
being punished for sins perpetrated in previous incarnations and hence to liberate diem would 
be to interfere widi that just retribution.^ The problem created by the confrontation of rival 
conceptions of justice, however, is often far more tangible dian such philosophical 
speculations. Once again, Lesslie Newbigin eloquentiy summarises die dilemma when he 
writes 'We all long for justice, and it is these passionate struggles tiiat tear the worid to pieces. 
There is a tragic irony in... Aloysius Pieris's definition of true religion as a"revolutionary 
urge... to generate a new humanity" while his beloved Sri Lanka is being torn to pieces by 
rival claims to "justice".'*^ Newbigin thus reminds us that rival defmitions inevitably 
translate into claims that some 'justices' are superior to others. Though admitting that diere is 
83. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' p. 193. 
84. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' p. 194. 
85. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' pp. 195 - 196. In this way, the community 
will be assured that theologians 'who are exploring... a nonabsoluust christology are doing so not 
merely for the sake of novelty or for the sake of joining the excitement of a truly pluralist 
interreligious dialogue; rather they do so because "the love of Christ urges them" (2 Cor. 5:14). 
They want to be faithful to the original message of die Nazarean - Uiat to which Jesus always 
subordinated himself: the kingdom of love, unity and justice.' pp. 196 - 197. 
86. Karmic law is summarised by the Chandogya Upanisad (v. 7), which stales '...those who are of 
pleasant conduct here - die prospect is indeed, diat diey will enter a pleasant womb, either the womb 
of a brahmin, or the womb of a ksairiya, or the womb of a vaisya. But those who are of slinking 
conduct here - the prospect is, indeed, that diey will enter a slinking womb, either the womb of a 
dog, or die womb of a swine, or the womb of an outcasie (candala).' Quoted in A Sourcebook in 
Indian Philosophy, ed. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957), pp. 66 - 67. 
87. Newbipin. The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, p. 146. 
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no Archimedean arbitrator vindicating his conception of justice,** Knitter holds, albeit 
tentatively, that only tiiose resonating with his are legitimate. 
I f this objection is correct, then Knitter's argument does not free Christian theology of 
reUgions from a restrictive christological absolute, but simply replaces an absolute christology 
wiUi an equally absolute justice. He must therefore demonstrate why his 'justice', embedded 
as it is in a modem Western context, transcends and evaluates (however tentatively) all others. 
He is thereby committed to an argument for die uniqueness and supremacy of contemporary 
Western culture.*' Thus, die charge of (post-)Christian inclusivism is established. The 
argument is (post-)Christian in that its conception of justice is rooted in, but not limited to a 
Christian understanding. It is inclusive in that it reserves for itself die abUity to evaluate 
accurately other culturally embedded conceptions of justice. It is dierefore inappropriate to 
designate diis position 'pluralist' for it does not conform to die accepted definition. The great 
religions are not independently authentic ways of salvation/liberation, but are effective only 
insofar as diey embody Soteria. 
Now, let us return to Hick's philosophical argument for pluralism. By die nature of 
the case, his argument is meta-critical: it cannot be limited by Christianity, or any religion. 
Take for instance die following excerpt from An Interpretation of Religion: 
That there is not just one but a plurality of such historical channels is prominent 
among the facts for which an interpretation of religion must account. In doing so 
it will inevitably have to go beyond die dominant self-understanding of each 
tradition. For each has come over the centuries to regard itself as uniquely 
. superior to die odiers, seeing them either as lying outside die sphere of salvation, 
or as earlier stages in an evolution of which it is the culmination, or as less full and 
authentic versions of itself But diis cannot be sustained on impartial grounds. A 
genuinely pluralistic hypothesis will dius inevitably call, at least by implication, for 
further development within each of the u-aditions. Change is in fact going on all 
the time by means of interpretation, exegesis, commentary, midrash, dieological 
experimenu and insofar as each of die world religions comes, in today's global city, 
to see itself as one among many it will use diese methods to deemphasise its won 
absolute and exclusive claim, allowing diis to fall into the background and 
eventually to become absorbed into its past history.^ 
Hick's pluraUsm strives to be a mctacritique of all reUgious experience and activity. It follows 
dien that to be a pluralist, one must cultivate die ability to 'stand back' from one's u-adition." 
Ordy this departure enables one to see widi W.C. Smith, Hick's most immediate influence, die 
88. Knitter, 'Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions,' pp. 187 - 188. 
89. Heim, Salvations, p. 93; for an example of such an argument, see John Rawls, A Theory of 
Liberalism. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). 
90. lOR, pp. 2-3. 
91. GUF.p. 132. 
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obvious. Smith writes, 'The unity of humankind's religious history is so obvious, once one 
sees it. We have, however, been assiduously trained not to see it. Even more strongly, we 
have been pressured not to diink it; and not to feel it.'*^ Thus, die objective of philosophical 
pluralists such as Hick is to constiiict a theory unlimited by die cordines of any religious 
ti-adition. 
Nevertheless, die call to stand back is increasingly being answered by diose from 
various philosophical and dieological persuasions asking, 'stand where?' Lesslie Newbigin 
suggests that die standpoint is that of a consumer-oriented society. While pluralism 'owes 
much to the Hindu concept of die ishta devata, die god of one's choice, diere is litde doubt 
that it is attractive to contemporary inhabitants of die affluent Nordi because it corresponds 
exactiy to the edios of the consumer society where die choice of the customer is free and 
sovereign.''^ Simdariy, J.A. DiNoia observes that pluralist hypotheses 'do not so much 
account for the diversely featured religious worid diey observe as suggest some important 
changes in it. They can be read as in effect inviting die Christian community and, by 
impUcadon, other religious communities as weU, to entertain and adopt certain revisions and 
their doctrines.''^ Finally, John Milbank writes, 'The terms of discourse which provide bodi 
die favored categories for encounter widi other religions - dialogue, pluralism, and die like -
togedier widi the criteria for the acceptable limits of die pluralist embrace - social justice, 
liberation, and so forth - are themselves embedded in a wider Western discourse become 
globally dominant.'*^ 
Thus, Newbigin, DiNoia, and Milbank, from exclusivist, inclusivist, and 
postmodernist perspectives, make clear that when Hick and Smith ask Christians to 'stand 
back' from dieir Christianity, diey are in effect caUing for a shift to another tradition entirely, 
and that diis ti-adition is not widiout its own absolute and potentially intolerant claims. 
(Though as Peter Donovan righdy notes, 'a cynic might well be intrigued to see die 
descendants of Calvin and of die Inquisition joining forces widi die disciples of Nietzsche to 
92. Wilfred Cantwell Smidi, Towards a Worid Theology, p. 6. 
93. Lesslie Newbigin, 'Religion for the Marketplace,' in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered, p. 138. 
Similar criticisms can be found in his Truth to Tell: The Gospel as Public Truth. (London: SPCK, 
1991); The Gospel in a Pluralist Society; and A Word in Season: Perspectives on Christian World 
Mission, chapters 7 - 10, 14. 
94. J.A. DiNoia, 'Pluralist Theology of Religions: Pluralistic or Non-Pluralistic?' in Christian 
Uniqueness Reconsidered, p. 121. 
95. John Milbank, 'The End of Dialogue,' in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, p. 175. 
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give lessons on tolerance to die children of die Enlightenment!')** S. Mark Heim summarises 
tills doubt: 
of the vast religious diversity in the world, the pluralists affirm as fully vahd only 
that narrow segment where believers have approximated die audiors' approach to 
Uieir own tradition. The many faiUis of Uie world - even in Uieir exclusivisl 
versions - may all save in some sense, but only according to a plan the pluralist 
understands and other believers do not. It is clearly staled dial those widiout a 
pluralistic understanding of dieir faidi stand urgendy in need of fulfilment and 
enlightenment. Widiout such conversion diey and Uieir traditions are at least 
latent threats to world peace and justice, morally dangerous as well as dieologically 
wrong. Oddly enough, then, diese opponents of claims to superiority or 
normativeness see no hope, not only for the Christian uadition but for all other 
religions and the world itself, unless dieir own views prevail.'^ 
On the basis of Hick's own aims as well as of some of die attacks launched against diem, dien, 
we can safely conclude that diis philosophical argument for pluralism is in fact anodier 
variety of (post-)Christian inclusivism. It is (post-)Christian because its dominant exponents 
continue to be Christian dieologians; it is inclusive because it retains die right to evaluate the 
soteriological efficacy of non-pluralist traditions according to its own criteria. Thus, when 
subjected to close scrutiny, actual arguments for pluralism looks less pluralistic Uian the 
definition suggests. Therefore, the typological account of pluralism is deceptive. 
2,3 The Soteriological Axis 
It is now clear diat commonly accepted definitions of exclusivism and pluralism mask 
subtieties and ambiguities in each, diereby underscoring die original charge: that die typology 
is a polemical device which denies the validity of non-pluralist positions and supports the 
inevitability of pluralism. I now want to consider whether die typology could be rescued by 
shifting die axis from questions of salvation to related but distinct questions of trudi, fi-om 
soteriology to epistemology. Through an examination of die confusion created by Race's 
definitions, I wi l l show that such a shift direatens die internal boundaries of die typology. 
I begin widi his definition of exclusivism which 'counts die revelation in Jesus Christ 
as Uie sole criterion by which all religions... can be understood and judged.''* This definition, 
unlike Hick's soteriological one, embraces all exclusivists. For example, die self-proclaimed 
soteriological exclusivist Harold Netiand includes in his defirution die following phrases: '... 
(c) die Bible is God's unique revelation, and thus is true and audioritative; and (d) where the 
claims of Scripture are incompatible widi diose of other faiths, the latter are to be rejected as 
96. Peter Donovan, 'The Intolerance of Religious Plurahsm,' in Religious Studies. 29 (1993), p. 210. 
97. S. Mark Heim, 'Crisscrossing the Rubicon: Reconsidering Religious Pluralism,' in The Christian 
Century, 108 (1991), p. 688. 
98. Race. Christians and Religious Pluralism, p. 11. 
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false.'" Eschatological agnostic, Newbigin agrees: 'in Jesus, die absolute truth has been made 
present amid die relativities of human cultures....''*" This exclusivism affirms not that odier 
religions are false in toto, but only where dieir claims conflict with die claims of Scripture or 
die revelation of God in Jesus Christ. However, where Hick's definition too narrowly defines 
exclusivism, Race's too broadly embraces some inclusivists. For instance, Qark Pinnock -
one of a growing number of inclusivist evangelicals- writes, 'Recognizing trutii in odier 
religions does not take any glory away from Jesus Christ. For i f all treasures of wisdom and 
knowledge are hid in him, die truth anyone possesses is a facet of die trudi in Jesus....'"" 
Moreover, most Roman Catholic inclusivists also affirm that a property Christian evaluation 
of oUier religions is rooted in Jesus Christ. Jacques Dupuis is unequivocal: 'We traditionally 
affirm that Jesus is unique not only as any person whom God would choose as the vehicle of a 
divine self-revelation and self-manifestation would necessarily be unique... but in die sense 
that, by and in Jesus, God effected a self-manifestation in a manner that is decisive and can be 
neitiier surpassed or repeated.'"^ 
His summary of inclusivism fares litde better. He writes, 'To be inclusive is to 
believe that all non-Christian religious truth belongs ultimately to Christ and die way of 
discipleship which springs from his way.''"' The inclusivists just mentioned, whether Roman 
CaUioIic or evangelical, would subscribe to dtis definition. However, so would exclusivists 
following Hendrik Kraemer who hold that while much in die religions is erroneous, 'God 
works and has worked in man outside the sphere of biblical revelation.'"** He continues. Even 
in diis fallen worid God shines dirough in a broken troubled way: in reason, in nature and in 
history.'"^ Again, Newbigin writes of an 'awareness of God which seems to be part of human 
99. Harold Nedand, Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism and the Question of Truth. (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), p. 34. 
100. Newbigin. The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, p. 163. 
101. Clark Pinnock. A Wideness in God's Mercy, p. 139. 
102. Jacques Dupuis, Jesus Christ at the Encounter of the Worid Religions, pp. 91 - 110, 178 - 206, 
esp. p. 92. See also Rahner, Foundations of the Christian Faith, chapter 10, 'Jesus Christ in Non-
Christian Religions,' pp. 311 - 321, esp. pp. 312 - 313; and D'Costa, Theology and Religious 
Pluralism, pp. 70 - 75, 81 - 139, esp. pp. 135 - 137. 
103. Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, p. 38 
104. Hendrik Kraemer, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian Worid. (London: Edinburgh 
House, 1938), p. 136. 
105. Hendrik Kraemer, Religion and the Christian Faith. (London: Lutterworth, 1956), p. 232. 
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nature wherever it appears.''"* The confusion is even more apparent when one sets diese 
definitions together. I f die revelation in Jesus Christ is die sole criterion of religious trudi 
(exclusivism), does it not dien foUow diat all religious trudi belongs ultimately to Christ 
(inclusivism)? Likewise, i f all refigious trudi belongs to Christ (inclusivism), dien is not his 
revelation die sole criterion (exclusivism)? I f die central issue is the standard of religious 
truth, then according to Race's definitions, exclusivists and inclusivists agree that it is Jesus 
Christ. The difference between diem seems to be not one of substance but degree: bodi agree 
that trudi exists in other religions, but how much may be debated. On die odier hand, Race 
may mean by his definitions to say that exclusivists hold that Uiere is no trudi outside 
Christianity and that inclusivists are more open-minded. I f diis is his intention, then judging 
by the exclusivists cited above, he is wrong. I dierefore conclude that on die distinction 
between exclusivism and inclusivism. Race's epistemological definitions are eidier incoherent 
or incorrect. 
Finally, consider his definition of pluralism: 'knowledge of God is partial in all faitiis, 
including die Christian. Religions must acknowledge their need of each other i f die full truth 
about God is to be available to mankind.'"" The first sentence, as far as I can tell, contains 
one proposition: Partial knowledge of God is found in all faiths; and die corollary: 
Christianity's knowledge of God is partial. Consider die former: perhaps only die most 
extreme Barthian would deny that this is in fact the case. As we have seen, the possibility of 
genuine religious knowledge outside Christianity is affimied by dieologians regardless of 
typological location. The latter is as uncontroversial for even die most fervent exclusivist 
holds that 'Now we see but a poor reflection as in a mirror.... Now I know in part;' (1 
Corinthians 13:12). Thus, the first half of diis definition says nodiing to distinguish pluralism 
from its typological interiocutors. The point of departure, dien, lies in die second sentence: 
Religions must acknowledge dieir need of each other i f die full truth about God is to be 
available to humanity. 
There is an admirable humiUty about diis sentence and it is certainly true that die 
truth is much greater dian any one person or any one religious tradition can grasp. 
106. Newbigin. The Gospel in a Pluralist Societv. p. 73. Similar views are expressed by Sir Norman 
Anderson in Christianity and Worid Religions: The Challenge of Pluralism. (Downer's Grove: 
InterVarsity, 1984), pp. 112 - 136 and Stephen Neill, Christian Faith and Other Faiths: The 
Christian Dialogue with Other Religions. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). Revised and 
reprinted as Crises of Belief: The Christian Dialogue with Faith and No Faith. (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1984). This argument for natural revelation, in spite of Earth's denial, is a cenu^ al part of 
classical Reformed dieology. See Calvin, Institutes. Book 1, 'The Knowledge of God the Creator,' 
esp. chapters 1 - V, pp. 33 - 68. 
107. Race. Christians and Religious Pluralism, p. 72. 
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Nevertheless, this humility is at best superficial. At worst, die definition deceptively makes a 
claim to privileged epistemic access. On this point, Lesstie Newbigin is particulariy eloquent: 
In die famous story of the blind men and die elephant, so often quoted in die 
interest of religious agnosticism, die real point of die story is constandy 
overiooked. The story is told from die point of view of die king and his courtiers, 
who are not blind but can see that the blind men are unable to grasp the full reality 
of the elephant and are only able to get a hold of part of the truth. The story is 
constantly told in order to neutralize die affirmation of the great religions, to 
suggest that diey learn humility and recognize that none of diem can have more 
dian one aspect of the trudi. But, of course, the real point of the story is exacdy the 
opposite. If the king were also blind diere would be no story. The story is told by 
die king, and it is the immensely arrogant claim of one who sees the full uuth 
which all the world's religions are only groping after. It embodies the claim to 
know die full reality which relativizes all the claims of the religions and 
philosophies."** 
Newbigin's point is underscored when one considers die epistemological situation of pluralisls 
who make specific claims about die nature of reality. Compare for example, John Hick's 
central diesis widi a typicaUy exclusivist one. Hick insists that die great reUgions embody 
independenUy audientic, saving responses to die one Ultimate ReaUty. Furthermore, he has 
written numerous books and articles in an attempt to convince die widest possible audience 
that this is die case. Likewise, an exclusivist holding that salvation is found only in Jesus 
Christ. In diis chapter, I have cited a number of authors who, believing diis to be die case, 
have written books and essays to convince others of its truUi. It is crucial to note that die 
epistemological situations of both dieses are identical: both make claims about reality; bodi 
marshall evidence and compose arguments in support of diem; both hold people disagreeing 
widi them to be mistaken."^ Epistemologically speaking dien, diere is nodiing pluralistic 
about the plurahst hypodiesis."" 
One pluralist openly acknowledging diis epistemological exclusivism is Peter Byrne. 
Like Race, the focus of his attention is the epistemology of religious beUef; unlike Race, he far 
108. Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, pp. 9 - 10. 
109. It is possible to reinterpret one claim in the light of the odier. Hick does diis dirough his 
argument for 'mythologising' the particularistic uans-historical truth claims of die religions - and in 
this case, diose of ordiodox christology. See especially MGI. MeGl and 'The Logic of God 
Incarnate,' in DQ. S. Mark Heim, while by no means a tfadilional exclusivist, has done just the 
opposite by recasting Hick's hypothesis as a non-realist affirmation of tolerance. In this way, the 
pluralist hypothesis is seen not to describe reality, but to describe an attitude which is wholly 
compatible with a Christian woridview. See S. Mark Heim, The Pluralistic Hypothesis, Realism and 
Post-Eschatology,' in Religious Studies. 28 (1992), and Salvations: Truth and Difference in 
Religion, pp. 35 - 42. Such strategies, however, only end up affirming that bodi claims cannot be 
true in a realist sense. 
110. For argument for this thesis from the perspective of analytic philosophy of religion, see Alvin 
Plantinga, 'Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,' unpublished paper supplied by the 
author. 
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more accurately, i f not exhaustively, typifies the various epistemological interpretations of 
religious plurality into naturahsm, confessionalism, pluralism, relativism and varieties of what 
he calls neutralism. I do not want to enter into a discussion of die merits of Byrne's 
typological arrangement here. For my purposes, the following observations are important. 
First, Byrne regards exclusivism and inclusivism as soteriological variants widiin 
epistemological confessionalism which 'finds cognitive success in religion, but locates it solely 
or primarily in one confession.'"' Secondly, and more crucially, he presents epistemological 
pluralism as a composition of three minimal elements: 'a fundamental realist commidnent 
arising out of die faiths to die existence of a transcendent, sacred reality; a basic cognitive 
equality between faiths in putting human beings in contact widi diis reality and enabling diem 
to be vehicles of salvation; and finally agnosticism toward, and therefore disengagement 
from, the specifics of any confessional interpretation of religion.'^^^ In other words, 
pluralism is less about a pooling of religious resources to discover truth, as Race indicates, 
and more about die prescription of agnosticism in die face of religious plurality. 
Thus, when die direefold typology is set out along an epistemological axis, one ends 
up not widi diree distinct approaches to rehgious trudi, but widi two muddled varieties of 
exclusivism. On the one hand, die search for religious truth is defined in exclusively Christian 
terms. To be sure their may be degrees of scepticism or hope as to whether or where extra-
Christian truth may be found, but the criteria for discerning that truth are recognisably 
Christian. On die other, pluralists also make particular claims about Uie search for religious 
truUi - claims which purport eidier to refute or reinterpret particular claims of other traditions. 
The labels are meaningless i f exclusivism and inclusivism cannot be distinguished and 
pluralism is simply exclusivism of another type. Defined epistemologicaUy, die typology is 
functionally incoherent. Therefore, such a move does not rescue it from die objections of 
previous sections. 
Conclusion: 
In summary, this chapter sought to show that die exclusivist/inclusivist/pluraUst 
typology is designed to duU die edge of non-pluralist positions. This diesis was suggested by 
an inquiry into the introduction of die typology in die eariy pluralist hypodiesis of John Hick. 
Furthermore, it was confirmed by examinations of both exclusivism and pluralism. 
Definitions of each were deemed to be misleading in die light of exclusivist attempts to 
broaden the scope of salvation and die restrictive nature of die ediical and philosophical 
111. Peter Byrne, Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism: Reference and Realism in Religion. 
(London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 3. 
112. Byrne, Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism, p. 6 (emphasis mine). 
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arguments for pluralism offered by Paul Knitter and John Hick. Finally, I argued diat die 
typology could not be delivered from diese objections by shifting its axis from soteriology to 
epistemology. The epistemological definitions offered by Alan Race, i f anydiing, lead to even 
more problems. Now, in conclusion, die final question must be faced. 
Should die typology be retained at all? I believe it should at least until a superior raie 
is introduced for the following reasons. First, when surveying the exploding amount of 
literature in Christian theology of religions, a grouping of certain authors or positions over 
against others will take place: some kind of typological arrangement is inevitable. Second, 
diis typology has enjoyed a great deal of popularity across confessional boundaries and has, 
despite its polemical nature, been successfully adapted to suit die purposes of non-pluralists. 
Finally, diis popularity and adaptability has, in turn, given a starting-point for much of die 
new work going on in Christian dieology of religions. Neverdieless, its continued use must be 
qualified in two ways. First, it must be admitted that diis typology, as any other, may in fact 
obscure important differences and commonalities while clarifying odiers. Second, its 
preliminary role must be acknowledged. It provides a starting-point which must be 
U-anscended i f research is to be continued, and new proposals offered and debated. In my 
view, die direefold typology is not unlike Wittgenstein's ladder: anyone who understands it 
eventtiaUy recognises it as nonsensical, when one has used it - as steps - to cUmb beyond it. 
One must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after one has climbed up it."^ 
It is time to dirow the ladder away. In Part I I I of diis diesis, I wiU show that Hendrik 
Kraemer, once liberated from die straight-jacket of exclusivist definitions and die constraints 
of die typology in general, opens to Christians a way of being both faithfully Christian and 
radically open to other religions. 1 must first, however, set Kraemer in his historical context 
and summarise his major works. These are the tasks of Part I I . 
113. Adapted from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. u-ans. D.F. Pears and 
B.F. McGuinness, (London: Roudedge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 6.54, p. 74. 
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Chapter 3 
Reading Kraemer in Context 
Introduction: 
Part I , by mtroducing the reader to Chnstian theology of religions in gaieral, provided die 
foundation for Part IE. There, I will show that the Kraemer withstands common objections levelled 
agamst him and continues to contribute important insights to current theological debate. Yet, these 
apologdic and constructive proposals must be postponed until Kraemer has been properly situated 
in his historical context and his work, carefiilly exposited. These are the aims of Part D. This 
diapter will situate Kraemer historically while the one following will s^ out his theology of 
religions. 
Whde Kraemer has nghdy been employed by bodi D'Costa and Race as an exponent of 
the exclusivist position, this is not to say that he is the only one: the most obvious alternatives are 
Kari Earth and Lesslie Newbigin. Nevertheless, my choice of Kraemer is debberate. Despite his 
gigantic stature within and without Reformed Theology, Barth never wrote outside the European 
context.' Kraemer did: 'As a theologian, Kraemer lacks Earth's profundity but, unlike Barth, he 
speaks from real experiaice: he speit years in the field.'^ Like Kraemer, Lesslie Newbigm draws 
upon experieitial resources and has the added advantage of being familiar widi contemporary 
tiieological problems. Yet, he acknowledges in his indebtedness to Kraemer: '1 find myself .. 
1 . Earth's famous reply to D.T. Niles typifies his lack of interest in other religions: When asked by Niles 
how he knew diat Hinduism was unbelief when he had never known a Hindu, BarUi replied, 'a priori,' after 
which Niles only smiled and shook his head. See D.T. Niles, 'Karl Barth - A Personal Memory,' in The 
South East Asian Journal of Theology. 11 (1969), pp. 10-11. 
2 . Barnes Christian Identity and Religious Pluralism, p. 35. 
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bracketed with Kraemer, where I am delighted to be. I would want to be an exclusivist along widi 
Kraemer in believing that God's work in Christ is (to use Kraemer's favorite phrase) sui generis, 
that there is notiiuig that can be put mto the same category as the incarnation, ministry, deadi, and 
resurrection of Jesus. Kraemer affirmed this with passion and I would wish to do so too.'' 
Because he tiius combmes missiologjcal experiaice witii tiieological creativity, I have chosen 
Hendrik Kraemer. 
Indeed, for at least three decades one could not do theology of religions without reference 
to him,"* as WUliam Temple predicted: '[The Christian Message in a Non-Chnstian Woridi is a 
product of... knowledge, experioice and vision. It is likely to remain for many years to come die 
classical treatment of its theme - periiaps the central theme for Christian thought in this age of 
multiform bewilderment.'' Yet, four decades after Temple penned these words, the situation had 
changed: 'Among the younger generation,' wrote Origai Jathanna ui 1981,'... Kraemer seems to be 
a figure of the distant past, oftei hiddai bdund a smoke-screai of undiscrmimatmg critiasm in 
terms of over simplified position defining catdi-words.''^  Now, another fifteen years on, if 
Kraemer's work is mentioned at all, it is either badly distorted or summarily dismissed.' 
3 . Newbigin, 'Mission in the World Today,' p. 127; see also Lesslie Newbigin, 'A Sermon Preached at the 
Thanksgiving Service for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Tambaram Conference of the International 
Missionary Council,' in International Review of Mission. 78 (1988), p. 328, wliere he writes, 'Please permit 
me another autobiographical note. Kraemer always recognized that the most penetrating critic of his 
position was A.G. Hogg, principal of Madras Christian College. Kraemer and Hogg were bodi. for me, 
revered and beloved friends. Both were great missionaries. In the past forty years I have over and over 
again read and reflected upon the debate both here at Tambaram and in the following years, during wliich 
bodi of them (as in proper dialogue) modified their positions. I find myself more and more compelled to 
stand with Kraemer.' 
4 . Kraemer's The Christian Message in a Non-Christian Worid, finally ceased printing in 1969. 
Compare The Christian Message in a Non-Christian Worid. (London: Edinburgh House, 1938) widi The 
Christian Message in a Non-Christian World, (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1969). All subsequent references to 
the original are cited hereafter as CM. 
5 William Temple, 'Foreword,' in CM, p. ix. AR. Gaultieri has expressed a similar opinion; The 
Christian Message 'became die unavoidable standard against -which to formulate one's own views of die 
relationships of Christian to non-Christian faith.' A.R. Gaultieri, 'Theological Evaluations by Christians of 
die Religious Faidi of non-Cliristians,' (unpubUshed Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, 1969), p. 29. 
6 Origen V. Jathanna, The Decisiveness of the Christ Event and the Universahty of Cliristianity in a 
World of Religious Plurality. (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1981), p. 47. Cited hereafter as DCE. 
7 For example, Kraemer's contribution is not mentioned at all in Hick's lOR while in Knitter's No Other 
Name?, he arises only three times and then only to be quickly dismissed again as a 'Bartliian' (see pp. 82, 
111,138). Even the nomially careflil Keidi Ward in Revelation and Religion: A Theology of Revelation in 
the Worid Religions. (London: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 16, caricatures Kraemer's position as 
advocating 'tiiat God has spoken in the Bible and that's that.' Moreover, such abmpt ejections are true nol 
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Consequently, a recovery of Kraemer must b^m with a careful analysis of the historical 
context m which he lived and wrote. This investigation is conducted m three stages, b^inning with 
a general introduction to his life and works. Having compld;ed this introduction, 1 thai sharpai my 
focus to Kraemer's role within the missionary thinking of the eariy ecumaiical movemait by 
critically examining the first three ecumaiical missionary conferaices: Edinburgh 1910, Jerusalem 
1928, and Tambaram 1938. Finally^ the third stage argues that to (dis)regard Kraemer as Earth's 
moudipiece is too sunplistic and that a far more important influoice, albat natively, was William 
Hockirg. This contention is established by outlining chronologically Kraemer's influences as a 
studoit, his experiaices m Indonesia, his aicounter with dialectical theology, and his confrontation 
with the antithesis of the Christian Message. W.E. Hockmg's Re-Thinkuig Missions.* 
3.1 Kraemer's Life and Woriis 
Bom m Amsterdam on May 17, 1888, Haidrik Kraemer saw the death of his fadier in 
1894 and his mother only six years later. With his sister, he was then placed m a Nederiandse 
Hervormde Kerk orphanage, where he came to Christian faith.' At sixteai, after hearing a 
only with those associated with pluralism. The inclusivist Jacques Dupuis, in Jesus Christ at the Encounter 
of World Religions, grants Kraemer two paragraphs, but agam summarily discards him after equating him 
witii Barth (see pp. 105-106, 109). Similarly, in A Wideness in God's Mercy. Clark Pinnock likens 
Kraemer to Barth (p. 108) and demonstrates a thorough misunderstanding of Kraemer's 'totalitarian' view 
of rebgions (p. 115). Even fellow exclusivist Harold Nedand, recalls him only as a figure of the hoary past 
in Dissonant Voices, p. 18. There seem to be only two exceptions. First, Kraemer is remembered in die 
missiological and ecumenical publications of the World Council of Churches (See, for example, die 
International Review of Mission. 78 (1988) and the Ecumenical Review, 41 (1989) - both commemorate 
the fiftieth anniversary of the International Missionary Council Conference at Tambaram, 1938). Second, 
Gavin D'Costa's Theology and Religious Pluralism is one contemporary theological work to offer an 
accurate summary and sensitive critique of ICraemer's work. Unfortunately, it is now nearly a decade since 
publication and it will not be reprinted. 
8 . Of course, this discussion is not intended to be, and indeed cannot be, exhaustive. As W.A. Visser't 
Hooft recalls, Kraemer's 'life has so many different aspects that anyone who desires to write about him 
must first select which of Kraemer's varied contributions he will discuss. There is die pliilologist: there is 
the expert on Islam; there is the leader of the spiritual resistance against National Socialism; there is the 
fighter for the renewal of the Netheriands Reformed Church; there is the professor of dieology wlio is really 
a layman and there is the layman who asks theological questions about modem culture; there is the first 
director of the Ecumenical Institute who gave shape to that new advenhire; and there is, of course, the 
missionary, or rather the missionary thinker, strategist and statesman.' Quoted in Ans J. van der Bent, 
'Kraemer, Hendrik,' in Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement, ed. Nicholas Lossky, et. al., (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), p. 574. 
9 . Gunter Gloede, ed., Okumenishe Gesalten: Bmchenbauer der Einen Kirche. (Berhn: Evangelische 
Veriangenstalt, n.d.), p. 204. See also Wayne Isaac Nicholson, 'Toward a Theology of Comparative 
Religion: A Study in the Thought of Hendrik Kraemer and Wilfred Cantwell Smith,' unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis. Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1978, p. 64; DCE. p. 62. 
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missionary speak of the need for workers in Papua, New Guinea,"* Kraemer resolved to become a 
missionary hunself, thereby embarking on a career whidi would aflfect ecumaiical Protestantism 
greafly. 
In.the autumn of 1905, Kraemer took the first step toward his goal whai he was enroled in 
the newly-opened Nederiandse Zaidingshooge-sdiool in Rotterdam. Although he had not 
completed his secondary education, he was admitted as a candidate for the Utrecht Missionary 
Union (UZV). His years at the sdiool cannot be underestimated for he there became familiar with 
influaitial Dutdi missiologists, among them J.H. Gunning (the sdiool's principal), Nicolaus 
Adriani and A.C. Kruyt." More importandy, Kraemer was initiated into international missiolpgy 
by servmg as J.H. Oldham's guide during Oldham's visit to the N^eriands m 1907 in prqiaration 
for the Worid Missionary Conferaice which was to take place in Edinburgh three years later. 
Most notably though, because they lectured at the sdiool penodically, Kraemer sat under two 
Leidoi University professors who would later influence his theological ideas: W. Brede Knstensei 
and Pierre Chantqiie de la Saussaye.'^  Kraemer failed his final examinations in 1909 because of 
an unsatisfactory result in systematic theology. Whde preparing to rewnte them, he began to study 
languages and displayed an uncanny ability (in six weeks he completed the normally year-long 
Latin course).This impressive linguistic capaaty caught the attaition of Mcolaus Adnaiii, who 
eicouraged Kraemer to specialise in Eastern languages. After passing his examinations with 
honours three mondis later, and another two years of intoise study, Kraemer passed his State 
examinations. Because of his irr^ular pre-University education, passing diese examinations was 
necessary for University admission. He left the UZV to join the Netheriands Bible Society (NBG) 
m June 1911. That autumn, he acted on Adriani's suggestion and oiroled m Leidai University, 
thus taking his second step. 
10 . Nicholson, 'Toward a Theology of Comparative Religion,' p. 65. 
11 . Carl F. Hallencreutz, Kraemer Towards Tambaram: A Study in Hendrik Kraemer's Missionar>' 
Approach, (Uppsala: Gleerup, 1966), pp. 47f Cited hereafter as KTT. 
12 Oldham was a major figure at Edinburgh (he served as its secretary) and at die first International 
Missionary Council conference in Jerusalem in 1928. Because Kraemer was preparing for matriculation, 
he was not able to attend the Edinburgh conference. See KTT. p. 47 n. 2. 
13 . Nicholson, 'Toward a Theology of Comparative Religion,' p. 65. 
14 Nicholson, 'Toward a Theology of Comparative Religion,' p. 66. 
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At the tune, Leidai was the leading centre of Indology in the N^eriands,'' and Kraemer's 
work in Arabic, Javanese, Malay and Orioital literature left him few free moments.Though his 
primary field was linguistics under the Islamicist, Snouck Hurgronje," Kraemer speit much of his 
limited spare time in W. Brede Knstaisai's lectures on Comparative Religion and Pierre Dame! 
Chantqaie de la Saussaye's on Islam. The rest was spait working closely with Chantqsie de la 
Saussaye m the missionary and administrative work of the Dutch Studoit Chnstian Movement 
(DSCM).'^ Through the DSCM, Kraemer also came into contact with the other student Christian 
organisations active in the University: 'De-Vrizinnig-Christelijke-Studaitai-Bond was a forum 
promoting liberal Christianity vMe 'de ethisdioi' was a vdiicle for Christian humanism." J.R. 
Mott, the key figure bdiind Edinburgh 1910 (and the oitire ecumaiical movemait), addressed a 
Study Conference of the D S C M in November, 1913. Whai commaiting on the mission efforts in 
the IXitdi East Indes, he oudined the 'tremendous possibilities' for mission activity among Javanese 
students.^ " Kraemer's interest, sparked by Mott's preseitation, grew through his friendship and 
continued work with Chantqjie de la Saussaye until evaitually, he relinquished his dream of going 
to New Guinea and focused instead on Indonesia. After completing his sixth temi, Kraemer left 
Laden for Hamburg to continue his linguistic work with Karl Meinhoff. b January, 1915, 
however, World War I forced him to return to Leiden where he contmued his studies and assumed 
the diair of the Leidoi DSCM.^' 
It was as diairman that Kraemer attoided and delivered the opaiing address at the 
Nunsp^ Conference in July of that year. His former teacher, Nicolaus Adriani, contributed a paper 
entitled 'Geestelijke stroomingoi onder de Bevolking up Java,'^ ^ in whidi he called for a 
15 . K I T , p. 48. 
16 . Arend Theodoor van Leeuwen, Hendrik Kraemer: Pioneer Per Oekumene, trans. Hemiann VVitsclii, 
(Basel: Basilea Verlag, 1962), p. 13. Cited hereafter as PDO. 
17 . PDO. p. 14. 
18 , K I T , p. 50. 
19 . K7T,p. 59. 
20 . K I T , p. 43. 
21 . ICrT,p. 67f 
22 . Nicolaus Adriani, 'Spiritual Currents among the Javanese,' in International Review of Kdission. 6 
(1917), pp. 113-125. See also KTT. pp. 69f. 
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reoriaitation of mission on Java by cultivating relationships with the emerging Javanese 'elite.''' 
Those taking up the dialleige would require extaisive training in the field in order to become 
familiar with ideological developmaits and the indigenous press. Kraemer contributed to the 
discussion by expanding Adnani's themes and indicating his willingness to direct the operation.""* 
With aicouragemait of Adriani and Chantepie de la Saussaye, and the support of A.W.F. Idaiburg 
(former Governor Gaieral to Indonesia), Kraemer proposed a 'policy of association' to the NBG."^ 
In Mardi, 1916, the Board of the socirty approved the proposal and finalised it the following 
November. Kraemer was to be soit to Java 'for the communication of the Christian message to 
Moslem intellectuals.'^ '^  
The third step in Kraemer's journey to Java was takan that same year whoi he passed his 
'candidaats' examinations cum laude^^ and b^an study for the Ph.D. in Languages, Saaice of 
Religion and Ethnology.^^ IXiring postgraduate study, Kraemer persisted in a variety of extra-
curricular activities, including memberships m several missionary soci^es, working closely witli 
the D S C M and contnbutmg r^ulariy to its journal, 'Ethileto.' In 1919, he mamed Hijke van 
Gemeren and became national president of the DSCM.^^ Finally, on January 28, 1921, Kraemer 
successfully defended his thesis on a rare Javanese Islamic mystical wntmg entitled, 'Eai 
Javannsdie Primbon uit de zestiende eeuw.' 
Nevertheless, the route to Indonesia continued to meander. The fourth stqj involved a 
three month period of study in the history of religions at the Sorbonne with Louis Massignon and 
23 . By 'elite,' Adriani meant those Javanese nationals who, having benefitted fi-om a Western education, 
took up important positions in the colonial civil service and later were among the leaders of the Indonesian 
drive for independence. 
24 . KTT, pp. 70-71. 
25 . Nicholson, Toward a Theology of Comparative Religion,' p. 67. 
26 . KTT, p. 82. 
27 . roO,p. 14. 
28 . P.D. Lathuiliamallo, 'Church and World: A Critical Study About tlie Relation of the Church and 
Worid in the writings of Hendrik Kraemer,' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Union Theological Seniinao', 
1959), p. 15. 
29 . EDO, pp. 17f 
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Marcel Maus,'° while the fifth took bun only as far as the Middle East, where he studied for Islam 
for four months at El-Azhar, the Mushm University in Cairo.'' H s colleagues there soon dubbed 
him 'Sheikh Kraemer,' 'because of .his perfect Arabic and his deep understanding of the Moslem 
faith.''^ Finally in 1922, over a year after completing his Ph.D. and several months after ieavmg 
Holland, Kraemer arrived in Java. It must be emphasised here that just as Kraemer was not a 
theology student at Leidai, neither was he a 'missionary* in Indonesia. His role, in addition to Bible 
translation, was to rqDort regulariy to the N B G concerning the cultural and spiritual situation in the 
colony. The NBG, in turn, passed this information on to the many missionary societies operating in 
tlie islands. To accomplish this task, Kraemer travelled widely and immersed himself in the 
indigenous press and other writings." 
Throughout the twaities, as Indonesia edged towards indepaidence, Dutch mission focus 
shrfted from 'conversion of the natives,' to strengthenmg indigoious Chnstians and their 
responsibility for leadmg the dialogue witii I s l a m . M . Lindebom led this shift on a colony-wide 
scale while Kraemer concerned himself with the implemaitation and expansion of Lindebom's ideas 
on Java. In June, 1923, at the Conferoice of the N^erlands Missionary Union, Kraemer raised 
the indigenous issue and asked for a special conferoice to address it. The next year, whai working 
witli the East Java Mssion, he called for contacts bdweei the mission socidjes and major 
nationalist organisations, mcludmgthe moderate Budi Utomo and the more extreme Sarekat Islam. 
At the conferatce of Javanese-speaking missionanes in Djokjakarta in August, 1924, Kraemer 
expressed particular concern for Christian nationalists who were being portrayed by tlieir Muslim 
counterparts as coloniahst collaborators. To counteract this, he argued for a thoroughly Indonesian 
expression of Christianity and unity among indigoious Christians.'' 
30 . Nicholson, 'Toward a Theology of Comparative Religion,' p. 69. 
31 . PDO, pp. 22-25. 
32 Hans-Ruedi Weber, 'Hendrik Kraemer: A man who obeyed the vision he saw (An address given in 
the Cliapel of the Ecumenical Centre, 15 November 1965),' in The Ecumenical Review, 18 (1966), p. 7. 
33 . Nicholson, 'Toward a Theology of Comparative Rehgion,' p. 69. 
34 . KTr,pp. 140- 144. 
35 . KTT, pp. 144f 
Kraemer's concern for the indigaious Christian population dominated his thought and 
work throughout his first term in Java. He aivisaged an autonomous Indonesia where missions, 
mdqjQideit of the Dutdi govemmoit, could be both positive towards and critical of nationalistic 
elemaits and could prevait the isolation of indigenous Chnstians. Increasingly, this vision forced 
Kraemer to expose the growing Islamicisation and anti-missionary trends within nationalistic 
organisations.'"' In addition, this vision brought him under scrutiny at home where the NBG 
suggested he was becommg too politiased." Yrt, there were also some significant achievements: 
m 1925, the indigeious congr^tion at Djokjakarta welcomed their first Javanese minister and at 
Whitsuntide, 1928, Javanese ministers were first permitted to administer the sacraments.^ * 
That year also marked an interlude in Kraemer's missionary activity whai he left Indonesia 
to diair the session in Islam at the International Missionary Council Conferaice on the Mount of 
Olives, betweai 24 Mardi and 8 April. After the conferaice, ill-health returned Kraemer to the 
Netheriands instead of Java. Persistoit insomnia led him fi-om there to Chnstian psydiologist 
Alphonse Maeder in Switzerland for treatmait. Though his contact with Maeder was bnef, it was 
significant for Maeder introduced him to Emil Brunner.^' It was also during this fijriougli that 
Kraemer first encountered the work of Kari Barth, whom he r^rded with cautious optimism.'"' 
He spait most of 1928 and 1929 convalescing. However, November 11, 1929, saw Kraemer 
embark on a hectic sdiedule again, b^inning with a four month tour of India during which he 
36 . K I T , pp. 144f; 161 - 164, 
37 , K I T , pp. 144f 
38 . KTT, pp. 144f Kraemer's concem for Indonesian Christians is well-illustrated in .the following 
recollection: 'Some small Christian groups had been fomied there [on Bali] and die Church of East Java 
had been requested by these Christians to send pastors. But then came a reaction. A number of 
anthropologists and artists were strongly opposed to any form of Christian work on the island ... Hendrik 
Kraemer had taken up this challenge with his customary energy. He had shown tiiat no culture could live 
any longer in complete isolation. The invasion by Western tourists was a much more disturbing element 
than Christianity. And missions had learned their lesson. Nobody wanted to westernize tlie Balinese. 
What the Church of East Java and he himself had in mind was to help the small church in Bali to work out 
its own forms of Ufe in the light of its own cultural background.' W. A. Visser't Hooft, Memoirs (London: 
SCM, 1973)p. 54. See also Hans-Ruedi Weber, 'The Mission of the Church in East Java on Bali,' in Asia 
and the Ecumenical Movement, (London: SCM, 1966), pp. 170- 179. 
39 . Nicholson, 'Toward a Theology of Comparative Religion,' p. 73; KTT, pp. 21 If; PDO. pp. 66f 
40 . KTT, p. 224; see also Theodoms Lamberms Haitjema, Karl BartiVs "Kritische" Theologje. trans. 
Peter Schumacher (Wagenigan: F. Veenmehr & Zonen, 1926). 
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studied Islam for the Indian Y M C A , followed by a return to Indonesia where he found the Church 
in a delicate situation. 
As a result of the national elections of 1929, the right-wing majority in the IXitch 
parliamait mcreased and m 1930 the Vaderiandsche Club, made up of Europeans in Indonesia, 
became the dominant party in the Indonesian People's Council. Moderate and radical nationalists 
reacted to these conservative developmaits by increasing opposition to the colonial govemmait and 
the colonial government responded in turn by imprisoning or exiling nationalist leaders. Kraemer, 
along with many other missionaries, found himself in the middle of this potentially explosive 
situation, opposing both radical nationalist and conservative colonial elements while sympathismg 
with moderate nationalists.'*' Kraemer expressed both his opposition and sympathy in regular 
contnbutions to the periodical 'De Stuw,' a Dutdi penodical 'which stood for a policy of co-
operation with the constructive forces in the nationalist movement.'^ ^ Also during this second stay, 
Kraemer was instrumental in establishing a theological sdiool in D j a k a r t a I n 1935, however, ill-
health again took Kraemer back to the Netheriands. 
Shortly thereafter, W. Brede Kristensen retired fi-om Leiden University and recommended 
Kraemer to succeed him in the Chair of History and Phenomaiology of Religion. Kraemer 
accqDted and on December 3, 1937, delivered his inaugural lecture. Entitied, 'De Woriaai can het 
Syncrdisme,' it foreshadowed mudi of The Chnstian Message m a Non-Christian worid. whidn 
was published one year later.** Over Chnstmas, 1938, Kraemer was a centre of controversy at the 
International Missionary Council Conference, wWdi was convened at Madras Chnstian College, 
Tambaram, India. Kraemer rd:umed fi-om Tambaram to a Dutch Reformed Church sharply 
divided along liberal and conservative lines. Heice, in addition to his University responsibilities, 
Kraemer also b^an to work in churdi raiewal. Once again, though, his activities were hampered 
by a World War. 
41 . KTT, pp. 230 - 236. 
42 . Visser't Hooft, Memoirs, p. 54. Visser't Hooft goes on to record that eventually, the journal was 
forced to cease publication 'because of the fierce opposition it aroused in government circles ' 
43 . Nicholson, 'Toward a Theology of Comparative Religion,' p. 74. 
44 . PDO. p. 160. 
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During the occupation of Holland, Kraemer actively opposed the Nazis by writing 
pamphlOs and by resigning his University Chair m 1941.^ " Bdween 1942 and 1943, Kraemer was 
mterred m the concentration camp at St. Mdiielgestel because of his resistance."** Yet, whai the 
war aided, Kraemer's was an eariy voice calling for reconciliation betweei the German and 
Continaital churches. In 1945, whai delegates of the embryonic World Council of Churches met 
with the Council of the Evangelical Church of Germany, Kraemer r^resented Holland. W.A. 
Visser't Hooft recalls that it was in this capacity that Kraemer 
said there was no hatred in the hearts of Christians in Holland. Those who had suffered 
much had learned to be merciful in their judgment. He hoped we could speak together 
as standing before God.... He understood this as a call to his own church also, that it 
could only live by the forgiveness of sins. It could not be a matter of bartering. In the 
Ught of what had been said the other churches could now say to the German church that 
they were also ready to accept their responsibility for what had happened in Germany.''' 
After the war, Kraemer returned to Leidai, but his post-war University career was short-
lived. In 1947, he resigned in order to become, in cooperation with Suzanne de Dietridi, the first 
director of the Worid Coundl of Churdies' Ecumaiical Institute at Chateau de Bossey (near 
Gaieva).'** As director, Kraemer was the driving force bdiind the creation of tiie Worid Coundl of 
Churches' Regional Study Caitres, in Willingai m 1952,'" Also m 1952, the Institute had its first 
semester as the Graduate School of Ecumaiical Studies. Despite these successes, Kraemer's stay 
in Geneva was also brief: three years later, he returned to Drdbergen, in the N^eriands and 
devoted himself to lectunng, travelling and writing. The immediate result was Kraemer's classic 
restatemeit of his theology of religions, Religion and the Chnstian Faith. Over tiie next rune years, 
Kraemer travelled, lectured and wrote extaisively.'" 
45 . Botli the pamphlets and die resignation were Kraemer's response to Jewish persecution. He resigned 
along with fifty-three other members of faculty when two Jewish colleagues were removed and in a 
pamplilet smuggled out of Holland, he stood against Nazi anti-semitism. See Hendrik Kraemer, 'The 
Riddle of History: Thoughts on Romans IX - XI,' in The International Review of Mission. 32 (1943), pp. 
78 - 87. 
46 . David Edwards, 'Signs of Radicalism in the Ecumenical Movement,' in The Ecumenical Advance: A 
History of tiie Ecumenical Movement. Volume 2, ed. Harold E. Fey, (London: SPCK, 1970), p. 385. 
47 , Visser't Hooft, Memoirs, p, 192, 
48 . W.A. Visser't Hooft, 'The General Ecumenical Development Since 1948' and H. Kruger, 'The Life 
and Activities of the WCC,' both in The Ecumenical Advance. Volume 2, pp. 9, 50. 
49 . Lesslie Newbigin, 'Mission to Six Continents,' in The Ecumenical Advance. Volume 2, p. 185, 
50 . This resulted in the publication of several smaller works, including The Communication of die 
Cliristian Faith. (London: Lutterworth. 1957); Worid Cultures and Worid Religions: The Cominfc^  
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On November 11,1965 at his home in Dreibergai, Hoidrik Kraemer died. Stqjhai Nail's 
tnbute, writtai whai Kraemer was still alive, stands as a fitting qjitaph: 
Everything in tlie career of this outstanding man is paradoxical. He has never been a 
missionary; he went to Indonesia as an expert in languages and Bible translation on 
behalf of the Bible Society of the Netheriands. Yet no living man has exercised a deeper 
influence on missionary thinking. He is a layman. But no minister has had more to do 
with shaping the pattern of the life of the Dutch Reformed Church. He is not a 
theologian. Yet he has read more theology than many of those who make it tlieir 
profession, and by his writings and liis work as the Director of die Ecumenical Institute 
near Geneva he has influenced the theological thinking of many leaders of the younger 
generation." 
3.2 Kraemer and the International Missionary Coundl 
Having completed this introduction to his life and works, I now sharpai my focus to 
Kraemer's role withm the missionary thinking of the eariy ecumaiical movement by critically 
examining the first three ecumenical missionary conferences: Edinburgh 1910, Jerusalem 1928, and 
Tambaram 1938. The Worid Missionary Conferaice convaied in New College, Edinburgh 15 to 
23 June 1910," is rightiy seat as the birth-place of ecumaiical Protestantism, and more 
specifically, of the International Missionary Council (IMC) and the Worid Council of Churches 
( W C C ) . " It is therefore important to observe first that Edmburgh 1910 itself is a climax of a 
succession of conferaices beginning with New York and London, 1854, and continuing in London, 
1878 and 1888 and New York, 1900.^ ^ Second, it should neither be forgottai that while it was 
ecumenical in intaition, its 1356 attaidants were mainly British and Amencan, witli European 
delegates a distant second at 175, and members of the 'younger diurdhes' standing third at only 
Dialogue. (London: Lutterworth, 1958); and Why Christianity of All Rehgions?. (London: Lutterworth. 
1962). Though these books are commonly recognised not to contribute anything of substance to Kraemer s 
mature position, I will cite them where appropriate in cliapter 4. 
51 . Stephen Neill. Men of Unity. (London: SCM, 1960), pp. 113-114. 
52 . Hans-Ruedi Weber, Asia and the Ecumenical Movement. (London: SCM, 1966). p. 131. 
53 . In fact, the site of the birth can be narrowed still further to tlie report of Commission Vlll, wliicli was 
ecumenical in intention, title and content. See Report of Commission VIII: Co-Operation and the 
Promotion of Unity. (London: Olipiiaunt, Anderson and Ferrier, n.d.), esp. pp. 131 - 150. 
54 . See George Robson, 'Part I: History of the Conference,' in Volume IX: The History and Records of tiie 
Conference together with Addresses Delivered at the Evening Meetings, (London: Oliphaunt, Anderson 
and Femer, n.d.), pp. 3 - 7. Cited hereafter as WMCIX. 
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14." Third, it is also important to remember tiiat Edinbuigh 1910 delegates, were also 
predommantiy Protestant and almost overwhelmmgly evangelical.^ * 
The Conference proper, its dght commissions overseai by J.R. Mott," dealt witli the 
foUowmg subjects: l)carrying the gospel to the non-Chnstian worid; 2) the church in the mission 
field; 3) education m relation to the Chnstianisation of national life; 4) tiie missionary message m 
relation to the non-Christian religions; 5) the pr^aration of missionaries; 6) the home base of 
missions; 7) missions and governments; and 8) co-operation and the promotion of unity."* These 
topics had beai selected by an international committee, of whidi J.H. Oldham was Executive 
Secr^ry, m 1908. 'This procedure proved to be a precedent for later gatherings of the ecuniaiical 
55 WMCDC pp. 18 - 19; see also WiUiam Paton, 'The History of the Jemsalem Meeting of die 
International Missionary Council,' in Volume VIII: Addresses and Otiier Records. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1928), pp. 3 - 4, Cited hereafter as IMCVIII, Yet, K.S. Latourette reminds us tiiat tius 
was an improvement over previous conferences. For instance, at the Liverpool conference, only one Indian 
attended while in London (1888), there were no non-Europeans at all and in New York (1900), there were 
only six. See K.S, Latourette, 'Ecumenical Bearings of the Missionary Movement and the International 
Missionary Council,' in A History ofthe Ecumenical Movement. 1517- 1948. ed. Ruth Rouse and Stephen 
Charles Ndll, (London: SPCK, 1954), pp. 359 - 360. According to Weber, 'Eight came from India: V S. 
Azariali (invited by British Executive Committee), K.C. Chaterji (Presbyterian, USA), J.R. Chitambar 
(Methodist Episcopal, USA), S. Ghose (SPG [Society for the Propagation of the Gospel], England, 
Shivram Masoji (Presbyterian, USA), John Rangiah (American Baptist), R.K. Sorabji (CMS [Church 
Missionary Society], England), Thang Khan (American Baptist), One came from Burma: Ah Sou 
(American Baptist). Three from China: C.Y. Cheng (LMS [London Missionary Society], England, T.E. 
Tong (American Baptist), D.T. Tsang (Presbyterian, USA). One from Korea: T.H, Yun (invited by 
American Executive Committee), Four from Japan: Y, Chiba (American Baptist), T. Harada (American 
Board, Congregational), Y. Honda (invited by the American Executive Committee), K. Ibuka 
(Presbyterian, USA).' Asia and the Ecumenical Movement, p. 131, n. 1. Weber goes on to note that Asians 
who did not attend Edinburgh were nevertheless active in various preparatory commissions (pp. 131 - 132) 
and that they were highly active in the plenary sessions and delivered several key addresses (pp. 132- 133). 
56 . While there were a small number of Anglo-CathoUc representatives (see Latourette, 'Ecumenical 
Bearings,' p. 361), representatives of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches were not present and liad 
not been invited. See Ans J. van der Bent, 'Ecumenical Conferences,' in Dictionary of the Ecumenical 
Movement, p, 325. 
57 . Mott, the father of modem ecumenism, presided at most of the sessions at Edinburgli, was also 
appointed chairman of the Continuation Committee and later became the first cliaimian of the 
International Missionary Council. See 'Part III: The Continuation Committee,' in WMCIX, p. 135. For an 
excellent account of Mott's contribution not only to Edinburgh, but to the Christian church, see C. Howard 
Hopkins, 20th Century Ecumenical Statesman John R. Mott. 1865 - 1955: A Biography. (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1979). 
58 . Each commission produced a report, which in mm became a volume when the fiill records of the 
conference were published. Full bibliographic information on each volume is found in the bibliography. 
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movemait, including die enlarged meetings of the IMC m 1928, 1938, and 1947, the Conferaice on 
Life and Work held at Oxford m 1937, and the first assembly of the [WCC] in 1948.''' 
True to its evangelical heritage, Edinburgh 1910 was indeed a 'missionary conferaice,' as 
Commission I made clear when introducing their findings: 'This is a decisive hour for Christian 
missions. Hie call of providence to all our Lord's disciples, of whatever ecclesiastical connections, 
is direct and urgent to undertake without delay the task of carrymg the gospel to all the non-
Christian worid.'^ " Nevertheless Commission IV, without sacrificing any of this missionary-
fervour, displayed unusual opainess to other rebgions. Chaired by D.S. Caims and Robert E . 
Speer, Commission FV sought an informed discussion by saiding a questionnaire, reproduced 
below, to missionaries throughout the worid. 
1. Kindly give your name, station, and the Church or Society in connection with which 
you are working. Name the non-Christian religion or religions with which you have to 
deal in your missionary work, and say with wliat classes of die population you yourself 
come into contart. 
2. Can you distinguish the doctrines and forms of religious observances current among 
these classes any vAach are mainly traditional and formal fi-om others which are taken 
in earnest and are genuinely prized as a religious help and consolation? 
3. What do you consider to be the chief moral, intellectual, and social hindrances in the 
way of a full acceptance of Christianity? 
4. Have you found in individuals any dissatisfection with their own feith on specific 
points? If so, give details. 
5. What attitude should the Christian preacher take toward the rebgion of the people 
among whom he labours? 
6. What are the elements in the said rehgion or religions which present points of contact 
witii Christianity and may be regarded as a preparation for it? 
7. Which elements in the Christian Gospel have you found to possess the greatest power 
and appeal and which have awakened the greatest opposition? 
8. Have the people among whom you work a practical behef in a personal immortality 
and in the existence of a Supreme God? 
9. To \\tot extent do questions of "higher criticism" and otiier developments of modem 
Western thought exert an influence in your part of the mission field, and what effect do 
they have on your missionary work? 
10. Has your experience in missionary labour altered either in form or substance your 
impression as to what constitute die most important and vital elements in the Christian 
Gospel? [This question was addressed to missionaries]. 
11. What was it in Christianity which made special appeal to you? Did the Western 
fonn in which Christianity was presented to you perplex you? What are the distinctively 
Western elements, as you see them, in the missionary message as now presented? Was it 
59 . Latourette, 'Ecumenical Bearings,' p. 358. 
60 . Volume 1: Report of Commission I: Canving the Gospel to all the Non-Christian Worid, (London: 
Ohphaunt, Anderson and Ferrier, n.d.), p. 363. 
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tiie sense of sin which enabled you to go behind Western forms? If not, what was it? 
[This question was addressed to converts].*' 
The Commission, impressed by the quahty of the 185 responses recaved, condaised and divided 
them mto them mto 5 cat^ones: Animistic Rehgions, Chinese Rehgions, Japanese Religions, 
Islam, and Hinduism.*^ 
Wesley Ariarajah commaits that 'the work of Commission FV shows a remarkable degree 
of thinking that was in rnany ways, ahead of its time.'*^ This is espedally evidait m the first of two 
gaieral conclusions drawn by the Commission. It stated that 'the practically universal testimony 
that the true attitude of the Christian missionary to the non-Christian rehgions should be one of true 
understanding and, as far as possible, of sympathy.'** While not denying 'that ui some forms of 
rehgion the evil is appalling.,.' the 'missionary should seek for the nobler elemaits m the non-
Chnstiari reUgions and use them as steps to higher things..,,'*' Y d , the second conclusion was 
equally clear: 'along with this gaierous recognition of all that is true and good m tiiese rehgions, 
there goes also the universal and emphatic witness to the absolutaiess of the Chnstian faitii.'** 
Furtiiermore, the Commission beheved the taision created by the juxtaposition of these conclusions 
was both good and necessary: 
All down througli the history of Christian missions from the earhest days, tiiere have 
been two types of thought on the question of the relation of the Gospel to existing 
rehgions - the types exemphfied in Tertullian and Origen - the one dwelling most on the 
evils of rehgions and the newness of the Gospel; and the other seekuig to show that all 
tiiat was noblest m the old rehgions was fulfilled in Christ.... There is no reason 
whatever for Christian propaganda unless the missionary has sometiiing new to 
proclaim; but if is equally certain that tiiere is no basis whatever for the inissionary 
61 . Volume IV: Retx)rt of Commission FV: The Missionary Message in relation to Non-Christian 
Religions. (London: Ohphaunt, Anderson and Ferrier, n.d), p. 2. Cited hereafter as WMCfV. 
62 WMCIV, pp. xi - X X , 3. Each of these, in turn, became a chapter in the volume. 
63 . Wesley Ariarajah, Hindus and Christians: A Century of Protestant Ecumenical Thought. Currents of 
Encounter: Studies on tiie Contact between Christianity and Otiier Rehgions. Behefs, and Cultores. 
Volume 5, gen. ed. Rein Femhout, et, al, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), p, 28, 
64 . WMCIV. p, 267. 
65 . WMCIV. p. 267. 
66 . WMCIV. p. 268. Indeed, as far as the commissioners were concerned, tiie first conclusion was 
possible only m the light of the second: 'Deeper consideration of the fects leads us to the conviction that it 
is precisely because of the strength of their conviction of tiie absoluteness of Christianity tiiat our 
correspondents find it possible to take tiiis view of the non-Christian rehgions. They know that in Christ 
they have what meets tiie whole range of human need, and tiierefore they value all that reveals that need, 
however imperfect the revelation may be.' 
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appeal, unless the missionary can say, "whom therefore ye worship in ignorance, Hini 1 
declare unto you."*' 
On the whole, Edinburgh 1910 stressed the expansion of Christianity and the decline and 
death of otiier religions, yet Ariarajah mentions three pomts deserving attaition. First, die 
Conferaice, and especially Commission TV sought to understand non-Chnstian rebgious expenaice 
and doctrine tiieologically rather than apologdically. It therefore displayed a remarkable lack of 
defensivQiess.*^* Second, there was no attempt to judge these religions 'based on unaccqstable 
manifestations of their rebgion bi social life, even though such manifestations were takai seriously 
and cnticized.'*' Third, doctrines of otiier rebgions were not ruled out a priori as bicompatible 
with the g o s p e l . A unifyuig theme bi Ariarajah's three pobits is the Conferaice's belief that 
Christianity was the fiilfilmait of the worid's rebgions.^ ' Combbied with tins belief was tiie 
certamty that as Chnstianity progressed, other rebgions, cultures and peoples would be 
transformed, that 'national life' would become 'Christianised.'^ By the time of the IMC Conference 
m Jerusalem eighteai years later, this certamty had evaporated under the combmed pressure of the 
Great War, the rise of seculansm and nationabsm, and a worid-wide rebgious raiaissance 
expressing anti-missionary sentimait. The concept of fijfibnent, however, remabied. 
The International Missionary Council, conceived at Edbiburgh 1910, was formally 
constituted at a meoing of the Continuation Committee b ^ e a i October 9 and 16, 1921, in Lake 
Mohonk, New York.^' Over subsequent meetings, bicluding Canterbury 1922, Atiantic City 1925 
and Rattvik 1926, the nascait IMC took shape. At the Atiantic City meeting, 'full consideration 
67 . WMCrV. p. 279. 
68 . Ariarajah, Hindus and Christians, p. 29. 
69 . Ariarajah, Hindus and Christians, p. 29. 
70 . Ariaraiah. Hindus and Christians, p. 29. 
71 . Not surprismgly, one of the responses to the Commission IV questionnaire came fi-om J.N. Farquhar 
(then a YMCA missionary bi Calcutta) who went on to write die classic statement of Protestant ftilfilment 
imssionary theology. The Crown of Hbiduism. 
72 . See Volume ni: Report of Commission III: Education in relation to die Cliristianisation of National 
Life. (London: Oliphaunt, Anderson and Ferrier, n.d.), esp. pp. 365 - 384. 
73 . IMCVm. p. 4. 
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was givai to the subject of holding another worid conferaice,' and prehminary plans were inade." 
These plans were fleshed out at Rattvik and Jerusalem was diosen to host the Meting, In addition, 
sevai themes were proposed for discussion: The Chnstian Life and Message in Relation to Non-
Christian Systems of Life and Thought; Rehgious Education; The Relation of the Older and 
Younger Churches; The Chnstian Mission and Race Relationships; The Chnstian Mission and tiie 
Growth of Industrialism in the Mission Field; The Chnstian Mission and Rural Problems; and the 
Future of International Missionary Co-operation.^' 
The Jerusalem Meeting of the International Missionary Coundl, which took place on the 
Mount of Olives betweei Mardi 24 and April 8 1928, improved on Edinburgh 1910 in tiiree ways. 
First, instead of Edinbuigh's vast quantities of questionnaires and Commissions, preliminar>' 
papers were prqiared by experts pnor to the M e ^ g and these m turn served as springboards for a 
more focused discussion during the plenary sessions.'* Second, as a comparison betweai the 
volume-tides of the two conferences cleariy reveals, Jerusalem 1928 saw missions as touching on 
many areas of hfe including, but not hmited to, evangehsm.^' Last, the number of delegates from 
the younger churches increased greatly and they made thdr presaice known throu^ significant 
contributions to the Meeting.'* Still, Jerusalem 1928 is rarely remembered for these improvemaits. 
It is more oftai recalled because of the controversy surrounding the sevai prqiaratory papers 
74 . MCVm, pp. 5 - 7. 
75 . As at Edinburgli 1910, these went on to become the volumes of the Jerusalem 1928 Report. Full 
bibhographic details can be found in the bibliography. It should also be noted that the first topic is listed 
here as 'The Christian Message in Relation to Non-Christian Systems of Life and Thought.' Tliis is the 
tide used by Paton in IMCVIII. pp. 8 - 9. However, the actual tide of the ^ropriate volume is slightiy 
different. It reads, Volume I: The Christian Message in Relation to Non-Christian Systems of Thought 
and Life. (London: Oxford University Press, 1928). Cited hereafter as M C I . 
76 . JMCVm, p. 9. 
77 . For example, the only Edinburgh volume not focused specifically on ttaditional missionary activity 
was Volume VII: Report of Commission VIl: Missions and Governments, (London: Ohphaunt, Anderson 
and Ferrier, n.d ), see esp, 'Appendix D: Missionaries and their Assertion of Civil Rights: Note by tiie Rev 
Dr, Barbour,' pp. 137 - 139, On the other hand, four of the seven Jerusalem 1928 volumes (volumes 3 - 6) 
specifically moved beyond traditional missionary problems. One tackles a more ecclesiological problem 
(3) and the rest were concerned wifli relatmg missions to explicitly secular areas of life. 
78 . Paton writes, 'The most important change made by the Rattvik Committee in the Atlantic Coniminee 
proposals was in the decision to make the Jerusalem meeting representative m approximately equal 
numbers of the missionary organizations of the "sending" countries, and of the Christian councils and 
missionary organizations on the mission field not less than two-thirds of the delegates from the latter 
regions being nationals of the countries they represented.' IMCVIII, pp. 7 - 8. 
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whidi make up Part I of The Christian Life and Message.^ " Prepared m advance of tiie Memig 
and not submitted to the Council for approval,^" the papers were under the direct supervision of 
J.H. Oldham. H s desire to decrease the evangebstic fervour of Edmburgh 1910 and to focus 
instead on the positive values inherent bi the rebgions is evidait ui this excerpt fi-om a later he 
wrote to Martin Sdilunk a year pnor to Jerusalem 1928: 
What we propose is to ask ourselves, not in terms of theological formulation or 
. definition, but in terms of the interpretation of spiritual experience, is wlial men bve by 
and rely upon for support in the non-Christian systems and secondly, wiiat Christianity 
has to offer in enrichment of and addition to the insights and help, which they attain 
from their own religious systems. We are tiius not raisbig a discussion as to what is and 
what is not important in Christianity, but are inviting the co-operation of Christians, 
whatever their individual views may be in a common effort to discover what respect the 
Christian faith transcends the best that other religious systems can offer 
From the papers themselves, it seems that Oldham's ideas were not cleariy communicated 
to the contributors. Nicol Macnicol's submission on Huiduism,for mstance, remauied firmly withbi 
tiie 'fiifilmait theology of Eduiburgh 1910, as this excerpt demonstrates: 
The Christ whom we preach does not destroy any gracious and beautifiil trait in the 
character of the Hmdu, or deprive him of anythmg of which he is justly proud in his 
cultural biheritance.... If Hinduism will let Christ enter within its ancient walls, then it 
will be found that he is no stranger, but One who has sojourned there before, and who 
will find within it those vAio will recognise his Lordship and set Him upon its throne.^ 
J. Leighton Stuart's essay, however, pushed the bmits of'fulfilmait': 
We welcome all the spmtual mtuition or ethical enthusiasm that may come through any 
of the worid's great seers or sages as part of tiie "bght tiiat Ughtetii every man commg 
into the world."... [we seek to] blend the experience with any such racial heritage, 
bebevbig that the resultant gain to all will be greater.... We gladly if humbly anticipate 
that the specific emphases of Oriental culture wiU bring fresh understanding of Hiin and 
help us correct or supplement our one incomplete appreciation of His transcending 
greatness. 
79 . See Nicol Macnicol, 'Christianity and Hinduism,' IMCl. pp. 3 - 52; J. Leighton Stuart, 'Christianity 
and Confucianism,' IMCL pp. 53 - 82; D. Willard Lyon, 'Rebgious Values bi Confuciamsm,' IMCl. pp. 83 
- 118; K.J. Saunders, 'Christianity and Buddhism,' M C , pp. 119 - 185; A K . Reischauer, 'Christianity and 
Northern Buddhism,' IMCl, 186 - 234; W.H.T. Gairdner and W A Eddy, 'Christianity and Islam,' IMCl. 
pp. 235 - 283; and Rufus M. Jones, 'Secular Civibzation and the Christian Task,' IMCl. p. 283 - 338. 
80 . IMCVm. p. 9. 
81 . J.H. Oldham, letter to Martm Schlunk, Febniary 19, 1927 (in WCC archives) quoted in KTT, p. 170 
(my emphasis). 
82 . Nicol Macnicol, 'Christianity and Hbiduism,' bi IMCl pp. 11, 34. 
83 . J. Leighton Stuart, 'Christianity and Confiicianisni,' in IMCl, pp. 62 - 63. 
K.J . Saunders' paper on Buddhism, went further to hmt at an ineffable mystical core common to all 
religions: 
Whatever our Christologies or our Buddhologies may be, the great feet remains that 
behind all rehgions there is ReUgion and the rehgious consdousness of man. The 
mystics are the experts who experience the tmth by which the rest of us live. According 
to their upbringing and environment, they give the mefifeble a local habitation and a 
name. But the missionary must get behmd the names to reaUties; and there is a growing 
recognition among such Buddhist scholars as D.T, Suzuki and such Christian scholars 
as Rudolph Otto tiiat what die German mystic calls Das Nichts and tiie Upanishad seer, 
Neti, the Buddhist calls Svnyata: it is "that from which the words turn back."*^  
Iromcally, the most controversial paper dealt not with 'a religion,' but with secularism." hi 
'Secular Civihzation and the Christian Task,' Ruflis Jones argued that while Christianity fulfilled 
the longings of secular culture, an interfaith aUiance was necessary to oppose its creqimg influence. 
He concluded the paper with this diallaige: 
Go to Jerusalem, tiien, not as members of a Christian nation to convert other nations 
which are not Christian, but as Christians witiiin a nation fer too largely non-Christian, 
who fece within their own borders the competition of a rival movement as powerfiil. .. as 
any of the great historic rehgions. We meet our fellow Christians m these other 
countries on terms of equahty, as fellow workers engaged in a common task. More tiian 
this, we go as those who find in the otiier rehgions wliich secularism attacks, as it 
attacks Christianity, witnesses of man's need of God and aUies m our quest for 
perfection,** 
The strong reaction of the Continaital delation to what they percdved as tiie synergistic 
flavour of the prqiaratory papers threataied to scuttie Jerusalem 1928 before it began," 
84 , K,J, Saunders, 'Christianity and Buddhism,' m M C I , p, 128. 
85 . Because of the mtensity of the feehngs aroused by the paper, secularism is often recalled as tiie major, 
if not the only, theme at Jerusalem 1928. For uistance, ui Hmdus and Christians. Ariarajah entities his 
examination of the Meeting, 'In Search of Collaboration: Hindu-Christian Enrichment and Collaboration 
Against Secularism,' p, 32. It should therefore be noted first that Jones' p ^ r was only one of seven papers 
discussed in one of seven plenary sessions and second, that it was a last minute addition to the Jerusalem 
1928 agenda. On May 6, 1927, during an M C Emergency Committee Meetmg in London, Oldham urged 
that greater attention be paid to the rehgious confrontation with secular civilization, proposing tiiat 
secularism be freated as another non-Christian rehgion akin, for mstance, to Hinduism or Buddhism, The 
Committee agreed and assigned tiie preparatory paper to Charles Raven and Rufiis Jones, tiiough finally 
the paper was composed by Jones alone. See KTT. p. 173. 
86 . Rufus M, Jones, 'Secular Civilization and the Christian Task,' in DvlCI, p, 338, 
87 , The Continental reaction must be understood in the tight of tiieological developments in Europe: 
'their protest ought to be understood more as an expression of neo-confessionalism on tiie continent, both 
in neo-Lutheran and neo-Calvuiist forms. But nevertheless, behind this more general protest was at work 
tliat element which was to become more markedly dialectical theology,' Johannes Aagaard, 'Revelation 
and Religion,' in Studia Theologica, 14(1960), p, 151, 
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Consequaitiy, an emergency meeting m Cairo was convened m order to resolve the situation. 
Wilbam Paton, the I M C rqiresentative at the Cairo meding, remembered it as givmg 'the 
opportunity to those delates, to some of whom laigthy discussions m Engbsh must needs be a 
heavy burden, to acquamt themsdves ultimately with the subjects to be discussed, and to express 
thar mbid upon them before joubng m the larger meeting at Jerusalem.'** Kraemer, vjho acted both 
as secr^ry and biterpreter for the meeting, assessed it differentiy. 
The debate was opened by the German delegates, vAio expressed frankly but candidly a 
feelmg of uneasmess about the trend of the papers. They felt as if, generally speakmg, 
the p ^ r s were drifting on the dangerous waters of syncretism and had msuflBcientiy 
worked out the essential difference and absolute uniqueness of Christianity. .. The 
delegates of other Continental countries formulated in a somewhat different manner the 
same feebngs. There were amongst them some vA\o avowed to have been troubled bi 
reading the pamphlets and who desbed to see stated, in a more unequivocal way than 
seemed to be done by the papers, the feet that Christianity is a rebgion sui generis in the 
most pregnant sense of the word.*' 
Finally, the Cairo meeting agreed on the following four pobits: first, that the concerns raised by die 
Continaital delegates should be made known to the Committee of the IMC; second, that this 
uneasbiess about the syncretistic tone of the papers be presetted to the Council bi written fomi; 
third, that the papers had not shed sufBdait bght on the essence of Christianity because tins was 
not thar purpose, because they conftised the nature of Christianity and the problem of missionary 
contacts, and because the authors were tiiemselves committed Christians; and fourth, tiiat even the 
best elemaits bi the non-Christians rebgions need to be 'converted and regenerated' through an 
encounter with Jesus Christ.'" 
At the opposite extreme, some of the American delates were openly aithusiastic about 
Stuart's fiilfiibnait, Saunders' mysticism and Jones' interfaith albance. These found a voice m tiie 
philosopher and mystic, WiUiam Ernest Hockbig. He proposed 'a form of hospitality to tiie 
experience and thought of otiier rebgions... whidi was demanded by the new situation in the worid 
of thought to-day.'" This new situation, brought about by the spread of 'scientific matenabsm or 
88 . IMCVm. pp. 9-10. 
89 . Hendrik Kraemer, 'Report of tiie Cab-o Meeting,' 16 March, 1928. Quoted by Robert E. Speer, 'What 
is the Value of tiie Rebgious Values of tiie Non-Christian Religions?' in M C I , p. 418. 
90 . Robert E. Speer, 'What is the Value of the Religious Values of the non-Christian Rebgions?' in IMCl. 
pp. 418-419. 
91 . W.E. Hockbig quoted in Robert E. Speer, 'The Discussion in Plenary Session of tiie Council,' in 
M C I , p. 369. 
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naturahsm' was 'opposed to all rehgion.,,, [and] required a new ahgnmait of rehgious forces, a 
recognition of alhance with whatever was of the true substance of rehgion everywhere.'*^ Hocking 
wait on to speak somewhat cryptically of 'a world rehgion,' into whidi the rehgjons would merge 
'm the universal human faith in the Divine Bdng,'" Finally, he suggested three reasons for 
Christian openness to other rehgions: first, Christianity must speak the language of other rehgions if 
it is to be understood; second, Christianity, like the other religions, is a produd of particular 
historical events ui specific cultures; and third, Christianity's concqitions of truth need to be 
enlarged.^ 
Somewhere in bdween these extremes fell members of the British and Asian delations, 
and Kraemer himself. Representing the British, Edwyn Bevan emphasised not the uniqueness of 
Christiaraty but the uraquaiess of Christ, calhng for Hindus, Jews and Christians alike to 'bow to 
tiie Hebrew Jesus as the supreme Lord.''' The Indian delation also struck a more Chnstocaitnc 
position, embodied in the words of Pandipeddi Chendiiah: 'The Hindu does not want a way of life, 
but hfe; not the preadiing about Christ, but Christ, ff you have Christ, pass Him on.''* The 
Chmese, on the other hand, saw Christianity fulfilhng Confliaanism and combatting secularism. 
According to Frands C. W d , 'Christianity is to fulfil Confudanism, not to destroy it.'" While 
T . C . Chao insisted, 'the battiefield of Chnstianity in China is not the realm of the non-Chnstian 
religions, but in the realm of secularism.''* Kraemer took a different tack, trying to set out the 
pomts whidi both extremes had in common: 
1. God was the Creator and Redeemer of the world. On one side man was the most 
wretched and damnable of creatures and on the other side, he had kinship wiUi God. 
92 . MCI, p. 369. 
93 . MCI, p. 369. 
94 . MCI , p. 370. See also W.E. Hockmg, 'Psychological Conditions for Growtii m Religious Faitii,' in 
MCVni, 138 - 161. For a fiill statement of Hockmg's mystical philosophy of rehgion, see his Giftbrd 
Lectures, entitied The Meaning of God ui Human Experience: A Philosophic Smdy of Rehgion. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1912), 
95 . Quoted in Robert E . Speer, 'What is the Value of tiie Religious Values of tiie Non-Christian 
Religions,' in MCI , p. 436. 
96. MCI , p. 361. 
97 . MCI, p, 358. 
98 . MCI, p. 358. 
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2. The world was a creation of God which had become wretched and damnable, but 
which must again become God's world 
3, Christianity was the most paradoxical reUgion and the most matter-of-fect religion in 
this world. Paradoxical because it combined in real communion of life two opposites, 
ethically and ontologically, i.e., the Holy Personal God and sinful man.... It was matter 
of feet because it took into account the stem fects of Ufe: sin, pain, disappointment, and 
QQ 
unrest.' 
William Temple was presoited with the daunting task of drafting the 'Statemait by the 
Council' in a manner sudi that it would be siqDported by both extremes. In 'The Chnstian 
Message,' he oflfered a twofold missionary approadi. First, missions should call the 'religious man' 
to fight secularism and to study Christ (not necessarily Christianity). Second, when approaching 
the 'secular man' missions should acknowledge the values of secular culture while remainmg aware 
of its problems and joining with other religions in opposing it. Temple also recognised the value of 
other religions, but in a manner which did not threatai the sni generis nature of the Christian 
message, as this excerpt bears witness: 
we recognise as part of the one Tmth that sense of the Majesty of God and the 
consequent reverence in worship, vMch are conspicuous in Islam; the deep sympathy 
for the world's sorrow and unselfish search for the way of escape, which are at the heart 
of Buddhism; the desire for contact with Ultimate Reality conceived as spiritual, wiiich 
is promised in Hinduism, the belief in a moral order of the universe and consequent 
insistence on moral conduct, which are inculcated in Confucianism; and the 
disinterested pursuit of truth and human welfere wiiich are often found in those who 
stand for secular civili2ation, but do not accept Christ as their Lord and Saviour.""* 
The 'Christian Message' was accqjted unanimously, but Terry White astutely observes that this 
probably had more to do with Temple's political ability than a bridging of the American / 
ContinoTtal gulf. 'Accqstance of the statement was possible,' he writes, 'only because it neither 
doiied some value in other religions nor the basis of missions in the uniquoiess of the Gospel.'"" 
99 . Quoted in Robert E . Speer, 'The Discussion in Plenary Sessions of the Council,' M C I , p. 348. 
100 . William Temple, 'Statement by the Council: The Christian Message,' in M C I , pp. 479 - 495, esp. p. 
491. 
101 . Terry Louis White, 'Religion and Religions in the thought of W.E. Hocking and Hendrik Kraemer,' 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Southern Methodist University, 1972), p. 51. Jerald D. Gort is far more frank 
in his assessment: 'In contrast to the acclaim it received in Jerusalem, the Message drew a good deal of 
criticism later on: it allowed itself to be too easily informed by certain trends of the day; there was a certain 
note of syncretism in it; it may have concealed serious differences and crowded out important emphases 
through clever wording and composition,' in The International Review of Mission, 67 (1978), p. 278. 
Cited by Ariarajah, Hindus and Christians, p. 84. 
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Thus, with regard to the world religions, Jerusalem 1928 attempted to accommodate 
almost opposing points of view. Though not all were prqaared to go to Hocking's extreme, the 
Amencan delation was keen to speak of values, fulfilmait, and collaborations against seculansm. 
On the other hand, the Continental delegation eschewed the language of the preparatory papers, 
diarging it with syncretism, and spoke instead of proclamation, conversion, and the sui generis 
character of the Gospel. Of the several mediating positions suggested, not even Temple's could 
reconcile the two positions. As we shall see, the distmction between the two became only more 
pronounced v/h&i the I M C mrt at Madras Christian Col l ie , Tambaram brtweai December 12 
and 29, 1938.'°' 
Tambaram 1938 incorporated two significant differences over previous conferences. Both 
Edinburgh 1910 and Jerusalem 1928 were focused explicitly on Chnstian missions, the former 
attempting to articulate v/hat missions were and the latter attempting to discern the relationship 
between missions and other areas. The first advance was evidait m the planrung stages at Hermhut 
1932, Salisbury 1933 and Northfield 1935 whai the scope was broadened to consider the 
relationship between the Churdi and the worid.'"^ Again, the titles of the six discussion themes 
bear out this broadaied focus: The Authority of the Faith; The Growing Churdi; Evangelism; The 
Life of the Churdi; The Economic Basis of the Church; and The Churdi and the State."" Carl 
Hallaicreutz attributes this shift from missions to Churdi to three factors. Primary among these is 
Re-Thinking Missions: A Lavman's Inquiry After One Hundred Y e a r s . a critical restatement of 
the American position expressed at Jerusalem 1928. This is followed closely by two others, namely 
the nse of nationalism especially in Germany and Italy and the growth of Barthian and Biblical 
Theologies."' 
102 . Hans-Ruedi Weber, Asians and the Ecumenical Movement, p. 183, 
103 . KTT,pp. 253f 
104 . Full publication details for each theme can be found in the bibhography. 
105 . W.E. Hocking, ed. Re-Thinking Missions: A Lavman's Inquiry After One Hundred Years, (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1932). In addition to influencing the members of the Council generally, the Re-
Tliinking. Missions liad enormous impact on Kraemer specifically. This will be fully discussed in 3.3. 
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The second difference came later in the planning stages. In a memorandum dated 17 
November, 1935, William Cash suggested to Oldham that experts be appointed to deal with 
proposed themes in a manner similar to Jerusalem 1928.'°' He proposed that Kraemer edit a 
volume of preparatory papers on the evangebstic approach to the adheraits of non-Christian 
faiths.'"^ Oldham agreed and presented Cash's suggestion at the Ad Interim Committee meeting of 
the I M C at the Old Jordan's Hostel m 1936. Though gaierally erthusiastic about the 
recommendation, William Paton preferred a more uniform approadi: the work of one author on one 
specific issue. The Committee concurred and Mott, Oldham, Cash and Paton commissioned 
Kraemer to 'state the fimdamental position of the Christian Churdi as a witness bearing body in the 
modem worid,... and to deal in detail with the evangehstic approach to the great non-Christian 
faiths:'"" 
During the eariy stages, Mott and Paton were of particular importance in shaping what 
would become The Christian Message in a Non-Chnstian Worid. Mott, wdiile completing the 
arrangemaits of Kraemer's appointment, suggested he go to the United States in order to become 
acquainted with American missiological thought. There, Kraemer expenaiced the aftermath of the 
Re-Thinkmg Missions first hand.'"* Paton, on the other hand, was a constant source of 
107 . KTT. pp. 261 -263. 
108 . KTT, p. 262. 
109 . CM, p. V. Quoting the Minutes of the Ad Interim Committee of the IMC, Old Jordan's, 1936. See 
also KTT, pp. 263 - 265. 
110. KTT. p. 270f. Kraemer recalled this experience in CM, pp. 46 - 47, wiiere he wrote: 'In America, 
which takes a large share in the world-wide missionary enterprise at home and abroad, the scene is much 
more confusing. The relativistic spirit of a Christianity which in the case of thousands of people is all too 
much assimilated to a humanistic conception of life undermines the missionary understanding of 
Christiamty. If it were not for the feet that the American temperament, for natural and historical reasons, 
is youthftilly aggressive and prone to a crusading type of idealism, the missionary temperament in tlie 
Churches of America would be still lower than it is. To be sure, there is to be observed a turning away 
from the roads of subjectivistic idealism and an expectant returning to the bed-rock verities of historic 
Christianity. The rank and file in the Churches, however, are wholly at sea about the Christian faith and 
tlie Christian obhgation in the worid. An all-pervading pragmatist attitude, which naively takes the 
practically-demonstrated value of a certain attitude in life as the standard of reference for trutli, nattirally 
causes a very diluted conception of w4iat reUgion and Christianity really are. This is die more easily so 
because the rehgious and moral quality of life of many of Uiose who tiiink in tiiis line is strikingly pure and 
novel and is still emotionally centred around the Personality of Jesus Christ. However, if tiiere should not 
occur in die future a real re-discovery of Bibhcal Christianity, die next generation will lack tiiis emotional 
connection with die realm of christian feith and worship, and become definitely unchristian and anti-
christian.' 
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encouragement. 'This involved finding a salary for Kraemer while he wrote it and taking the 
decision to permit him to write double the amount commissioned, which meant that someone (Nicol 
Macnicol) had to be found to produce a summary of it, and to help Kraemer write readable 
English.'^" Although it was intaided to be just one of several inputs at Tambaram 1938, 
Kraemer's work, because of its size and quality, became the centre of debate. 
This is not to say that Kraemer's contribution was the sole source of controversy. In fact, 
toision had been increasing since Northfield, 1935. At that time, Japan and China had both applied 
to host the conference and the IMC at Northfield proposed Kowloon, m the Hong Kong nev\' 
territories, as a compromise site. However strongly they had argued for their own sites, the 
Japanese and the Chinese were united in their opposition to holding the conference in a British 
colony. In November 1935, Hangdiow, China was chosar Two years later in November 1937, 
because of the Sino-Japanese conflict, this site was abandoned for the alternate, Madras Christian 
Co l l i e , Madras, Tambaram, in India.''^ As late as May 1938, the German delegates sought a 
postponement or cancellation because of the worid crisis. 
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Nevertheless, the controversy aroused by Kraemer seems to be the only one left unresolved 
at the conclusion of the conference. W. A. Visser't Hooft recalls that "Within the fellowship of the 
meeting, the very real tensions among the conference members - Chinese and Japanese, British and 
Indian, South African whites and South African blacks, Germans and other contmental Europeans -
were transcoided by the common purpose [of emphasising the universality of the Church] He 
continues, 'The conference was less successful in dealing with the basic theological conflict for 
whidi Hendrik Kraoner's book, writtoi for the conference..., provided the focus. .. In fact, that 
conflict was not resolved in Tambaram, but Kraemer had at least forced the whole missionar>' 
movement to reconsider its basic assumptions.'"' A full examination of the Tambaram 
111. Eleanor Jackson, Red Tape and the Gospel: A study in the significance of the ecumenical missionary 
struggle of William Paton (1886 - 1943). (Birmingham: Phlogiston Publishing, 1980), p. 85. Kraemer 
acknowledges his debt to the M C and to Macnicol specifically in CM, p. vii. 
112 . Jackson, Red Tape and the Gospel, pp. 148 - 149. 
113 . Jackson. Red Tape and the Gospel, p. 149. 
114. Visser't Hooft, Memoirs, p. 59. 
115. W.A. Visser't Hooft, Memoirs, p. 59. Likewise, Henry P. Van Dusen recalls that 'Tlus proved to be 
the only theological issue upon which the conference did not achieve unanimity.' See Henry P. Van Dusen, 
World Christianity: Yesterday Today Tomorrow. (London: SCM, 1948), p. 193. 
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controversy, both Kraemer's position and vanous responses to it, awaits in 4.1 - 4.2. For now, 1 
conclude with an excerpt of the statement eidorsed by the entire Conferaice: 
There are many non-Christian rehgions that claim the allegiance of 
multitudes. We see and readily recognize that in them are to be found values of deep 
religious experience, and great moral achievements. Yet we are bold enough to call 
men out from them to the feet of Christ. We do so because we beheve tiiat in Him alone 
is the full salvation vMch man needs.... 
Everywhere and at all times [God] has been seeking to disclose Himself to 
men. He has not left Himself without witness in the worid. Furthermore, men have 
been seeking Him all through the ages. Often this seeking and longing has been 
misdirected, but tiiere are evidences tiiat His yearning after His children has not been 
without response. 
As to whether the non-Christian religions as total systems of thought and hfe 
may be regarded as in some sense or to some degree manifesting God's revelation 
Christians are not agreed. This is a matter urgently demanding thought and umted 
sttidy."^ 
Tambaram 1938 is nghtiy interpreted, wntes Anarajah, as attempting 'to put inission 
tiieology back on its rails,' after Jerusalem 1928."' The minutes of the Ad Intenm Committee 
Meeting in 1936 show that this was the intention of the organisers. In the aftermatii of the 
Continoital / American division, Re-Thinkmg Mssions. and the very intaise pohtical climate, a 
clear statement of the Christian faith and a convincing apologue for missions and evangelism were 
necessary. This is what Kraemer was asked to, and did, provide. He 'was in a strong position to do 
this for no one could accuse him of failing to study. This had started at Cairo. .. [and had] 
continued in the same way in Central Java, in Bali, among the Bataks in Sumatra and in India.''"* 
Indeed, none of Kraemer's opponarts accused him of misrepresenting or misunderstanding non-
Christian religions (although sudi accusations did come in later years). Rather, as will be seoi in 
4.2, the controversy revolved around the presuppositions upon which his argumeit was based. 
116. 'The Witness of tiie Church in Relation to tiie Non-Christian ReUgions, die New Paganisms and die 
Culttiral Heritage of the Nations,' in The Worid Missions of the Church: Findings and Recommendations 
of die Meeting of the International Missionary Council, Tambarani. Madras. December 12 - 29. 1938. ed. 
William Paton, (London: International Missionary Council, 1939), Volume 1: The Authonty of the Faith, 
p. 194. Cited hereafter as AF 
117. Ariarajali. Hindus and Christians, p. 85. 
118. W.A. Visser't Hoofl, Has the Ecumenical Movement a Futtire?. (Belfest: Christian Journals, 1974), 
pp. 58- 59. 
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3.3 Kraemer's Theological Development 
Before an exarmnation of the Tambaram controversy can take place, however, I must 
situate Kraemer theologically. In introducmg this diapter, I noted that Kraemer has often beai 
appraised solely in the light of Earth's theolo©'."' I now aigue that to (dis)regard Kraemer as 
Barth's mouthpiece is too simplistic and that a far more important influence, albeit negatively, was 
William Hocking. I will establish this contaition by outlining chronologically Kraemer's 
influaices as a student, his experioices m Indonesia, his oicounter with dialectical theology, and his 
confrontation with the antithesis of the Christian Message. W.E. Hocking's Re-Thinking Missions. 
Pierre Daniel Chant^ie de la Saussaye and W. Brede Kristaisai were major figures in 
Kraemer's eariy development. Chantepie's phoiomenology of religions resembled that of C P . 
Tide, the first professor of Comparative Religion at Leidai. Though he was a member of the 
theological faculty, Tiele wanted to avoid a Chnstian theological interpretation of Religion. In his 
Gifford Lectures, Tiele proposed instead a two tier approadi, the foundation of which was 
'morphological': the comprdiension of Religion in its cultural and histoncal manifestations. '^ ^ This 
evolutionary analysis posited the ethical consciousness, as opposed to theological categories, 
embodied in Christianity as the critenon by whidi other rehgions were to be judged.'"' From there, 
he moved on to the 'ontologjcal': a metaphysical, not theological, inquiry into the nature of Religion 
Itself.'^ ^ Like Tiele, Chantq^ie sought to avoid theological interprdations of religious phenomena 
by arguing that theology had a dififerait object m view. 'On the one hand, the a-theologjcal trait is 
expressed in an acknowledgement that, as sudi, the inquiry does not and cannot m&dL the 
qualifications of a geiuine theological inquiry. On the other hand, it is expressed m the eObrt to 
119 . Seen. 7. 
120. He writes, 'All she [tlie Science of ReUgion] desires, arid all she is entitled to do, is to subject 
reUgion, as a human and therefore historical and psychological phenomenon, to unprejudiced 
investigation, in order to ascertain how it arises and grows and what are its essentials, and in order 
thoroughly to understand it.' CP. Tiele Elements of the Science of Religion: Part I. Morpliological. 
(Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1897), p. 8. 
121 . See Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion: Part I.. 'Lecture III: Stages of Development - the 
Lowest Nature-ReUgions'; 'Lecture IV: Stages of Development - the Highest Namre Religions'; and 
'Lecture V: Stages of Development - the Ethical Religions,' pp. 58 - 149. 
122 . C P . Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion: Part II. Ontological. (Edinburglv William 
Blackwood and Sons, 1899). 
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preserve the integrity of the study of the object from the eicroadimaU of a theological agenda." 
However, he broke sharply with Tiele r^rding his evolutionary model. He resists any plotting of 
religious objects, beliefs, or practices along a developmatfal axis according to some essence of 
religion. 'He proceeds systematically from the religious object to the religious subject witiiout 
referaice to any inherait chronology or advancment among the phaiomena .'' 
,124 
In 1901, W. Brede Kristaisai, thai newly appointed Chair of History and Phaiomaiology 
of Religion, delivered his inaugural lecture. Therein he set out themes which set his approach to the 
study of religions apart from many of his contemporaries. Like them, he distinguished the 
'Philosophy of Religion' from the History of Religions,' the former deahng with the ontoiogical 
problem of religion and the latter seeking to understand the history and charaderistics of different 
religions. Unlike them, Kristoisen opposed an evolutionary grading of reUgions"' According to 
Halloicreutz, religious evolutionary 'theory presupposed differences betweei higher and lower 
stages, as well as the possibility of development from lower to higher. Different persons could 
apply different reveraices whoi estimating what was higher and lower in sudi a development. And 
every evolutionist r^rded himself as standing on the highest peak of developmait.''^' Knstensai 
insisted that this raidered any kmd of sympathdic understanding of a reUgion impossible and 
proposed instead a totalitanan approach whidi spoke not of ReUgion but religions as complex, 
mdivisible unities. 'While theology inquires after the knoweldge of God givai by revelation, 
Kristoisen inquires into the religious value the believers attach or have attached to their faith, what 
thar religion meant for them.'''' His interest lay in understanding a religion's speafic beliefs and 
practices in thdr relationship to the organic whole. 128 
123 . George Alfred James, Interpreting Religion: The Phenomenoloeical Approaches of Pierre 
Daniel Chantepie de la Saussave. W. Brede Kristensen. and Gerardus van der Leeuw. (Washington, 
D C : Catholic University of America Press, 1995), p. 57. 
124. James. Interpreting Religion, p. 81. 
125 . KTT,PP- 113f 
126 . KTT,PP 114-115. 
127 . James, Interpreting Religion, p. 158. 
128 . KTT.pp 115f 
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Kraemer follows his teachers in his phoiomenological treatmait of the religions of 'total' 
systems of thought and life. Any sympathetic understanding of a religious belief or practice 
explores its relationship to the religio-cultural matrix in which it arises rather than accordmg to 
some evolutionary model which was itself historically and culturally situated. Though, Kraemer is 
not as scqjtical about the value of a theological interpretation of religions as ather Chantepie or 
Knstaisai, he also follows them in refusing to confiase phenomenological and theological studies. 
These presuppositions - the totalitarian approadi to religions and the distinct nature of theology of 
religions - underbe The Christian Message and became the sources of controversy at the 
Tambarani Conference. They are diametrically opposed to those who confiase phaiomaiological 
and theological studies by regarding the rdigjons as stages culminating in Christianity or in some 
other essence of religion. Furthermore, these paragraphs show that they are rooted not in Barth, 
but in Dutdi Phaiomaiology of Religion. 
Now consider his cross-cultrual experiaices. Whai he arrived in Indonesia, Kraenier 
retained an optimism inherited from the Dutdi Ethical Theology of J.H. Gunning and Nicolaus 
Adnani. 'Before the first Worid War, Ethical Theology presupposed the disint^ation of the 
Eastern sodeties, and conceived the task of Christianity in terms of a contribution towards the 
"raiewal" of man and s o d ^ espedally in the East. "Divine Life" was thdr mam category and the 
Incarnation, their model.''^' Ethical Theology located tiie uniqueness of Chnstianity in conversion 
- humanity's experiaice of'new divine life powers' givai by God through Jesus Christ.'^" Kraemer 
followed his eariy maitors in emphasising conversion and predicting the demise of other 
religions . '^' Ya, Kraemer's mature position bore no resemblance to the optimistic appraisal of the 
eariy twenties. His emphasis on conversion remained, but instead of 'divine life powers,' Kraemer 
now spoke of it as a recognition of what God had done for humanity in Jesus Christ . '^ '^  Li addition, 
he relinquished any idea of the future disintegration of the religions; in his opinion, religious 
129 . DCE. p. 64. 
130 . KTT. p. 81; DCE, p. 64. 
131 . Of course, neither Kraemer nor Dutch Etliical theologians were alone in this belief It was a 
hallmark of the entire missionary enterprise at least until Jerusalem 1928. 
132 . For Kraemer, the necessity of conversion was the presupposition of all missionary activity: 'tlie 
presupposition of the Gospel is the necessity of conversion for everyone - even the finest and the noblest 
personality'....' CM, p. 45. 
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plurality would persist until the consummation of history.'" In the light of botii factors, Kraemer 
r ^ r d e d indigaious expressions of Christianity as v i t a l . H o w does one account for this 
reversal? 
The answer lies in his experience of the Islamic raiaissance in Indonesia. Contrary to 
expectations, Kraemer did not find Islam disintegratmg before advancing western tedmology and 
values. In fad, quite the opposite was taking place: Islam was growing rapidly and finding 
expression in such organisations as the radical nationahst party, Sarekat Islam, and the anti-
missionary organisation, Muhammadijah.'^' Attaidance at the pan-Islamic conferaices at 
Cheribon m 1922 and Garaut two years later confirmed Kraemer's suspicions that while some 
nationalists may have beai using Islam merely as a means to aid colonialism, the reUgion was 
espeaally healthy.'^ "^  He therefore b^an to stress the importance of mdigoious expressions of 
Christianity as outUned m 3.1. Though the mission agaides were bound to educate and stroigthai 
mdigenous congregations, Kraemer held that the responsibility for the dialogue witii Islam and the 
conversion of Indonesians lay not with tiieni but with Indonesian Christians. 
137 
Perhaps the most frustrating asped of Kraemer's theological context is his relationship to 
dialectical theology, and specifically to Kari Barth. The critidsm of Kraemer as a Bartiiian,'^^ as 
I have shown above, disr^rds the fad that the skeldon of his mature position was m place pnor 
to his first oicounter with Barth in 1929. Cari Hallencreutz has countered that Kraemer should be 
133 . See, for example, RCF. pp. 366 - 376. 
134 . CM, pp. 229f; RCF, pp. 409 - 411; Hendrik Kraemer, World Culhires and Worid Religions: Tiie 
Coming Dialogue. (London: Lutterwortii, 1960); From Missionfield to Independent Church: Report on a 
Decisive Decade in the Growth of Indigenous Churches in Indonesia, (London: SCM, 1958); aid 'The 
Role and ResponsibiUty of the Christian Mission,' in Philosophy. Rehgion. and the Coining World 
Civili2ation: Essays in Honor of WiUiam Ernest Hocking, ed. Leroy S. Rouner, (The Hague: Martinus 
NijhofT, 1966). 
135 . For a detailed analysis of these and other Islamic organisations in Indonesia in the early hventieth 
cenmry. see KTT. pp. 21 - 121. 
136 . KTT. pp. 130- 136. 
137 . KTT, pp. 144f 
138. Some contemporary examples of this strategy were cited in n. 7. Nevertiieless, it is not new. It was 
first employed immediately after Tanibaram. See, for example A G . Hogg, 'The Christian Attitude to Non-
Cliristian Faith,' in AF, PP 102 - 125. 
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understood against his own inissionary bacl^ound, thereby relating Barth to a position of 
minimal influeice."' This, it seems to me, runs to the other extreme. In what follows, I will 
examme Kraemer's wntings and propose a mediating position. 
In The Christian Message, Kraemer praises Barth's theology as 'an energetic endeavour to 
assert and lay bare the exclusive nature of Biblical religious truth as wholly sni generis. Its 
outstandmg merit in the presait deluge of relativist thinking is that it states the problem of 
revelation as a matter of life or death for Christianity and theology.'''"' It is a 'merdless war-cry 
against... persuasive and omnipresait relativism.'''" However, he is not uncntical. For Kraemer, 
Bartii's refusal to discuss how God works ui other religions 'savours too niudi of tiieological and 
logical consistoncy and breathes not suffiaaitly the free atmosphere of Biblical realism. This self-
willed refiosal to move fijrther,' declares Kraemer, 'will in the long run appear to be untoiable.''"*" 
To Bartii's declaration, 'There is no point of contact' betweei Christianity and otiier religions, 
Kraemer counters, that 'the fact that faith in God's revelation occurs pre-supposes that it can be 
communicated to man and apprehended by him as revelation coming from God.''"*^  
This sympathetic critidsm continues m Religion and the Chnstian Faith, where Kraemer 
distances himself from both Barth and Emil Brunner, whom he describes as fiendliche Bnider^^ 
On the subject of 'Religion and Rebgions,' Kraemer is closer to Brunner's position, whidi, in his 
view, 'shows great discemmait as to the religions in concreto, and is in this respect one of die best 
modem contributions to the subject.''"*' Nevertheless, he cntidses Brunner for dwellmg 'niamly in 
139 . KTT. pp. 11 - 250; esp. p. 99. 
140 . CM, pp. 115-116. 
141 . CM, p. 118. 
142 . CM, p. 120. 
143 . CM, p. 131. 
144 . That is, 'feuding brothers,' RCT, p. 178. 
145 . RCF, p. 185. This position is well-summarised in the following passage; 'Jesus Christ is both tlie 
Fulfillment of all rehgion and the Judgment on all Religion. As the Fulfiller, He is the Tmtii wliich these 
reUgions seek in vain. There is no phenomenon in the history of religion that does not point toward 
Him:... From the standpoint of Jesus Christ, the non-Christian religions seem like stammering words from 
some lialf-forgotten saying. None of them is without a breath of the Holy, and yet none of tiiem is the 
Holy. None is witliout its impressive tmUi, and yet none of them is the Truth; for their Truth is Jesus 
Christ ... [As the] Judgment on all religion.... viewed in His liglit, all reUgious systems appear untrue, 
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tile reaUn of theological prindples,' and not mcorporating a knowledge of otiier reUgions into his 
argumoit.'''* Against Bartii's position as it is found in Churdi Dogmatics. 1.2,''" he argues that 
while it 'bears the marks of the Uon,' and is 'in the Ught of the justificatio impii in Christ, quite true,' 
it is nevertiieless, 'too simpUstic and obvious to be satisfying m deaUng with this complicated and 
dialectic subjed. One does not feel that this is dialectical theology!''''^  Barth's treatment fails 
because it estabUshes no contact with other reUgions. Y d , Kraemer is quick to point out that Bardi, 
'without yielding an inch,' offers a good corrective to 1.2 in ni.2.''" 
On the subjed of 'Natural Theology,' Kraemer seems equally uncomfortable witii both. 
On the one hand, Brunner realises better than Barth that this is a complex problem which is a 'life-
and-death matter for the relation of Church and worid.'"" Y d , notwithstanding his persuasive 
argumoits and appeals to Scripture, Kraemer is 'uneasy about tiie fad tiiat [Brunner] fought his 
battie as a defoice of Natural Theology witiiout making it sufSdoitiy clear that if we go on usmg 
this term..., it must have an entirely differoit content from the usual one....'"' On the otiier hand, 
while Bartii nghtiy rejects classical concepts of General Revelation and Natural Theology, Kraemer 
believes he goes too far, becoming botii 'undialectical and rationalistic.''" Moreover, his arbitrary 
unbeUeving, and indeed godless.' Emil Bruimer, Revelation and Reason: The Christian Doctrine of Faith 
and Knowledge, trans. Olive Wyon, (London: SCM, 1947), pp. 270 - 271. See also Bninner, The 
Philosophy of ReUgion from the standpoint of Protestant Theology, trans AJ.D. Farrer and Bertram Lee 
Woolf; (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1937), chapters 6 and 7, pp. 99 - 149; The Divine 
Imperative: A Smdy in Christian Ethics, tfans. Olive Wyon, (London: Lutterworth, 1937), pp. 29- 33; and 
The Christian Doctrine of God: Dogmatics Volume I. trans. Olive Wyon, (London: Lutterworth, 1949), pp. 
101 -102. 
146 . RCF, p. 185. 
147 . See above, 1.1. 
148. RCF, pp. 191, 193. 
149 . RCF, pp. 193 - 196. 
150. RCF, p. 356. 
151 . RCF. p. 356. For Bmnner's defence of Namral Theology, see Emil Bmmier, 'Nature and Grace.' in 
Nattiral Theology, pp. 15-64; The Letter to the Romans: A Commentary. (London: Lutterworth, 1959), 
pp. 16 - 28; Revelation and Reason, pp. 58 - 80, esp. p. 61; God and Man: Four Essays on the Nattire of 
Personality, trans. David Cairns, (London: SCM, 1936), pp. 103 - 135; The Theology of Crisis. (New 
York Charles Scribemer's Sons, 1929), pp. 23 - 44; The Divine Imperative, pp. 17 - 52; The Pliilosophy 
of ReUgion, pp. 22 - 30; 79 - 98; The Christian Doctrine of God, pp. 14 - 34. 
152 . RCF. p. 356. 
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ex^esis 'of the classical Bible passages whidi for caituries had served to underscore the notions of 
Goieral revelation, confused the controversy in a very dq)lorable way.''" Specifically, he rejects 
Barth's contaition that 'acceptmg the self-disclosure of God in the past, the presait and the fiiture, 
through nature, history and consdence, wdiidi is cleariy taught by Paul in Rom. 1 and 2, must 
mean accqjting the current concq^ts of General Revelation and Natural Theology.''" He 
concludes, 
Christomonismus is a horrible word, but one must judge discriminatingly what Bartli 
does and does not say. If Barth says - and he does - that the Bible knows no other mode 
of revelation than Christ, he has the Bible against him. If he says that all modes of 
revelation find their source, their meaning and criterion in Jesus Christ, and that the 
revelation of God's righteousness in Christ is the final revelation in the hght of which 
Jesus Christ is the Truth, the only Tmth, without vAiom no man comes to the Fatiier -
then he is quite right and we ought all to be Christomonists^^^ 
Two final examples provide a fitting summary. First, in a review writtai for Theolog\' 
Today, Kraemer expresses his admiration for and distance from Barth: 'it ou^t to be an obligation 
on everyone who claims to be a theologian to seek an aicounter with Barth's theology, not in order 
to become a "Barthian", but in order to leam ui our t w a i t i ^ century what it means to be a 
tiieologjan.''" Second, on his own list of influeices, Bartii ranks only fifth: 'The only ones to 
whom I know myself to be deqily indebted as far as theological thinking is concerned are Paul, 
Pascal, Kierk^aard and also, although in a lesser way, Blumhardt and Barth.''" These examples 
cleariy illustrate the simplistic nature of the solutions of those \^ d^ o would ather equate or sunder 
Barth and Kraemer. The truth lies somewhere in betweai: Kraemer was both sympatiietic to and 
critical of Kari Bartli. They were 'feuduig brothers' in tiie Reformed family. Kraemer was a 
theological ally who was ndther a clone of nor complrtely indqjaidait of Barth. 
153 . RCF, p. 357. 
154. RCF. p. 357. 
155 . RCF, p. 358 - 359. 
156 . Hendrik Kraemer, 'A Manifold Appraisal of Barth: Review of Karl Barth's "Festschrift" Antwort,' in 
Theology Today. 2 (1956), p. 398. 
157 . Hendrik Kraemer, 'Theologie en het kerkeUjk vraagstuk,' in Onder eigen vaandel. 17 (1942), p. 17. 
Cited in Annand Garon, 'Hendrik Kraemer and the Mission to Islam,' (unpubhshed Ph.D. thesis, Ottawa 
University, 1979), p. 43, n. 61. 
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The above examination provides a goieral theological context within whidi Kraemer's 
ideas developed. Yd, the major influence remains for witiiout W.E. Hockmg's Re-Thinkmg 
Missions: A Lavman's Inquirv After One Hundred Years. Kraemer could not have wnttai The 
Christian Message. To this influoice I now turn. Much of the work is practical in nature and 
reflects the insights of a number of important American missionaries. Nevertheless, I want to focus 
on the transcaidental ideaUsm underpinning the report. It can be found in the opening four chapters 
of the book (drafted by Hockmg alone) under the heading, 'General Prindples.' Li these chapters, 
Hockmg outUnes three fadors whidi he believes aU reUgions share; namely, a common mystical 
core, a common search for truth, and a common reUgious uniquoiess. 
According to Hocking's first fador, 'if there were not at the core of all creeds a nucleus of 
reUgious truth, ndther Christianity nor any other faith would have anytiiing to build on.'"* He was 
convinced that 'withm the pidy of the common people of every land, encrusted with superstition as 
It usually is, and wdghed down with vulgar self-seeking in their bargaining witii the gods, there is 
this germ, the inaUoiable reUgious intuition of the human soul. The God of this intuition is tiie true 
God: to this extait, umversal religion has not to be established, it exists.'"' This common starting-
point leads Hocking secondly to afBrm beUef in a common goal: 'The relation betweai the 
religions,' he wntes, 'must take increasingly hereafter a common seardi for trutii.' Accordingly, 
missionary activity should continue, but instead of seeking converts, the missionary should look for 
opportunities for mterreligious inspiration and improvement. The missionary 'will look forward, 
not to tiie destruction of these reUgions, but to their continued co-existaice with Chnstianity, eadi 
stimulating the other in growtii toward the ultimate goal, unity in the compl^ est reUgious truth.' 
These two fadors logicaUy require Hocking, thirdly, to presait a new understanding of the 
uniquaiess of Chnstianity. For him, Chnstianity is unique in its interpr«ation and expression of 
the 'inalienable rebgious mtuition.' He writes, 
In respect to its theology and etiiics, Christianity has many doctrines in common witii 
other religions, yet no other religion has the same group of doctrines ... [What] is true 
belongs, in its nature, to the human mind everywhere. 
From this treasury of thouglit, however, Cliristianity proffers a selection which 
is unique. The principle of selection is its own pecuUar character: its individuality has 
158. Hocking Re-Thinking Missions, p. 37. 
159 . Hocking Re-Tliinking Missions, p. 37. 
160 . Hocking, Re-Tliinking Missions, p. 44. 
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in the way in which it assembles and proportions these trutiis, and leads them to clarity, 
certainty, exemplification and therefore power. Its features, Uke the featiu-es of a person, 
are unmistakably its own.""' 
Tins uniquaiess extends from theology and dhics to embrace also symbolism and history: 'The 
uniqueness of Christianity does not consist solely ui its interpretation of religious trutii. It consists 
also, perhaps diiefly, in those things whidi make religion different from philosophy, - its 
symbolism, its observances, its historical fellowship, and espedally the personal figure to whom it 
points not alone as founder and teadier, but as its highest expression of the rehgious Ufe.'"'^  Thus 
for Hocking, Christianity is unique just as every historically and culturally embedded expression of 
the essence of religion is unique. 
For Kraemer, Hocking's transcendental idealism 'manifested a remarkable mixture of 
sincere devotion to the missionary cause as a Christian obligation witii a very weak sense of 
apostolic consdousness.''*^ He r^rded it as relativism masked by the language of tolerance,'^ 
which failed to take 'the apostolic obligation towards God and tiie worid' senously.'" In Religion 
and the Christian Faitii. Kraemer recalled his objection bluntiy: 
The point of view advocated by Re-Thinking Missions and its chairman [Hocking] is 
devoid of real theological sense and is, though intended to be the conu-ary, a total 
distortion of the Christian message, its content and real meaning. Rehgion and 
Christianity are simply reduced to immanent cultural phenomena. Nowhere is that 
maintained. Nor is the case stated in this way, because none of the writers had that in 
mind. In feet, however, the whole argument amounts to that. Its consequence is a 
suicide of missions and an aimuhnent of the Christian feith.'^* 
Kraemer concluded this polemic as follows: 'With the bombshell of this Report in mind my book 
The Christian Message in a Non-Christian Worid was wnttai, and acted, at least for a great part 
of the American missionary worid, as anotiier bombshell.''*' 
161. Hocking, Re-Thinking Missions, p. 49, 
162 . Hocking, Re-Thinking Missions, p. 51. 
163 . CM, p. 36. 
164. CM, pp. 45 - 46. 
165 . CM, p. 49. 
166 . RCF, pp. 223 - 224. 
167 . RCF, p. 224. 
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On the basis of these words. Hairy Van Dusen is quite right to diaracterise The Christian 
Message as Kraemer's attempt to exordse Hocking's tiieological demons."^ * Likewise, Bishop 
Sabapathy Kulandran, though disagreeing with Kraemer on a fundamental level, wntes that 
Hockmg had 'posed with sardonic frankness the question whetiier [the Chnstian Churdi] had 
anytiiing to preach.' In this Ught Kulandran considers Kraemer's work as botii necessary and 
beiefidal: 
What Kraemer did was to seize hold of the main idea of the book witii both hands and 
throttie it to death. Its ghost still occasionally haunts the theological field here and 
there. But as a full-blooded and serious figure to be reckoned with it certainly died witli 
the ^ppearance of Kraemer's book and tiie Madras [Tambaram] conference of 1938. It 
is this punitive aspect of Kraemer's book that made the deepest impression on people. It 
was not that there was no constructive aspect, but once the chief item in the show was 
over, whether people stayed through the rest of the programme or not they paid httie 
attention to it.'*' 
Conclusion: 
It is unfortunate that this 'punitive asped of Kraemer's book* is most oftai tiie only aspect 
of his work that is remembered and it is to be r^etted more that evoi these memones of his work 
are faulty. This diapter was a first stqp toward correcting this mnemonic imbalance. It sought to 
take this stqp by placmg Kraemer in his historical context in three stages. It opoied with a general 
mtroduction to his Ufe and works. Thereafter, the focus was sharpaied to Kraemer's role within tiie 
missionary thinking of the eariy ecumenical movemoit by criticaUy examining tiie first tiuee 
ecumaiical missionary conferaices: Edinburgh 1910, Jerusalem 1928, and Tambaram 1938. 
Fuially, I argued that to (dis)regard Kraemer as Bartii's mouthpiece is too sunpUstic and that a far 
more important influoice, albeit natively, was WiUiam Hocking. The second step - wrestiing 
directiy with Kraemer's work - awaits in the next diapter. 
168 . Henry P. Van Dusen, 'The Missionary Message Since Madras,' in Cliristendoni. 9 (1944), p. 27. 
169 . Sabapathy Kulandran, 'The Renaissance of Non-Christian Religions and a Definition of Approach 
to Non-Christians,' mimeographed paper presented to The Sttidy on tiie Word of God and Men of Other 
Faitiis (WCC Archives), Box 26.32.19, p. 26. (Quoted in Anarajali, Hindus and Christians, p. 86. 
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Chapter 4 
Hendrik Kraemer's Theology of Religions 
Introduction: 
The previous diapter introduced Hendrik Kraemer by surveying the historical context of a 
career spanning four decades. In three sections, this chapter compld;es the recovery by acquainting 
the reader with Kraemer's theology of religions through an expository account of his major works: 
The Christian Message in a Non-Christian Worid. 'Continuity or Discontinuity,' and Religion and 
the Chnstian Faith. 
4.1 The Christian Message in a Non-Christian Worid 
Kraemer opens The Christian Message with a description of two interrelated cnses. The 
first is a global crisis caused in the West by the collapse of the quest for certainty and culmmaling 
in botii 'the complete... dominion of the spirit and attitude of relativism,'' and in tiie nse of the 
'pseudo-absolutes': communism, fasdsm and National Sodalism.^ Triggered by colonialism in the 
East,^ the same crisis has destroyed many political, sodal, economic, and cultural structures. 
1 . CM, p. 6. He continues, 'The quest for truth and certitude has driven him [man] to the conclusion tiiat 
all systems are somehow projections of tendendes of tiie human mind. He is alone in a howling 
wilderness. All his efforts are to be compared with Baron von Munchausen's endeavour to draw himself by 
his own hair out of the swamp in which he is sunk' p. 11. 
2 . Pseudo-absolutes, Kraemer writes, are attempts 'to overcome relativism by selfmade absolutism. The 
absolute is a life necessity for man. Therefore, when he has annihilated God, man... makes himself god. 
However, just because the absolutism of these new "reUgions" is self-made, it is void and felse.' CM, p. 16. 
3 . CM, p. 17. For him, 'never before in the history of the worid has there been a meeting between worlds 
so radically and irreconcilably different as East and West.' (p. 18). Likening the crisis to an earUiquake, 
Kraemer locates the epicenfre in the machine which enabled the technological West to dominate tiie 
agricultural East. 'In [the machine],' he writes, 'the creative urge and intelligence of the Westerners liad 
shaped a marvelous but feteful tool to express and multiply tiieir creativity infinitely, even to the degree 
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Kraemer su^ests, however, that the accompanying religious raiaissance may signal the birth of a 
new world power."* This global situation has provoked an identity-crisis in tlie Church: religious 
relativism and persistent religious plurality have combined to raise a troubling question; What is 
the Churdi's 'relation to the world and all its spheres of life....'?' 
This question is especially acute where Churdi and worid meet. In the araia of missions, 
the Churdi must forsake colonial conceptions and instead proclaim its message withm an encounter 
with other faiths. 'The whole complex of religious and spiritual life in the large non-Christian world 
with all Its possibilities will be no longer merely an object of study, curiosity or indifference; it will 
have Its share in the shaping of the spiritual life of mankind, and its influence on the course of the 
history of the Christian Churdi.'^ Moreover, the responsibility for this aicounter from now on 
rests not with Westem churdies, but with Asian and African ones.^  'Church history will and mmf 
that the creator became the servant and victim of his own invention. The ensuing industrial revolution, 
which now found at its disposal tools more highly perfected than even before, and the Uberation of life 
from its own fetters, made the conquest of the worid inevitable.' pp. 17-18. 
4 . Kraemer writes, 'The East... has become now a fector as influential as the West. Probably there is no 
feet more fraught with consequences for the shaping of the fiiture of humanity than the passing of the 
European worid hegemony. It not only fundamentally changes the political and economic outlook for the 
worid but - more significant to those who are engaged in the great missionary cause - all prognosis about 
the future rehgious and spiritual development of mankind will have to adjust itself to the new fact that all 
great rehgions and conceptions of life may become worid-wide in their effects and probabilities. Their 
latent dynamics, whetlier spiritual or political, may become world factors.' CM, p. 21. Three decades on, 
he repeated this observation: 'The hghtning-hke change of a great part of Asia from the status of being 
colonies of Westem powers to the status of poUtical independence and sovereignty is a feet of cataclysmic 
importance.... Until Worid War H.... It had no power, influence or voice in its own right.... Since the great 
landshde toward independence broke loose in 1947 with the independence of fridia, this has radically 
altered. Notwithstanding the central place of the U.S.A. in worid-afifeirs, it is possible to defend tlie tliesis 
that the world has not shifted from Europe-centredness to America-centfedness but to Asia and Africa-
centredness.' Hendrik Kraemer, 'The Role and Responsibihty of the Christian N4ission,' in Pliiiosophy. 
Religion and the Coming World Civilization: Essays in Honor of William Ernest Hockina. ed. Leroy S. 
Rouner, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p. 236. 
5 . CM. p. 30. While no solution will apply to every situation, 'one demand universally emerges from the 
situation everywhere, that is, back to the recapturing of the vision of what God in Christ meant tlie 
Christian Commumty to be - a fellowship of behevers, rooted in God and His divine redemptive order, and 
therefore committed to the service and die salvation of die worid; going to the bottom in its criticism of and 
opposition to die evil of the world, but at the same time going to the bottom in its identification with die 
sufferings and needs of the worid.' 
6 . CM, p. 38. 
7 . For not only 'Uirough the Christian mission from die West, but tivough the face of Uie presence of die 
Christian church as part of the total indigenous life, and through their Christian mission, Christianity has 
now its own responsible place in the hfe of Asia and Africa' Kraemer, 'The Role and Responsibility of die 
Cliristian Mission,' p. 242. 
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be writtei in the future in the life-books of Africa and Asia, and ... these new chapters will be of 
decisive importance for the life and development of the Christian Church in its older domains.'* 
A satisfactory answer is founded not upon 'a connected series of religious and moral 
ideals,' but upon 'the revelation of a series of divine acts'' incapable of explanation by any means 
other than the Biblical narratives. 'Therefore, to the Bible we will turn, because there the witness of 
the proph^ and the apostles is to be found on which the Churdi is built.''" For this basis, 
Kraemer is unapolog^c: 'The Christian faith is indifferent to rational coherence... not because it is 
incoherait or necessarily irrational, but because, as the divine order of life revealed in Jesus Chnst, 
it has a coherence and rationality of a quite differait order....' Consequaitly, 'whai formulated in 
the terms of a definite philosophy,' it is necessarily 'strangled or distorted.'" The 'series of religious 
and moral ideals,' the 'definite philosophy whidi Kraemer rejects is Hocking's transcaidental 
idealism.'^ Instead, he offers 'Biblical realism''^ as tlie only adequate pouit of dqjarture whai 
discerning the relationship betweoi Church and world. 
8 . CM, p. 39. 
9 . CM, p. 61. 
10 . CM. pp. 61 - 62. This is not to say that Kraemer advocates an uncritical reading of the Scriptures, for 
he goes on to write, 'It can confidently be asserted that never before in the history of mankind has a religion 
been exposed to such a relentless procedure of analysis, comparison and testing as Christianity has in tlie 
least centuries.... The Christian feith has been summoned before the tribunal of reason and history and has 
been tested severely.' For Kraemer, this severe testing, of which biblical criticism is one part, is really a 
'blessing in disguise' for 'the same critical method of investigation and of disinterested understanding has 
developed the attitude that the only way to understand [rehgions] and to be just to them is to take tlieni 
according to their pecuhar fundamental motives and meaning. This mle apphes also to the Christian faitli, 
and naturally leads again to the Bible as the source of the most valued answr to the question. What is the 
Christian faith?' CM, pp. 62 - 63. 
11. CM. p. 64. 
12. See 3.3. 
13 . Bibhcal realism, says Kraemer, radically recasts tlie great philosophical and theological mysteries. 
Take for instance, the enigma of transcendence and immanence. 'To Biblical realism, tliis problem is quite 
irrelevant ... The Bible and the Christian feith know in their own characteristic and reahstic way about 
transcendence and unmanence. God is the sovereign Creator of the world and or man; He is the Lord of 
liistory. This transcendence is not the derived transcendence of a divine essence. .., but is absolute, primary 
transcendence, founded on the fact of God's Godhead. God works in history and in man . .. This essentially 
religious immanence is radically different from the concept of immanence as current in religious 
pliilosophy with its ontological colouring. It is the immanence of personal fellowship with and active 
participation in the life of the world and of man; the fellowship of the Father, but the Fatlier who is in 
Heaven. Hence an exposition of this Bibhcal realism is of greater advantage to tlie elucidation of the 
Christian faitli than the inevitably abstract discussion of the relation of the immanence and transcendence 
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'Bibhcal realism' is rooted in Kraemer's concqjtion of revelation for while the Bible has 'no 
theory about revelation,' it 'is the presupposition on which the prophetic and apostolic witness of the 
Bible is built.'''' Properly defined, revelation is 'what is by its nature inaccessible and remains so, 
even when it is revealed'^^ It is primarily the Christ-evait: "Nowdiere is the gaiuine mearung of 
revelation mamtamed so consistaitly.... God was truly revealed in Jesus Christ, but at the same 
time He hid and disguised Himself in the man Jesus Chnst. The universal revulsion from and 
protest against the Licamation at all times is a clear indication of how completely hidden God's 
revelation remains from the natural eye of man.'"' YA it is also the revelation of '[man] as a bemg 
who m his deepest instincts and desires wants to be god.''^  It is never a senes of revealed 
propositions,'^ but always 'a tale about "the wonderfiil things God has done" (Acts li.H) whidi 
remain "wonderful" and incomprehaisible despite their being told.'" It is not speculation about 
'God's Essence,' but an announcemoit of'the mystery of His JVill....'^° 
of God as commonly understood.' CM, pp. 66 - 67. This alone is his 'fundamental starting-point and 
criterion of all Christian and theological thinking.' CM, p. 66. 
14. CM, p. 69. 
15 . CM, p. 69. 
16. CM, p. 70. 
17 . CM, p. 70 
18 . As fer as Kraemer is concerned, this view of revelation mistakenly but inevitably defines feitii as 
intellectual assent. 'The Roman Cathohc Church,' he writes, 'has canonized tiiis mtellectuahst and non-
Christian conception in its doctiine about the natural order of rehgious fects which the human mind has 
acquired by its strenuous efforts, and the supernatural order of tmtiis which have come down from heaven.' 
This, he concludes, 'is the besetting sin of all orthodoxy,' and 'one of the most disastrous misinterpretations 
of the Cliristian feitii.' CM, pp. 71 - 72. 
19 . CM, p. 30. Moreover, this tale demands to be told and retold: 'When... revelation means God's doing 
redemptive and saving acts to realize tiie restoration of mankind and Uie worid, the only appropnate tiling 
to do for those who have apprehended it by die eye of faith is to bear witness to it, to become aposties, 
ambassadors, messengers.' CM. p. 72. 
20 . CM, pp. 72 - 73, italics his. 'Not tiie mystery of His being or Essence is revealed, because tiiat 
remains God's exclusive domain, but His redemptive Will towards mankind. God's saving Will, become 
manifest in divine action, is what is revealed in the Christian faith. .. The mystery of God's Essence, as is 
demonstrated in all ages and all rehgions, is to be concealed, to be hedged around by tiie shuddering awe of 
inaccessibility; the mystery of the divine Will, as lies in tiie nature of the case, has to be announced. The 
missionary command and urge in Chnstianity thus burst forth from tiie heart of God.' CM, p. 73. 
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'Biblical reahsm' may be portrayed in various ways 'because the richness of the Gospel is 
mexhaustible.'^' In the Incarnation, it proclaims an unthinkable and mysterious act whidi declares 
Gods love for humanity.^ ^ In justification by faith, it reveals 'why Chnst must be called die cnsis 
of all reUgions and philosophies,' by uncovering humanity's 'wilfiJ maintenance of self m the face of 
God. .. God Himself can only make possible the impossible by His sovereign, creative act of 
salvation m Jesus Christ.'^^ It declares that 'God by His creative act of reconcUiation and atonement 
in Jesus Christ, reconciling the worid unto Himself, not imputing men's trespasses unto them, 
opQied a way of reconcihation where there was no way.'^ As the proclamation of God's Kingdom, 
Biblical realism is a reminder that humanity 'cannot create an ideal socirty,' but that 'God has begun 
m Jesus Christ a new divine order of life, of vAndn Chnst is the centre and the head.'^ ' Yet in eadi 
portrayal, God's initiative m salvation is stressed as the heart of'the radical religions realism of the 
Bible.'^^ Though BibUcal authors display 'many varying, individual accents,' the 'Christ they 
proclaim is always the incarnate Son of God, whose Irfe and work meant the execution of God's 
plan of salvation.... The Holy Spirit to whom they testify is always the creator and sustainer of the 
new hfe in Chnst, and the guarantee of God's dealing with those vMo are new creatures m Chnst .'" 
This core calls Christians to 'expose the totahty of [their] being to the claim of die Bibhcal 
revelation for absoltite a l l iance to it - half-hearted allegiance means no a l l iance at all - and thai 
21 . CM, p. 73. 
22 . 'The Incarnation states that the decisive moment in worid history is the moment in wliich God 
revealed Himself in Christ as die holy and loving Travailer for die redemption and restoration of the world. 
Therefore, in the Incarnation God is not only revealed, but in it is also imphed that empirical man and die 
empirical world are reahties of infinite worth and objects of such deep concern to God that He surrenders 
Himself in Christ to the Cross.' CM, p. 74. 
23 . CM, p. 75, 
24 . CM, p. 76. 
25 . CM, p. 77. And it calls people to this new way of hfe, which Kraemer describes as 'the way of the 
Cross, of giving up all self-assertion and self-regard, the way of conflict with die world, of martyrdom and 
ruin; it is also die life of victory, of a new creation in Christ, of feith and hope and love, the way of absolute 
tmst in the reality of God, His acts and promises in Christ.... U is the way of "obedience to the faith" and 
fellowship with Christ, of joy and of service, of living by divine forgiveness and therefore loving God and 
loving men....' CM, pp. 77 - 78. 
26 . CM, p. 82. 
27 . CM, pp. 84- 85. 
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to take deasions.'^^ This 'is the only way to suggest sufiBaently the incommaisurablaiess of tiie 
rehgion of Bibhcal realism with all other specimais of life.'^' 
Therefore in regard to the problem of tiie legitimate variety of expression and approach 
in tiie Christian feitii, which in tiie Younger Churches and tiie mission field is a 
problem of fimdamental importance, because it crops up inevitably through the natural 
feet of tiie different backgrounds, heritages and mentahties, we find our point of 
reference again in the mdisputable and continuous confrontation with and orientation 
upon the radical realism of the Bibhcal revelation.^ " 
Thus, Kraemer wants to solve 'the all-embracing problem of the Chnstian rehgion or tiie 
Christian Church in relation to the world,'^' from the openly confessional perspective of 'Biblical 
reahsm.' Li contemporary terms, Kraemer's theology of religions occurs not in the forum of 
fiindamaital theology but of ecclesiolpgy. He thus hopes to safeguard tiie importance of Chnsdan 
missions by stressing the apostohc nature of the Churdi,^^ vMe maintaining a positive atiJtude 
toward the non-Christian religions by stressing God's presaice in all creation;^ ^ thereby revealing 
'the dialectical relation in which Christianity, if true to its nature and mission, ought to stand to tiie 
worid - the combination of a fierce "yes" and at the same time a fierce "no" to the worid: tiie human 
28 . CM, p. 83. 
29 . CM, p. 83. 
30 . CM, p. 85. 
31 . CM, p. 103. 
32 . He writes, 'In the first place, Christianity, under all drcumstances, must always be aware that it is 
built on the prophetic and apostohc witoess to a divine, transcendental order of hfe that transcends and 
judges by virtue of its inherent authority the whole range of historical human life in every period.' CM, p. 
104. And again. The Christian message 'is not a message about which the hearers have tiie right to decide 
whether it should be communicated or not,... It must be communicated because it issues from tiie 
prophetic consciousness that is the Word of the Lord of the Universe....' The Communication of the 
Christian Faith, p. 22. 
33 . He writes, 'In the second place, whether the attitude is one of renunciation, of reserve or of intimate 
relation, it has to be essentially a positive attitude, because the worid remains the domain of God who 
created it. After its rebellion against Him, He did not let it go but held it fest in His new initiative of 
reconciliation. It must be a positive attihide also because the Christian Church, as the witness to and 
representative of the new order of salvation and reconcihation, has been set by God in this worid in order to 
be and work for the sake of tliis worid. Jesus taught us to pray, "God's will be done on earth as it is in 
heaven," and tiiis petition will always be tiie Magna Charta of tiie Churchs obligation to occupy itself 
strenuously and positively with the worid and its spheres of life, including the non-Christian religions.' 
CM. p. 104. 
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and broken reflection of the divine "no" and "yes" of the holy God of reconcihation who held die 
worid under His absolute judgmait and at the same time claimed it for His love.'" 
Furthermore, in so doing he hopes to avoid arguments attempting to prove the superior 
value of a rehgion.^' Sudi proofs flounder for all reUgions can 'show up an impressive record of 
psydiological, cultural and other values, and it is wholly dependoit on one's fijndamental axioms of 
hfe whether one considers these non-Christian adiievemaits of higher value for mankind than the 
Christian.'^*' By framing theology of rehgions within ecclesiology, he bypasses the discussion 
aitirely. Focusing instead on the relationship between the Church and the worid, he onaits his 
work around that which sqjarates the Church from the worid, tiiat which is 'claimed to be die 
standard of reference for all truth and all rehgion,' namely, 'the faith that God has revealed the Way 
and the Life and the Truth in Jesus Christ and will this to be known to all the worid.'^' 
The preceding discussion has clarified three foundational points. First, Kraemer's attitude 
toward non-Christian rehgions 'is to be seoi in the context of the relation of Christianity to die 
worid and its spheres of hfe.'^ * Second, in his view, 'for a Christian the only standard of reference,' 
aiabling a Intimate evaluation of non-Christian religions and empirical Christianity is "tiie 
revelation of Christ.'^^ And third, he esdiews all feehngs of superiority. 'A missionary or a 
Christian who harbours the tiniest spark of spiritual arrogance and boasts of "his" supenority by 
being a Christian and "havmg" the truth, gneves the Spirit of Chnst and obscures his message, . . .'^ '' 
Having thus laid his foundation, Kraemer now attempts to answer tiie question, 'Does God 
- and if so, how and where does God - reveal Himself in the rehgious Ufe as preseit m the non-
34 . CM, p. 104, itahcs his. 
35 . He notes that it was failure to maintain diis distinction diat led to the confusion at Jerusalem 1928. 
CM, p. 103. 
36 . CM, p. 106. 
37 . CM, pp. 106- 107. 
38 . CM, p. 110. 
39. CM, p. 110. 
40 . CM,pp. 110- 111. 
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Christian rehgjons?'^' Borrowing from Knstensai, he b^ins by assertiing that 'all philosophies and 
worid-views, are the various efforts of man to apprehaid the totality of existence, often stirring m 
their subhmity and as oftai pathetic or revolting in their ineffectiveness.'^ ^ Every theology or 
atheology 'is an effort to reflect in a system of coheroit thinking the rehgious apprehension of 
existence."*^ Though these differoit systems sometimes share 'aspirations, ideas, institutions, 
symbols and mtuitions,' from these cannot be distilled the essence of rehgion.** 'As saentific 
research and critical thinking both teadi, there is no "natural" rehgion; there is only a universal 
religious consciousness in man, which produces many similarities. Besides that, there are conaete 
religions, eadi with its pecuhar structure and character.* '^ He continues by interpreting this 
totalitarian view of rehgions theologically. Humans, he writes, are 'dual beuigs': of divme ongin, 
but corrupted by sui.'*'' This divine ongin, tiie root of all rehgious creativity, is evidait 'in tiie lofty 
rehgions and the ethical systems that [humans have] produced and tried to hve by.'^ ' At tiie same 
time however, evai the most sublime rehgious adiievements are corrupted through humanity's 
'subjection to evil and to satanic forces....'^* Against these rival apprdiensions of the totality of 
existaice stands the Christian revelation which 'asserts itself as the record of God's self-disclosing 
and re-creating revelation m Jesus Christ, as an apprdiension of existence that revolves around tiie 
poles of divine judgment and divine salvation, giving the divine answer to this demonic and guilty 
disharmony of man and the world.''*' Edioing the eariy Barth, Kraemer contends that revelation is 
41 . CM,p. 111. 
42 . CM. p. 111 (emphasis mine). 
43 . CM,p. 111. 
44 . CM, p. 111. 'This endeavour,' he continues, 'although quite inteUigible on account of the mentioned 
similarities, is false. It confuses concurrent but widely scattered, unevenly distributed, differentiy graded 
and differently motivated religions and etiiical notions, with a supposedly coherent system, governed by 
some leading general ideas which the creators of this "natural" religion arbitrarily put upon it.' CM, p. 112. 
45 . CM, p. 112. 
46 . CM, p. 112. 
47 . CM, p. 113. 
48 . CM, p. 113. For instance, 'The mystic, who triumphantly realizes his essential one-ness with God or 
tiie Divine, knowing himself in serene equanimity the supreme master of the universe and of destiny, and 
who by his marvelous feats of moral self-restramt and spiritual self-disciphne offers a fascinating example 
of splendid humanity, commits in tiiis stiblime way tiie root sin of mankind, "to be like God" (Gen. iii. 5).' 
49 . CM, pp. 113-114. 
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'an act of God, an act of divine grace for foriom man and a foriom worid by whidi He condescends 
to reveal His Will and His Heart....''" Hence, '"gaieral revelation," in die saise of God reveahng 
Himself with compelluig lucidity m nature, history and reason, is a contradiction in terms, for what 
hes on the street has no need to be revealed. By its nature revelation is and must be special.'" 
Yet, Kraemer is dissatisfied with Barth's refijsal to take the issue fluther: 'The problem of 
the relation to the worid and all its spheres of hfe and that of the attitude towards other religions and 
how God works in them cannot be constantly passed by in silaice of left untouched.'" Barth's 
silaice surrenders Bibhcal reahsm to 'sterile irrtellectuahsm.'" While the revelation of God in Jesus 
Chnst is sui generis, Kraemer holds that 'the worid is the creation of God "who does not abandon 
the works of His hands," but continues working in it.'*^  
Even in this fellen worid God shines dirough in a broken, troubled way: m reason, in 
namre and history. Otherwise the urge for truth, beauty, goodness and holmess, stirring 
in science, philosophy, art, reUgion are incomprehensible. The community of die 
believers in Christ belongs to this worid and lives and works in it, and even for the sake 
of self-comprehension it needs hght on the subject of this worid as it is and its relation to 
God.'' 
Therefore, the 'universal religious consaousness of man and the results of his endeavour to obtain 
an apprdiaision of the totahty of existence cannot be dismissed as outside discussion.'"^ Calvin's 
'sensus divnitatis'^^ and Brunner's 'critical and right kind of natural theology,''* provide the 
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smpidity.' People 'do not therefore apprehend God as he offers himself but imagine him as diey have 
fashioned him in their own presumptions ' p. 47. 
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required corrective by affirming 'the unique and sui generis diaracter of the realm of revelation and 
salvation,' while speakmg 'about the realm of fallai creation... m a deeper, more realistic, freer 
way...' than B a r t h . T h e y enable one to rejoice 'over every evidence of divine working and 
revelation that may be found m the non-Christian worid' but maintain that these 'pure and 
unmistakable evidaices of divine revelation' are not 'of the same sort and quality as the revelation in 
Jesus Christ.'^" Unlike Barth, Kraemer does not reject terms hke 'general revelation' and 'natural 
theology,' but redefines them. Of the former, he writes, 'General revelation can henceforth only 
mean that God shines revealingly through tiie works of His creation (nature), through the thirst and 
quest for trutii and beauty, through the consciaice and the thirst and quest for goodness, which 
throbs m man evai in his condition of foriom sinfubess, because God is continuously occupying 
Himself and wi estlmg with man, m all ages and with all peoples.'*' Thus recast, geieral revelation 
is seal only through the laises of the revelation of God m Chnst." The latter is similariy re-
charactensed. 
The fimction of natural theology will henceforth be, not to constme preparatory stages 
and draw unbroken, continuous lines of religious development ending and reaching 
their surmount in Christ, but in the hght of tiie Christian revelation to lay bare tiie 
dialectical condition not only of the non-Christian rehgions but of all the human 
attempts towards the prehension of the totahty of existence. Or, to put it differentiy, 
to uncover in the hght of tiie revelation of Christ tiie different modes of God-, self- and 
world-consciousness of man m his rehgious hfe.*^  
Accordingly, Kraemer's answer to whether or not God is revealed in tiie non-Chnstian 
rehgions is both yes and no. From the human perspective, 'man's sublime faculties and 
accomplisliments in the realm of intellect, culture, art, morals, religion, mastery of life,' are 
hampered by 'man's apparaitly constitutional bUndness, evai m his subhmest momaits, to God as 
He is m Jesus Christ, and his perversion and corruption.'^ From tiie divme perspective, while he 
never outiines the nature this revelation, Kraemer affirms that God is revealed in other religions. It 
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is only m die hght of the revelation in Christ, however, that this revelation is recognised, hi 
summary, 
God works in man and shines dirough nature. The religious and moral life of man is 
man's achievement, but also God's wrestling with him; it manifests a receptivity to God, 
but at the same time an inexcusable disobedience and blindness to God. The worid feils 
to know God even in its highest wisdom, although it strives to do so. Man seeks God 
and at the same tune flees from Hun m His seeking because his self-assertive self-
centredness of will, his root-sm, always breaks througli. God's anger is revealed towards 
the iniquity of man as manifested in his rehgious and moral depravity, but nevertheless 
die entire creation is eagerly longmg for the revelation of the "glorious freedom of the 
children of God" (Rom. viii). Such was and is the contradictory condition of the worid, 
and of the rehgious and moral hfe of the worid in its difierent fomis, and die dialectical 
relation of God to it. To mdicate systematically and concretely vvhere God revealed 
Himself and wresded and wresdes with man in the non-Christian rehgions is not 
feasible. Every effort to do so is hazardous. Personal concrete experiences, the meeting 
of spirit with spirit and illumined divination can alone lead on the right track ^ ' 
With the last three soitaices of the quotation above, the problem of 'points of contact' is 
introduced. On the basis of previous discussion, it would seem that for Kraemer, there are none: if 
the biblically reahstic worid of the revelation in Christ is systematically mcommensurate with the 
totalitarian worids of non-Christian rehgions, thai there is no common ground. At die same time, 
however, if 'the essential meaning of Christianity is to witness to the world of divine and human 
reahties as revealed in Jesus Christ,'** there must be pomts of contact or common ground to which 
this witiiess can appeal in order to be grasped. Kraemer resolves the dilemma dialectically, saying 
on the one hand that betweai revelation and the non-Chnstian systems of thought, there are no 
pomts of contact while in the situational eicounters bdween Christians and non-Chnstians, there 
may be many. 
Takuig first the negative side of the dialectic, Kraemer rejects any 'pomt of contact' whicli 
takes 'seemingly kindred elements of other rehgions... as fragments d^died from [thar] total 
reahty,' as 'the starting-point of the road that leads to Christ and to Christian trudi.'" In the first 
place, such an approadi reftises to understand particular behefs or practices widiin their totalitarian 
framework, thereby rejecting them a priori on their own terms. Although it 'honesdy starts from 
the very laudable and (for a missionary) indispensable desire to show opai-mindedness and genuuie 
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sympatiiy for the best in other religions, it starts from the assumption that Christianity is the crown 
of these religions, and so it evinces a hidden feelmg of superionty, tiiat is rightiy sensed as 
condescQTsion.'** In the second, it ignores the fact that more oftai than not, such 'fictitious 
sunilarity acts more as a barrier than as a bridge,' to interrehgious conversation.*' While such an 
approach may uncover elemaits of the Chnstian message that are common and therefore relatively 
unsurpnsing, its surprising, unique features are the focal points for conversation. 'When the worid 
"approadi" is takai in the sense of Christianity as a total rehgious system approaching the non-
Christian rehgions as total religious systems, there is only differaice and antithesis, and tiiis must 
be so because they are radically differait.'^" 
Moving to the positive, Kraemer is equally adamant that 'in practice the rehgious needs 
and aspirations that are embedded in these great rehgious systems oftai offer, of course, splaidid 
opportunities for practical human contact.'" Rather tiian searching for systematic points of 
contact, Kraemer prefers a situational approach whidi 'means to have constantiy in mind that a 
missionary is a living human being among other living human beings, whose minds are soaked ui 
the atmosphere of their own religions. This bemg so, it goes without saying that it is impossible 
and not permissible to approadi them without a tiiorough knowledge of thar rehgious and general 
human background.'^ Kraemer thus highhghts the obligation to strive for the presentation of 
Clinstian trutii in terms and modes whidi the audiaice wiU understand: tiie problem of adaptation. 
'So it is obvious and Intimate that Chnstian trutii must be at presait expressed against the 
background of, and in conflict with, the moral and rehgious contait of the non-Christian 
rehgions.'^ ^ 
Once again, a dilemma is confronted: if biblical reahsm is incommaisurate with otiier 
religious apprdiaisions of hfe, thai no adaptation is possible; at the same time, however, if faitiiful 
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Christian witness is to take place, adaptation must occur. And once again, Kraemer's solution hes 
in the focus on situation over system: 'Adaptation... does not mean to assimilate the cardinal facts of 
the revelation in Christ as mucii as possible to fundamental rehgious ideas and tastes of the pre-
Chnstian past, but to express these facts by wresding with them concrd;ely, and so to present die 
Christian truth and reveal at the same time the intrinsic inadequacy of man's rehgious efforts for the 
solution of his cruaal rehgious and moral problems.'''* The New Testament writers were bait 
neither on the assimilation nor the refutation of Judaism, Greek philosophy and mystery religions, 
but used them to presait and formulate the revelation in Christ are paradigmatic for die strategy 
Kraemer pursues. 
This situational approadi, itself a reminder that the Christian message does not arise 
withm a sodo-cultural vacuum, first challenges missionary activity where 'Christianity is preached 
and transplanted in the histoncal, theological and institutional forms tiiat have beoi developed in die 
West, and in the case of Protestant Missions, this is still flirther aggravated by the fact diat die 
vanous and often sqaaratist-minded denominational, theological and institutional expressions are 
the models on wWdi various types of Christianity in Africa and Asia are moulded.'^ ' At the same 
time, however, it equally confronts missionary activity vdiidi 'leads to the weakening of 
Christianity, for in practice it is not the endeavour to bring Christian truth to its most vigorous and 
clear expression by indigaious ways, but to recast [it] mto an indigaious philosophy of life, in 
which the dominant elemaits are the pre-Christian apprehension of existaice, coloured and 
sanctioned by supposedly kindred Christian elements.'^ * 
The 'problem of adaptation is that of the gaiuine translation of Christianity mto indigaious 
terms so that its relevancy to their concrete situations becomes evident.'^ ' It is nather a simplistic 
antithesis, nor a naive synthesis, but a procedure dqsaident on concrete situations to determine 
whether one emphasises contrasts or commonalities. Thus, 'if a synthesis of Christianity and Indian 
or other elements will ever come about... sudi a synthesis will grow slowly out of die stress and 
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need of life, but never can be the result of a premeditated effort, apart from living and continual 
contact with the actual situations.''* 
In our description of the non-Christian rehgions, we have repeatedly stressed how rich 
and how varied are the ways m which man there has tried to give expression to his 
religious needs and aspirations, in theology, in worship, in art, in forms of organization, 
in different ways of presentation. .. It is not at all important that they do not fit in with 
our Protestant traditions and natural reactions, but it is very unportant to ask in the light 
of Bibhcal reahsm how they can fiinction so as to foster pure and vigorous Christian 
life." 
There is tiierefore no vahd objection to using the philosophical tenrunolos' of tiie great rehgions. 
To avoid doing so is to despise both the New Testamait and a natural means of communication. 
To summarise. The Christian Message in a Non-Christian Worid emphasised first of all 
that a Christian interpretation of the rebgious hfe of humanity took its starting-point withui tiie 
Chnstian revelation. Secondly, it argued that a proper mterprdation of this religious life dqiaided 
on a proper understandmg of behefs and practices m relation to the complex religious totality in 
which they anse. Finally, it contaided agauist the artrfidal and abstrart comparison of rdigious 
systems that true points of contact and adaptation were uncovered only in the situational aicounters 
b ^ e « i Chnstian and non-Christians. I turn now to the debate whidi erupted m the aftermath of 
this presaitation. 
4.2 The Authority of the Faith 
Section 3.2 pointed out that Kraemer's position was the source of much controversy at 
Tambaram 1938. In the conference statement, it was admitted that on w h ^ e r or how God reveals 
himself outside Chnstianity was not agreed, and a call for further study was issued.*" This resulted 
in the pubhcation of The Autiiontv of the Faith, in whidi Kraemer restated his position in an essay 
aititied 'Contmuity or Discontinuity,' and mvited cntidsni. An examination of tins essay and tiiose 
of its critics follows presentiy. 
While there is no diange of mind betweai The Chnstian Message and 'Continuity or 
Discontinuity,' Kraemer mtroduces tiiree important qualifications to tiie onguial presaitatioii. First 
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he admits that 'Bibhcal reahsm' is a 'more or less clumsy endeavour to express 'what can only be 
inadequately rendered by our human concqjts.'^' He intended it 'to express the idea that the Bible, 
the human and in many ways historically conditioned documait of God's acts of revdation, 
consistaitiy testifies to divine acts and plans in r ^ r d to the salvation of mankind and the worid, 
and not to rehgious experiaice or ideas' and was troubled vdiai it was critidsed as 'vague and 
unnecessary.'*^ 
Therefore, I shall be grateful if anyone will offer a better temi, provided it conveys more 
clearly and more adequately the idea that die Bible and its contents can only be 
understood when it is taken as the record of God's thoughts and acts m regard to 
mankind, and not as a tale about die pilgrimage of the human soul towards God, 
however moving a tale of that rehgious pilgrimage might by told by one wlio surveys the 
religious history of mankind," 
Second, \\diile he underscores the siii generis and thus discontinuous nature of the 
Christian revelation, he qualifies this by noting that there are 'longings and appercqations in die 
rehgious hfe of mankind outside the speaal sphere of the Christian revelation, of which Chnst, 
wdiat He is and has brought, may be termed in a certain sense the fiifilment.'^ Kraemer mediates 
betweai one extreme wdiidi regarded 'the rehgious pilgrimage of mankind as a preparation of a 
leadmg up to a so-called fiilfilment in Christ,' and its opposite whidi desires 'to mimmise or despise 
the value and significance of mudi [in]... the rehgious quest of die vanous peoples.'*' Though he 
thus admits a hmited 'fulfihnait,' he avoided the term at Tambaram first because his version of 
flilfilmait, unlike that of Edinburgh and Jerusalem, 'never r^resaits a perfecting of what has beai 
before. In this fulfihnait is contamed a radical recasting of values, because these longings and 
apprdiaisions whai exposed to the searching and revolutionary hght of Christ, appear to be blind 
and misdirected.'** This does not d^act from the fact that these elements are 'heart-stirring and 
noble,' but affirms 'the trutii that m Christ all things become new, because He is die cnsis of all 
religions.'*' Also, he refrained lest it be seal as taat approval of natural dieology, 'concaved as an 
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unperfect form of revelation, introductory to the worid of divine grace in Christ.'** He daiies 
ndther God's capadty to work outside the Christian revelation nor that there may therefore be 
'accqjtable mai of faith' outside Christianity,*' but will not affirm 'the rehgions of the worid as 
somehow... a sdioohnaster to Christ....' This is 'a misunderstandmg of the Christian revelation.'"" 
Third, he declined because an examination of the rehgions 'forbids us to construe a relation of 
prqjaration and fiilfilmait betweai these rehgions and the Christian revelation. .. Everyone who 
investigates tiie documaits and penetrates sympathetically into the spirit of these religions, can find 
this out without any diflBculty.'" He speaks instead of 'contradictive or subversive fulfilmait.''^ 
Finally, Kraemer clarifies the presiqjpositions bdimd The Chnstian Message.'^ First, it 
presupposed a Christian perspective: 'In all my reasonmg and in all my efforts to formulate my 
opinion, I take my standpoint within the realm of the Christian revelation... [It] is my autiioritative 
guide and no otiier prindple or standpomt.'''' Though he ndther requires nor expects non-ChnsUan 
commaitators to agree, he is perplexed by the controversy the adoption of such a standpouit 
88 . AF, P- 4. 
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Sovereign God of grace and love has to act.' PP- 4 - 5. 
90 . AF, p. 5. 
91 . AF, pp. 5, 6 - 7. Citing Pandipeddi Chenchiali, Kraemer continues '"If we take the "revelation" 
claimed in different religions, we have to confess that they do not piece together or form an intelligible 
whole. The Vedas, the Koran, the Gospel do make a coherent scheme. They do not even answer the same 
questions." The claims of the various rehgions are clearly conflicting.... "The fecile presumption that in 
Hinduism we have a search for salvation without satisfection and that Christianity satisfied tiie longing is 
untme to fact." "The supreme longing of the Hindu, to escape from samsara, Christ does not satisfy, and 
the Lord's gift of rebirth does not appeal to tiie Hindu. Thus the correspondence of longing and satisfaction 
fails." "Jesus kindles new hopes not feh before and kills some of the deepest and persistent longings of 
man." These dicta of Mr Chenchiali... stress facts that are generally glossed over in tiie discussion, because 
the laudable desire not to overlook or minimise rehgious insights or asphations which arrest by tiieir deptii 
and quality bhnds tiie eyes to tiie real elements of the discussion. Appreciation thus leads towards entirely 
unwarranted and untenable identifications.' AF, pp. 5 - 6. 
92 . AF, P- 5. 
93 . He writes, 'The amount of agreement and mutual understanding... reached in Tambaram, has been so 
appallmgly small that we in the first place stand in need of a patient endeavour to understand and probe 
each other's presuppositions and starting-points. The great danger that threatens our international 
discussions on Christian topics is not so much an undue and unchristian acerbity, as a generous politeness 
that, largely unwittingly, covers an indifference to or an impatience with each other's presuppositions ' AF, 
p. 7. 
94 . AF, P- 7. 
125 
aroused among his Christian critics." Second, it presupposed "tiiat a persistait and attaitive 
listaiing to the Bible is essential, if there is to be any possibihty of a "Christian" view of our 
problem.''* The discovery 'of the human and historically-conditioned trappmgs, in whidi the 
message of biblical realism is expressed,' has caused some to regard the Bible as 'an mteresting and 
highly important piece of rehgious literature, but not... as containing the prophdic and apostohc 
witness to God's dealing with mankind, the Word of God.''' While accepting bibhcal critidsm, he 
stresses that the Bible must continue to be 'recognised as the central oriartation-point for our 
theological thinking....''* Last, it presupposed a 'sympathetic understanding' of the nature and 
function of the rehgions 'according to the intention that anunates them and gives them thar peculiar 
life and attitude.'" Sudi an approadi, based on 'the results of the so-called comparative study of 
rehgion,' can aiable 'a more adequate - adequate in bonam et in malam partem - and mtelligait 
judgmait and evaluation aboirt the meaning and ftmction of rehgion in its many forms to the life of 
man.'""* While it can never become the 'audiontative guide' for die Christian, it should nonedieless 
remam an 'intelligait and mudi appreaated informant."'"' 
In the remainder of the essay, Kraemer s ^ out his position agam, this time by comparing 
Clement of Alexandria's positive assessment of Greek philosophy with Barth's n a t i v e assessment 
of religion.'"^ For Clemait, because 'Christ as the Logos [was] the audior of the general revdation 
95 . AF, pp. 8 - 9. He writes, 'How can I, and how can you ignore the feet that our whole apprehension of 
religious hfe is moulded and coloured by our contact with and knowledge of Christ? How can w« 
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among the peoples of the earth,' philosophy is a schoolmaster to Christ, a 'covoiant peculiar to the 
G r e e k s . B a r t h , on the other hand regards the revelation of God as the dissolution of religion.'*" 
Not surprisingly, Kraemer finds Earth's account more compelling not because of 'b^er and 
smipler logic,' but because of'deeper and more consistent rebgious and theological thinking.'"'^ 
Though Kraemer's position was attacked from a vanety of perspectives, the majority of the 
cntiasm centred on his concqat of revelation. Two critics took issue with his sqDaration of 
revelation from religion. H.H. Farmer argued that Kraemer, by sundering revelation and religion 
and r ^ r d i n g the latter as the result of human creativity alone, ignored "that awareness of God as 
One who makes sacred absolute demand whid i can be discerned in varying form at the heart of the 
religious life o f mankind.'""^ Walter Horton sought to overcome the disjunction by synthesising the 
best of Kraemer with the best of Hocking."" T.C. Chao took a more traditional approach which 
defaided a version of general revelation, and rejected Kraemer's suggestion that salvation may 
occur without the witness of the Churdi.'"* D.G. Moses, finally, sought to link revelation with 
distinct from theology, a product of autonomous human reason....' James D.G. Dunn and James P. Mackey, 
The New Testament in Theological Dialogue. (London: SPCK, 1987), pp. 32 - 38, esp. p. 33. 
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morality by proposing that the Christian revelation was the judge of religious truth not by virtue of 
its revelatory status, but because of any revelation, it best embodied 'universal moral values.'"" 
B y Kraemer's own admission, however, the most penetrating evaluation of The Chnstian 
Message came from A.G. Hogg,"" who argued that Kraemer failed to distinguish suffiaeitly 'non-
Chnstian faith' from 'non-Christian faiths.'"' By the former, Hogg meant 'a life whidi, althougli 
without Christ, is yet somdiow a life "hid in God".'''^ In so doing, Kraemer tended 'to exclude the 
possibility o f .. non-Christian faith by suggesting that these religions are a purely human 
phenomenon, a seeking but not a finding, not an experience of Divine self-disclosure....'"^ For 
Hogg, this IS wholly inadequate. By taking non-Christian faith as his clue, he concluded that all 
religions combine in varying d^ees divine revelation and initiative with adequate and inadequate 
human responses.""* Hence, tiie sid generis nature of the revelation of God in Christ lies in its 
portrayal o f a lovmg and forgiving Father."' 'It is not here aflBrmed, as Dr Kraemer's line of 
discussion at least appears to suggest, that Christianity is unique because it is created by the 
occurrence of revelation.... Christianity is unique because of the unique content of the revelation of 
whid i i f i s the apprdiension and product and to whid i it bears witness.'"'^ 
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typically Hindu colour, and yet who manifestly were no strangers to tiie life "hid in God".' AF, p. 110. 
113 . AF,p. 103. 
114 . Seeesp. AF,p. 113. 
115 . AF, P. 114. 
116 . AF,P 125. 
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Thus, most post-Tambaram analysis caitred on Kraemer's doctrine of revelation and 
specifically his sqDaration of revelation from rehgjon. His quahfications - distinguishmg 'empirical 
Christianity from 'the Christian revelation,' and preferring Brunner to Barth in his discussion of 
natural theology - were purely cosmetic. Most of his opponaits agreed despite them that Kraemer 
could not aflSrm genuine spiritual life outside Christianity and therefore, his intentions aside, 
elevated Chnstianity above all otiier rehgions."^ Kraemer addressed these concerns in later 
writings, but his overall starting-pomt remained the same. 'Continuity or Discontinuity concludes 
with these words: 
fundamentally speaking, we have in regard to this problem only to choose between two 
positions: to start, consciously or unconsciously, fi-om a general idea about the essence 
of rehgion and take that as our standard of reference, or derive our idea of what reUgion 
is or really ought to be from the revelation in Christ, and consistently stick to tiiis as die 
sole standard of reference. To my mind, the choice of the second of these our 
alternatives is inescapable."* 
4.3 Relifflon and the Christian Faith 
Rehgion and the Chnstian Faith begins where 'Continuity or Discontinuity aids: aiming 'to 
vindicate, by a critical evaluation of the attempts of the Sciaice o f Religion and of the Philosophy 
of Rehgion to understand and explain religion and rehgions, tiie scioitific and philosophic 
I n t i m a c y of a Theology of Rehgion and Religions.'"'' This vindication takes place m four 
movemoits. First, Kraemer argues that a proper theology of religions is justified by appeals to the 
saentific study of rehgion; second, that it is found in Chnstian history; and third, tiiat it is 
supported by Scripture. Then, to compile his defence, he outhnes how his approach impmges 
upon discussions of goieral and special revelation, natural theology, and interreligious co-operation 
and tolerance. 
First, Kraemer responds to those who diarged that his starting-point was somdiow 
arbitrary or prejudiced by outiining two important insights yielded by the saentific study of 
117 . The exceptions were T.C. Chao (cited above) and Karl Hartenstein. His contribution to Ihe 
Authority of the Faith, i f anything was more Barthian than Kraemer's was alleged to be. See liis 'The 
Bibhcal View of Religion,' m AF, pp. 126 - 147. 
118 . AF,P-23. 
119 . RCF, p. 32. 
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reUgions.'^" By 'scieitific study,' he means that all those aigaged in studying rehgion, whether 
anthropologists, philosophers or theologians, can and should use sciaitific m ^ o d s to collect, 
arrange and presort data. ]n other words, they are to strive for impartiahty.'^' This 'studious 
attitude of avoiding judgmaits of value and truth, is the indispaisable condition for having the right 
attitude, because the aim is to understand a rehgion or a rehgious phenomaion according to its own 
intention and structure. It must be done in sudi a way that a reUgjon or realm of spiritual life can 
speak for itself.'^^^ For Kraemer, thai, impartiahty, m so far as it is possible, is preserved through 
a totabtanan approach to religious beliefs and practices. 
This approadi enables the sdiolar to understand first tiiat a universal 'Essence of Religion,' 
is fiction. In so arguing, Kraemer opposes first, the 'Naturalist' philosophers of reUgion mcluding 
Durkheim, Freud and Feuerbach, who regard the rehgjons as stages in human self-
consciousness.'^^ Secondly, he also challaiges 'Transcendaitalists,' sudi as Sdileiermacher, Kant 
and Otto, who r ^ r d Rehgion as the realm where human consciousness meds the Absolute. 
Although these groups advocate opposmg theories about tiie nature of Religion, botii posit a 
universal rehgious essaice functioning either as an axiom from whidi they b ^ j n or the goal toward 
120 . He writes, 'The fundamental difficulty in the [Tambaram] debates was that tiie "standing-place" of 
the writer (namely that the right theological criterion is not a universal Idea of religion at its liighest. but 
God's self-disclosure in liis revelation in Jesus Christ) was misunderstood by many, and misinterpreted as 
narrowness of mind, dogmatism, even fiindamentahsm... .' RCF, p. 222. 
121 . Yet, as Kraemer later wrote, the 'objectivity after which this scientific study sUives should not be 
hampered by notions of neutrality. On the contrary, it rests on the undemonstrable assumption that it is 
worthwhile to investigate rehgion thereby recognisuig that it must have some meaning. Moreover tlie 
attempt to penetrate a religion in order to understand it 'is the opposite of neuu-ality, because it is an 
evaluating presentation of an alien or different spiritual world according to its own fundamental 
presuppositions and intentions. It is a congenial entering into a different universe of discourse, tiiat has its 
own language.' RCF, p. 49. 
122 . RCT, p. 48. 
123 . Kraemer saw Durkheim as reducing all rehgions to 'totemism,' while he mterpreted botii Freud and 
Feuerbach as reducing them to wish-fiilfilment personified in gods and demons. To tiiese and other 
namrahsts, he countered, 'Rehgion is conditioned by historical, psychological, and sociological causes. In 
all ages, common sense knew this, but the modem systematic study of religions has elevated this notion to 
the level of well-established irrefiitable knowledge and acute relevance ... Their weakness appears when 
tiiey pretend to explain religion in tiiis way, whereas what they really do is uncover liidden aspects of 
partial tmtiis.' RCF, pp. 56 - 57; see also pp. 54 - 71. 
124 . RCF. p. 57. For ScWeiemiacher, such an encounter took place in the 'feeling of oneness with the 
infinite;' for Kant, 'the conceiving of all duties as divine conmiands'; and for Otto, an encounter with 'tiie 
Ultimate, tiie Absolute... [which] transcends namre.' See also pp. 41 - 44. 
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which they strive. Moreover, both use it as a criterion to plot rehgions along an evolutionary 
s c a l e . A totabtarian, scientific study reveals this position to be mcapable of justification: by 
affirming the pecuhar nature of eadi rehgion, it undercuts all attempts to distil an 'Essoice of 
Rehgion.''^'' Second, it also uncovers the ambivalaice in all rehgions, including empirical 
Christianity. 'The merit of modem Saence of Rehgion is not tiiat it has discovered tins ambivalent 
diaracter, but that by its m^culous researdi into all the nooks and comers of rehgious experiaice 
and expression it has demonstrated in a compeUmg way the evideit trutii of this common notion, 
and so forces us to face the imphcations of the disturbing diaracter of this fact....''"' The 
unphcations to which he refers apply to the grading rehgions according to their 'value' and 'trutii.' 
W h o i examined carefully and honestiy, no empirical rehgion can be shown to be better or worse 
than any other for there is no universally recognised standard by which to grade religions. 
Tlie conclusion drawn from these insights may be stated n a t i v e l y and positively. 
N a t i v e l y , the problems associated with umversal rehgious essoice argumaits coupled with the 
ambivalait nature of the rehgions show the objectivity demanded by Kraemer's Tambaram cntics 
to be unpossible. The claim to be scientific and objective, 'inspite of the great legitimate place it 
should have, is a purely rational and mtellectuahst ideal, and assumes too carelessly that Reason is 
the best and most adequate instrument of "understanding"... in every fidd of hfe, that of nature and 
that of man.''^^ = Kraemer and his critics have rival starting-points, and while the rationality of 
either can be demonstrated, the superiority of one over the other cannot. Positively, understanding 
rehgion starts and ends with the taking o f sides in the great questions: What do you think of God 
and humanity? W h i d i God do you dioose? 
125 . 'The unportant concept by which they aimed at arrangmg and classifying tiie material in different 
grades is that of the essence of Rehgion {das Wesen der Religion), an all embracmg and all-explaining 
formula. Either one hopes to discover it by persevering research, and formulates provisional working 
definitions, or more precise ones, of what rehgion is, or one starts from a philosophical concept of tiie 
Essence of Rehgion, making it the criterion of judgment and explanation. In either case it is considered to 
be derived from the rehgions which are either cmde or sublime expressions of it.' RCF, p. 59. 
126 . There are and have been many concrete rehgions, each with its pecuhar. stmcture and cliaracter. All 
general definitions of religion eitiier reduce them to such a kind of common denominator tiiat little 
meaning is left. .. The feet remams the ways in which the "unseen powers" and the ways of obedience to 
them are multitudinous and incompatible.... [They] cannot be equated. And if they are, they become an 
intangible, rather void ens generalissimiim which has nothing to do with the ens realissimiim which these 
cultural notions of tiie concrete rehgions pretend to be.' RCF, p. 76, 
127 . RCF. p. 38. 
128 . RCF, p 49. 
131 
Therefore - and this is the real point we want to make - the theologian can and must 
[study and interpret Rehgion and ReUgions] witii a good philosophical conscience, by 
bemg feithfiil to his theological conscience. That is to say, in being a feith interpreter of 
God's self disclosure in Christ, and thereby exercising that interpretation of reUgion 
which is unphed m his primordial, undemonstrable startmg-point. In doing so, and in 
doing it feithfuUy and methodically, open to all he can leam from tiie Science of 
Rehgion, and deUght in the rules of the "scientific" game, he is not prejudiced, but 
humanly speaking in the same position as any other honest investigator of rehgion, 
whether the latter is conscious of his starting-point or not. We are, in saying this, not 
invoking the right of prejudice. On the contrary, by full recognition and avowal of one's 
bias one is comparatively speaking better armed agamst the temptations of partiality, to 
which every scholar without exception is constantiy exposed.'^' 
Thus, Kraemer b^ ins his vindication by aiguing that even on the best 'scientific' and 'objective' 
evidaice a theological evaluation of rehgions is inevitable. His dioice, therefore, of an explicitiy 
Christian evaluation is not necessarily arbitrary or obscurantist. 
He opens the second movement - an evaluation of five tiieological starting-points in 
Chnstian history - by taking this conclusion one stq) fiirtiier: not only does a theological approach 
have 'the same right as the other approaciies to rehgion to say its word,' it is preferred for it declares 
its biases from the b^inning and remains aware of the temptation towards subjectivity. Kraaner 
mamtains that 
on scientific and philosophical grounds, theology is fully entitied to fomiulate tiie case 
and to say its personal word on the problem of rehgion and rehgions, on the basis of its 
pecuhar presuppositions. Just when it is fiiank about its presuppositions, it can be free of 
a felse make-believe of "scientific" objectivity. It is obliged to give a clear account of its 
estimate of the value and tmth of all religions outside the sphere of Biblical 
revelation.'^" 
The pecuhar presupposition to whicii Kraemer alludes is than made plain: 'Under all conditions, in 
all kinds of work,... [the Christian] remains primarily a disciple, a captive of Jesus Christ in vAxom 
God disclosed Hunself, fu l l of grace and truth.''^' For the Christian, thai, the starting-point for a 
theological study of the rehgions can be none otiier than the revelation of God in Jesus Chnst.'" 
129 . RCT, p. 52. 
130. RCT.p. 143. 
131 . RCF. p. 144. 
132 . Later m RCF, Kraenier writes that for the Christian tiiinker, tiie basic assumption is 'tiiat Jesus 
Clirist is the Way, the Tmth and the Life, by whom alone man conies to the Fatiier, and by whose liglit 
alone all problems can be seen in their proper perspective ... Jesus Christ is the centre of liisiory and 
tiierefore the religious history of man before and after him, till the end of history, can only riglitly be 
understood in Hini. He is God's decisive and final act of self-disclosure or revelation, and in Him all divme 
revelation, past, present and fumre, has its proper criterion.' p. 237. . 
132 
To the non-Christian, Kraemer can say only that 'this theological starting-point is as valid as, for 
instance, that of the mystical philosophies of rehgion, whidi assume axiomatically the idoitity of 
God and man as self-evidait.''" To the Christian, however, he says that this 
is revelation, which is basically different from rehgious intuition or divination, and 
which is not a product of the human religious consdousness because accordmg to 
Bibhcal religion it enters history in the form of sovereign divme words and acts. 
Revelation of God, i f taken in the real sense, is divine self-disclosure, issuing from 
divine initiative. This, by the nature of the case can only be motivated by itself. The 
sole possible response to it is, therefore, that of faith, not a justification by reason; 
although reason can render Christianity help in understanding it, without believing it. 
Without feith, the Bibhcal thesis of revelation will generally be considered a fiction, an 
illusion, a pretence, or a useful error.'^'' 
Havmg defined his starting-point, Kraemer thai evaluates three histoncal and two 
contemporary Christian approadies to the theology of religions.'" He b^ins witii the logos 
spermatikos as set out by Justin, developed by the Fathers, and perfected by Clemait and 
Ongai.'^** Through thdr use of the Stoic notion of tiie logos spermatikos (seed of reason), they 
argued that all that was good m Greek philosophy was in fact a praeparatio ethinca sive 
evangelica and thus 'a basis for a positive attitude towards the spiritual hentage of their forefathers 
and non-Christian ndghbours.''" Though 'fired by sincere conviction,' this presaits 'Christianity 
as a philosophical rehgjon, consisting of Greek (espedally Stoic) ideas m a Biblical garb, and as a 
moralist religion, in wWdi man by a moral deasion works out his own salvation.' It obscures 'the 
caitral pomt of the Christian revelation, i.e. tiiat it means altering m and tiirougli Chnst mto a new 
life-relationship with God. Instead of that the emphasis is shifted towards attaining fuller rational 
knowledge of God.''^* For Kraemer, the logos spermatikos fails because its Stoic roots have not 
133 . RCF. p. 144. 
134 . RCF, pp. 145- 146. 
135 . 'We have to do this work of survey and critical consideration,' he writes, 'because i f we really want to 
drive towards a common ecumenical effort of Christian thinking on die non-Christian religions, ws must 
scmtinize and sifl first the great attempts of preceding generations of Christians.' RCF, 147. 
136 . RCT, pp. 148 - 154; see also Justin Martyr, 'The First Apology of Justm, The Martyr,' in Early 
Chnstian Fatiiers. trans, Cyril C, Richardson et al., (London: SCM, 1953), pp. 231 - 235; 247; 265; 272; 
Clement of Alexandria, 'On Spiritual Perfection,' in Alexandrian Christianity, trans, and ed. Jolin Ernest 
Leonard Oulton and Henry Cliadwick, (London: SCM, 1954), pp. 96 - 97; Origen, 'On Prayer,' in 
Alexandrian Christianity, pp. 433,437f 
137 . RCF,p. 150 
138 . RCF,p. 153. 
beai sufficientiy subverted by Bibhcal reahsm (unlike the Prologue of John's Gospel, where such a 
subversion successfully takes place). 
He thai considers Thomas Aquinas,''"' who sqjarated knowledge of God mto Natural and 
Revealed categories, h i the first hes knowledge of God's existence and certain Divine attributes, 
wtiile in the second, the supernatural Christian dogmas are revealed to the faithful. ' '" h i a manner 
similar to the Fathers, Thomas regarded the former knowledge as the 'pmeainbulo fidei and 
praepamtio evcmgelica.'^'^^ Although Aquinas provides 'a feast for the intellectual connoisseur... 
[his] balance is artificial and falsifies the true perspective of the Biblical revelation, being obtained 
at the cost o f distorting the Bibhcal Christian faith.''"*^ While his system will always supply 'new 
discoveries of old truths,' he fails to presort the Christian revelation as the crisis of religion.'** 
Indeed ui Kraemer's view, Chnstianitys approach to pagan religion and philosophy was 
largely mistakoi until the Reformation, tiie third historical period. 
The Apologists, the Fathers (with the sole exception of Tertulhan), the mediaeval 
scholastics had all tried to fomiulate a Christian philosophy of religion. Incidentally 
they were theologians, but never did they dream of a theology of religion. They did not 
139 . Similarly, Kraemer beheves Augustine, 'the great genius who for the first time formulated 
evangehcal Christianity with its emphasis on sin and grace,' whose Civitas Dei was tiie last 'great Apology 
for Christianity... mdulges too much m luxuries of metaphysical thinkmg entirely alien to Biblical religion.' 
RCF. p. 157. He prefers the Retractiones, where 'greater reserve is expressed. He recognized more and 
more, notwithstanding smiilarities and affinities, the unbridgeable gulf between the non-Christian religions 
and the vera religio, yet felt that the rehgious consciousness of classical paganism had something to do 
witii God.' p. 158. Kraemer is more sympathetic to Tertulhan and the 'mtiiless way he talked about the 
"stupidities of Philosophy".' Kraemer concludes, 'The merit of Tertulhan is that he seized the dialectical 
condition of man: God-conscious, yet un&ithftil, and therefore in his natural condition far from the until.' 
p. 156; see also Tertullian, 'Prescriptions Against the Heretics,' in Early Latin Theology, trans, and ed. S.L. 
Greenslade, (London: SCM, 1956), pp. 25 - 77; esp. p. 36 where Tertulhan writes, '1 have no use for a 
Stoic or a Platonic or a dialectic Christianity. After Jesus Christ we have no need of speculation, after tlie 
Gospel no need of research.' 
140 . RCF, pp. 159- 167. 
141 . RCF. p. 161; see also Saint Thomas Aqumas, On the Tmth of the Catiiohc Faitii: Sunmia Contra 
Gentiles, trans. Antony C. Pegis, (New York: Doubleday, 1955), Book I , chapters 2 - 10, pp. 61, 62 - 64, 
66 - 67, 74, 77 - 78. 
142 . RCF. p. 161; see also Saint Thomas Aquinas, Nature and Grace: Selections from the Sunima 
Theologica of Thomas Aquinas, trans, and ed. A.M. Fairweather, (London: SCM, 1954), Part 1. Question 
1, Article i , pp. 35 - 37. 
143 . RCF, p. 164. 
144 . RCF, pp. 164- 165. 
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and could not delimit philosophy and theology sufBdentiy. They acted spontaneously or 
more reflectively on the assumption of their afifinify and unity, and felt in their pecuhar 
situation no need for defining their different character, in spite of he affinities. It needed 
the mtense concentration of the Reformers on the Bible to achieve this complete 
overthrow.'''^ 
Calvin, for instance, 'recognizes that all rehgion presupposes rightiy or wrongly a transcendait 
superhuman reahty, and that one has to take that seriously in order to understand rehgion.''"** Yet 
because of sin, 'man who could be a worshipper of the true God produces a great vanety of 
fictitious religions.,,. Man's erring finds it origins in man's disoriaited rehgious consdousness so 
that the hght afforded by the sensns divinitatis is insuffidait for the vera notitia Dei (real 
knowledge of God).''"*' Kraemer presaits Lutiier as following similar hnes, but where Calvin is 
'dispassionate and balanced,' Luther is 'profoundly prophetic,' and evidences 'volcanic ganus.'''"' 
Though he extols this first 'attempt [at] a fiolly theological interpr^tion of religion and religions,' he 
also remarks that the Reformers were nevertheless 'handicapped by the fact that the time had not 
yet come whai a profound and concrd;e knowledge of the rehgions was possible.''"" 
This unpairment is overcome, however, in Kraemer's first contemporary approadi. While 
tiie Reformers' goal was lost during that whidi Kraemer calls 'The Liberal Period,'''" and tiiough a 
145 . RCF, p. 168. 
146 . RCF, p. 170; see also Calvm, Instittites. Book I , chapter 3, pp. 39 - 42. 
147 . RCF, p. 170; see also Calvm, Institotes. Book I , chapter 4, pp. 43 - 47, 
148 , RCF. p, 174; for example, on tiie nahiral knowledge of God, Lutiier writes. 'This light and 
understanding is in the hearts of ah men and can neither be suppressed nor put out,' Martin Luther, D, 
Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. (Weutiar, 1883) volume 19, p, 205, Cited in Paul 
Althaus, The Theology of Martm Luther. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), p, 15, For a full account of 
Lutiier's perspective, see chapter 3, 'The General and tiie Proper Knowledge of God,' pp, 15 - 19, Zwingli 
unlike both Calvm and Luther, 'was not fixed on tiie dilemma of feitii and works, but on God as tiie only 
Saviour,' (p, 174) His writings therefore display a greater optimism with regard to the salvation of non-
Christians which is absent in those of his fellows (pp, 175 - 176); see Ulrich Zwmgli, 'An Exjxjsition of tiie 
Faith' in Zwingli and BuUinger. ed, G,W, Broniiley, (London: SCM, 1953), pp, 273 - 276; esp, pp. 275 -
276, where he writes tiiat in heaven, 'You will see... Theseus, Socrates, Aristides, Antigonus, Numa, 
Camillus, the Catos and Scipios;,,, In short, there has not lived a single good man, tiiere has not been a 
smgle pious heart or beheving soul from the beginning of the worid to tiie end, wliich you will not see there 
in the presence of God.' 
149. RCF, p. 176. 
150. RCF,pp 177- 178. 
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recovery was foreshadowed in the writings of J.G. Hamann,"' Barth and Brunner were the first to 
reclaim tiie perspective of the Reformation, hi their wntings. 
The revelation in Christ stands apart from all religions - not as a unique individual case 
of a common species, but as a different genus. It is sui generis. There is no continuity 
between what becomes manifest in the data of the different rehgious stmctures and tiie 
Christian message with its view of the human condition, the character of God and His 
relation to man and the world. In the doctrine of the justification of the sinner all 
religion ^jpears to lose its real basis, because from God alone comes salvation. The 
Christian revelation is the crisis of aU rehgion.'" 
Kraaner r ^ r d s the two as the 'outstanding representatives of a f i i l ly theological understanding of 
rehgion and rehgions.''" Nevertiieless, evai the dialectical pioneers do not escape criticism, hi 
thar desire to avoid the logos spermatikos error, they 'ignore entirely the Logos doctrine, whose 
sole mterprrtation is not necessarily that of tiie Fathers.''" Moreover, neitiier employ all tiie 
Bibhcal material available; they are excessively Pauhne. 
Finally, Kraemer considers contemporary Anglo-Amencan and other European 
contributions. Though one may leam mudi from the philosophical assessmaits of E.S. Brightman, 
Nathan Soderblom, H.H. Farmer, and W E . Hocking, '" eadi falls 'back again m tiie fatal vicious 
arcle of all philosophy of religion, whid i recognizes theoretically the transcoidoice in rehgion, and 
yet elevates the purely historical and psydiological element... into the criterion of tiie transcoidait, 
wliich practically means the personal religious taste of the philosopher.'"* He is more sympatiietic 
to missionaries because of their cross-cultural experience,'" but evoi their best examples, J.N. 
151 . RCF. pp. 179-181; see also CM, p. 11. 
152 . RCT, p. 182. 
153 . RCF, p. 189. 
154 . RCT, p. 189. 
155 . For Kraemef s evaluation of Brightman, see RCF. pp. 205 - 208 and compare with E.S. BrighUnaii, 
A Philosophy of Religion. (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946). For Sbdeiblom, contrast RCF, pp. 208 - 214 
with Nathan Soderblom, The Living God: Basal Fomis of Personal Rehgion. (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1933), and The Nature of Revelation, trans. Frederic E. Pamp, (London: Oxford University Press, 
1933). For Farmer measure RCF. pp. 218 - 220 against H.H. Farmer, Revelation and Rehgion: Studies in 
the Theological Interpretation of Religious Types. (London: Nisbet and Company, 1954). And finally, on 
Hocking, compare RCF. p. 203 with the list of Hocking's works cited above. 
156 . RCF,pp. 202-203. 
157. RCF. pp. 214-215. 
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Farquhar,"* and Nicol Maa i ico l , " ' 'have dther hardly any articulate theology or a weak one, 
focused on comparing "rehgious experience", and reducing the Christian message to some "gaieral 
prmaples".'"^" The desire to be generous 'seduces them into fatally blurring the true issues.''*' 
From this summary, it is clear that Kraemer mtends to follow the route proposed by the Reformers 
and blazed by Barth and Brunner. However, he is not content with recapitulating thdr argumaits. 
He hopes to presait a modd whidi is botii makes b ^ e r use of Bibhcal material than dther those of 
Bartii or Brunner and is better acquamted witii religions than that of the Reformers. 
An examination of his theological interpr^tion of otiier rehgions follows presaitiy; but 
first, I turn to his bibhcal exegesis,'*^ which is arranged around three doctrines, the first being 
theological anthropology. Kraemer's theological anthropology is rooted in Genesis, and speaficalJy 
based upon tiie Creation and Fall (Gai. 1:26-30; 3:1-24), Noahic Covenant (9:1-17), and Babd 
narratives (11:1-9). Regarding the first, Kraemer's chief concem is a proper interpr^tion of the 
Imago Dei (1:26). Where past ex^etes distinguished 'image' from 'likeness' in which humanity 
was created, Kraemer counters that this results only in a mismterprelation of the text."'^ The 
'image' and 'hkeness' are not s^arate but represeit Hebrew parallehsm: both mean 'copy,' or 
'figure.'"^ Humanity is a divine creation with a divine mandate to r^resait God's rule on eartii. 
Hence, conjecture about what aspects of the Imago Dei have been lost or retained after the Fall 
fails to grasp the narrative's purpose: to describe the fragmaitation resulting from sm. The 
breach of the communion with and obedience to God.,, has as its unmediate imphcation 
the total disturbance and cormption of all human relations (man-woman, man-man,,,), 
of the relation to the worid (animals, soil, work, etc). The usurped autonomy of man. 
158 , RCF, p. 215; see also J,N, Farquhar, The Crown of Huiduism. (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint 
Corporation, 1971; originally Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1913). 
159 . RCF, p. 216; see also Nicol Macnicol, Indian Theism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1915) and 
Is Christianity Unique? A Comparative Study of tiie Rehgions. (London: SCM 1936), 
160. RCF, p. 216. 
161 . RCF. p. 216. 
162 . It is not my intention to evaluate Kraemer's exegesis in tiie light of contemporary biblical sttidies. 
Rather, I want simply to outiine his interpretation of biblical texts as a basis for his tiieology of religions. 
163. He writes, 'Now if one looks at Gen. 1:26-30 and tries to practice the art of reading tiie text, there is it 
seems, not one jot or tittle of all these constmctions in it.' RCF. p. 248. 
164. RCF. p. 249. 
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tiirough his repudiation of the theonomy, under which he began his career, mms out to 
the polynomy of his fencies, passions and self-febricated gods.'*' 
Creation and Fall together paint a dialectical picture. In all activities, including rehgious ones, 
humanity is God's creation capable of creativity and beauty, yet also a rebellious creation capable 
of destruction and ughness. 
This dialectical picture is reinforced m the Noahic Covenant and Babel narratives. 
Followmg the Flood, the Noahic Covenant recounts the divine dialectic of judgmoit on sui and 
mercy on humanity. Furthermore, 'It is striking and deqily significant that before God's special 
revelational experimoit with Abraham and His Covoiant with him... the "everiasting Covenant 
bdweoi God and every living creature" is stated as an established and irremovable fact, governing 
the spiritual destiny of mankind as a whole.''**' Babel, on the other hand, expresses the dialectic in 
human terms: 
Its meaning is that man, who by his own means and to his own glory "makes a name", 
leaving God outside, tries to circumvent the chembim and the flarmng sword of the lost 
Paradise, and tries in his own power to force his way back to the Tree of Life (Gen. 
3:24): In this story, the predicament of man in his cultural and rehgious achievements 
is admirably expressed. The cultural and rehgious creative urge is, m itself grand. In 
the Bibhcal view, it is implanted by God in man. Man's accomphshments in liistory are 
great but appear always uifected by cormption and pride, which has its root according to 
the Bible, in the forgetfiilness of God, The deep meaning of tiie confiision of languages 
can only be fuUy appreciated ui the tight of Acts 2, the tale of Pentecost. God's Holy 
Sphit restores the God-wiUed, but desfroyed, unity of mankind.'*' 
f 
Thus, Kraemer's account of the rehgions b^ins with his presaitation of the dialectical nature of 
human beings. As the Goiesis narratives describe it, human beings are designed to be God's 
rqjresoitatives, but sin has corrupted represoitation into tyranny. So on the one hand, the rebgious 
life of human beings is affirmed and preserved through the Noadiic Covenant, but restrained at 
Babel. 
The second doctrine on which Kraemer coitres is that of Logos. Before considening the 
Johannine Prologue direcdy, however, Kraemer tums to its forerunner - tiie wisdom literature of tiie 
Old Testament. After noting the 'pure dehght' accorded to 'wisdom' m Job and Proverbs, he 
observes, 
165 . RCF. pp. 250-251. 
166 . RCF,pp. 253-254. 
167 . RCF p. 254. 
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it is evident that alongside the broad stream of negative and condemnatory judgments of 
pagan religions,.,, there are also traces, shght, but undeniable, of a positive attitude 
toward human Wisdom,... esteemed as a great, universal human value, essentially a gif) 
of God, and on a par with the God-given namre of man.... The attitude, impUed in these 
passages, can be formulated in a simple sentence: God is at work in man's spiritual 
aspirations and achievements. 
Though the Johannme Prologue has been the victim of much theological speculation, Kraemer's 
exegesis of the passage is simple. 'To summarize the meaning of the passage: the Logos, from 
demity with God and Hunself God, is the fact Jesus Christ, the man of Nazar^. ' '* ' I f this is 
correct, Kraemer cautions, 'the age-long recourse to this classical passage as the scnptural basis or 
justification to interpret all non-Christian religion and philosophy as preparatio evangelica, to 
evaluate them accordingly and to take thdr so called "best and highest elemaits" as indications tiiat 
they are well on the road to Christ needs drastic revision.''™ 
The Prologue states in an uncompromising way that man's condition is such that he is 
unable to know God as He really is, or himseU; by his own powers. It can only happen 
through feith and the work of the Holy Sphit, i.e. tiirough revelation, through divine 
self-disclosure. The tmth about God is not, either in the Prologue or in any other part of 
the Bible, a lofty conception about His bemg and namre, monotheistic, mystic or what 
not, but it is the mcomprehensible feet that He became flesh in Jesus Christ, that God is 
self-giving, self-forgetting love, as was manifested in the scandal of the Cross.''' 
Thus, God is indeed at work in the rehgious life of humanity, but this work is not the result of a 
uraversal Logos, but of the Logos become incarnate in Jesus Chnst. Therefore, i f this work is to be 
discerned at all, it is only through tiie revelation of God in Jesus Christ. 
Kraemer saves his most extensive ex^etical work for the third doctrine: the Pauline 
understanding of the righteousness and wrath of God. B^inning m Acts, with Paul's speech in 
Lystra (Acts 14:8-18), he draws three pomts: first, the goal of Paul's preadiing is conversion (15); 
second God has abandoned people to thdr own ways (16); yet third, God contmues to testify to 
them through creation whether or not they recognise it (17). These are underscored by three more 
pomts drawn from Paul's sermon in Athais (Acts 17:16-34). First, all have sinned m thdr religions 
(22-23,30); second, people nevertheless demonstrate a dim awareness of God (27-28); and last, 
God never compl^ely abandons people, but redeems tiiem by converting them (29-31).'" 
168 . RCF, p. 265. 
169 . RCF, p. 275. 
170. RCF, p. 276. 
171 . RCF, p. 277. 
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Kraemer then moves to Romans 1:18-2:16, arguing tiiat the righteousness of God, an act of love 
and grace towards humanity, nevertiieless manifests itself as wrath (18). 
God who is the God of righteous, holy love, is as such bent on savmg smners, and also, 
as such, the God of wrath on all the [unrighteousness] of men. His wrath is revealed as 
an act of righteousness, holiness, and love. It is reaUy the wrath of God, which can be 
terrible, which is the mtrinsic manifestation of his love. Therefore we have to take tiiis 
theological concept of the wrath of God very seriously as a terrible... yet savmg, gracious 
reahty.'" • 
He tho i elaborates: God has never beoi inactive with regard to humanity; his self-disclosure is so 
plam that no one has an excuse (19-20). The problem lies not with the adequacy or uiadequacy of 
God's revelation, but with the human response to it.'^"* Listead glorifying the true God, new gods 
are invented (21-23). Therefore, God expresses his wratii by giving people over to the 
consequoices of their actions (24-32). In these verses, 
Paul uncovers the appaUing drama between God and man which underhes tiiis 
perverted lust and anti-social destmctivity. God's wrath is revealed m it m a double 
movement which can be defined by usmg the words of Heb. 10:31: "It is an awflil thing 
to fell mto the hands of the living God", and by saymg at the same time that it is a 
terrible thing to fall out of the hands of the living God... God did not leave [people] to 
tiiemselves, but gave them up, so that tiie fellmg away of men from God mto tiieir self-
willed autonomy draws them into a worid of evil which is animated by its own severe 
logic of increasing self-destmction."* 
Jews and Goitiles botii find themselves in this predicament (2:1-16); no one is without excuse. The 
final four verses (13 - 16) are not intoided as an aigumait for salvation by works, but a further 
indictmait against those who beheve that simply havmg the Law is proof of God's favour. '^' 
On the basis of this exegesis, Kraemer draws several conclusions: first, humanity is God's 
creation intended for divine fellowship; second, God is present in otiier cultures and other rebgions; 
third, the rehgions nevertheless belong to unredeemed humanity and therefore no matter how 
marvellous in.appearance, they stand under divine judgment."* Yet fourth, their attempts to deal 
with ultimate problems of existaice cannot be ignored by those who live by God's revelation."* 
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While one carpot behttie these 'best and highest elemaits' one must not forget that they are 
nonetheless marred by sm and take on thdr true significance only ui the hght of Chnst. Finally, tiie 
religions are at the same time ignorant gropings for God and dehberate rebelhon against God. 
Nowhere m the Bible are these pieces of evidence seen or defined as roads to God, as 
effecting the righteousness which is only wrought througli God's sovereign act of 
righteousness consistmg m the forgiveness of sms, and only ^rehended by feitii and 
not by any great cultural or sphitual achievement on the part of non-behevers or of 
behevers.... Everywhere in the Bible, especially m the New Testament, we find, 
alongside the recognition of this evidence, a sfrong emphasis on its precariousness, its 
constant tendency towards new perversion, so that man mms even his great human 
achievements mto instmments for glorifying himself and forgettmg or rebelUng 
against, God wlio alone is to be glorified and thanked. '^ ^ 
Thus far, Kraemer has maintained that a proper theology of rehgions is justified by the 
saaitific study of rehgion, found in Chnstian history and supported by Scnpture. Now, to 
compld;e his vmdication of a proper theology of rehgions, he outiines how his dialectical approadi 
shapes discussions of gaieral and spedal revelation, natural theology, and interrehgious co-
operation and tolerance. His dialectical approadi mediates brtweoi 'systasis (harmorazing, 
synthesis), [and]... diastasis (keqjmg a distance)...''^' botii of which exclude real dialogue and 
communication and are contrary to the dialectical diaracter of the Christian faith. ' ^ In this way, 
'the attitude o f opai, congaiial understanding of otiier rehgjons and ahai spiritual worids,' is 
combined with the 'theological understanding and mterpretation on a Biblical basis.''^^ 
Wha i discussing general and spedal revelation from this perspective, two foa are 
mtroduced. 'The first is a strong, ddermined unequivocakiess in r ^ r d to the truth, tiiat is to say 
that tiie knowledge and honouring of God, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, tiie God and 
Father of the Lord Jesus Christ, is tiie sole religio vera, and that all the otiier rehgions and 
rehgions, of whatever quality and value they may be, are... religio falsa '^^ On its own, tins focus 
may m fact fall to the critidsm of obscurantism; however, this is to ignore the second: 'that, botii 
180 . RCF, p. 312. 
181 . RCF,p. 322. 
182 . RCT, p. 322. Yet he adds that 'in certain culmral situations, both systasis and diastasis may acquire 
a relative right and necessity.' 
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positively and n a t i v e l y , there are manifestations in this rebgious and spintual life and witness in 
the realm outside the revelation of Christ that are acknowledged as evidence of God's urunterrupted 
concern and of His travaibng with man.'"' Thus, rebgions must be r ^ r d e d as 'idolatry, spiritual 
adultery, manifestation of the divine wrath,' and a 'response to God in various ways, but never in 
the sense of an autonomous faculty or aduevement of man; always as evoked and wrought by 
God."** 
This perpetual dialectic rebuts the view tiiat Christianity is the 'result of tiie Spedal 
Revelation in Christ; [while] the non-Christian rebgions are, at least in thar highest and best 
elemoits, the result of General Revelation.''*' This sqjaration devalues the revelation in nature, 
history and consdoice, for i f revelation is 'a purely divine initiative and act,''** general revelation is 
not revelation at all. For Kraemer, revelation is 'objective divine action, dedsively ui the person and 
work of Jesus Christ, the "Word made Flesh".''** Therefore, the distinction bdweai goieral and 
spedal revelation is a false one. Revelation is not a combination of natural and supernatural 
propositions, but 'God's judgment on man, ... God's active relationship to man, and His long-
suffering dialogue with man. He, God, is takmg the initiative m the dialogue, from which man 
spontaneously ties to escape.'"*' For Kraemer, then, 'general revelation' is a misleading temi. 'The 
initial difficulty is that, when we take seriously the Biblical way of speaking of revelation as God's 
active self-disclosure out of direct personal concem for man, arid directed towards the creative re-
estabbshmoit of the relation of God with man, every kind of revelation is a "spedal" revelation.'"' 
The revelation in nature, history and consdence is thus spedal revelation and the religions are 
positive and negative responses to this revelation. Nevertheless, 'it is impossible for Chnstian 
thinking to interpret God's revelation in nature, history and consdoice as indqjoident fields. They 
can be Intimately explamed m the bght of the revelation ui Christ.'"^ For this reason, Kraemer 
185 . RCF. pp. 340-341. 
186 . RCT, p. 341. 
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prefers instead the terms Urqffenbaning (original revelation) or Gnindqffenbarung (fundamental 
revelation).'*^ 
Whai applied to natural theology the dialectical approach produces a similar outcome. On 
Kraemer's view, natural theology builds 'theories w^ch function as preambles or st^ping-stones or 
bndges. .. which lead gradually to what is thai called, in the context of such constructions, the 
fullness of Christ.''** So described, natural theology justifies 'what the Bible considers one of the 
root-sins and fiindamaital blindness of man, i.e. that man is able to arrange his relation witli 
God.''*^ Such an approadi renders Christ, 'The Wisdom of God^ only the culmination of tlie 
'religious and moral wisdom of man.''*^ Kraemer proposes not the rejection of natural theology, 
but a reversal in priority. Truly natural theology, he wntes, is illuminated and judged solely by "the 
centra! revelation in Christ.''*^ 
Thus Kraemer says that betweoi the Wisdom of God and the wisdom of humanity, 'there 
is no pomt of contact. .. Only the Holy Spirit can open the eyes for God's world. Understanding 
and accqDtmg the gospel means conversion, nobody excqjted. This is unambiguous Biblical 
teadung. Therefore it is said that "the world by wisdom knew not God" (1 Cor. 1:21).''** And at 
the same time he says 'there are points of contact.' There is no systematic method of discerning 
these pomts; it rests in the concrete situation of communication betweei mdividuals. 'Different 
spintual worlds m wliidi the abortive positive responses, often in a deq^ly moving way, and also 
the negative responses to God's ongoing dialogue with man, are frequently crystallized in mytlis, 
aspirations, expectations, demonic distortions, etc.''** These responses will necessarily be used 'in 
192 . RCF, p. 354. 
193 . RCF,p. 355. 
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the spirit of humble service' by Uie ordinary bearer of the gospel message... when encountering non-
i200 Christian fellow-beings or particular manifestations of spiritual reality. 
All that has been said thus far leads directly into an application of the dialectical approach 
to tolerance and inter-religious co-operation. Kraemer argues strongly for both, but cautions 
against a tolerance rooted in the 'secr^ truth' that all religions are ultimately one.^°' He writes, 
If co-operation and co-existence... really mean to have a frank and openminded respect 
for each other as sincere men and women, behaving oneself as a sincere Christian, 
Hindu, Buddhist, etc., then it is a cause to be applauded and furthered. The danger is, 
however, that such groups come and work together on the basis of so-called agreements, 
and are systematically silent on the so-called disagreements, and thus are 
unintentionally insincere.^ "^  
True co-operation and tolerance should be approadied by people who are at once 'smcerely 
religious' and ready 'to take a candidly self-critical view of the empirical reality of tiieir own 
religjon.'^ "^ Moreover, they should be conducted on a pragmatic basis which does not and should 
not include common worship. Co-operation and tolerance 'on a pragmatic basis and with a 
pragmatic goal in mind, out of a common feeling of responsibility and concern for man and his 
needs, is a very important thing to strive after. This can be done if one does not seek first for a 
common religious basis wdiidi transcoids or presumably unites the religions.'^ *" 
We are quite aware that this sounds extremely harsh and intolerant, but it is the only 
way to look matters in the fece, to stop blurring the issues and to arrive at a really 
tolerant attitude, bom from a real concem for the cause of the co-operation and munial 
sincere esteem of adherents of different religions.... Why is [common worship] wrong, 
insincere... unclean, corruptive? For the simple reason that it is spiritual quackery to 
maintain that one is praying to the same God named alternatively God, Ram, Allali. .. 
It is not allowable to experiment with God. This softheartedness leads to a cormption of 
truth and loss of identity and spiritual character unintentional though this may be. 
Christians should be the first to point out and keep to the rules of sound inter-religious 
co-operation. To accompUsh common worship is overstepping the boundaries and 
creating (in sincerity and seriousness!) newly constructed gods, unwittingly used as 
toys.^ "' 
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For Kraemer, sudi practices have more to do with a yearning for human solidarity than one for 
common religious truth and experience.^ "'' For the Christian, any model of tolerance and co-
operation cannot be built on anything other than the Christian faith itself^"' 
The Christian Faith is only a right response to the revelation in Christ, if it is tolerant. It 
is against God's character and His whole way of deaUng with men, it is against the life, 
work and death of Christ, to be intolerant. God's way, Jesus' way is not the fight for 
tmth, either by power or violence, but by love. Therefore, Christian tolerance should 
have nothing to do with a smiling attitude towards the finiteness and relativity of human 
workings of tmth, including the tmth which is in Christ and which is Christ. This 
finiteness and relativity are fects - and not at all disturbing fects - for those who live by 
feith in God's righteousness in Christ, and not the theological doctrines or ecclesiastical 
prescriptions. The should make us humble, modest, patient and open with others.""' 
To summarise the exposition above. Religion and the Christian Faith is Kraemer's 
endeavour to rebut the diarge that an openly Christian interpretation of the rehgious life of 
humanity was somehow arbitrary or unsaentific. First, he insisted that a proper theology of 
rehgions is justified by appeals to the saaitific study of rehgion and indeed is more legitimate than 
other 'neutral' approadies whidi simply mask or refijse to acknowledge tlieir own theological 
biases. Second, he argued that theological assessments of religion are found throughout Christian 
history. Finally, he contended that sudi interpretations are supported by Scripture. To complete 
his defence, he outhnes how his approach impinges upon discussions of gaieral and special 
revelation, natural theology, and mterreligious co-operation and tolerance. It is thus clear diat this 
apologetic is designed to appeal to a Christian audiaice. 
Conclusion: 
In three sections, this diapter conpleted the rediscovery of Haidrik Kraemer begun in 
diapter 3 by acqtiainting the reader with his theology of rehgions. They were based on expositions 
of his major writings. The Chnstian Message in a Non-Christian Worid emphasised first of all that 
a Chnstian interpretation of the reUgions b^an within the Christian revelation; second, that it 
d^Qided on a proper understanding of beliefs and practices in relation to the complex rehgious 
206 . RCF, pp. 370- 372. 
207 . He writes, 'The Christian mission, fiilly conscious of its role and responsibility in the serious matter 
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totahty in whidi they arise; and that true points of contact and adaptation were uncovered only in 
the situational encounters betweai Christian and non-Christians. The qualifications introduced in 
'Continuity or Discontinuity (distinguishing 'empirical Chnstiaruty fi-om 'the Chnstian revelation,' 
and preferring Brunner to Barth in his discussion of natural theology), in the eyes of both his 
opponents and Kraemer himself, did not alter significantiy these contentions. Finally, Religion and 
the Christian Faith. Kraemer's fourfold restatement and vindication of his position, maintained that 
theology of religions is justified by appeals to the saaitific study of rehgion; tiiat it is found m 
Chnstian history; that it is supported by Scnpture; and finally that it called for a difFereit 
understanding of revelation, natural theology, and interreligious co-operation and tolerance. Now 
we must consider wh^er or not Kraemer's position continues to offer insights to the contemporary 
debate. 
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P A R X m 
RE-APPROPRIATING HENDRIK K R A E M E R 
U7 
Chapter 5 
Theological Responses to the Postmodern Condition 
Introduction: 
To summarise the thesis thus far: Part I introduced the reader to Christian theology of 
rehgions and argued that the various positions available were not as easily defined as the threefold 
typology appeared to suggest. Part 11 then offered chronological and thematic surveys of Haidrik 
Kraemer's contribution to theology of rehgions, demonstrating thereby that he cannot be sunply 
dismissed, either as a traditional exclusivist or as a Barthian, but deserves serious examination in 
his own right. I f the argument is left here however, sudi an inquiry would remain confined to 
tiieological history, wh^er that of Christian missions or the growth of ecumenical Protestantism in 
the twQitieth century. It is therefore the task of the remaining chapters to show that Kraemer's 
theology of religions, however worthy of historical study, continues to oflfer important insights to 
contemporary theology of reUgions. 
The difiSculties with sudi an undertaking were noted eariy m chapter 3.' hi curroit 
debate, whoi remembered at all, Kraemer's position is often misunderstood and too-quickly 
dismissed as an historical artefact irrelevant to contemporary problems. This attitude is 
exemphfied in the July, 1988, issue of The International Review of Mission. It celebrated the 
fiftieth anniversary of Tambaram by pubhshing the proceedings of a small consultation on the 
'relationship of dialogue and mission, as these impact on Christian understandings of relations to 
people of otiier faiths.'^ Therem, Stanley Samartha argued that Kraemer could no longer contnbute 
1 . See chapter 3, n. 7. 
2 . Eugene Stockwell, 'Introduction,' in The Intemational Review of Mission, 78 (1988), p. 309. 
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to discussion in a world threatened by nuclear and aivironmental annihilation,^ wiiile a more 
concihatory Wdfred Cantwell Smith asserted that had Kraemer hved long enough, he would have 
adopted a more plurahst position."* Only Lesshe Newbigin presented Kraemer's position as a 
necessary theological response to Hocking's revisioning of the religions within the picture of global, 
liberal democratic capitahsm.' 
In spite of this seemingly pervasive attitude, diapters 6 and 7 will show that Kraemer's 
theology of religions not only stands up well to contemporary criticism, but goes b^ond to suggest 
a position wtodi is both philosophically and theologically sophisticated. Before these tasks can be 
undertaken though, a brief assessmeit of the current philosophical and theolc«jcal cUmate is 
required. In two steps, this diapter offers such an analysis. The first is a brief oudine of 
postmodemity and postmodernism, centring on the work of Fraidi philosopher Jean-Fran9ois 
Lyotard. It conteids that wdiile Lyotard's prescriptive response to the death of modernity is deeply 
problematic, there is no reversing the postmodern tum. The second section thai considers 
theological responses to the postmodem tum. The a/theology of Mark C. Taylor and the theology 
3 . Stanley Samartha,' Mission in a ReUgiously Plural World Looking Beyond Tambarani, 1938,' in The 
hitemational Review of Mission. 78 (1988), pp. 315 - 324. 
4 . He wrote: 'An undisceming reader might say that he was stubborn, chnging to inherited doctrine 
fomiulated in earher, ignorant days, and deeming it important so to cling Personally, 1 feel that Kraemer 
was not holding on so much as was being held; he never succeeded in brmging together what his heart felt, 
and half of his briUiant head knew, with wiiat the other half had been taught, and fi-om which he never 
managed constmctively to struggle - as if God had revealed traditional Christian theology, rather than, as 
the best Christians as always known, that he revealed himself (to us and to others).... It was not only the 
majority of those attendmg the first Tambaram conference that Kraemer failed to convince of this stated 
thesis. He failed to convince hmiself He spent the rest of his hfe writing fiirther books, each of which in 
effect was an attempt to say that no, he had not quite meant what the last one seemed to be saying for that 
was not quite right. He moved mcreasingly towards a more comprehensive vision. Yet he died, poor man, 
without ever managmg to satisfy himself that he had formulated that vision adequately.' Wilfi-ed Cantwell 
Smith, 'Mission, Dialogue and God's Will for Us,' m The International Review of Mission. 78 (1988), p. 
372. Though I am certain no ill-will was intended, as one sympathetic with Kraemer's position, it is 
difQcult not to regard Smith's words as more condescending than conciUatory. 
5 . He wrote: 'Kraemer did not claim uniqueness for Christianity, which is a changing variegated and 
ambiguous human phenomenon; he claimed uniqueness for the events that form the substance of the 
gospel. In Kraemer's favourite phrase, these events are sui generis.... Therefore we have no business 
trying to domesticate it within our cultures, or rational projects and programmes, no business to confiise it 
with tiie so-called Christian civilization of the west. The gospel is unique, sovereign, unbound. Our 
busmess is to bear witness to it.' See Lesshe Newbigm, 'A Sermon Preached at the Thanksgiving Service 
for the Ftftietli Anniversary of the Tambaram Conference of the International Missionary Council,' in The 
hitemational Review of Mission, 78 (1988), p. 327. 
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of John Milbank are presented as extremes whidi can and should be avoided wdiile the work of 
Hans Frei and George Lmdbeck is proposed as a more fruitful mediating position which I call 
'postmodern orthodoxy.' This section thai concludes by responding to four objections to the 
theology of Frei and Lindbeck. Thus, this chapter sets the stage for the critical re-appropriation of 
Hendrik Kraemer's theology of religions. 
5.1 The Postmodern Condition 
EvQi though the term 'postmodern' was employed in the opening half of this century to 
describe western culture,*^  it has gained prommence only in the last 25 years, beginning as a 
description of specific movements in art, ardiitecture, and Uterary theory Postmodern art, 
^itomised by Andy Wariiol's paintings, is not preoccupied with a rqjresentation of the natural 
yvorid or the artistic imagination, but re-presaits crther works of art (oftai with an added element of 
parody), thus serving up 'images of images.'^  In a similar way, postinodem ardiitecture erects 
premodem facades (for example, pilasters and architraves) but using modem tediniques (for 
instance, steel frameworks).^ In berth, the signifier (the painting or building) is defined by other 
signrfiers (yet more paintings or buildings), not the signified (something 'behind' which tiie work of 
art or building is said to r^resait). The work of postmodern literary theonsts such as Roland 
Barthes and Jacques Derrida similariy locates meaning within language and refijses a premature 
extra-Unguistic shift.' A mundane but accurate analogy is offered by the dictionary where tiie 
ineanmg of words is oicapsulated in yet more words. In all three examples, 'postmodern' descnbes 
6 . According to Matei Calinescu, Arnold Toynbee employed the term in 1946 to designate tiiat period of 
history following 'Western ID (Modernism)' to be the postmodern era. See Matei Cahnescu, Five Faces of 
Modernity: Modernism. Avant-Garde. Decadence. Kitscli. Postmodernism, (Durham, North Carolina: 
Duke University Press, 1987), p. 267. 
7 . R. Detweiler, 'Postmodernism,' in Blackwell Encyclopedia of Modem Christian Thought, ed. Ailtser E. 
McGrath, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 457; see also Brandon Taylor, Modernism. Postmodernism. 
Reahsm: A Critical Perspective on Art. (Winchester: Winchester School of Art Press, 1987), pp. 40, 65. 
8 . Charles Jencks, The Language of Post-Modem Architecmre. (New York Rizzoh, 1977). In a later 
work, Jencks calls this combination of premodem conventions with modem techniques 'double-coding.' 
See Charles Jencks, Current Architecture. (London: Academy Editions, 1982), p. 111. 
9 . See for instance Roland Barthes, Image-Music Text, trans. Stephen Heatii, (New York Hill and Wang, 
1977); and Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology. trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
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a worid 'conceived, in semiotic terms, as one in which the signifier has rqjlaced the signified as the 
focus of oriaitation and value.''** 
Nevertheless, postmodern art, ardiitecture and hterary theory are but responses to a larger 
shift in contemporary western culture - the transition from modernity to postmodemity. It is 
tiierefore necessary to distinguish betweoi postmodernism and postmodemity. For some, 
postmodemity is that which comes after modernity; it is the beginning of a new stage in sodal 
evolution." While it does not describe this new era exphdtiy as postmodern, an example of this 
interpretation is Frands Fukuyama's The End of History, whidi sees the climax and conclusion of 
history in Westem capitalism and liberal democracy become globally dominant.'" For others, 
however, postmodemity is simply modernity takai to its extreme; it is more accurately described 
not as 'post-' but 'hyper-' or 'ultra-' modem. Whdher takai as the b^inning of a new era, or the 
aid of them all, postmodemity 'is the economics of the consumer market apphed to all areas of 
human hfe. There is nothing that cannot be bought and sold.... [it] is a fashionmg of commodities -
of films, food and clotiies, and of people (who no longer have diaracters but life-styles).''"' 
Postmodemity, in sum, is the culture of late capitahsm and postmodernism whether in art, 
ardiitecture, or Uterary theory, is both forming and formed by this culture. 
With this gaieral sketch in mind, \&L us critically consider the work of Jean-Fran9ois 
Lyotard, whose The Postmodern Condition is widely considered to be a postmodern classic. 
Therein, Lyotard proposes to discern 'who deddes what knowledge is, and who deddes what needs 
to be dedded', by comparing 'narrative' and 'sdaitific' knowledge." The former broadly embraces 
10 . Detweiler, 'Postmodernism,' p. 457. 
11 . Stephen Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations. (New York: 
Guildford, 1991), p. 171. 
12 . Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and die Last Man. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992). 
13 . Thomas C. Oden, After Modernity... What? Agenda for Theology. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1990), 
p. 77. 
14 . Gerard Loughhn, Telling God's StoiY Bible. Church and Narrative Theology. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 5 - 6. 
15 . Jean-Franqois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington 
and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 9. While Lyotard is not the only 
151 
criteria of eflBaaicy, justice, and beauty; it 'is what makes someone capable of forming "good" 
daiotative utterances... "good" prescriptive utterances and "good" evaluative utterances'.'* Sudi 
judgements are deemed 'good' in so far as they conform to criteria 'accepted in the sodal arcle of 
the "knower's" interiocutors.... The consaisus that permits such knowledge to be drcumscribed and 
makes it possible to distinguish one who knows from one v/ho doesn't (the foreigner, the diild) is 
what constitutes the culture of the people.'" Narrative knowledge, thai, defines criteria of 
competaice and aiables evaluation according to them by providing 'the set of pragmatic rules that 
[constitute] the sodal bond,' or, 'the community's relationship to itself and its environment.'"* 
Saentific knowledge, on the other hand, uses only the language of denotation; it purports more or 
less accurately to describe reahty through statemoits whidi are opai to verification and/or 
falsification. 'In this context, thai, one is "learned" i f one can produce a true statement... one is a 
sdentist i f one can produce verifiable or falsifiable statanents'.'* A sciaitific statemait must 
continually be opai to the possibility of proof or disproof; it gains no validity simply by being 
rqDorted. Because of this exclusive focus on daiotation, scientific knowledge does not cohere witii 
other types of language to form a soaal bond. Rather, it claims access to that whidi is true for all 
time and in all places. Thus, while narrative knowledge defines what may be said or done within a 
culture or community, and is Intimated by so doing, sdentific knowledge describes reality and is 
legitimated by its correspondence to it. 
Lyotard, however, is unhappy with this distinction. He counters that modem science has 
abandoned the search for a 'transcaidental authority as a response to the question... "Who deddes 
the conditions of truth?'"^" On the contrary, sdentific knowledge legitimates itself not by appeahng 
to a sure foundation of universal and indubitable truth, but by aiforcing rules accorded status 
through the consaisus of experts within the arena of sdaitific debate. But in so doing, scioitific 
postmodem theorist, I have chosen to focus on hmi because space prohibits an examination of several 
exponents and unlike many of his contemporaries, his writing is readily accessible. 
16 . Lvotard. The Postmodem Condition, p. 18. 
17 . Lyotard, The Postmodem Condition, p. 19. 
18 . Lyotard, The Postmodem Condition, p. 21. 
19 . Lyotard, The Postmodem Condition, p. 25. 
20 . Lyotard, The Postmodem Condition, p. 29. 
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knowledge lapses back into narrative and its fijnction as a sodal demarcator: it is defining what 
may or may not be said within the sdentific community not according to correspondaice with 
reahty but to consensual authority. Moreover, this is not 'an involuntary lapse in the l^tunation 
process. The ejqjlidt appeal to narrative in the problematic of knowledge is concomitant with the 
hberation of bourgeois culture from the traditional authorities.'^ ' While they may appear to be two 
distinct types of knowledge, Lyotard contends that sciaitific knowledge is in fact a species of 
narrative knowledge. 
Lyotard summarises the self-understanding of those subscribing to tiie modem narrative in 
the following way: 
the name of the hero is the people, the sign of legitimacy, the people's consensus, and 
their mode of creating norms is deUberation.... The people debate among themselves 
about what is just or unjust in the same way that the scientific community debates about 
wliat is tme or felse; they accumulate civil laws just as scientists accumulate scientific 
laws; they perfect their mles of consensus just as the scientists produce new "paradigms" 
to revise their rules in tight of wiiat they have leamed.^ ^ 
Like all narratives, this one prescribes the rules which govern the Ufe of a community, in this case, 
'the people.' It is concemed not only with denotative uO:erances vMd\ mirror reality, but also 
prescriptive utterances whidi mirror justice. Nevertheless, this particular narrative is set apart 
from others in its desire to Intimate knowledge which is true at all times, everywhere. Lyotard 
expresses this difference in his descnption of this story as a grand recit, a mOanarrative. The 
narrator is not 'a people mired in the particular positivity of its traditional knowledge, nor evai 
sdaitists takai as a whole, since they are sequestered in professional frameworks correspondmg to 
their respective spedahties' but is a 'mdasubjed in the process of formulating botii the legitimacy 
of the discourses of empirical sdences and that of the dired institutions of popular cultures.'^ ^ This 
is the story of modernity, the mdanarrative of the West. 
In his Reconstruction in Philosophv. John Dewey tells tiie modem story as tiie story of 
human progress. The modem human, no longer focused on the supernatural nor shackled by 
ecclesiastical autiiority, now beheves 'in the power of individual minds, guided by methods of 
21 . Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 30. 
22 . Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 30. 
23 . Lyotard, The Postmodem Condition, p. 34. 
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observation experience and reflection, to attain the truths needed for the guidance of hfe.' So re-
oriented, the modem unagination is dominated by the future, rather than the past. 'The Goldai Age 
hes ahead of us not bdiind us.' Indeed, 'Man is capable, i f he will exerdse the required courage, 
inteUigence and effort, of shaping his own fate.' Progress, accordingly, is made by 'the patieit and 
experimental study of nature, bearing fiuit in inventions whidi control nature and subdue her forces 
to sodal use.'^ What Lyotard describes, however, is not the peaceful hberation from superstitious, 
backward narrative knowledge to reasonable, progressive sdentific knowledge, but the conquest of 
the one modem mrtanarrative over ail other littie narratives. 'It is therefore not at all surprising,' he 
writes, 'that the rqDresaitatives of the new process of Intimation by "the people" should be at the 
same time actively involved in destroying the traditional knowledge of peoples, percdved from that 
point forward as minorities or potential sqaaratist movements destined only to spread 
obscurantism.'^' 
The modem, sdaitific metanarrative not only denies to the other his or her own narrative, 
but authorises its violait suppression. What Lyotard claims to have found in the modem sdaitific 
metanarrative is not the Intimation of knowledge, but the legitimation of power. Yet, this is not an 
occasion for despair. By unmasking the metanarrative as a Intimation of power, he has broken its 
oppressive hold over tittle narratives. 'All that has beei recdved,' he writes, 'if only yesterday, must 
be suspected.'^ ^ The systematic taking apart, or deconstruction, of the metanarrative, and mdeed 
all claims to universal rationahty and authority is a liberation from terror and a cause for 
celebration.^' As 'incredulity toward metanarratives' vAadx seek only to conquer and subsume 
others, postmodernism 'refines our saisibility to differaices and reinforces our ability to tolerate tiie 
24 . John Dewey, Reconstmction in Philosophy. (New York Henry Holt, 1929), pp. 47 - 49; cited in J. 
Richard Middleton and Brian J. Walsh, Tmth is Stranger Than It Used to Be. (Downer's Grove: 
InterVarsity, 1995), p. 14. 
25 . Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 30. 
26 . Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 79. 
27 . Lyotard writes, 'The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we can take. 
We have paid a high price for the nostalgia of the whole and of the one, for die reconciliation of the 
concept and the sensible, of the transparent and the communicable experience. Under the general demand 
for a slackening and for appeasement, we can hear the niutterings of the desire for a return to terror, for the 
realization of the fentasy to seize reality. The answer is "Let us wage a war on totahty; let us be witnesses 
to the unpresentable; let us activate tiie differences and save tiie honor of the name".' Lyotard, The 
Postmodern Condition, pp. 81 - 82. 
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incommaisurable.'^ ^ Li the ruins of the modem metanarrative, we have to tell our own httie stories 
and play our own language-games. Instead of a legitimation of power, the postmodem aicounter of 
httle narratives is to be concaved as a game played 'for the sheer pleasure of its invaition.. .. Great 
joy IS had m tiie aidless mvention of turns of phrase, of words and meanings.'^ * 
It is ironic that Lyotard's celebratory account of the death of the metanarrative is itself a 
narrative, and a rather grand one. In later writings, he admits that his postmodernism, in order to 
understand and estabhsh itself, necessarily claims the ability to understand and place everytiimg.^ " 
It is itself, m other words, a metanarrative. Senous critiasm can be raised predsely at this pomt of 
arculanty for in admitting postmodemism's own m^anarratival nature, Lyotard places himsdf on 
the homs of a dilemma. On the one hand, by his own account there is no reason why a postmodem 
mdanarrative cannot and should not be deconstruded as simply another legitimation of power; on 
the otiier, i f the struggle betweai littie narratives is all there is, Lyotard seems not to recognise the 
violaice resulting from the encounter of little narratives and further, cannot stop it. Either way, tiie 
httie narratives which postmodernism seeks to preserve from the violence of modernity continue to 
suffer. 
According to the first diaige Lyotard overthrows the modem mdanarrative and its claim 
to universal autiiority only through the construction of yet another mdanarrative. He exconates 
modernity for constructing the metanarrative of sdeitific knowledge by whidi it seeks to legitimate 
its claim to a universal authority or rationahty and purports to transcend the need for narratives 
altog^er. He wntes, 'the old poles of attraction rqDresoited by nation-states, parties, professions, 
uistitutions, and historical traditions are losing their attraction.... Idaitifying with tiie great names, 
the heroes of contemporary history is becoming more and more difBcult.' The 'grand Narratives' 
are fragmenting.^' Nevertheless, this loss should be celebrated as the recovery of differaice, 
eiablmg the tolerance of the incommaisurable. But is this not itself a m^anarrative, a new 
universal autiiority? I all^e that it is. 
28 . Lyotard, The Postmodem Condition, pp. xxiv - xxv. 
29 . Lyotard, The Postmodem Condition, p. 10. 
30 . Jean-Franpois Lyotard, The Postmodem Explained To Children: Correspondence 1982 - 1985, 
(London: Turnaround, 1992), pp. 40-41. 
31 . Lyotard, The Postmodem Condition, p. 14. 
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Ridiard Middlrton and Bnan Walsh aigue that tiie universal diaracter of the postmodem 
tum becomes clear i f it is hkened metaphorically to a smorgasbord with a multiphdty of 
worldviews offered for consumption ' I f among the variety of offerings we find Westem modernist 
soup, Marxist rice. Christian stew and Mushm bread (so to speak) is there not also a postmodem 
dish of some sort? Do postmodernists consider thdr worldview as one option among many?' Not 
at all for it is the table on vAnd\ the other dishes are set.^^ Postmodernism has become the new 
metanarrative whidi universally and authoritatively relates all other narratives to the status of 
human constructions. It does not herald the offering of a multiphdty of narratives from whidi one 
may pick and choose. Rather, it is the authonty vMd\ permits no narrative to claim for itself any 
more than local, temporary status. 
There is therefore no reason as far as I can tell why postmodernism as it has beai 
articulated by Lyotard cannot and should not be deconstructed as yet another culturally Umited 
intiniation of the suppression of the other. Consider for instance a Sunni Mushm: his narrative, 
as far as he is concerned, has beei revealed by God to Muhammad and is recorded in the holy 
Our'an. Evai though it is told in different places and at different times, this is not a geographically 
and historically limited human construction. It is the universal tale of humanity as living dther in 
submission to or rebelhon against the will of God as proclaimed by the prophets he has sent, the 
last and greatest being Muhammad. It is a metanarrative and as sudi it reserves an authonty for 
itself whidi it does not for otiiers, not even those of 'the People of the Book', that is Jews and 
Christians.''^  According to Lyotard, however, these claims to revelation, universality, and finahty 
32 . Middleton and Walsh. Tmtii Is Stranger Than It Used to Be. p. 77. 
33 . On this point, the Islamirist Edward Hulmes writes, 'In the Islamic tradition, each of the tiiree 
distinctive commimities of feith [Islam, Judaism and Christianity]... shares not just the privilege of having 
been fiimished witii a 'Book (that is to say, an autiioritative corpus of instruction about tiie will of tiie 
Creator for his creatures), brought by a messenger expressly sent by God for the purpose, but also die 
responsibihty for preserving the same insphed message deUvered to each community in the first instance. 
The task of securing the unity of feith and action thus devolves on all those in receipt of such divinely 
instituted fevour. Mushms believe that Musa (Moses) was sent with the tcmrah (Torah) to regulate tiie life 
of the Jews; that Jesus (Isa) was sent with the injil (Gospel) to direct the life of the Christians; tiiat 
Muhammad was sent witii the Qur'an to guide the Islamic community. To Mushms, the essential unity of 
all these manifestations of tiie will of God is a matter of logic as well as of faith, for altiiough tiie message 
has been sent at different times and different places its essence cannot change. The tragedy... is tiiat tiie 
unity of feith and action lias been lost because the original vision has been ignored, became blurred, or 
even - as Mushms contmue to aver - wilfully distorted by Jews and Christians.' Edward Huhnes, '"The 
People of tiie Book" and the Question of Jesus,' in Theology. 95 (1992), p. 335. 
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are falladous. The Sunni's story hke all otiiers is but one option among many and nothing more. 
Thus, Lyotard claims to know the narrative of the other b^er than he or she knows it him- or 
herself. By so claiming, he subsumes the other into the postmodem metanarrative, only continuing 
the cycle of suppression against whidi he reacts. 
Now consider the second diarge, namely that Lyotard's proposal cannot recognise the 
violence inherent in the aicounter of httie narratives. The modem mdanarrative's hero, 'the people,' 
claims a universal rationality which will evaitually aihghtai, subsume and/or rq)lace all otiier 
rationahties. This story, however, has lost its lustre. Two worid wars, the Holocaust, the threat of 
nuclear and environmental disasters have combined to create a widespread disaichantment with the 
story of sdentific progress. Tog^er, these crises have uncovered 'the nihihstic destiny of sdence, 
namely, the necessity for the disaphne of trutii-finding to admit that tiiere are no tnitiis, and 
therefore no objective goods '^ According to Lyotard, however, this is to be celebrated in tiie 
playful struggle of littie narratives. This optimistic interpretation of the death of the modem 
metanarrative is underscored by Walter Truett Anderson: 'Lacking absolutes,' he declares, 'we will 
have to aicounter one anotiier as people witii different information, different stones, different 
visions - and trust the outcome.'^ ' 
History gives littie reason for sudi optimism, ff Lyotard's postmodernism unmasks the 
modem mdanarrative as simply the Intimation of violait power and yd: is itself simply the end of 
modernity, why should one be optimistic about the outcome of encounter betweai narratives? 
Consider for instance the conflicts in Bosnia and Israel; both typical examples of Lyotardian littie 
narratives aicountering each other. None of the stories involved, whether Bosnian-Serb, Bosnian-
MusUm and Bosnian-Croat, or IsraeU and Palestinian, claim a universal scope; all tie themselves 
quite dehberately to hmited geographies, to the Balkans and Palestine respectively. These 
aicounters, however, have not beai marked by Lyotards playflil struggle, but by tiie horrors of 
ethnic cleansing, terrorism, and even genodde. In the face of sudi tragedies, I counter, tiiere is no 
34 . John Milbank, Theology and Sodal Theory: Beyond Secular Reason. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 
284. 
35 . Walter Traett Anderson, Reality Isn't What h Used to Be: Theatrical Politics. Ready-to-Wear 
Rehgion. Global Myths. Prmiitive Chic and Otiier Wonders of the Postmodem Worid. (San Frandsco: 
Harper and Row, 1990), p. 183. 
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reason for Lyotard's or Anderson's optimism. I f anything they are occasions for despair. As John 
Milbank has put it, ' i f violence is the result of the seardi for knowledge, tiiai violence is what tiiere 
is to be known.'^ ^ 
Furthermore, even i f it could recognise the continuing problem of violaice, 
postmodernism, as sunply the recognition of the violence underiying the modem metanarrative, 
cannot explam why violence should be avoided. Lyotard writes, 'to speak is to figjit, in the sense of 
playing, and speech ads fall within the domain of a gaieral agomstics. This does not mean that 
one plays in order to iw>?.'" The question, posed powerfiolly by Seyia Baihabib, is 'why not? 
Why isn't language simply a sphere through whidi the universal power game is carried out? Why 
isn't all conversation seduction? All consensus conquest?'^ ^ Lyotard may acclaim tiie nearly 
infinite diversity of littie narratives in the postmodem world, 'but he cannot pass this off as libera! 
plurahsm, because nothing, in his philosophy, in prindple raiders ilintimate the expansion of one 
language-game at the expense of others, nor the capture and manipulation of many language games 
by a single power.'^' Once again, the littie narrative is violentiy subsumed into the grand one and 
postmodernism cannot act as a bulwark against it. 
Thus, postmodernism as articulated by Lyotard falls dther to the Scylla of 'criteriologicai 
dogmatism,' that is, it rejects the autiiority of the modem metanarrative tiirough the construction of 
a new one, or to the Charybdis of 'uncritical polythdsm,' that is, it can ndther account for the 
violaice in the encounters of httie narratives nor explain why violence is to be avoided.'"' In both 
instances, the powerless are violartly suppressed by the powerful. Lyotard rightiy pomts to the 
problem of violence, but at worst partidpates in it or at least, cannot stop it. Nevertiieless, tiiis is 
not to suggest a return to the modem metanarrative. Lyotard's description of the postmodem 
condition is in my view, accurate. He rightiy brings to the forefront the problems of autiiority - that 
36. Milbank Theology and Social Theory, p. 311. 
37 . Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 10. Emphasis mine. 
38 . Seyla Benhabib, 'Epistemologies of Postmodernism: A Rejomder to Jean-Francois Lyotard,' in 
Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. L. Nicholson, (London: Routiedge, 1990), p. 115. 
39 . Milbank Theology and Social Theory, p. 317. 
40 . Benhabib, 'Epistemologies of Postmodernism,' p. 113. 
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whidi Intimates knowledge - and the other - he or she v^ose authority and knowledge is differait 
from mine. He correctly suggests that the real authority Intimating the modem mrtanarrative is 
not peacefully persuasive reason, but violently coercive power. So, while his optimistic 
prescription - the playful telling and re-telling of little narratives - may be deeply problematic, there 
is no reversing the postmodern turn. 
5.2 Theological Responses 
How does Christian theology respond to this new cultural situation? This question must 
now be addressed. Because 1 cannot account for all the different responses (ranging from the 
hostile, through the curious and fashionable, to the arthusiastically postmodern) here, I limit my 
focus to three very different, yet openly postmodern ones. At one extreme, Mark C. Taylor's 
a/theology rejects any claims to authority and ultimately succumbs to nihilism. At the other, John 
Milbank so magnificaitly reintroduces theology as the Queei of the scioices that he threatais to 
subsume the other into the new/old Christian metanarrative. Somewhere in betweei falls the 
postmodem orthodoxy of Hans Frei and Geoige Lindbeck. It is this mediating position which, I 
believe, comes closest to resolving the authority/other dilemma. 
Taylor, noted originally for his work on H^el and Kierkegaard,'*' invites his readers to 
celebrate the postmodem theological carnival in his book. Erring.'*^ The opening analysis of the 
implications of postmodernism for four notions essential to traditional theology starts with an 
examination of the way in whidi the death of God has found expression in humanistic atheism. 
Though undertaken to transfer the Divine attributes to the human self, Taylor concludes that the 
death of God 'culminates in the disappearance of the self ."^ ^ The relation betweei western images 
of God and self are thoi flirther analysed. By showing selfhood to be an historical construction, 
Taylor moves from the death of God to the dispossession of the self .** He thirdly deconstructs 
history, or the attenpt to unite disparate human activity into a meaningful totality by insisting that it 
41 . Mark C. Taylor, Joumevs to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, (Berkley. University of California 
Press, 1980). 
42 . Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). 
43 . Taylor, Erring, pp. 14,19 - 33. 
44 . Taylor, Erring, pp. 34 - 51. 
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is indissolubly linked to notions of God and self. Accordingly, with their disappearance, history 
comes to an a^d/'^ Finally, the book, as the re-presaitation of personal and social history', 
completes the cycle of deconstrucdon. It strives to be a closed whole, a compld;e totality and in so 
doing, struggles to dominate, rqsress or exclude the other. The other, however, can never be 
completely dominated, rqjressed or excluded. Both its presaice and its absaice subvert the book, 
showing It to be always opai and incomplete.''^  Having deconstructed God, self, history and book, 
Taylor insists that the web of traditional theology is thus unravelled. 'Oiir problem,' he goes on to 
write, 'is how to count all of this not only as loss, but as gain.'^ ^ 
The gain lies in the possibility deconstructive a/theology whidi Taylor descnbes as 
'mazmg grace' - 'a life of serpentine wandering,' embodying "the ceaseless interplay of desire and 
delight '''^  This description of deconstructive aAheology evokes the image of a Imguistic maze 
lackmg both caitre and exit where meaning always playfully alludes one's attempts to aitrap it in 
words. The camivalesque nature of the wandenng is summed up by Gerard Loughlin m this way: 
'In the past, we thought that God wrote the story, but now we know that we ourselves have wnttai 
God. Now the religious task is to keqD up the fiction, and not with a heavy but with a light 
toudi."^^ Taylor writes, 'In the festive dance of the carnival, individual idortities dissolve and social 
oppositions break down. Here the levity of comedy rqjlaces the gravity of tragedy. In the absaice 
of transcendence, interiority and depth give way to a labyrinthian play of surfaces. When nostalgia 
is gone and waiting is over, one can delight in the superficiality of appearances.''" It is the task of 
the postmodern a/theologjan to join in the 'Bacdianalian revel' of aidless emng.'' There is 
45 . Taylor, Erring, pp. 52 - 73. 
46 . Taylor, Ening, pp. 74 - 93. 
47 . Taylor, Erring, p. 17. 
48 . Taylor, Erring, pp. 13 -15. 
49 . Loughlin, Telling God's Story, p. 15. 
50 . Taylor, Emng, pp. 15 - 16. 
51 . Taylor. Erring, p. 182. 
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therefore no conclusion: the death of God is also the end of the End. 'Instead of a conclusion, we 
are left with an Interiude, vMdi, it appears, is always already playing.'" 
Taylor's deconstructive aAheolpgy ultimately rejects any claims to theological authority by 
affirming that there is neither beginning nor aid, for we b ^ j n and end 'wherever we are in a text 
where we already believe ourselves to be.'" Knowledge of b^Lnning and aid authorises the route 
(not) takai and gives it meaning, but to claim this knowledge is to forgrt the linguistic labyrinth in 
which we find ourselves. 'As Ta>dor's image of language as a maze suggests, we are forever 
enclosed, wandenng in the labyrinth. No matter how long our piece of thread, there is no way out 
and no\^ ^ere to go.''^ Yet, the loss of b^innmg and end, of authorisation and meaning, for Gillian 
Rose is not an occasion for Bacdianalian revel, but one for despair: 
it is the beginning and the end which give authority to.the way, and meaning to being 
lost - especially to any conceivable relishing of being lost. If the beginning and end are 
abolished, so that all is divine middle... joyful erring would not be achieved... [One] 
would be left helpless in the total domination of the maze, every point equally beginning 
and end. This is to encounter not pure freedom but pure power and to become its 
perfect victim." 
Taylor's language of play and carnival cannot cover the nihilism implied by his aidless emng. This 
can and should be pushed further for the labyrinthine imagery central to deconstructive aAheology 
whidi Rose nghtly deconstructs as nihihsm points to an inconsistency in Taylor's position. As we 
have seal, with Taylor meaning is always one word away; 'it is always differait and deferred. In 
language we can never have the thing itself; we can never stop the aidless drift of meaning from 
one sign to the next, from one sign-string to another.'"' Sudi a position is postmodern insofar as it 
affirms that there is only language, but it is insuffiaently postmodern m its refusal to admit its own 
position is also only a hnguistic construction. Taylor's maze is itself a story and a nihilist one at 
that." By takmg the violait postmodernist vision as primal, Taylor has forgottai that there is 
52 . Taylor, Erring, p. 183. 
53 . Taylor, Erring, pp. 17, 183. 
54 . Loughlin, TeUing God's Story, p. 16. 
55 . Gillian Rose, The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 286 -
287. 
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another story, the caitral theme of vMch is not a meaningless linguistic maze, but the love of God 
which is both beginning and aid. 
This is the story narrated in John Milbank's postmodem reconstructive theolc^ as set out 
in Theology and Social Theorv. In four 'sub-freatises,' he hopes to show that secular reason 'does , 
not just "borrow" inhereitly inappropriate modes of expression from religion as the only discourse 
to hand... but is actually constituted in its secularity by "heresy" in relation to orthodox 
Chnstianity, or else a rejection of Christianity that is more "neo-pagan" than simply anti-
religious.''* For him, '"saentific" social theories are themselves theologies or anti-theologies in 
disguise' and are rooted in an 'ontology of violaice,' which must be tamed by reason." The first 
two treatises deconstruct eighteerth century pobtics and political economy.*^ " The third tums to 
Hegel and Marx: for them in their attempt to transcend the secular reason of the previous treatises, 
against them in their '"gnostic" plot about a historically [sic] necessary fall and reconstruction of 
bemg, with a gam adiieved through violaice undergone.'*' 
Throughout, Milbank writes m two 'voices': that of postmodem nihilism and that of 
Christian virtue. Li the final treatise, he disaitangles these voices and sets them against each other. 
From the perspective of the latter, modem thought and politics fijndamentally assumes that there is 
only violence 'whidi cannot be tamed by an opposing transcendent prinaple, but can be 
immanoitly controlled by subjecting it to rules and giving irresistible power to those rules in the 
form of market economies and sovereign politics.'*^ The climax of the book comes m the final 
diapter \Nh&\ Milbank juxtaposes the secular ontology of violaice over against Chnstianit>''s 
ontology of peace. Unlike secular reason, Christianity recognises no original violence, but a created 
order of harmonious differaice.*^ Coupled with his nihilistic deconstruction of secular reason. 
58 . Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 3 
59 . Milbank, Theology and Social Theorv. pp. 3, 5. 
60 . Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pp. 9 -143. 
61 . Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pp. 4,147 - 255. 
62 . Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pp. 5, 257 - 379. 
63 . Milbank, Theology and Social Theorv. pp. 380 - 438. 
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Milbank thus presents his reader with a stark dioice: to hve m the violoit Civitas Mundi or the 
peaceful Civitas Dei^ He concludes, 'there can be no going back; only Christian theology now 
offers a discourse able to position and overcome nihilism itself. This is why it is so important to 
reassert theology as a master discourse; theology alone remains the discourse of non-mastery .'*^  
It is Milbank's Augustinian imagery of the two cities whidi provides the foundation for 
criticism. As Gillian Rose rightly observes, a city is marked off from other cities by boundaries, 
limits and differait laws.** It is defined at least partially by that whidi is outside it. Milbank's 
description of Christian theology as 'Other City is noticeably devoid of such definitions: he does not 
hold that there are two narratives, but one Christian metanarrative told heretically by 'secular 
reason '*^  In his effort to out-narrate his opponents, he has left no room for ambiguity, no place for 
the other. To borrow from Rose again, Milbank has mended the brokai middle,*^ and is thus 
dommated by a 
compulsive singularity: a sense that Christianity "alone" is tlie " O H / V " tmly good 
discourse and therefore will a priori approach its others through the task of "out-
narrating". Alone. Only. It is one thing to admire and embrace the virtuosity of one's 
story. It is another out of hand to condemn all other stories - ultimately, insofar as they 
do not inadvertently contain the wisdom of the one tme meta-narrative - to the bin of 
nihilism and subjugation.*' 
64 . He writes 'Salvation fi-om sin must mean "liberation" from pohtical, economic and psychic dominium, 
and therefore from all stmctures belonging to tlie saeculum, or temporal interval betwsen the fall and the 
final return of Christ. This salvation takes tlie fomi of a different inauguration of a different kind of 
community.' Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pp. 391 - 392. 
65 . Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 6. 
66 . Gillian Rose, 'Diremption of Spirit,' in Shadow of Spirit: Posunodemism and Religion, ed. Ptiillipa 
Berry and Andrew Wemick, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 48. 
67 . This criticism is not new. It was originally made by Stanley Hauerwas in response to an essay 
contributed by Milbank to a Festschrift for Donald MacKinnon. Compare John Milbank, '"Between 
Purgation and illumination": a critique of the theology of right,' with Stanley Hauerwas, 'On being 
"placed" by John Milbank a response,' both in Christ. Ethics and Tragedy Essays in Honour of Donald 
MacKinnon, ed. Kenneth Surin, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 161 - 196, 197 -
201. 
68 . Rose, 'Diremption of Spirit,' pp. 45 - 56, esp. pp. 52 - 55. 
69 . Roland Coles, 'Storied Others and Possibilities of Caritas: Milbank and Neo-Nietzchean Etlucs,' in 
Modem Theology. 8 (1992), p. 332. 
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Furthermore, despite his proclamation of an ontology of peace rooted in the harmonious difference 
of the Trinity, it can be argued that MUbanks out-narration of the other is violait. Consider the 
ihetoric: 'The secular episteme is a post-Christian paganism, something in the last analysis defined, 
natively, as a refijsal of Christianity and the invention of an "Anti-Christianity".''° This 
thoroughly negative rhetoncal construction, dramed of any positive specifiaty, effectively reduces 
the other (specifically Nietzsche, Derrida, and Foucault) to nothing, tf Taylor's rejection of 
authonty falls to nihihsm, Mlbanks metanarrative n^tes the other." 
In my view, the goal of postmodern theology is to navigate betweoi the extremes: to 
articulate a position whidi recognises Chnstian theology's mevitably audioritative claims, but 
refuses to allow this authority to legitimate the suppression of the other. My description of a 
possible third way, albdt one which is much closer to Mlbank than to Taylor, b^ins with an 
exammation of Hans Frd's hermaieutics. The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative is his case for a 
dedsive break with modem hermeneutics, both liberal and conservative.^ The former, b^innmg 
m the aghteaith coitury, located the mearung of the biblical story dther in universal human 
experience or reason, or in a worid bdiind the text accessible only through histoncal reconstruction. 
Though conservative hermeneutics rejected the first option, it shared the fimdamaital 
presuppositions of the second, dififenng only in the conclusions readied. In both, the 
real events of history constitute an autonomous temporal framework of their own under 
God's providential design. Instead of rendering them accessible, die narratives, 
heretofore indispensable as means of access to the events, now simply verify them, thus 
afiBrming their autonomy and the feet that they are in principle accessible through any 
kind of description that can manage to be accurate either predictively or after the 
event." 
70 . Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 280. 
71 . In feimess, Milbank has addressed this criticism by arguing that his story is in fact an open-ended 
anti-metanarrative. See John Milbank, 'Enclaves, or Where is the Church? in New Blackfriars. 73 
(1992), pp. 341 - 352, Further, my summary and critique have been, for the sake of space, all-too-brief A 
thinker as original and important as Milbank is widely recognised to be deserves more attention than can 
be given here, 
72 . Hans Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
Hemieneutics. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). 
73 . Frei, Eclipse, p. 4. 
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Since the dghteenth caitury, liberal and conservative hermeneutics have posited a gap bdween the 
bibhcal narratives and the reahty to whidi they refer and located the meanmg m the latter.'"* 
Li contradistinction to both, Frd oflfers a postcritical hermaieutic whidi locates meaning 
ndther in psydiologically reconstruded authorial intaitions nor histoncally reconstructed worids, 
but in the biblical text itself. He therefore opposes both a critical sqjaration of text and meanmg 
and a precritical equation of intratextual meaning and extratextual reality." While there are other 
kinds of literature m the biblical corpus, the advantages of sudi an approadi are particulariy 
evident whai appUed to bibhcal narratives, espedally the Gospels, for here 'the meanmg of the text 
remains the same no matter what the perspectives of succeeding gaierations of interpreters may be. 
In other words, the constancy of the meaning of the text is the text and not the similanty of its 
effect on the Ufe perspectives of succeeding generations. No reference to the situation of the 
mterpraer is necessary in understanding the text.''^ He proposes to close the gap in cntical 
hermeneutics, both liberal and conservative. For him, there is no mteipr^tive breadi betweai the 
texts and their meanmg; rather the bibhcal narratives most resemble reahstic novels 'where meaning 
is most nearly insqjarable from the words - from the descriptive shape of the story as a pattern of 
aiactmait,,,,' He continues, 'there is ndther need for nor use m looking for mearung a more 
profound stratum underneath the structure (a sqjarable "subject matter") or m sparable author's 
"mtaition," or in a combination of sudi behind-the-scaies projections.'^' Thus, the biblical 
74 . Frei writes, 'the bond of continuity, the meaning of the narrative, has to be discovered at a level more 
remote than that of depiction or cumulative rendering tiirough the interaction of cliaracter and incident. 
The meaning of the narrative is something other than the narrative shape itself. There is, for tiiis whole 
point of view, simply no way of dealing with descriptive or narrative shape without shifting tlie meaning to 
a more profound sttamm. The documents mean something other than what they say.' Eclipse, p. 318. 
75 . It is 'reading with that second naivete which is done in correspondence with a hemieneutics of 
restoration... the kind of readmg that might well wish to be of a "revised hteral" sort. It distances the text 
from tiie author, from the origmal discourse's existential situation and from every other kind of reading that 
would go "behind" the text and "refer" it to any other worid of meaning than its own, the worid "in front of 
the text," And yet, this kmd of reading has been through the mill of critically transcending that (first) 
naive hterahsm for which every statement on the printed page "means" either because it refers not only 
ostensively but also correctly, naming a trae state of afifefrs each time, or else because it shapes part of a 
realm of discourse whose vocabulary one can finally understand by repeating it and in that sense (if sense it 
is) taking it at fece value.' Hans Frei, 'The "Literal Reading" of Biblical Narrative in the Cliristian 
Tradition: Does it Stretch or Will it Break?' in Hans Frei, Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays, ed. 
George Hunsinger and William Placher, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 130. 
76 . Hans Frei, 'Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal,' in Theology and Narrative, p. 32. 
77 . Frei. Eclipse, p. 281. 
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narratives can, but need not, describe actual historical events in order to be mearungflil for 
Chnstian theology 7* 
Interestingly, applied specifically to the Gospels, Frei's strategy uncovers 'what one might 
term a "high Christology".''' Therem, the character and circumstances of Jesus are so closely 
united that one can know v/ho Jesus is through their telling. There is, therefore, no need to search 
for an historical Jesus lying behind (and ultimately divorced from) the Christ of faith. The 'person 
of Jesus, and not only his message, is both indispensable to and known in the story. .. Jesus is who 
he is by what he does and undeigoes, and diiefly we must say that he is Jesus crucified and 
raised. .. Here my [Frei's] claim that we have in these narratives a high Christolpgy - not before, 
but after any "demytiiologization" or transfer of the "meanmg" of the story to "our day" that may be 
necessary.'*" Moreover, the developmait of the story is such that Jesus' particular identity is 
sharpest in the death-and-resurrection sequence. It is here, more than anywhere else in tiie 
narratives, that Jesus' idoitity can be known. The transition from crucifixion to resurrection 'is not 
one from a personal account of a man's death to its stylized mythical rehgious application... but 
rather that the one who died is the same one who is nsen. TJie identity of the cmcified Jesits and 
that of the risen Lord are one and the same in the accounts.'^^ 
In the crucifixion-resurrection sequaice, Jesus' human particularity is most sharply 
asserted and therefore allows, evoi forces the question. Did this actually take place? 'It is at this 
point that the transition from literary analysis to historical affirmation or denial as well as to 
theological truth claim should be made. And this point is the complex unity of the passion and 
78 . He writes, 'the Gospel stories as vjd\ as large portions of Old Testament narrative are indeed 
"realistic," but... the issue of their making or not making fectual or, for that matter, other kinds of truth 
claims is not part of the scope of hemieneutical enquiry. "Meaning" in this view is logically distinct from 
"tmtli," even where the two bear so strong a femily resemblance as the designations "history-like" and 
"historical" imply. The fectuality or non-fectuality of at least some of these narratives, important as it is no 
doubt in a larger rehgious or an even more general context, involves a separate argument from that 
concerning their meaning.' Frei, 'The "Literal Reading" of Bibhcal Narrative,' pp. 139 - 140. 
79 . Frei. 'Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal,' p. 32. 
80 . Frei, 'Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal,' p. 37. 
81 . Hans Frei,' Theological Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus' Death and Resurrection,' in Theology 
and Narrative, p. 58. 
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resurrection account, not the account of his earlier ministry.'^ This language is insuEBcientiy 
strong for Frei is arguing that the identity of Jesus is disclosed in the crucifixion-resurrection in 
sudi a way as to raider his nonresurrection inconceivable. He writes, 
Our argument is that to grasp what this identity, Jesus of Nazareth, is, is to believe that, 
in fact, he has been raised from the dead. Someone may reply that in that case the most 
perfectly depicted character, the most nearly life-like fictional identity ought also in feet 
to live a fectual historical life. We answer that the argument holds good only in this one 
and absolutely unique case \\liere the described identity, (the 'WHAT of him) is totally 
identical with his factual existence. He is the resurrection and the life; how can he be 
conceived as not resurrected?'^  
Thus, ill the crucifixion-resurrection, where narrative and history join, Jesus' idaitity is fiilly 
disclosed, leading mevitably to a high Christology. This is the mearung of the Gospels. 
This convergaice of narrative, meaning and history in turn provides an authontative 
starting-point for a Christian reading of the Scriptures. Fra asks, 
Shall we, as it were, radiate out from the Gospels witii their finn meaning... to the 
earlier and later story (that of the Old Testament and that of human history since Jesus 
Christ)? Or shall we reverse the procedure and move from tlie wider or narrower 
context of history... to the Gospels for deeper insight on that wider context and the pre-
understanding of it that we bring with us?^ 
The story of Jesus for postcritical (and precritical) readers forms the climax of the biblical 
metanarrative, thus raidering the Bible not a jumble of historically and culturally diverse 
documents, but one unified story. Furthermore, the biblical narrative provides the framework into 
which all other evaits must be placed and through whidi reality is aicountered and known. It is 
therefore also the starting point of Christian theology. ' If there is a "narrative theolog>'," the 
mearung of that term m the context of the self-description of the Chnstian community is that we are 
specified by relation to its peculiar narrative and by our conceptual redescnption of it in belief and 
life, not by a quality of "narrativity" inherait m our picture of self, worid, and transcendaice at 
large.''' 
82 . Frei, 'Theological Reflections,' p. 83. 
83 . Frei, 'Theological Reflections,' p. 83. 
84 . Frei, 'Remarks,in Connection with a Theological Proposal,' p. 42. 
85 . Frei, 'Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative: Some Henneneutical Considerations,' in Theology 
and Narrative, p. 112. 
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This narrative focus for the starting-pomt of Chnstian theology in turn aiables Frd to 
distinguish boweai two views of Christian theology. In the first, theology is primanly a theor^ical 
disdpline and is therefore to be subsumed under gaieral criteria of intelhgibility, coheraice and 
truth that it shares with other saentific disdphnes while in the second, it is cntical reflection on the 
belief and practice of the Christian community. In the former, theology's cognate disdphne is 
philosophy 'not only as transcendental analysis, but as positive procedure in q)istemology, 
ontology, and so on.' While for the latter, 'the natural external affihate for second-order Chnstian 
communal self-description is not so mudi philosophy but interpr^ve (rather than reductionist or 
causally explanatory) social sdaice, especially anthropology and sodology.'*^ For those following 
postcntical hermaieutics, the second view is to be pursued: 'One will have to subordinate the 
philosophical relationship to the Christianly self-descriptive one, without ehminating the former.'*' 
Tins position is summansed by Geoige Lindbeck in The Nature of Doctnne. 
His proposal, briefly maitioned m diapter 2, falls brtweai 'cognitive prepositional' and 
'expenaitial-expressivist' understandings of theology. In the former, the classical understanding in 
Western theology, doctrines purport to describe the nature of reality while m the latter, they are 
understood as symboUc, noninformative expressions of human expenence.** Lindbecks 'cultural-
Unguistic' understanding of theology however, hkens rehgions to languages and doannes to 
grammar - the communally authoritative second-order rules for first-order speech.*^  On this view, 
the Nicaie Creed is not so mudi articulating a m^physical theory concerrung the nature of God or 
Jesus, but an attempt to regulate the Churdi's language about both.'" Whatever we say about one 
Person of the Trinity we must say about the other two, however, we cannot say that one is tiie same 
as the other two. Likewise, whai speaking of Jesus, we can say ndther that he was only human nor 
only divine nor some land of demigod. The vocabulary of'symbols, concqjts, ntes, injunctions and 
stones' forming this language is found m the Bible whidi is accordmgly the pnmary text for 
86 . Hans Frei, Types of Christian Theology, ed. George Hunsinger and WiUiam Placher, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1992), p. 2. 
87 . Frei, 'Theology and tiie Interpretation of Narrative,' p. 113. 
88 . Lindbeck. The Namre of Doctrine, p. 16. 
89 . Lindbeck, The Namre of Doctrine, pp. 32 - 45. 
90 . Lindbeck, The Namre of Doctrine, pp. 92 - 96. 
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tiieological reflection." Lindbeck and Frei thus presait Christian theology as a postcritical 
description of the way in whidi the Bible is normative for the language of tiie Christian 
community.'^ 
From the point of view of one wishing to preserve the distinctive voice of Christian 
tiieology, it is clear that the positions associated with Milbank and Frei and Lindbeck are preferable 
to Taylor's nihilistic a/theology.'^  Moreover, that of Frei and Lindbeck recognises the distinctive 
nature of the Christian m^anarrative without lapsing into coercion as Milbank seems to do. 
Indeed, Lindbeck devotes an entire chapter to the benefits a cultural-linguistic understanding of 
tiieology brings to 'nonproselytizing interreligious dialogue' and the thorny problem of the 'salvation 
of "other-believers" .'** For Lindbeck, dialogue is freed from the necessity to postulate eitiier a s^ 
of common critena enabling value- and truth-judgement or a common core experiaice, and is 
reconceived as a variety of ad-hoc aicounters. Furthermore, this approach esdiews neither 
apologdacs nor evangelism, but resists any programmatic approadi to both claiming to have 
uncovered the process by whidi unbelievers become bebevers.^ ' These advantages 
91 . Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 81. 
92 . While they are widely recognised authorities, they are not alone in this position. Common 
philosophical themes can be found both in the work of Paul Ricoeur and the later Alasdair Maclntyre. See 
Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative. 3 volumes, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, (Cliicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984 - 1988); and Alasdair Maclntyre After Virtue: A Study in Moral 
Theorv. second edition, (London: IXickworUi, 1985); Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. Q-ondon: 
Duckwortli, 1988); Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encycloipaedia, Genealogy and Tradition. 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). In addition, their writings fomi the core of a recent 
American theological movement associated with the divinity schools of Yale and Duke universities. 
Dubbed 'posthberalisni,' its key spokespersons include Stanley Hauerwas, WiUiam Placher, and Ronald 
Thiemann. See Stanley Hauerwas, Against the Nations. (Minneapolis: Winston, 1985); WiUiam C. 
Placher, Unapologetic Theology Christian Voice in a PluraUstic Conversation. (Louisville: 
Westininster/John Knox Press, 1989); and Ronald Thiemann, Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as 
Narrated Promise. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1985). For a good uitroduction to and 
bibliography of postliberal theology, see Sheila Greeve Davaney and Delwin Brown, 'Postliberalism,' in 
The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Modem Christian Thought, ed. Alister E. McGrath, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1993), pp. 453-456. 
93 . This is bome out in Taylor's shift away from theology to cultural studies evident in liis books 
Disfiguring: Art. Architecture, Rehgion. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Nots. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993) and with Esa Saarinen, Imagologies: Media Pliilosophy. (London: 
Routiedge, 1994). 
94 . Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, pp. 46 - 47; for an exposition of the second issue, see chapter 2.2. 
95 . William Placher writes, 'The appropriate theological account of why a Christian beheves in the 
resurrection would therefore take the form of describing how the world makes sense as seen from a 
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notwitiistanding, postmodern orthodoxy is not without its problems. These will be addressed 
presentiy. 
Because space prohibits a full developmait and response to all possible critiasms of 
postmodern orthodoxy, I will Umit my apology to tiie four whidi variously diarge tiiat the 
intrasystematic approach is ultimately reductive. Paramount among these is the argument tiiat 
postmodern oithodoxy abandons any possibility of extratextual trutii. Gerard Loughhn puts it this 
way: 'How can there be true stories when it is said that tiiere are only stories? For it is supposed 
that a true story is one that matdies up to reality, to the way things are. But i f the way things are 
can never be known, because all we can ever know are stories of one sort or another, we can never 
match stories against reahty, but only against each otiier.''*' This cntiasm arises as a result of 
Frd's location of meaning withm the text and Lindbecks cntique of cognitive-propositionalist 
understandings of theology and is not wholly without merit. Nevertheless, it can be countered tiiat 
this objection is more property directed not against Frd and Lindbeck, but an extreme which ndther 
advocates. 
Postmodern orthodoxy contends that the predpitating or gaierative evait of Chnstian 
theological reflection is the story of Jesus of Nazaretli, and more preasely his death-and-
resurrection as the point where story and history converge. Accordingly, the two primary functions 
of Chnstian theology are soaal demarcation (the distinguishmg of the Christian community from 
other communities) and self-description (the internal interpretation of the Christian story). Botii 
focus on die intrasystematic trutii of Christian doctniie (i.e. its coherence withm the body of beliefs 
and practices whidi help to shape the Christian community). Lindbeck wntes, 'Utterances are 
intrasystematically true what they cohere with the total relevant context which, in the case of 
Christian perspective; how the bibhcal narratives, seen as a coherent whole, shape such a perspective, and 
how Christ's resurrection forms a central and necessary element of such an understanding of tiiose 
narratives. Such a meditation on the strarture of Christian feith may have its own kind of persuasive 
power.,,, but does not in any sense constitute too much on tiie processes by which unbeUevers become 
believers. Such hnes of thought lead to apologetic sfrategies tiiat distort botii the logic of feitii and the 
meamng of tiie bibhcal texts, and they risk seeking to define and regulate the mysterious grace of God.' 
See William Placher, 'Introduction,' in Theology and Narrative, p. 4. See also David F. Ford, 'System, 
Story, Performance: A Proposal about the Role of Narrative in Christian Systematic Theology,' in Why 
Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones, (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1989), pp. 191-215, 
96 . Loughlin, Telling God's Story, p. 23. 
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rehgion whai viewed in cultural-hnguistic terms, is not only other utterances, but also the 
correlative forms of life. '" This need not preclude the possibibty of extrasystematic truth clarnis, 
but emphasises the importance of internal coheraice as a necessary if insufificiait condition for 
them. Far from daiying the importance and inevitability of extrasystematic trutii, Frei and 
Lindbeck simply afBrm participation in the life of the Christian community as a prerequisite to a 
proper understandmg of the ontologjcal force and intention of Christian language. 
The second criticism is but a variation of the first:. Again Loughlin asks, 'is it possible to 
affirm the reality of God while allowing that such an aflSrmation can take place only witiun a story, 
albeit a master story which is said to go all the way down, without remainder?''* If the contaition 
of the previous paragraph is correct, i.e. that Christian theology can and inevitably does make trutii-
claims, then the answer would appear to be yes. However, we must go further. The objection is 
founded on a misunderstanding of Derrida's famous phrase 'there is nothing outside the text.''' It is 
mistakaily takai to mean that there is only text.'"" As Kevm Hart has pointed out, a b^er 
interpretation 'is neither esoteric nor difficult: it is merely that there is no knowledge, of which we 
can speak, whidi is unmediated.'"" Moreover, 'one of the things that we know in language is tiiat 
there are things outside language.'"*^ Thus, postmodem orthodoxy does not daiy extratextual 
reality any more than it denies extrasystematic truth. It simply affirms that a Christian cannot 
speak about the reality of God without referaice to the Chnstian commumty and its foundational 
narrative - the story of Jesus. 
Now consider the third: postmodem orthodoxy is said to render the Churdi sectanan. On 
this view, theology's focus on the vocabulary of the bibhcal narrative and the grammar of the 
97 . Lindbeck, The Namre of Doctrine, p. 64. 
98 . LougWin, TeUing God's Story, p. 22. 
99 . Derrida, Of Grammatology. p. 158, 
100 . Tills misunderstanding seems to me to be foundational in Don Cupitt's What is a Story?. (London: 
SCM, 1991). 
101 , Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstmction. Theology and Plulosophy. (Canibndge: 
Cambndge University Press, 1989), p. 26. 
102 . Louglilin. Telling God's Story, p. 23, 
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Christian community prevents the justification or indeed the translation of any tiieological claim in 
a manner satisfactory to an 'other-behever.' Once again, the force of this critidsm is substantially 
weakened by the recognition that postmodern orthodoxy daiies ndther extrasystematic trutii nor 
extratextual reality. Still, more can be said. In the ad hoc encounters envisioned by Frd and 
Luidbeck, justification of a theological claim does not require a criterion shared by all rational 
people everywdiere. Rather, it requires only those common to all partidpants in the conversation. 
Similariy, translation fi-om one language to another takes place without recourse to a common 
tongue. Just so, postmodern orthodoxy does not daiy the possibility of justification and translation 
of Chnstian claims, but holds that a universal set of criteria is not necessary for such activity to 
take place. It therefore does not render the Church sectarian. 
Finally, it can be argued that postmodern ortiiodoxy is violait 'in thmkmg tiie Chnstian 
story a master narrative that positions all other stones. It is the violaice of having the last word.'"*^ 
Middlrton and Walsh have countered that this critidsm fundamaitally misunderstands tiie opai-
aided character of the Christian metanarrative. For anyone founded upon the biblical story, 
passages sudi as the banishment of Hagar (Genesis 16 and 21), tiie rape of Tamar (2 Samud 13), 
Jqihthath's sacrifice of his daughter to fulfil a vow to God (Judges 11), and tiie rape, murder and 
dismembermait of an anonymous concubine (Judges 19) are beyond assimilation into tiie 
mrtanarrative."" Ratiier than passing over sudi stones in silaice, tiiereby allowmg critiasm 'from 
the outside,' they suggest that readers continue to ask 'from the inside' why these stones were 
mcluded in the Bible, Drawing on Walter Brueggeman, they propose that sudi stones be 
mterpreted 'as an inner-biblical critique of any totalizing or tnumphalistic readmg of the 
metanarrative.''*" These 'mmonty voices of resistance and dissait' tiius 'have tiie potaitial to call 
mto question violait and abusive uses of the bibhcal story. In thdr angularity, with thar diflferaice 
103 . Loughlin, Telling God's Story, p. 24. 
104 . They write, 'It is not just that the acts of violence are perpetrated against women, but tiiat tiiis 
violence is eitiier explicitiy or tacitiy approved of by otiier characters in tiie story, by tiie story's narrator or 
the editor of the biblical book in which the story occurs, or by later commentators on the story.' Middleton 
and Walsh, Tmtii Is Sfranger Than It Used to Be. pp. 186 - 179, esp. p, 177, The allusion to Phyllis 
Trible's 'texts of terror* is deliberate. See Phyllis Trible, Texts of Tenor: Literary-Feminist Readings of 
Bibhcal Narratives. (Pliiladelphia: Fortress, 1984), 
105 . Middleton and Walsh, Tmth Is Stranger Than It Used to Be. p. 179. See also Walter Bmeggeman, 
Abiding Astonishment: Psalms. Modernity and the Making of History. (Louisville: Westminster/John 
Knox, 1991), p. 50. 
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and heterogaieity, these voices ... serve to keep the story opai,''°* In the light of tiiese brief 
responses, it appears that postmodem orthodoxy could be a fruitful way forward for contemporary' 
theology. 
Conclusion: 
In order to set the stage for remaining chapters, this chapter briefly explored theological 
responses to the postmodem condition in two steps. The first briefly introduced postmodemity and 
postmodernism, centrmg on the work of Frendi philosopher Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard, contending that 
while his prescriptive response to the death of modernity is deeply problematic, there is no reversing 
die postmodem turn. The second section then considered three theological responses to die 
postmodem tum. The a/theology of Mark C. Taylor and the theology of John Milbank were 
presented as extremes whidi can and should be avoided while the work of Hans Fra and George 
Lmdbeck, albeit much closer to Milbank than Taylor, offered more fruitful mediating position -
'postmodem orthodoxy. It concluded by respondmg to four objections to postmodem ortiiodoxy. 
The cntical re-appropriation of Hendrik Kraemer's tiieology of religions may now b^in in earnest. 
106 . Middleton and Walsh. Tmtii Is Sfranger Than It Used to Be. p. 180. 
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Chapter 6 
Key Themes and Criticisms ofKraemer's Theology of Reiigioiis 
Introduction: 
Having set the stage in the previous chapter, the two remaining show that Kraemer's 
theology of religions continues to suggest ways of faithful theological creativity for Chnstians 
wresthng with the problem of otiier rehgions in a postmodern worid. This diapter begins witii a 
three-stqD apology. Li the first, four key themes are set out to summarise the position. After 
expositions of biblical reahsm, the totahtarian approadi, adaptation and the point of contact, the 
second thai considers five theological critidsms. The first of these, attacking Kraemer's view of 
Scripture, botii misunderstands that view and is deeply problematic itself Though the remaining 
four are more or less accurate, they fail to consider Kraemer's historical context, his habit of 
rh^orical over-emphasis, and the more subtie articulation of later work and therefore attack an 
extreme whidi he avoids. As such, they are important boundaries, but do not seriously undermme 
Kraemer's position. The final section considers two phenomaiological critidsms: that Kraemer can 
account ndther for intrareligious nor mterrehgious developmait. Though the vahdity of these 
objections is uncontested, I argue that they lead to a slight but not inconsequential modification m 
Kraemer's phaiomenology rather than a wholesale rejection. All this pr^ares the way for 
Kraemer's critical re-appropriation, 
6.1 Key Themes 
The first of four organisaticml themes, biblical reahsm, is Kraemer's reply to a perceived 
theological confiision r ^ r d i n g the nature of the Churdi and its mission. Rooted firstiy in tiie fact 
that the Churdi 'has become a s^ment and reflection of modem sodety with all its respectabilities, 
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entrenched interests, prejudices and hypocrisies, only in a somewhat more antiquated manner, and 
often also in a vulgar bouigeois way,'' theology has 'nearly lost the consciousness that the object of 
Christian faith and thought, the Gospel, is primarily armouncemoit, proclamation of salvation and 
victory in the name of God and not in the name of cultural purposes or ideals.'^  The taiga is 
Hocking's reinterprdation of Christian mission as the fostering of interreligious cooperation against 
secularism. For Kraemer, this so radically recasts mission that it ceases to be recognisably 
Christian. Second, evoi whei a more traditional understanding of mission is preserved, the 
confusion remains because 'the clue of the situation [is found] m adjustment to the dominant 
philosophies and demands of the hour.'^  Opposed here are those who see Christianity fulfillmg the 
values inherent in the great worid religions. As far as Kraemer is concemed, both confuse the 
Christian Churdi with western culture and Christian mission with the spiritual expression of its 
advancement. 
Instead of this cultural idealisiru he founds Chnstian mission, and accordmgly the 
relationship of Chnstianity to other religions, on a realism of a far deeper quality. Rather than 
universal truth, religious or moral philosophy, even theology, Kraemer opts for 'the tale of God's 
self-disclosure and of the disclosure of the gaiuine condition of man and the worid in the light of the 
divine Self-disclosure....'^  The Bible is not simply classic literature and evai less 'a tale about the 
pilgnmage of the human soul towards God,' but the record of God's self-disclosing activity.' Why 
choose this text? 'It is a simple fact that this book is the only real source we have for that peculiar 
type of religious life, that has its historic caitre in the appearance of Jesus Chnst on the stage of the 
worid.'*^ Of the two issues here to be unpacked, the first is the institution of a final authonty ui 
matters of doctrine, a point of orientation for the Churdi's faith and practice: the problem of 
1 . CM, P- 32. 
2 . CM, p. 32. 
3 . CM, p. 32. 
4 . CM, p. 299. 
5 . M, P- 2. 
6 . RCF, pp. 237 - 238. 
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canon.' From a strictly historical perspective, it may be objected that this was both arbitrary and 
accidoTtal. This is precisely all an historian can say, replies Kraemer, except that while arbitrary, it 
was of aiormous significance. Nevertheless, 'A member of the Chnstian Church cannot and ought 
not to be satisfied with this external judgment. Standing in the stream of the fellowship of believers, 
he sees in this act not only a right intuition, but the guidance of the Holy Spirit.'^ Kraemer does not 
see the Bible's authority deriving from its recognition by the Churdi, but argues that in it, the 
Church has recognised the testimony to God's self-disclosing acts culminating m Jesus Christ. 
Thus, the second issue is the cortrality of diristology for theological reflection.' The revelation of 
God in Christ is sui generis. Without daiying revelation outside Chnst, Kraemer affirms that for 
the Christian, the revelation in Christ is the criterion by which all daims to revelation are to be 
judged. The Bible is normative because its authority, recognised by the Churdi, derives from its 
recordmg of God's revelation, the climax of whidi is Jesus Christ." 
In order to discern the nature of the Church and its mission to the worid, one must be 
founded on the only authority to which the Churdi can be held accountable, the revelation of God 
in Chnst as recorded in the Bible. This is biblical realism. Still, this might suggest that an 
individual alone stands on this foundation. For Kraemer however, proper discemmait also requires 
7 . Kraemer writes. The Church, in estabbshing the Canon of the Bible, acted out of the right intuition 
that it needed, in the welter of interpretation and definitions of the various aspects of the Faith wliich 
accompanied her growth and expansion, a norm above itself and the developing diversities of doctrinal 
definitions. The apostohc kerygma about the history of salvation, its meaning and purpose, being the real 
basis of the Church, in forming the Biblical Canon it declared the Apostohc Tradition to be her nonn for 
the present and the fiiture, the standard of reference and of spiritual orientation for her feith and life.' RCF, 
p. 266. 
8 . RCF. pp. 276 - 277. ^ -
9 . Christology is central 'fi-om the point of view of the Christian thinker, ^^ 4lo works on wliat for him is 
the basic assumption, i.e. that Jesus Christ is the Way, the Truth and the Life, by whom alone man comes 
to the Father, and by whose light alone all problems can be seen in their proper perspective. .. Jesus Christ 
is the centre of history, and... therefore the reUgious history of man before and after Him, till the end of 
history, can only be rightly understood in Him. He is God's decisive and final act of self-disclosure or 
revelation, and in Him all divine revelation past, present, and future, has its proper criterion.' RCF, p. 237. 
10. CM, pp. 126- 127. 
11 . CM, p. 70. 
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situation within the Churdi - the structure whidi has been erected on the biblical foundation. The 
Church is essentially a divine-human society: founded on the revelation of God and erected by 
humans in history. From the divine perspective, it is unique in the world and among the religions 
because it is 'a fellowship rooted in God and His divine redemptive order, and therefore committed 
to the service and salvation of the worid....'''' Uniquaiess derives from its commission to be 'a 
bearer of witness to God and his decisive acts and purposes.'''' Regardless of its position in history, 
the Churdi is an apostolic body called to testify to what God has done in Christ. Yet, 'it cannot be 
defined only in terms of its essential nature. It does not exist in a vacuum but is also a part of this 
worid, operating through our limited human instrumaitality and tormaited by our sms. It lives and 
functions in definite times and places, and is composed of human beings with their peculiar 
temperameit and cultural predispositions.'" From the human perspective, the Churdi has also 'to 
be viewed largely as a specimen of human eJEFort in the field of religion, and therefore to be brought 
into line with the other expressions of human spiritual life.'"' This divine-human dialectic is 
inevitable for 'it is impossible to keep the essence of our religion alive unless it works througli some 
human institution.''^ 
To summarise: biblical realism holds that the relationship of the Church to the worid, and 
accordingly to its religions, is properiy discerned only whai the mquirer is deliberatdy and 
12 . He writes, .'religion and Church in the essentially Christian sense of the words are no affimiations or 
apprehensions of absolute values, but express an act of trust and self-committal to the God and Fatlier of 
our Lord Jesus Christ. The Church has in God its origin and its centre. .. the sui generis character of the 
Church... consists in the feet that Jesus Christ is its primal and ultimate King and Lord, whose autliority 
transcends and conditions all other authority and loyalty. The feet of being governed by such a Head and 
of being obhged to djey Him above all other authorities, determines the unique cliaracter of the Church. 
From this feet is derived its priestly and prophetic character as being at the same time the servant and the 
critic of the worid and all its spheres of life.' CM, p. 417. 
13 CM, p. 30. 
14 CM, p. 2. 
15 CM, p. 419. 
16 CM, p. 285. 
17 CM, p. 290 
to confront itself constantiy with tiiis mystery of its divinely-willed fellowship, and be cleansed and inspired 
by it in order to realize a kind of fellowship in tiie worid that has its roots in eternity, and thereby manifests 
a deeper quality than any form of fellowship can.' CM, p. 418. 
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exphdtiy situated within 'the realm of the Christian revelation.''* The foundation is the Bible, and 
its chmax, the narrative of Jesus Christ. The Christian Church is built upon this foundation, 
testifies to it and stands under its judgment. It this foundation is rejected for another, 'hopeless 
confijsion' is the only result.'' Thus, bibhcal realism attempts to situate the theologian exphdtiy 
within the tradition through whidi he or she comes to the problem of otiier rehgions. 'The 
senousness of true rehgion,' Kraemer concludes, 'demands that one shall be one's true rdigious 
self'" 
The second theme, the totahtarian approach, responds to essaitialist phaiomaiologies of 
rehgion. The Christian Message and 'Continuity or Discontinuity,' centre on two positions with 
wdiidi the reader is already famihar. In one, Christianity fulfils the rehgions while the otiier locates 
a transcQidoital source bdiind them including Christianity.^' To these, ReUgion and the Christian 
Faitii adds naturalist phaiomoiologies whidi find 'the gaierating factors of rehgions in some region 
of man's consaousness, a certain psydiological attitude or sodal necessity, a lack of adequate 
knowledge of the worid.'^^ Prima facie, the positions are very different. For the first, Chnstianity 
perfects the highest and best of the rest; for the second it is one among equals; and for the third, 
Christianity is the highest and last of many mistakes. Neverthdess, all tiiree posit an essence 
bdiind rehgions which grades them. For Kraemer, essentiahsm in any form is an artifiaal 
abstraction whidi fails to take seriously the pliuahty and diversity of rehgious beliefs and practices. 
He wntes, 'concretely there is no such thing as rehgion in the singular. There is only a multitude of 
rehgions.'^ ^ Essentiahsm says dther too httie or too mudi about the actual rehgions it seeks to 
place. Eitiier it so reduces particular behefs and practices to fit tiie universal essence tiiat httie 
wordi investigation is left (it is predsely the particularities which interest him in tiie first place) or it 
so stresses one feature common to many religions that it ignores otiiers where it is marginal or 
18 . AF,P 7. 
19 . AF,P- 9. 
20 . Hendrik Kraemer, World Cultures and World Religions: The Comina Dialogue, (London: 
Lutterworth, 1960), p. 356. 
21 . See CM, pp. I l l - 113, and AF, pp. 1-7. 
22 . RCT, p. 54. 
23 . RCF, p. 73. 
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absait.^ 'All religions,' Kraemer insists, 'if taken senously according to thdr true soul and body, 
are distorted and misrqjresaited whai strrtched on the Procrustean bed of some gaieral Idea of 
Religion.''' 
This assessment is confirmed by the constant disagreemoit over what compnses this 
religious esseice.^ '' Consider 'Comparative Religion' whidi 'constructs for the religions a 
hierarchical scale, according to their content and truth-value, from "lower" to "higher" and even 
"highest"... religions.''^ Grading religions not according to revelation, but philosophical thinking, it 
'claimed to develop the right doctrine of the Essence of Religions w ^ d i is presait in all religions. 
These religions can thai be demonstrated as more or less imperfect embodiments of it.... The 
concqDt of the Essence of Rebgion, as its secret and ultimate standard of reference was oftai 
consdously opposed to revelation.''^ Now, however, the disdpline has biflircated into opposing 
transcendental and naturalist approadies whidi not only disagree with eadi other, but also fail to 
speak with one voice. Members of the former follow the differait positions of, for example, 
Sdileiermacher, Kant and Otto while those of the latter embrace tiie arguments of, for instance, 
Durkhemi, Freud, and Feuerbach.'^  Kraemer argues that the disagreemait is rooted m 
fijndamentally incommoisurable starting-points: i f the premises differ, it is no wonder that the 
24 . He writes, 'All general definitions of reUgion either reduce them to such a kind of common 
denominator that littie is left, as, for instance, recognition of one or more higher powers entitled to 
obedience and worship, or they reflect some aspect of the reUgious quality in human Ufe, vMch is 
undeniable but not necessarily central or even peripheral in many of the reUgions. .. The more one 
penetrates different religions and tries to understand them in their total pecuUar entity, the more one sees 
that they are worlds in themselves, with their own centres, axes, and stmctures, not reducible to each other 
or to a common denominator which expresses their inner core and makes them all u-anslucent.' RCF. p. 76. 
25 . RCF, p. 77. 
26 . 'The patent feet,' Kraemer declares, '...is that there is no unanimity as to what the'Essence of Religion 
is. .. [There] can be none because every philosophical approach rests ultimately on an attimde and a 
decision as to what to think about man and his attitude in relation to the Beyond, which cannot be cogently 
and universally demonstrated. Hence a universally and compellingly valid concept of the "Essence of 
Rehgion" is not to be expected. Here again we have to accept our human condition, wtiich requires tiiat 
tile search for scientific and metaphysical truth will go on as a spiritual contest - fell of risks and precious 
results, to be sure - and not as a march towards intellectual unanimity.' RCF, p. 60. ' 
27 . RCF, p. 58. 
28 . RCF, p. 59 
29. RCF.pp.41 -71. 
179 
conclusions do also.^° Consequaitly, he follows his teadier, W. Brede Kristensai, in proclauning 
that, 'the only way to understand these religions and to be just to them is to take them accorduig to 
their peculiar fundamaital motives and meaning.'^ ' Thus, the totahtarian approach takes seriously 
the particularity of rehgious behefs and practices as they arise in concrete situations. Rejecting the 
sqjaration of secular from sacred , i t contaids that a sympath^c understandmg of non-Chnstian 
or non-Western rehgious behefs and practices rests on perceiving both great and so-called 
'primitive' rehgions not as philosophical speculations, but as totalities encompassing qDistemology, 
ethics and aesthetics, extaiding to include community and culture." This argumait has beai 
goierally supported by third worid theologians, berth Christian and otiier.^ 
As totahties encompassing knowledge, morals, and art, rehgions offer complete and 
coherait ways of interpreting humanity's place within the cosmos. While many areas may overiap 
(in organisational details, theological and philosophical pronouncements, ethical practices, ^c) , at 
30 . This is not an endorsement of relativism or subjectivism, but an assessment of the human condition 
which Kraemer believes will guard against just such extremes. He writes, 'Every philosophy, every way of 
thinking, every way of research, starts with a fundamental assumption and attitude about God, man and die 
worid. One may also call it a feith, a decision. At any rate, there is a starting-point of which no account is 
given. This belongs to our human condition, h ^ i l y preventing man fi-om becoming, in the absolute sense 
of the word, a mere onlooker, a mere observmg intellect outside. 
'In saying this, we are fer fi-om recommendmg, or defending, an unbridled subjectivity or putting 
all degrees of subjectivity on the same level. On the contrary, what we need is the clear recognition of tiie 
feet that, as scientific investigators also, we are always partly conditioned by the worid in which we have 
our roots, and m the selecting and marshalling of fects we are partly led by our "subjectivity". To 
recognize this is and to guard against it is the best way to reduce it to the smallest possible proportions ' 
RCF, pp. 46 - 47. 
31 . CM, pp. 62-63. 
32 . RCT, p. 38. 
33 . He writes, 'the non-Christian religions are not merely sets of speculative ideas about the eternal 
destiny of man.... [They are] all-mclusive systems and tiieories of hfe, rooted hi a religious basis, and 
therefore at the same time embrace a system of culture and dvihzation and a definite stmcture of society 
and state. To pronounce from the stand-point of the Christian feith upon our attitude towards tiie non-
Christian religions necessarily means to pronounce upon the relation of the Christian feith to culture, state, 
society - in short, to the world and its spheres of hfe.' CM p. 102. 
34 . Eleanor Jackson, Letter to tiie autiior, 19 February, 1996. For example, in a note to Lesslie Nevvbigin 
on this issue, Brahmin scholar Chaturvedi Badrmath wrote, 'If 1 had been at Tambaram, 1 would have been 
on the side of Kraemer.' Lesslie Newbigin, Letter to the author, February 9, 1996. See also, Chamrvedi 
Badrinath, 'The Labyrintii: A history of tiie Western encounter with India,' (unpubhshed manuscript, 1981, 
in tiie hands of Dr Eleanor Jackson) pp. 441 - 535. I am grateful botii to Bishop Newbigin and to Dr 
Jackson for tliis reference. 
180 
boO:om rebgions are marked by differoit experiences, emphases, and most importantiy, starting-
pomts. Also, just as talk of religious 'values' is rejected on the theological ground of biblical 
realism, it is again on phenomenological grounds here. To speak of 'values' is to speak in terms 
according to whicii, all religions exhibit toidaides toward the sublime and the aberrant. '^ All can 
point to significant cultural adiievements, rich philosophical traditions, and satisfying spiritual 
experiences. Talk of resemblances and values cannot conceal the 'incommaisurable pecuharity of 
the many religions.'^ ^ 
As totalities whidi do not resped the secular/sacred distinction, religions are 
fiindamoitally incommensurable and complete apprehensions of the totality of existence. Whai 
questions interpr^tion arise, it is accordingly unsurpnsing to find Kraemer insisting that one 
cannot abstrad a particular dodrine or practice from its religio-cultural matnx to treat it m 
isolation and expect accuracy. It is both inappropriate and inaccurate simply to equate surface 
similanties," for 'every religion is an indivisible... unity of existertial apprdiaision. It is not a 
series taiets, dogmas, prescriptions, institutions, practices, that can be taken one by one as 
indq^aident items of religious life, concqition or organization, and that can arbitrarily be compared 
with, and somehow related to, and grafted upon the similar item of another rehgion.'^ ^ In response 
to the position of a universal essaice to grade particular religions, Kraemer insists that tiiey 
35 . Thus of Hinduism, he can say, 'it is indeed a feet that in Hinduism, many people have found salvation 
and satisfection.' RCF. p. 84. 
36 . RCF, p. 78. 
3 7 . He writes, 'Buddhism and Christianity are both, in a very emphatic way, rehgions of salvation.... Yet, 
however sublime these conceptions may be, both cannot be true. The Buddhist salvation means salvation 
from existence as such, because existence is suffering, which is necessarily evil. In Christianity it means 
salvation from sin. Another example: It is impossible to equate as one and the same Reality die God and 
fetiier of Jesus Christ and the unconditioned and pure essence of die Vedanta. Sublime and profound of 
conception they are both, but either one of them is tme, or neither. Therefore the claim of adherents of 
non-Christian religions, which impresses certain Christian theologians and missionaries very much, 
namely that these reUgions lead people often into a deep and satisfying rehgious experience, may be wholly 
justified: but yet this undeniable feet does not guarantee that there is Tmth or tiie same Tmth in them. It is 
philosophically superficial to equate the psychic experience of satisfaction with the certainty that it is 
therefore true, or is related to realities which are tme.' RCF, p. 85. 
38 . CM, p. 135. He continues, 'Every reUgion is a living, indivisible unity. Every part of it - a dogma, a 
rite, a myth, an institution, a cult - is so vitally related to the wiiole that it can never be understood in its 
real function, significance and tendency, as these occur in the reality of Ufe, without keeping constantly in 
mind die vast and Uving unity of existential apprehension in which this part moves and has its being.' 
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encompass all areas of life and are internally complete and coherait. They therefore cannot be 
analysed as collections of doctrines, symbols, or practices; rather, these must be interpreted in 
relation to the organic whole. 
Biblical realism and the totalitarian approadi together address the problem of passing 
judgment on the rehgions. For Kraemer, to seardi for a common core or set of universal and 
neutral cnteria providing a vantage-pouit for 'legitimate' evaluation is futile theologically because 
this submits the Christian faith to a fordgn criterion, subjugating the 'Wisdom of God' to the 
'foohshness of humanity.'^' It is therefore irrelevant whether or not bibhcal reahsm is accqjted as a 
Intimate autiiority by those outside the Christian faith.'*" Phaiomaiologically, as apprdiaisions 
of the totality of existoice, religions are founded upon thdr own ultimate, unprovable 
presuppositions; there is no umversal foundation, only rival claims to finality.'" hievitably, 
'Christian revelation places itself over against the many efforts to apprdiend the totality of 
existaice. It asserts itself as the record of God's self-disclosmg and recreatmg revelation m Jesus 
Christ, as an apprdiaision of existence that revolves around the poles of divine judgmait and divine 
salvation....'''^ 
The third theme, 'adaptation,' seems to introduce an elemoit of discontinuity with previous 
tiiemes for it articulates the possibihty of translating the gospel into the terms of another religious 
totality. As was shown ui Chapter 3, Kraemer's years of cross-cultural expenaice eigoidered 
concern that members of 'younger Churdies' be able to express faithfully thdr Christian behefs in 
their own language and culture rather than r^rgitating the vocabulary of Western missionanes. 
39. CM, pp. 326 - 327. 
40 . He writes, 'The theological startmg-pomt therefore is revelation, which is basically different from 
rehgious mtuition or divination, and which is not a product of the human reUgious consciousness, because 
according to Biblical rehgion, it enters history m the form of divine words and acts. Revelation of God, if 
taken in tiie real sense, is divine self-disclosure, issumg from divine mitiative. This, by the namre of the 
case, can only be motivated by itself. The sole possible response to it is, therefore, that of faitli, not a 
justification of reason; although reason can render Christianity help in understanding it, witiiout believing 
It. Without faith, the Biblical thesis of revelation will generally be considered a fiction, an illusion, a 
pretence, or a usefiil error.' RCF, pp. 145 - 146. 
41 . AF,P- 8. 
42 . CM, pp. 113- 114. 
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On one hand, adaptation opposes a sunphstic assimilation of the Christian message with religious 
ideas of one's non-Christian past by presupposing 'a revolution, a total rupture with one's rehgious 
past... [a] conversion in the deqjest sense of the word.'''^ Similariy, it rejects an equally naive 
rejection of former religious hfe. Rather, adaptation requires Christian behef to be expressed botii 
m terms of and m conflict with non-Christian rehgions.** Models of sudi adaptation abound in the 
Bible and Christian history. The New Testament, the 'expression of the revelation in its concrete 
conflict and intermingling with the Jewish and Hellaiistic worid of rehgion and dvilization,... 
[confirms] that the religion of revelation stands in revolutionary contrast to this concrrte Jewish and 
Hellaiistic worid, but at the same time freely uses its ideas and tiiought-forms to express itsdf, and 
so Christian truth experiaices its first incarnation.''" Further, the Christian message has taken on 
vanous incarnations throughout history, vdiether in Augustine's philosophy of history, or medieval 
scholastidsm, or contemporary Protestantism.''* This is not to say that sudi incarnations are (ever) 
infallible, but that 
ui principle and for reasons of history, new incarnations and adaptations of Christianity 
in the concrete Asiatic and Afiican settings are natural and legitimate. Christianity 
never fell and never can fell into a religious, cultural and social vacuum, and therefore 
must find in its various envhonments an intellectual, emotional and instimtional 
expression that in its psychological and social aspects can reasonably be called an 
expression and not an impediment or mhibition.'*' 
Thus, adaptation attempts to overcome the 'fordgnness of Christianity without recasting it as ya 
another indigenous philosophy of life. 
43 . CM, p. 308. 
44 . Thus, Kraemer writes, 'Adaptation in the deepest sense does not mean to assimilate tiie cardinal facts 
of the revelation m Christ as much as possible to fundamental religious ideas and tastes of tiie pre-
Christian past, but to express these fects by wrestling with them concretely, and so to present the Christian 
tmtii and reveal at the same time tiie mtrinsic madequacy of man's rehgious efforts for tiie solution of his 
cmcial religious and moral problems.' CM. p. 308. 
45 . CM, p. 312. 
46 . Kraemer writes, 'In the course of its history. Christian theology has always freely employed tiie 
different thought-patterns that were available, such as Platonic and Aristotehan and Neo-Platonic-coloured 
Aristotehan philosophy. This was natural, because all speakmg to man must be done in his language and 
in tiie terminologies and thought-patters he understands.... There is, hence, no vahd objection to the 
deliberate use of tiie rich religious and philosophical terminology of tiie great non-Cluistian religious 
civilizations, whetiier tiie Hindu, the Buddhist, or the Confucian. The real problem is not tiieir use,... but 
how to use them.' CM, pp. 325 - 326. 
47 . CM, p. 313. 
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At least as it was being preadied in Asia and Africa in the first half of this caitury, the 
Christian message was coloured by the theological and personal histories of the Western 
missionaries proclaiming it. Sudi colouring, albdt inevitable, was oftai miscast as part of the 
uraque and final diarader of the gospel.'** In Kraemer's view, this only serves to make Christianity 
more fordgn to adhereits of other religions. Nevertheless, the opposite extreme, qjitoniised by 
Hockmg and the fulfilment theologians, is also to be avoided. The gospel is ndther a spedes of the 
essence of Rehgion nor the fijlfilmait of pre-Christian longings and cannot, therefore, be presented 
as such. To do so is to rob the message of its uniquaiess. In content and form Christianity is 
inevitably foragn. ' If one adequately realizes this foragnness, which attaches inevitably to 
Christianity for all these reasons, ind^aidentiy of the will or the working of modem missions, one 
becomes vividly aware of the vital importance of tiie problem of adaptation.'^ ' 
It is not an academic exerdse, but 'the genume translation of Christianity into mdigenous 
terms so that its relevance to... concrete situations becomes evidait.''" Institutional experiments in 
cultural, mtelledual and theological synthesis brtween the Christian message and non-Christian 
systems are necessarily artifidal and therefore, rarely lasting. Likewise, an a priori, ahistorical, 
and acritical emphasis on the contrast between the gospel and mdigaious cultures daiies its 
universality. Kraemer mediates betweai these extremes, writing, 'It is not a matter of partisanship 
m bndge-building or contrast-making, but, by concaitration on the living Christian trutii of Biblical 
realism, and on its living expression, of findmg out where to build bridges and where to emphasize 
contrasts.'" True adaptation, a biblical realistic, fiily indigenous expression of Chnstian belief, 
will arise only slowly and always within actual cross-cultural and/or interreligious aicounters." 
He concludes. 
48 . CM, pp. 316-317. 
49 . CM, p. 314. 
50. CM, p. 323. 
51 . CM, p. 323. 
52 . Kraemer writes, 'we liave repeatedly sfressed how rich and varied are the ways in wliich man... has 
ttied to give expression to his religious needs and aspirations, in theology, in worship, in art, in fomis of 
organization, in diBFerent ways of presentation. .. It is not at all important that they do not fit in with our 
Protestant traditions and natural reactions, but it is very important to ask in the Ught of Biblical realism 
how they can function so as to foster pure and vigorous Christian life.' CM, pp. 324 - 325. 
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The great need... is to be constandy aUve to the necessity that the reUgious and 
philosophical heritage should be used to "tell" what Christian truth really is, and not to 
amalgamate elements of it as harmoniously as possible with this heritage. The tendency 
to do the latter is very strong. The real programme is not to relate the thouglit of 
Christianity to the thought of Indian or China or another dvilization, but to express it 
through these different heritages, and then see whether this in various cases may be 
caUed relating or not. This attitude alone guarantees a virtual contact and wrestUng 
both with Christian tmth and also with the reUgious and philosophical heritage." 
Left here, adaptation appears to introduce a fundamental inconsistency m Kraemer's 
position. The totalitarian approadi r ^ r d s reUgious totalities as fijndamaitally compile and 
coherent apprdiaisions of existence, and, coupled with bibUcal realism, affirms internal cnteria 
authorising judgmaits about the beUefs and practices of other communities. Consequentiy, it 
would appear that betweai religious totalities rational debate on basic issues is impossible;''' and, 
givai that each totality shapes its own standpomt accordmg to its own cntena, it would further 
seem that translation from the language of one to that of another is also impossible." On one hand, 
the first two themes seem to require the incommaisurabUity of reUgious communities. On tiie otiier, 
by arguing that the Christian message can be translated into the terminology of another religious 
totality in a manner whidi is both faithful to the message and understandable (this is not to say 
agreeable) to the adherents of the other religion, adaptation presumes the opposite. Is Kraemer's 
position finaUy inconsistent? 
With this question m imnd, Irt us consider the final theme: 'the pomt of contact' brtweai 
Christian revelation and non-Christian religions. Like Barth, Kraemer rejects traditional 
distinctions betweei general and spedal revelation for risking 'the danger of making human 
religious expenence and effort a preamble of faitii, whidi would imply makmg the realm of 
53 . CM, p. 328. 
54 . In Alasdair Maclntyre's words, 'The adherents of confUcting tendencies within a Uadition may still 
share enougli m the way of fimdamental belief to conduct such debate, but the protagonists of rival 
traditions will be precluded at any fimdamental level, not only from justifying their views to the members 
of any rival tradition, but even from learning from them how to modify their own u-adition in a radical 
way.' Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, p. 348. 
55 . Again, Maclntyre writes: 'A social universe composed exclusively of rival traditions, so it may seem, 
will be one in which there are a number of contending, incompatible, but only partially and inadequately 
communicating, overall views of that universe, each tradition within wliich is unable to justify its claims 
over against those of its rivals except to those who already accept them.' Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality?, p. 348. 
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revelation and grace continuous to the reahn of human religious effort.'" Yet, he also suspects that 
Earth's own rejection suffers the 'dreary fate of sterile intellectuahsm.'" For Kraemer, botii to 
affirm and to daiy that all people shared a limited knowledge of God as the basis for revelation 
treats it as a static object ratiier than the dynamic movement of God toward humanity.'* By 
refusing to define how or where it may or may not occur, Kraemer presaits revelation not as a 
thmg to be apprdiended, but an evait winch is always and everywhere takmg place. 
This does not aflfirm all 'general' revelatory clauns,'' for '"gaieral revelation" can only be 
effectually discovered in the hght of the "spedal revelation.'"'*" He thus reintroduces tiie sui generis 
nature of the revelation m Christ,**' writing, 'Whosoever by Gods grace has some moderate 
understandmg of the all inclusive comparison of God and of Chnst rejoices over every evidence of 
divine working and revelation that may be found in the non-Christian worid. No man, and certainly 
no Chnstian, can claim the power or the right to limit Gods revelatory workmg.'**^  Revelation is 
not a matter of a /jn'on judgmoits and descriptions, but an evait discerned a posteriori in the hglit 
of the revelation in Christ. Haice botii traditional concq)ts of gaieral revelation and Bartli's daiial 
are but different ways prejudging the question. To 'indicate systematically and concretely where 
God revealed Himself and wrestied and wresties with man in the non-Chnstian religions is not 
feasible. Every effort to do so is hazardous. Personal concrete experioice, the meeting of spirit 
with spirit and illumined divination can alone lead on the right track.'^ ^ 
56 . CM, p. 120. 
57 . CM, p. 120. 
58 . CM, p. 119. 
59 . He writes, 'The wholesale talking about all rehgions bemg the product of revelation results, in fact, 
either in theological myopia or m a practical relativism or in an indifferentism in regard to tmth.' RCF, p. 
349. 
60 . CM, p. 125. 
61 . He writes, 'tiiere are manifestations in this rehgious and spuitual life and wimess in the realm outside 
the revelation of Christ that are acknowledged as evidence of God's unintermpted concern and of His 
travaihng with man.... Therefore, all religion is meaningfiil in some sense, as a dim response or as a 
refiisal towards God's working.' RCF, pp. 340 - 341. 
62 . CM, p. 122. 
63 . CM, p. 127. 
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It is therefore Intimate and necessary to expect points of contact first because humans, 
irrespective of thdr rehgion and in spite of thdr sin, are God's creatures. 'This tragic contradictory 
position is [man's] deqjest problem and testifies to his indestructible relatedness to God. The quest 
for God, evQi when man tries to kill it in himself, is the perennially disturbing and central problem 
of man. Therefore, there is here undaiiably a point of contad for the Message of the Gospd.'^ 
Second, they are further affirmed in the Incarnation. 'If there is any meaning in it, it means that 
God wants, evai passionately wants, contact with man, and thus through the ad of His revelation 
shows His behef m the possibility of contad.'*' Finally, points of contact are presumed by cross-
cultural missions; without them, the gospel is beyond comprehaision and communication. 'The 
apostohc nature of God's revelation in Chnst pre-supposes it. No human reasoning can wipe tiiis 
out, unless it wants to make the Gospel void and meaningless.'*^ 
Still, Kraemer is reluctant to speak of them for fear of leadmg to 'the delusion of buildmg 
too great hopes on our methods; that of expecting success surely to come from our psychological 
and theological approadies or our dogmatic correctness or hberahsm; that of taking the term "point 
of contad" in the sense of an idea or disposition in the rehgious consaousness from which faitii and 
conversion to Christ and His gifts and demands can be developed.'" This mistakeily assumes tiiat 
a better understanding of 'points of contad' results in more successful missionary activity and 
misunderstands them as the agoits of conversions to Christianity. For Kraemer, this resembles 
soteriologjcal synergism - the cooperation of grace and works in salvation - and as a Reformed 
theologian, he reacts against it. For hrni, 'The sole agent of real faitii in Chnst is the Holy Spirit' .^ * 
64 . CM, p. 130. 
65 . CM, p. 131. 
66. CM, p. 131. 
67 . CM, p. 132. 
68 . CM. p. 132. This reluctance m turn renders him sympathetic to the strong denial of points of contact 
as found in the early Barth. And yet, as was noted m Chapter 4, Kraemer concludes tiiat on this pomt, 
Barth is too extreme. Siding with Brunner, Kraemer writes 'Out of exclusive zeal for the right contention 
that God and not man liimself in any sense whatever is Saviour of the worid, [Barth] disregards what really 
is at stake in the problem of the "pomt of contact"; that is to say, the fact that man can respond to the call of 
God and consequentiy is held responsible for his doing so or not.' CM, p. 133. 
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Combinmg recognition and reluctance culminates in a dialectical understanding. In 
response to the question. Where are points of contact to be found?, Kraemer replies both nowhere 
and everywhere. Consider first the negative pole. 'Somdiow the conviction is aUve that it is 
possible and feasible to produce for every reUgions a sort of catalogue of points of corrtart.... based 
on the similarities b ^ e a i Christiamty and the non-Christian reUgions'.This compilation is 
impossible first because 'reUgion is nowhere in tiie worid an assortmait of spiritual commodities, 
that can be compared as shoes or neck-ties.'™ To approadi reUgions m sudi a manner is to forget 
that every doctrine, symbol and rite is vitaUy related to the totaUty of concrd:e beUefs and practices 
and cannot be understood in abstraction from it. While this may be necessary to gain an intellectijal 
command of the material, as 'a guide for the adequate apprdiension of reUgion as a living and 
thriving reality, it is less than useless.'^ ' Because discerning points of contact takes place in living 
cultures with thriving religious lives, the 'many attempts... to build up various points of contact witii 
dtfferait religions [whidi] proceed on this inteUedualist and analytical line of approach,' whidi m 
Itself has a Intimate purpose, disregards 'the all dedsive point in the whole matter' aitirely .^ ' One 
cannot know the real force, value and fijnction of a reUgious claim or ritual without considering its 
relationship to the 'fimdamental existaitial apprdiension of the totaUty of Ufe whidi dominates this 
whole reUgion.'^ ^ For these reasons, Kraemer can say with Barth, there is no point of contact. 
Nevertheless, this impUes 'the measuring of these reUgions with the rod of currait Chnstian 
dogmatism and dogma. That would be one of the worst forms of inteUectuaUsm.'^ '' Consider now 
the positive pole: 'there is only one point of contact, and i f that one point reaUy exists, thai there are 
many points of contact. This one point of contad is the disposition and attitude of die 
missionary.'^'- The missionary - as the person engaged in cross-cultural commumcation of the 
69 . CM, p. 134. 
70. CM,pp. 134- 135. 
71 . CM,p: 135. 
72 . CM, P- 136. 
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gospel - needs 'an untiring and genuine interest in the rehgion, the ideas, the saitimaits, tiie 
institution, in the whole range of hfe of the people among whom one works,/or Christ's sake and 
for the sake of those people Points of contact bdween the Christian revelation and the rehgions 
will be found in concrete situations, as people endeavour to adapt the Gospel to thdr cultures. On 
this more ad hoc, pragmatic approach, there are many points of contad. 
Points of contact do not arise within the encounter of conflicting rehgious systems,'^  but ui 
the everyday encounters betweai people.'* On one hand, there 'is no point of contact. There is 
tiieologically speaking, no point of contact betweoi the worid of Gods Righteousness and Wisdom 
in Christ, and man's [adiha], righteousness, and wisdom, whatever it may be. Only the Holy Spirit 
can opoi the eyes of God's world. Understanding and accqsting the gospel means conversion....' 
While on the otiier, there 'are points of contact. In saying this, no deviation whatever from the first 
thesis is unphed. We are sunply in a differait dimoision, namely that of communication, whidi 
aitails two capital things in the reality of life understood as intercourse with fellow beings of 
different spiritual worlds - fellow beings for w^om we are responsible and for whom we know that 
Christ came also.'^' Whoi so articulated, it becomes clear that the dialectical point of contact 
parallels and resolves the al l ied inconsistaicy bdween the incommensurability unplied by biblical 
reahsm and the totahtarian approach and commensurability presumed by adaptation. Kraemer^ s 
position, therefore, is not finally inconsisteit. 
6.2 Theological Criticisms 
The critidsms launched against Kraemer's position as summarised above can be sqDarated 
into theological and phaiomaiologjcal ones. This section addresses tiie former. Of tiie five 
considered, the first misunderstands his position entirely while the remaining four are more or less 
76 . CM, p. 140. 
77 . Kraemer writes 'When tiie word approach is taken in the sense of Christianity as a total religious 
system approaching the non-Christian religions as total rehgious systems, there is only difference and 
antithesis, and this must be so because they are radically different.' CM. p. 300. 
78 . He continues, 'Yet altiiough fundamentally speakmg there is no point of contact, in practice the 
religious needs and aspirations that are embedded in these great religious systems often offer, of course, 
splendid opportunities of practical human contact.' CM, p. 300. 
79 . RCF, pp. 363 - 364. 
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accurate. Nevertheless, I counter that these consistentiy fail to take into account one or more of the 
foUowing: Kraemer's historical context, his habit of ihetorical over-emphasis, and the more subtie 
articulation of later work and accordingly aid up attacking an extreme which he avoids. 
The first critiasm takes issue with Kraemer's use of the Bible: 'Histoncal studies have 
made us so aware of the nature of the bibUcal material and how it has come to us that Kraemer's 
reUance on the Bible, in his particular form, now seems over-simple and naive.'*" The 
unsophisticated and even stubbom nature of bibUcal reaUsm is particulariy evident in its orthodox 
affirmation of Incarnation. Blurrtly put, 'the argumait of those who apply the historical-critical 
method rigorously to the New Testamait is that it may reveal the interprdation of the figure of 
Jesus as the unique Incarnation of God as a belief which was appropriate to the eariy centuries of 
Christianity but nor necessarily binding m the modem worid.'*' Consider for example, die 
questions posed by Paul Knitter concerning Incamational language: Is it 'part of die essential 
message of the New Testamait or does it belong to the medium used to get that message across? 
Further, is it philosophical language about the structures of the relationship betweai the infinite 
and the finite, meant to negate all relationships to the divine apart from Christ? Or is it 
confessional language meant to affirm the importance of wtet God had done in Jesus?'*' Kraemer 
cannot account for the historically conditioned nature of the Bible for he 'd^aids too heavily upon 
a hteral reading of the bibUcal texts.... [He] interprets God as operating m the worid in a limited 
historical, geographical and cultural context.'*^ Dqjendait on a precritical and naive hermaieutic, 
he cannot withstand biblical critidsm; the historically, geographically and contextually bound 
bibUcal documaits cannot provide the foundation his position requires. 
80 . Race, Christians and ReUgious PluraUsm, p. 30. 
81 . Race, Cliristians and ReUgious PluraUsm. p. 33. 
82 . Knitter, No Otiier Name?, pp. 92 - 93. 
83 . Chester GilUs, PluraUsm: A New Paradigm for Theology. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, n.d.), p. 168. 
Earlier, he wrote, 'critical exegesis of New Testament texts tiiat properly siUiates them witiiin tiieir social 
and historical context will not support an exclusivist disposition. Jesus' words are not the literal speech of 
Jesus, and the text from Acts in which an exclusive claim is a legitimate tool for the primitive Church's 
evangelization cannot be supported outside its original missionary context ... The primitive Church was 
attempting to establish itself and atttact converts. What more definitive claim could tiie Church make tiian 
to claim its central figure was the exclusive conduit to God? This exclusivity gave impetus to the 
missionary tlimst of the early Church.' pp. 19 - 20. 
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This criticism is easily dismissed first of all because it is marked by a fundamental 
Ignorance of Kraemer's understanding of Scripture. Evei a cursory glance at his writings indicates 
that he welcomes the findings of critical biblical sdiolarship. Consider these words: 
Thanks to the remarkable results of modem Biblical research our possibilities of feithful 
interpretation (of various elements of the Bibhcal literature as well as of these elements 
in the context of the whole of the Bible) have enormously increased. These results of 
modem Bibhcal research have set us freer on the one hand, and on the other hand have 
taught us that we should be very serious in accepting the fact that the Bible speaks the 
Word of God in definite historical situations and wholly by means and in terms which 
were the products.of this situation.^ 
He does not found bibhcal reahsm i^on rigidly hterahst reading of Scripture, but refers to the 
'human and in many ways historically conditioned' nature of the Bible.*' As the preceding 
quotation indicates, Kfaemer's view of Scripture is far closer to Frei's postcritical hermeneutic than 
any precritical one and therefore sidestqDS the critiasm. Still, more can be sa id for bibhcal reahsm 
and cntical hermaieutics cannot conflict for they wrestie with two distinct types of questions. 
Knitter's questions cited above, for instance, imply that bibhcal critiasm discloses the pre-textual 
essential message by abstracting the kernel of mearung from the husk of human accretions m the 
medium.**^  In my exposition of Frd, such an approach to the Bible was shown to be deeply 
problematic and it is not necessary to recapitulate his argumait here.*^  It is enough to say that it 
relocates the meaning and authority of the text from its received form to 'what actually happened.' 
Just so, 'What is authoritative is not the text, but the "facts" bdiind the text as reconstructed by the 
84 . RCT, p. 267. 
85 . AF, p. 2. 
86 . Hicks critique of orthodox christology provides a good example of this procedure. For him, phrases 
such as '1 and the Father are one' (John 10:30) and 'He wlio has seen me has seen the Father" (Jolin 14:6) 
'are not the pronouncements of the historical Jesus but words put into his mouth some sixty or seventy 
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Church.' Also, by freeing the love-language of the disciples from the shackles of Greek metaphysics, Hick 
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historian.'** The meaning of the Bible is sundered from its literary form for the 'facts' are set within 
'a new mterpretative framework provided by the biblical scholar. Thus, the historiast approadi 
allows the Bible to speak only within the limits of the assumptions about the nature of history 
brought by the interpreter of the text.'*' Worse, by so shifting the locus of authority, histoncal 
critiasm is forced to answer questions it cannot address. Properly employed, it discems how the 
biblical texts have come to their presait form, addressing (among others) issues of authorship, 
redaction, and historical context. It cannot account for basic theological problems of authority, 
canonicity and revelation because it is not designed so to do. 
Biblical realism, on the other hand, wrestles precisely with these dilemmas. The question 
which concerns Kraemer, Why has this text come to be?, is theologically prior to the histonan's 
How have these texts come to be? Consequently, he can accept on the one hand the findings of 
biblical criticism and aflSrm on the other the authonty of Scripture as the revelation of the word of 
God. Rewrites, 
The Bible is a book which, being composed of many writings produced over a range of 
more than a thousand years, and stemming from authors who were mostly ignorant of 
each other, reflects various historical, cultural and religious situations. Only when the 
collections gathered under the names Old and New Testament gradually became 
canonized, and constituted one book did it begin its career as a solid authoritative unity. 
It did not originate as one book, but as a collection of independent productions which in 
part were never intended to become parts of a "Sacred Book". The remarkable thing 
about it is that, from the time it was made into one book, it not only functioned as one 
book, because the Church's canonization made it so, but that, independently of this 
canonization, it proved to have on the whole an intrinsic unity, because, in spite of its 
multiform composition, it was held together by its great theme: God, the Creator, the 
God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; the God of the Covenant with Israel, His chosen 
people; God, the Creator and Redeemer through His Son Jesus Christ, who entrusts His 
"people", the ekklesia, to the guidance of His Holy Spirit; God the Consummatory, who 
leads His worid towards His end, which is the full manifestation of His Kingdom. Botli 
this intrinsic unity, which witnesses consistently to a wholly transcendental conditioning 
of the book in all its aspects, and the multiform historical conditioning of the book in its 
many parts, must be seriously kept in mind if the material is to be used in the right 
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By pointing to the thematic unity of the diverse scriptural documaits, Kraaner locates authority 
(rightiy m my view) not within historically reconstructed, prrtextual facts, but within the text itself, 
within the larger pattern of the bibhcal narrative and its climax, the life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus Chnst. Bibhcal reaUsm is an attempt to articulate the authority and indispaisability of the 
Bible not only for a Christian interpretation of rehgjons, but for all Chnstian faith and Ufe. It thus 
recognises the hmits of bibhcal criticism overlooked by its opponaits. 
The remaining criticisms centre on Kraemer's persistait description of the revelation of 
Chnst as sui generis. The first, directed against a perceived weakness in his ecclesiolpgy, contends 
that Kraemer's focus on the primacy of the revelation in Christ as the evaluative cnterion creates a 
disjunction not between Christianity and other reUgjons, but b ^ e a i Christ and all religions. 
Haice, the siii generis revelation in Christ provides an equally damning judgment on vA\at Kraemer 
calls 'empincal Christianity.' He writes, 'Chnstianity as a historical [sic] religion has to be 
distinguished very sharply from the Christian revelation because Christianity, as the well-known 
historical phenomenon whidi belongs to worid history and diurdi history, has in very many 
respects to be put on the same plane as the other reUgions of mankind.'' To divorce the Christian 
revelation from Christianity in so sharp a way is criticised by Lesshe Newbigm who observes that 
the Christian revelation cannot be abstracted from the communities which receive, remember, 
protect and proclaim it. 'The claim that... Christ is decisive for all human life is a meaningless 
claim except as it is interpr^ed in the hfe of the community which lives by the tradition of the 
apostohc testimony. There cannot, therefore, be a total disjunction between the Gospel and 
"Chnstianity".''' 
It cannot be denied that Kraemer's writings, both eariy and later, distinguish sharply 
bdweoi Christianity and revelation.'^ Still, the objection fails to consider the context of 
Tambaram and the ecclesiological framework of Kraemer's aigument. When takai into account, 
these factors show that the distinction was not to disparage the Christian Churdi, but to preserve 
and better articulate its mission. First, it must be remembered that Kraemer sqDarates empinca! 
91 . AF,P. 13. 
92 , Lesslie Newbigin, The Finality of Christ, (London: SCM, 1969), p. 77. 
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Christianity from the Christian revelation in the aftermath of Jerusalem 1928, and its preoccupation 
with the 'values' of non-Christian rehgjon. This discussion distracted participants from the central 
issue: the mission of the Churdi in the worid. On one hand, those standing in the fijfihneit sdiool 
spoke of Christianity as the compl^on of the highest and best of the religions. Sudi an attitude, 
however well-intoitioned, was both condescending and mistakoi for the 'non-Christian rehgions can 
just as well as Christianity show up an unpressive record of psycJiological, cultural and other 
values, and it is wholly d^endait on one's fimdamoital axioms of life whether one considers these 
non-Christian adiievements of higher value for mankind than the Christian.'*^ On the other hand, 
those following Hocking took the values argumait to its logical conclusion and spoke of an 
mterrehgious alhance aimed at oiridiing an increasmgly secular worid. This strategy ignored the 
nature of the Church as an apostohc body witnessing to the revelation of God in the worid." Each 
case presupposed that Christianity was one species in the goius of Rehgjon. By distinguishing 
bdweai Christianity and Revelation, Kraemer countered that the Chuidi's umquaiess derives not 
fi"om its abiUty to complete non-Christian behef and experience, but from the message it has been 
commissioned to proclaim. His Christianity/Revelation distinction, far fi-om drtracting from the 
uniquaiess of the Churdi was a means to underscore it against those vJho misunderstood it. 
Furthermore, the criticism overiooks the overtly ecclesiolpgical model within uhich 
Kraemer works and about which he is exphcit. 'The Churdi and all Christians, i f they have ears to 
hear and eyes to see, are confronted with this question: What is its essential nature, and what is its 
obhgation to the world?''^ This is the question which The Christian Message proposes to answer. 
Moreover, it is also the central problem tackled in Religion and the Christian Faith: 
Independent of any ckcumstances or historical situations, the problem of the relation of 
the Christian feith to the many other rehgions is inherent in the nature of the Christian 
Church.... As an apostohc body, the Church is commissioned to proclaun - by its 
kerygma of God's acts of salvation in Christ, by its koinonia as a new community, living 
94 . CM,P- 106. 
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in the bonds of peace and charity - the message of God's dealings with, and purpose for, 
the world and mankind." 
Any theology of rehgions wdiidi strictly hmits the discussion to problems of general revelation, or 
natural theology without addressing ecclesiology neglects that the conversation 'is embedded in the 
all-embracing problem of the Christian reUgion or the Christian Churdi in its relation to the 
world.''* The position both preserves and is sd; within a strong doctrine of the Churdi. Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in the closing diapter of The Christian Message where he writes, 'Just as 
the prophdic rehgion of Bibhcal reahsm is a rehgion sui generis, so the Christian Church, 
according to the concephon of the New Testamait is a community sui generis. .. It is... not a 
voluntary society but God's act through Jesus Chnst, called into being by His redemptive 
purpose.'" In this hght, it is clear that Kraemer does not so mudi sharply separate Christianity 
from revelation, as emphasise that the Church's uniqueness hes not in any inherait 'value' but in the 
message it proclaims and by whidi it is judged. 
The second criticism diallenges his dual afBrmation of the revelation in God in nature, 
history, conscioice and the universal rehgious consciousness and that all religious hfe is misdirected 
in the light of the sui generis Christian revelation. In 'what sense,' asks Gavin D'Costa, 'can 
Kraemer claim a siii generis status for the event of God's revdation in Christ, in the light of his 
own admission that God works outside this revelation?'He pursues this question fiirther with 
Israel as a test case. 
Israel's understanding acceptance and feith in Yahweh, although feltering provides a 
test case for examining the coherence of Kraemer's... assertions that salvation is only 
possible through exphcit confession and surrender to the revelation of God in Christ. If 
this exclusivist contention is taken seriously, then it must imply that the revelation of 
God in Israel's history was with (a) not revelation after all, or (b) a revelation, but 
somehow inadequate for salvation.'*" 
According to D'Costa, Kraemer opts for (b) thus contradicting his own position in three ways. 
First, i f there is revelation outside Jesus Christ, 'thai it cannot be claimed that Jesus is the only or 
97 . RCF, pp. 17-18. 
98 . CM, p. 103. 
99. CM, pp. 415-416, 
100 . D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, p. 65. 
101 . D'Costa. Theology and Rehgious Pluralism, p. 66. 
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sui generis evoit of revelation.'^ "^ While the conteits of the Christian revelation may have 
normative status, it is self-contradictory to admit on the one hand other revelatory events and on the 
other assert that the Christ event is siii generis. More perplexing however, is the second apparait 
contradiction: 'How can it be maintained that the only way to salvation is exphdt confession and 
surraider to God in Christ, i f God has truly revealed Himself in Israel's history before the coming 
of Jesus Christ?''"^ I f a study of Israel shows that God's revelatory activity is not hmited to Jesus 
Christ, thai the same is true for God's saving activity. The third contradiction is merely an 
expansion of the second: 
Wliat of the many pious Jews before the time of Jesus; those vAio did submit entirely to 
God's self-disclosure within Israel's history? What of Abraham and Moses and the ' 
many holy men and women of Israel hsted so eloquently in the Letter to the Hebrews, 
chapter 11? Relatedly, we may ask what of the countless milhons of non-Christians 
who lived before the time of Jesus who have never heard the gospel, often through no 
fault of their own?... Can we really accept that the God revealed in Christ, a loving 
father of "generous unlimited Divine love" has denied so many miUions the means to 
salvation - tiirough no feult of their own?'"'' 
The success of the critidsm dqjaids on what Kraemer means by the phrase siii generis 
whai applying it to the Christ event. In the dtations above, D'Costa contaids that Kraemei^ s 
phrase means both that the revelation of Christ is the only revelation and that salvation is possible 
only by responding in faith to this revelation. I f this interpretation is correct, then the charge of self-
contradiction is justified. It can be shown however, that in his use of sui generis, Kraemer intends 
ndther. Ratiier, he uses the phrase to emphasise that a property Christian evaluation of other 
rehgions takes , as its criterion the revelation in Christ. In this way, he sets himself against the 
flilfihnait theology predominant at Jerusalem and Tambaram and Hocking's nascoit pluralism. 
'Natural theology of that sort,' he writes, 'which conceives the Gospel as essentially the fiifilment, 
the highest developmait and budding fortii of the religious forces and seeds in mankind overiooks -
we rqaeat - the sui generis character of the revelation of Christ.''"' To do otherwise subjects the 
102 . D'Costa, Theology and Rehgious Plurahsm, p. 66. 
103 . D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, p. 67. 
104 . D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, p. 68. 
105 . CM, p. 123. 
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revelation m Christ to yet another, higher standard.'*"^  The siii generis nature of the Christian 
revelation does not deny the working of God outside it, but posits it as the standard by wtoch sudi 
divine activity is measured. 
To leave the matter here, however, b ^ the question of self-contradiction for it can y ^ be 
argued that Kraemer's affirmation of extra-Christian revelation contradicts his evaluation of the 
'world whidi is manifested in the whole range of rehgious striving' as discontinuous with the 
revelation m Christ.'"^ Here, his notion of 'contradictive or subversive, fulfihnait'"'* must be 
further explored. In Kraemer's view, to represent 'the rehgions of the worid as somehow, however 
unperfect and crude it may be... a sdioohnaster to Christ,' fails to account for the 'essaitiai 
"otiiemess"' both of the rehgions and of the Christian revelation."" ff the religions are indivisible 
totahties, eadi with their own distinctive doctrines, practices and ultimate aims, thai to regard them 
as 'preparation or a leading up to a so-called consummation or flilfilmait in Christ,' is to fail to take 
them seriously."" In the hght of Christ, they are 'blind and misdirected' because they do not share 
the goal of the Christian revelation in the first place.'" He continues, 'Only an attaitive study of 
the Bible can opai the eyes to the fact that Christ "the power of God" and "the wisdom of God" 
stands in contradiction to the power and the wisdom of man. Periiaps in some respects it were 
proper to speak of contradictive or subversive fiilfihnait.'"' Thus, the dual affirmation of the 
Christian revelation as sui generis and the revelation of God outside it is not necessarily self-
106 . He asks, 'Is Christ the measure of tme rehgion, or is it some general rehgious a priori by which 
Christ has to be measures? Christians cannot behave as if there is an ultimate rehgious a priori, under 
which Christ is to be subsumed. For them Christ is the religious a priori. Non-Christians... naturally will 
disavow this, but we have to keep m mind that this decision for their rehgious a priori is just as much an 
act of feith as the Christian's choice for Christ.' RCF, p. 145. 
107 . AF, p. 2; see also Antonio Gualtieri, 'The Failure of Dialectic in Hendrik Kraemer's Evaluation of 
Non-Christian Faith,' in Journal of Ecumenical Studies. (1978), pp. 274 - 290. 
108 . ^ , p . 5. 
109 . AF, P- 5. 
110. AF,P-3. 
111. P 3: Thus, of tiie missionary experience in Africa he writes that 'not the consciousness of sin 
brings men to Christ, but the continued contact with Christ brings them to consciousness of sin.' CM, p. 
112. 
112 . AF,p. 5. 
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contradictory. By sui generis, Kraemer does not mean to say that the revelation in Chnst is the 
only revelation, but that it is the criterion by whidi Christians are to judge all religious activity. 
Nevertheless, this is but the first half of D'Costa's interpretation. 
Recall the second: by sui generis ICraemer means salvation is possible only by responding 
in faith to the revelation in Christ. This, quite smply, is not true. By rejecting the fulfihnent 
theology of many of his contemporaries, Kraemer does not withhold salvation from those who have 
not responded to the gospel. Like Newbigjn, Kraemer refuses to pronounce on the rtemal fate of 
non-Christians. He never asserts that salvation is possible only through explidt faith in Christ. 
D'Costa, however, is unhappy with Kraemer's agnostidsm: 'this answer seems painfully 
inadequate... and it is not clear, i f we use our test case of Israel, where there are supposedly 
inadequate grounds for attempting to probe the issue further.'"'' With these words, D'Costa 
unplies that God's covenant with Israel is a hmit-case for all non-Christian or pre-Christian rehgion. 
For Kraemer, however, Israel and the Old Testamait are umque for the latter records the revdation 
of God to the former - the revelation wtiidi finds it fullest expression in Jesus Christ.'" This 
ndther demeans the 'rehgious quahty of non-Christian sacred texts nor means that the Old 
Testament is 'unmaculate.' 'The crudal point is that rehgjously speaking, the Jewish Old Testament 
IS not primarily the documoit of Jewish reUgjous experiaice, but of God's revelational dealings with 
the people of Israel and through them vyith the worid, as an introduction to His dedsive and 
revelational deahng with Israel and the world in Jesus Christ of whidi the New Testament is the 
113. He writes, 'This rejection of a theologia natwalis as affording the basic rehgious tmths on \\4iich the 
realm of the Christian revelation rises as the fittmg superstmcture does not, however, include denymg that 
God has been working m the minds of men outside the sphere of the Christian revelation and that there 
have been, and may be now, acceptable men of faitli who live under the sw^ of the non-Christian rehgions 
- products, however, not of these non-Christian rehgions but of the mysterious workings of God's spirit. 
God forbid that we mortal men should be so irreverent as to dispose of how and where the Sovereign God 
of grace and love has to act.' AF, pp. 4 - 5. 
114 .: D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, p. 68. 
115. He writes, 'Christianity is a child of the rehgion of Israel, the rehgion of Moses and the prophets. 
Jesus stood deeply rooted in this ancesfral heritage and breathed in this atmosphere of God's revelation 
through His dealing with, and His sphitual gifts to, the people of Israel. The religion of Israel is an 
important part of the worid of Bibhcal reahsm, and Jesus Christ, in wtiom God revealed Himself 
decisively, is in His human thinking and feehng altogether a child of Israel.' CM, p. 237; se also pp. 328 -
335. 
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document.'"^ Of course the uniqueness of the revelation of God to Israel is not pecuhar to 
Kraemer, but a postulate central to orthodox Christian doctrines of revelation. 
I f Israel is a unique case in the history of God's dealings with humanity, thai EyCosta's use 
of Israel and the Old Testament as a salvific test case can be questioned. Can he legitimately aigue 
that remaining agnostic on the fate of those who have never heard of Jesus Christ through no fault 
of their own is tantamount to being scq^tical about the d;emal fate of "the many holy mai and 
womai of Israel hsted so eloquaitiy in the Letter to the Hebrews'?"' I think not. On the other 
hand, i f as J.A. DiNoia has persuasively argued, rehgions offer 'distinctive teadiings about the true 
ami of hfe, the reasons for pursuing it and the means of attaining and eijoying it'"* must we not be 
cautious about affirming the final salvation of members of other religious communities? At the 
same time however, given the esdiatological hope for the renewal of all creation comprising a 
redeemed Israel and a restored humanity (e.g. Romans 8:18- 11.36), must we not also refrain from 
daiying it? Kraemer's avoidance of a priori judgmaits, in this hght, appears justified. D'Costa 
rightiy admits that whai debating 'the salvation of non-Christians, or Christians for that matter, we 
cannot confidentiy assert that this or that person is saved or not - ultimately all rests within the 
"mysterious workings of God's Spirit.'""' Just as Kraemer's emphasis on the sui generis nature of 
Christian revelation does not necessarily contradict his affirmation of extra-Christian revelation, 
neither does it necessarily withhold salvation from those who are not incorporated into the Christian 
Churdi. 
This soteriological debate leads directiy to the third critidsm. D'Costa writes 'Kraemer's 
stark emphasis on the sui generis nature of Christ's revelation assumes a deep and unbridgeable 
gulf betweoi God's grace and fallai humanity.... That is, salvation is constituted and brought about 
by Christ who is the sole bridge across the gaping abyss betweai God's grace and fallai 
humankind's sinfiiness.' Li so doing, Kraemer risks reducing all events other than the revelation in 
116. CM, pp. 329 - 330. 
117. D'Costa, Theology and Religious Plurahsm, p. 68. 
118. DiNoia, The Diversity of Religions, pp. 34 - 64, esp. p. 35. 
119. D'Costa, Theology and Rehgious Pluralism, p. 68. 
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Christ to 'human adiievemaits and failures, despite his protestations to tiie contrary.''^" It is also 
the source of his opposition to all natural theology: 'according to Bibhcal reahsm,' Kraemer insists, 
'the opposite of grace is not nature or reason, but sin.''^' Finally, assuming sudi a gulf seems to 
contradict his behef in a universal rehgious consdousness wdiidi 'God has laid... in man.''^ " 
D'Costa counters, ' I f a person's abihty to respond to revelation is not by means of reason or through 
any faculty possessed by that person, but by the initiative of God, however misused and 
misdirected, is not this basic oriaitation towards God a gift of grace? What dse can it be called? 
And i f it is, can such an absolute rift betweoi grace and sinful nature be maintained?''^ ^ 
This critidsm makes three chaiges, the first being that Kraemer risks reducing all religious 
activity to human adiievements and failures. While I have shown that his emphasis on the 
Christian revelation does not doiy extra-Christian revelation, there is some justification to this 
critidsm. 'Surveying human endeavour towards spiritual expression over the whole range of life,' 
he wntes, 'the obvious statemeit to be made is that all rehgions... are the various efforts of man to 
apprehend the totality of existence....''^ Not only does he stress the human element in rehgions in 
The Christian Message, but also, while critidsing Barth for a similar short-coming, Kraemer 
remains vague on the working of God outside Christ.'^' This can be attributed to his desire to 
'throttie' (in the words of Bishop Kulandran) Hocking's naive endorsement of rehgious activity. He 
sought to right the balance by (over)emphasising that 'The most sincere rqjresaitative of the most 
unpressive forms of piety or quahty of hfe may happoi to be the farthest from the kingdom of God. 
There is, at least, no guarantee whatever that sincerity, or, humanly spiking, superb expressions 
of spintual cahbre, mean necessarily openness or nearness to the understanding of God's 
"foohshness in Christ".''^^ In this hght, his overemphasis on the human nature of rehgious activit>', 
while peihaps unjustifiable, is understandable. 
120 . D'Costa, Theology and Rehgious Pluralism p. 69. 
121 . CM, p. 115. 
122. RCF,p. 171. 
123 . D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, pp. 69 - 70. 
124 . CM, p. 111, my empliasis. 
125 . CM, p. 120. 
126 . RCF, p. 365. 
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A more balanced approadi is found in Rehaion and the Christian Faith, where, rooted in 
the 'dialectic character of the Bibhcal revelation,' Kraemer says 'in one breath "yes" and "no" to the 
worid in all its spheres of life, wdiich precludes m prindple the programme of synthesis, and yet 
unpels toward true "commuracation".'''' For instance, a mytii caitral to the rehgious hfe of a tnbe 
m Ceram 'conveys the idea that tiie hfe of the worid is estabhshed in the death and sacnfice of a 
god, and that it has to be re-estabhshed constantiy therein by re-eiacting this primordial event in the 
ritual actions of tiie whole tribe.'''* Kraemer discems a deep Ahung (intuition): 'It is strikmg that 
this dramatisation of myth contains an apprdiension akin to the Bibhcal one that all hfe and 
existaice rests in the activity of God.'"' This positive analysis, however, is but the first half. 'The 
dialectical condition manifests itself in the fact that this re-enactmait of myth is perverted into a 
magical human act: With all his sacral awe, man bdiaves as a usurper of God's domam, which is 
exacdy what is meant by "Ongmal. Sin".''^ ° Thus, while D'Costa is nght to pomt to a possible 
extreme in Kraenier's work, the force of the charge is blunted by a contextual understandmg of his 
eariy thought coupled with a carefijl reading of his later thought. 
Consider the second diarge: that the assumption of an unbridgeable gulf betweei God and 
humanity prohibits any and all natural theology. The gravity of this diarge and wh^er or not 
Kraemer avoids (or would want to avoid) it dqjaids on what is meant by natural theology. If the 
term designates 'the process wiiere by persons can, by thdr own natural rational powers arrive at 
behef in God,''^ ' then Kraemer, as a Reformed theologian, is quite willingly guilty. He opposes 
any natural theology concaved as a universal foundation for revelation because it rests on 'a 
flindamaital rehgious rriistake.... [Its] starting-point is the ontological concq^ tion of Greek 
philosophy about God, that God is Pure Essaice and the Unity of all Bang - and not tiie proph i^c 
voluntaristic concq}tion of the Bible.''^' In this system, revelation and its content becomes. 
127 . RCF, p. 322. 
128 . RCF, p. 333. 
129 . RCF, p. 324. 
130 . RCF, p. 324. 
131 . D'Costa Theology and Rehgious Plurahsm, p. 58. 
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logically speaking, a mudi-needed supplement to the insuflBdency of reason in the reahn of 
supernatural truth, and not the crisis of all rehgions and all human reasoning, which it is in the 
sphere of Bibhcal reahsm.''" Moreover, that whidi Kraemer sedcs is not a rejection of natural 
theology, but its redefinition and reappropriation. Li Rehgion and the Christian Faith, his 
opposition to natural theology remains undiminished for it makes "the God and father of our Lord 
Jesus Christ, "the only true God" accordirg to John 17:3, a subordinate idea which can fit m with a 
philosophy of rehgion but not with theology whidi understands its real function, i.e. faithful 
uiterpr^tion of the Bibhcal teadiing.''^ Ratiier than repudiate it altogether, Kraemer subverts tiie 
traditional relationship betweoi the natural and the revealed where 'a Bibhcally based doctrine of 
God's revelation in nature, history and consdeice,' are treated as 'modes within the one coitral 
revelation m Christ, whidi illuminates the real meaning and is the criterion of these modes.''" 
This leads to the final charge, for i f by thdr own rational powers, i .e. tiirough some kmd of 
natural theology, people cannot respond to revelation thai they must do so by the gradous 
intervention of God. I f the source of this response is Kraemer's universal rehgious consdousness, 
thai it is necessarily a gift of grace. F i t is a universal gift of grace, however, thai the rift betweai 
God and humanity, grace and nature, does not seem as severe as the sui generis seems to indicate. 
The unpact of this diaige is dissipated vAi&i one remembers that Kraemer does not require the 
exphdt confession of and surraider to Christ as a precondition to the aijoyment of salvation. He is 
not an Arminian; he does not beheve (as mudi evangehcal thought does) that people are saved by 
thdr exphdt faith in Christ. To his ears, such a proposition would sound hke sotenological 
synergism, a denial of the sola gratia. On the contrary, he is a Reformed theologian who refiises to 
hmit dther the prevaiiait or the saving grace of God. The sui generis does not daiy that God 
saves outside Christianity, but affirms that any salvation willed by God is always the salvation won 
by Christ."' 
133 . CM, p. 115. 
134. RCF, p. 361. 
135 . RCF, p. 363. 
136 . On tills point, Kraemer is in agreement witii Rahner. See 1.2; Rahner, TIV, p. 122, TLX, pp. 38 -
39. 
202 
The final critiasm presaits Kraemer's diristology as reductive insofar as it 'tends to 
absolutize only one aspect of Christ's revelation of God (concerning humankinds sinfiJness), which 
is excessively Pauline.... Time and time, again, Kraemer dismisses the value of non-Christian 
insights because they lack the consdousness of sm and the need for forgiveness.''" Li so doing he 
doiies a priori the possibility of learning what M.M. Thomas calls 'new trutiis in Christ' whidi 
stand outside the cat^ones of sin and salvation and indeed orthodox diristology completdy, yet 
w ^ d i do not contradict tiiem.'^* Thus, despite professmg opainess to leammg from otiier 
religions, it is difficult to see how he can gjvai his diristological criterion, hi rejecting Hocking's 
'both-and' religious q^istemology, Kraemer has gone to the opposite extreme, adopting an equally 
sunplistic 'ather-or' model. 'Cleariy wtiat is needed is a judidous use of botii the ather-or and tiie 
botii-and models, wdienever appropnate, rather than the a priori adoption of one ratiier tiian tiie 
otiier. In this way, it seems possible to remain committed, while truly opai to whatever nches are 
discovered in the lives and religions of non-Christians, both past, presait and to come.''^' 
Again, this critidsm is not without foundation. Though he does speak of the plurality of 
approaches within biblical reahsm,''"' Kraemer goes on to focus exphatiy on 'this inexplicable but 
patait fact... that man wanted to be "like God". Man, whose natural relation to God, his Lord and 
Maker, is obediaice and love, has become a rebel.''"' The great rehgious and philosophical 
systems, even in tiiar most subhme and beautiful expressions, are attempts at self-justification.'"*" 
This overstatemait is rightiy interpreted as Kraemer's attempt to nght the balance of missiologicai 
thought after Hocking. The attitude to be overcome was an unsophisticated reductionism positing 
an Ultimate Reality as the common goal of the rehgions. Kraemer counters tiiat evai a cursoiy 
137 . D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, p. 72. 
138 . D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, p. 72; M.M. Thomas, The Acknowledged Christ of the 
hidian Renaissance. (London: SCM, 1969), pp. 304 - 305. 
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142 . It is the aim of CM to show tiiat the rehgions including empirical Christianity are theologically (i.e. 
when approached tlirough the revelation in Christ) and phenomenologically (i.e. when approached as 
totalities) attempts at self-justification. See CM, pp. 142 - 283. 
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examination of religions revealed a plurahty of distinct and sometimes opposing ultimate goals and 
amis. Therefore, to ascribe to them the aim of the Christian revelation - justification by grace and 
renewed feUowship with God - was once again to fail to take thdr own claims seriously. Moreover, 
there are resources within Kraaner which can counter without rqjudiation what is ui context 
another necessary overemphasis. For example, his admission of a plurahty of biblically reahstic 
themes and motifs whicJi can be legitimately used in evaluation, his behef that God's revelation 
extaids past the borders of Christianity (albdt in a brokai and troubled way), and his refusal to 
pronounce on the eternal fate non-Christians because of God's constant work in (not through) the 
rehgious hfe of humanity, eadi provide avaiues of opainess to Thomas' new trutiis in Christ 
without compromising Kraemer's caitral belief that the revelation in Christ was for Chnstians the 
only Intimate evaluative criterion. 
This section summarised and attempted to counter five critiasms directed against 
Kraemer's theology. Aside from the first which misunderstands his view of Scnpture compirtely 
and is itself de^ly problematic, they were found to be more or less accurate. Nevertheless, they 
consistaitiy failed to take mto account one or more of the following: Kraemer's historical context, 
his habit of ihetorical over-emphasis, and the subti^ of later work. Therefore, although these 
cntidsms provide unportant protocols against an extreme interpretation, tiiey do not senously 
undemune Kraemer's position. 
6.3 Phenomenological Criticisms 
The final section considers two phenomenological critidsms and argues that tiidr vahdity 
leads to a shght modification to, rather than a wholesale rejection of, Kraemer's totalitanan 
approadi. Again, Gavin D'Costa asks, 'although his emphasis on the totalitarian nature of religion 
provides a salutary dieck against surface sunilarities and compansons, does he not n^ect tiie 
dynamic nature of religion as well as the creative interaction betweai beliefs and practice whidi 
result in the development of traditions?'''*^  and continues, 'A recognition of these latter features 
would m prindple preclude any^«a/judgemait upon the rehgious life of humankind, and require a 
more nuanced analysis than Kraemer provides.'''''' Thus, Kraemer fails to account suffiaaitiy for 
intrareligjous and interreligious developmait. 
143 . D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, p. 61. 
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B^jnning with the problem of intrareligious developmait, D'Costa insists that 'Kraemer 
underestimates the dynamic and changing nature of rehgions because of his emphasis on thdr 
totahtanan nature.'''*' Spedfically, he fails to comprehend that the term Hinduism' is at best an 
umbrella term whidi ought to be abandoned in favour of the more predse dehneation of Indian 
religious life offered by sudi terms as 'Advaita Vedanta, Visistadvaita or Samkhya Yoga and so 
on.'''*'' All too oftai n^ecting this complexity, espedally in his analysis of bhakti traditions in 
Indian religions,'"' Kraemer draws an unnecessarily negative conclusion: because these movements 
are a part of Hinduism, 'they are fundamaitally anthropocentric, as all good monistic, mystic Hindu 
religions is'.'"* For D'Costa, this evaluation is liistorically and phenomenologically reductive and 
limiting.''"' Likewise, in his account of Japanese Buddhism, Kraemer's dismissal of the 'almost 
Lutiieran msights of Shinran's Japanese Shin-Shu Amida, where the prinaple of faith in grace 
alone, as against effecting salvation by works, is strongly emphasized',"" is insaisitive. 'Kraemer 
discards this phenomaion on the questionable grounds that Shin-Shu must be viewed in the liglit of 
the "naturahstic monism [of] Mahayana Buddhism".'"' Therefore, D'Costa concludes, potentially 
many points of contact are obscured by Kraemer's reductive hermeneutic. 
It is not my intention to debate the specifics of Kraemer's analyses of Indian religions or 
Japanese Buddhism; rather we must consider whether interpretative errors warrant the rejection or 
modification of Kraemer's totahtanan phoiomenology. Before forrmng any final judgmait, we 
must first consider the context. Above, I contaided that Kraemer's phaiomenology is his corrective 
to the equally reductive hermeneutics advocated by fulfilmait theologians and the Transcaidaitalist 
and Naturalist phenomenologists. His foremost concern is to preserve the particularities of 
145 . D'Costa, Theology and Rehgious Pluralism, p. 62. 
146 . D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, p. 62. 
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rehgious behef and practice by refusing to grade them according to an all^edly universal 'Idea of 
Rehgion.' Rather, Kraemer maintains that in order to preserve thdr uniqueness, religious bdiefs 
and practices must be interpreted within thdr religio-cultural matrix. As an attempt to preserve the 
particularity of the rehgions, I doubt, wh^er D'Costa would disagree with Kraemer's 
totalitarianism. 
One must also keep m mind secondly Kraemer's paichant to overstate his case. We have 
seal already how The Chnstian Message, whetiier for good or ill, deliberately overemphasises tiie 
human nature of rehgious activity as a response berth to Hocking and fulfilment theology while 
more moderate statemaits are found in later writings. The mtense, evai extreme, way in which 
Kraemer sometimes outiines the totahtarian approach is y&. another instance of riietorical 
overemphasis. This is borne out by his portrayal of Ramanuja as an agait of change witiiin tiie 
Hinduism. The 'great Z>/7/3to-theologian' is r^ rded by Kraemer as 'passionate in his protest 
against the absolute momsm of Shankara'.'" Rainanuja's behef in the reahty of a personal Lord, 
proclamation of divine grace, focus on the necessity of faith for salvation, and struggle over tiie 
relation of faith and works all indicate that 'Ramanuja, just as Pascal, was not satisfied with the 
Grod of the philosophers; with passionate rehgiousness he vindicated a really hving God, not merdy 
a thdstic concqjtion of God.''" He breaks 'in a radical way with the classic Hindu ideas about 
God, the soul and the worid. The worid is real, not maya [illusory]; the soul and human 
consdousness are so also. The eternal, personal God... is the sole and personal God and Saviour, 
not merely a god-rqpresentation necessary for man m a certam stage in his quest for tiie simimum 
bonum.'^^'* Cleariy, Kraemer does allow that religious totalities can and do change, tiiat they are 
dynamic not static aitities. 
His duef concem, reflected in the conclusion about Ramanuja which D'Costa rejects, is 
that Christians upon sedng words such as 'grace', 'faith', and 'Lord', etc. in the Bhagavaci Gita, 
would immediately interprd: them, according to Christian cat^ories, or as manifestations of an 
ethereal universal essence of religion. In dther instance, Ramanuja is not takai seriously in his own 
152 . CM, pp. 168- 169. 
153 . CM, p. 169. 
154 . CM, p. 169. 
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terms. Furthermore, in the light of the preceding IMC conferaices and Hocking's Re-Thinking. 
Missions, his concern is justified.'" He counters that Ramanuja is not the 'Indian Luther,' but a 
deeply religious man reacting against Vedantic philosophy and must be interprrted as sudi. This 
daiies neither the reality nor the significance of the dianges wrought by the bhakti sdiools and 
Ramanuja m particular, but resists any easy equation brtween them and Protestant pi^sm. To do 
so 'makes the religious mistake of overiookmg the radical difiFeraice betweai the Chnstian 
revelation and other religions.' While 'it starts fi-om the very laudable and... indispensable desire to 
show open-mindedness and genuine sympathy for the best in the other religions, it starts from the 
assumption that Christianity is the crown of these religions, and so it evinces a hiddai feeling of 
superiority, that is rightly saised as condescoision.'"* Thus, in the light of D'Costa's first criticism 
and of both Kraemer's context and overemphasis, v/hat is needed is not the rejection of the 
totalitarian approadi, but a modification which would preserve religious particularity without 
treating religions as static, undianging bodies of belief and practice. 
Before siting out this modification, let us consider the second objection. Whai confronted 
by mterrehgious developmoit, D'Costa contoids that 'Kraemer does not pay aiough attention to the 
way m whidi a religion's "classical" doctrines and axioms change in the light of practice. Again, 
the continual movemait of history and the possible surprises it may bring cannot be minimized.''" 
Once again, he has in mind Kraemer's exposition of Hinduism and specifically, the evaluation of 
the doctrine of ahimsa, that is, the abstaining fi-om giving pain to living beings (human and non-
human) in thought, word and deed. This doctrine, writes Kraemer, must be seen in the light of 
Hindu soteriology: 'The goal of individual deliverance fi-om the suffering of existoice engaidered 
the meticulous desire to lessen the dwices of re-birth by avoiding the infliction of sufiFering, but in 
the long run it became, psydiologically speaking, positive benevolaice towards all beings.'"^ 
Accordingly, ahimsa is properiy interpreted not as baievolence toward others for their own sake, 
but for the self-coitred reason of personal liberation from the karmic cycle of birtli, death and 
rebirtli. D'Costa counters that this reading of ahimsa neglects 'the way in which the psychological 
155 . See 3.2 and 3.3. 
156 . CM, pp. 301 -302. 
157 . D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, p. 63. 
158 . CM, p. 165. 
207 
componait here can lead to a deqjer rethinking and understanding, as is reflected in some strands of 
modem Hinduism.''" Thus, in this secxmd instance Kraemer's totalitarian approach has lead to an 
'abstract and over-textual analysis of religions'.'^" 
Once again, D'Costa validly criticises an extreme, but in so doing fails to give sufiBciait 
weight to the problems Kraemer opposed vih&\ writing The Christian Message. He concludes that 
Kraemer is abstract and over-textual whai I have shown that he was reacting against similariy 
abstract and over-textual analyses. In the immediately preceding paragraphs, 1 argued that 
totalitarianism did not preclude the possibility of genuine internal diange. I now show that it 
neither precludes the possibility of diange arising from external influaices. Consider his remarks 
concerning the permeation of the 'moral and social oudook in the non-Chnstian worid' with 
'"Chnstian" ideas, ideals and standards':"*' 
The great non-Christian religions have utilized the pentieation of Christian ideas and 
ideals for their own internal and external strengthening.... Men like Gandhi, Tagore 
and Radhakrishnan, vA\o evince each in his own peciUiar way a strong permeation with 
ideals and ideas deriving from Christianity, are no "unbaptized Christians,".... but rather 
have become invigorated Hindus by the process, with an unmistakable element of 
irritation in their attitude toward Christianity.... As a matter of fact, in the case of 
Gandlii and Tagore, however drastically their activist attitude towards hfe may differ 
from Hinduism as we know it, and however emancipated many of their leading ideas 
may be from dominant Hindu conceptions, the crucial feet is that the consciously keep 
to Hinduism as their recognised spiritual home, and even announce their new 
interpretation as being for the sake of Hinduism. 
Kraemer recognises that ideas imported from outside by influential individuals remaining inside can 
in fact lead to change within a religious totality. What he resists is the argumait that sudi change 
Qititles one to view that body of belief and practice as slowly becoming Chnstianised. 
159 . D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, p. 63. 
160 . D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, p. 63. 
161 . CM, p. 288. 
162 . CM, pp. 291 - 292. Likewise, he writes, 'Everyone wlio is familiar with conditions in the East 
knows that many non-Christian peoples have no objection whatever to recognizing Clirist as one of the 
higliest rehgious figures humanity has produced. To give Him an honourable place in the different 
pantheons does not meet with serious opposition. But to recognise Him and what He represents as the 
Lord of life, to whom supreme loyalty is due, is resolutely refused and rejected even by those who revere 
Him.' pp. 289 - 290. 
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To review, Kraemer's phaiomenology does not necessarily preclude die possibility of 
genume change within a religious tradition through the influaice of intemal factors (e.g. the 
theological thought of Ramanuja) or external factors (e.g. Christianity's impact upon Gandhi, 
Tagore, and Radhakrishnan). Therefore, I see no need to reject outnght the totalitanan approadi. 
Nevertheless, D'Costa's observations suggest that some modification is necessary in order to avoid 
treating the religions as static, monolithic entities. The problem is how to take particularity 
seriously without thereby daiying the possibility of diange over time. In The Christian Message. 
Kraemer's analysis of the 'living non-Christian religions' begins not by describing actual religious 
totalities, but with the highly theoretical division of 'prophetic religions of revelation' from 
'naturalist religions of trans-empirical realization'.'^ ^ The former, comprising Christianity, Judaism 
and Islam, is rooted in the self-revelation of God to humanity, and is therefore ultimately dualistic. 
God IS separate and distinct from creation. Those comprising the latter, on the other hand, 'are all 
mystical in their core, revelation consists of what are in some saise supreme religious 
expenaice.''" Includmg the great religions of India, China and Japan, it is ultimately monistic, 
starting 'from the fijndamartal assumption, r^ rded as self-evidoit, that man and nature are 
essaitially one.''^' This a priori division and the lumping of all non-Semitic religion into the latter 
necessarily affects Kraemer's conclusions. Take for instance his account of Ramanuja once again. 
Though Kraemer recognises that the Indian theologian 'radically" reacts against Vedantic 
philosophy, because all Indian religious and philosophical thinking is monistic, his changes must be 
purely cosmetic. Kraemer, in a manner not dissimilar to the transcendaitalist and naturalist 
philosophers he criticises, refuses to take Ramanuja on his own terms, but according to the essaice 
of all Eastern religious life and thought - monism. 
I believe that the totalitarian approadi can be preserved i f one takes a more pragmatic, 
local approach than Kraemer does above. In other words, instead of b^inning witli an a priori 
account of the fijndamoital starting-point of 'the naturalist religions of trans-empirical realization,' 
one should b ^ i n with actual encounters with religious totalities in concrete situations. Here, we 
can learn from Wilfred Cantwell Smith, viho, despite his talk of a global theolog>', takes the 
163 . CM,p 142. 
164. CM, p. 143. 
165 . CM, p. 155. 
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diversity of rehgious behefs senously.'**** In his view, appropriate observations are prefaced by 
phrases like 'most Muslims will agree' or 'this group of Vaisnavites acc^t,' rather than 'Islam 
teaches,' or 'Hinduism holds.''^' His operational principle is simply stated: 'No observer's statement 
about a group of persons is valid that cannot be appropriated by those persons.''^ * Though, this 
principle is highly problematic, it non^eless remains a vahd goal toward whidi to aim. 
Following Smith, I conteid that in order to take particularity as senously as Kraemer 
desires, one must b ^ j n at the level of the local religious community. In descnbing behefs and 
practices one cannot speak in general, but only in specific terms. This does not subvert the 
totahtarian approadi for there are elements within the local religious communities which render 
them recognisably Chnstian, Islamic, Buddhist. In the words of Paul Griffiths, these communities 
'bear a [sic] historical relationship that they take to be of salvific significance to one or another of 
those streams of evoits called "world rehgions".'"*^ Neither these communities nor their 
rqjresQitatives can be used to speak for 'Christianity,' 'Islam' or 'Buddhism', but they can be 
recognised as belonging broadly within one or another of these semi-fictional, amorphous aitities. 
Thus, a totahtarian interpretation of a specific belief or practice of a rural Reformed church would 
involve a description of how it relates to the behefs or practices of other Reformed communities, to 
the official documaits of their denomination and the various Reformed Confessions, and from there 
to other recognisably Christian bodies. In this way, particularity is preserved but the possibility of 
developmait, and/or diange is not daiied. 
Conclusion: 
Having set the stage in the previous diapter, this diapter offered a three-stqj apology for 
Kraemer's theology of rehgjons. In the first, four key themes were set out as a framework for 
166 . Smitli preserves the diversity of rehgious behef with tlie ultimate unity of rehgions by separating 
'behef from 'feith'. He writes, 'One's feitli is given by God, one's beliefs by one's century.' W.C Smith, 
Faith and Belief (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 96. Beliefs, for Smith, are intellectual 
appropriations of faith and vary not only between rehgions (a word Smitli dislikes) but between any two 
individuals within a religion. Faith, however, is a quality of religious life - the essence of rehgion. 
167 . W.C. Smith, Towards a World Theology. (MaryknoU: Orbis, 1981), p. 97. 
168 . Smith, Towards a Worid Theology, p. 97. 
169 . Paul J. GriflBths, An Apology for Apologetics. (Maiyknoll: Orbis, 1991), p. 6. 
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Kraemer's position. Afl;er a carefii summary of biblical realism, the totalitarian approadi, 
adaptation and the point of contact, the second then addressed five theological critidsms. The first 
of these was deemed both to misunderstand Kraemer's position and to be deeply problematic itself 
The remaining four, however, were judged to be more or less accurate. Nevertheless, because they 
fail to consider Kraemer's historical context, his habit of rh^orical over-emphasis, and the more 
subtie articulation of later work they ended up attacking an extreme whidi he avoided. As sudi, 
they are important boundaries, but do not seriously undermine Kraemer's position. The final 
section considered two phoiomoiological critidsms: that Kraemer can account neither for 
mtrarehgious nor mterreligious developmait. Though thdr validity was uncontested, 1 countered 
that they lead to a modification of the totalitarian approadi rather than its wholesale rejection. In so 
doing, it b^an to demonstrate that Kraemer's theology of religions continues to suggest ways of 
faithful theological creativity for Christians wrestimg with the problem of other religions in a 
postmodern worid. The final diapter complies the rdiabilitation by attempting a cntical re-
appropriation of his position. 
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Chapter? 
A Critical Re-Appropriation of 
Hendrik Kraemer's Theology of Religions 
Introduction: 
Kraemer was set in the background as diapter 5 defined and briefly outlined caitrai 
questions m postmodernist philosophy and presetted the postmodern orthodoxy of Hans Fra and 
George Lindbeck as a viable but not uncritical response to them. In chapter 6, he was returned to 
respond to his cntics demonstrating thereby that his position can and does stand up to serious 
analysis. In three sections, this final diapter now draws together Kraemer and postmodern 
orthodoxy in order to show that his theology of rehgions continues to suggest ways of faithful 
theological creativity for Christians wresthng with the problem of rehgions in a postmodern worid. 
The first shows that for postmodem theology of rehgions, bibhcal reahsm entails both that it 
recognise the exphdtiy Christian nature of theology of rehgions and that it appredate rehgious 
diversity as part of the Chnstian metanarrative. The second conteids that the totalitanan approadi 
brings to postmodem theology of rehgions a suspidon of universal and neutral evaluative cntena, a 
resistance to the mdacritical quest for a core common to the religions, and an allowance that they 
may be successfii in bringing 'salvation' to their adherents. Finally, the third shows how 
adaptation resists a strict incommaisurability thesis by underscoring the need for both comparative 
theology and apologdics and how, through Kraemer's dialectical point of contact, legitimate but 
mcomplete communication bdween traditions is possible: 
7.1 Biblical Realism and Authority 
Lyotard, as was shown in diapter 5, rejects the modem mdanarratival claim to universal 
autiionty and/or rationality because it thereby subsumes or suppresses the other's litiJe narratives. 
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In so doing, he believes he has created a discursive space for thdr telling and re-telling, where 
violait coerdve power is rqalaced non-violait, playfii struggle, or agonistics. While accqDting the 
critique of modernity, I countered that this postmodernist proposal was itself a metanarrative which 
either could not recognise the violence inheroit in the agon or could not articulate vA\y the coercive 
subsuming of all narratives into one is dhically rqjrdiaisible. Although his thought thus seems 
deeply problematic, Lyotard nevertheless directs the attention of Christian theologians to the 
problem of authority, namely its tendaicy toward violaice. Contra both Taylor's deconstruction 
and Milbank's reconstruction, I presaited the postmodern orthodoxy of Frei and Lindbeck as one 
addressing this problem by recognising the metanarratival claims of Christian theology without 
thereby Intimating violence against the other. I argued that this was accomplished through its re-
articulation of theology as primarily (though not exclusively) self-description and sodal 
demarcation, as the grammar of Christian language about God. 
In diapter 6, the problem of authority surfaced again with explidt referoice to Christian 
evaluations of the beliefs and practices of other religious communities. There, it was shown that 
Kraemer opposed both the IMC's fiifilmait theology and Hockmg's nascait pluralism because in 
his opinion, they confijsed the mission of the Church with the advancement of western culture. For 
both, interreligious evaluation was authorised by the all^edly universal vantage-point occupied by 
western intellectuals. Against this cultural idealism, Kraemer insisted that Christian assessmaits of 
other religions were authorised by the revelation of God m Christ as recorded in Scnpture and 
proclaimed by the Church. Rather than bemg all^edly universal, thai, Kraemer's authonty is 
intemal to Christian faith. This is aicapsulated in the phrase, biblical realism. Significantiy, Frei 
and Lindbeck parallel Kraemer insofar as they agree that Christian theology gaierally and theolog>' 
of religions specifically are rooted in the intemal logic of the Christian language. By so articulating 
an intemal authority for Chnstian judgemaits on other religions, they aitail both that a postmodern 
theology of religions recognise the explidtly Christian nature of theology of religions and that it 
appredate religious diversity as pait of the Christian metanarrative. In the remaining paragraphs of 
this section, eadi aitailment is briefly explored. 
First, because tlie Bible is not classic literature or a sacred text, but the sacred record of 
the revelation of God to humanity, biblical realism 'redescribes reality within the scnptural 
fi-amework rather than translating scripture into extrascriptural categones. It is the text, so to 
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speak, whidi absorbs the world, rather than the worid the text.'' It is chiefly through appeals to the 
Bible and through the history of its interpretation, that the Christian community tests, restates, and 
reforms its totahty of behefs and practices. It is therefore unsurprising that a postmodem theology 
of rehgions b^ins with exphdtiy bibhcal language and its various interpr^tions throughout 
history m order to make saise of other faiths. In this soise it is as mudi an exerdse in self-
understanding and self-description as it is one of understanding and describing the other. To the 
d^ee that this strategy is undeftakai. Scripture is 'not sunply a source of precqjts and truths, but 
the interpretive fi-amework for all reahty.'^  
As we saw in diapter 5, sudi language, focused as it is on sodal demarcation and self-
description, evokes diarges of sectarianism. Postmodem theology of rehgions, however, avoids 
these charges through a Kraemerian reinterprdation of natural theology. At first glance, sudi an 
assertion seems ironic i f not inconsistait with what has previously been argued. After all, Reformed 
theology and philosophy have always been suspidous of the projed^ and Kraemer, as a Reformed 
theologian, shares in this suspidon.'* Hoice, two types of natural theology must be distinguished. 
That whidi Refomied and postmodern theology rejects purports to describe a universally available 
1 . Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 118; see also Bruce D. Marshall, 'Absorbing the Worid: 
Christianity and the Universe of Truths,' in Theology and Dialogue: Essays in Conversation with George 
Lmdbeck, ed. Bruce Marshall, .(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 69 - 102. 
2 . George Lmdbeck, 'Scripture, Consensus and Community,' m Bibhcal Interpretation in Crisis, ed. 
Richard.John Neuhaus, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), p. 75. 
3 . In contemporary philosophy of religion, this suspicion is found m those commonly associated with 
'Reformed Epistemology.' See, for example, Alvin Plantmga, 'The Reformed Objection to Natural 
Theology,' in Proceedings of the American Cathohc Philosophical Association, 54 (1980), pp. 49 - 62: and 
Nicholas Wolterstorfi^  'Can Behef m God Be Rational If It Has No Foundations? in Faith and Rationality: 
Reason and Behef in God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas WolterstorEE; (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame, 1983), pp. 135 - 186. 
4 . He writes, 'any theology which claims the right to call itself Christian can only mean one thing when 
using tlie word God: i.e. the Triune God, the God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ. All other "ideas" of 
God, though they may be lofty and theistic, are. Biblically speaking non-existent "gods", functioning as 
idols ... Natural Theology m its current sense, consciously or unconsciously, works with an idea of Deity 
common to everybody who believes in God and transcendmg all "special" ideas of God. To maintain tliis 
means making the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, "the only true God" according to Jolin 17:3, a 
subordinate idea, which can fit m with a philosophy of rehgion but not with theology which understands its 
real function, i.e. faitliful interpretation of Bibhcal teaching' RCF, p. 361. 
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set of reasons or evidences which ground particular Christian beliefs and practices.' Consider for 
example the defoice of exclusivism offered by G d v ^ and Phillips, to whidi diapter 2 alluded, it 
holds that the universal religious impulse, 'diaracterized by a singular desire to make sense of 
human existence within the larger framework of reality,'^  has driven humans to ask 'Why is there 
anythmg at all, rather than nothing?' and responds with a version of the cosmological argument: 
'Our lives are sd within a context -whose initial conditions were established by the Cause of the 
b^innmg of the universe.'^  By appraising the limits and conditions of human existence, it thai 
purports to show that humans are dqjendent upon and estranged from God and in need of a 
'particular revelation, answering to the specific needs of the human condition, [\\diidi] might be 
provided by God.'* Finally, in order to distinguish gaiuine fi-om spurious revelation claims, it 
offers these criteria: compatibility with knowledge of God lying outside the revelation; suitability to 
universal human needs; and corroboration by external signs sudi as miracles.' Thus, in this first 
s t rata , natural theology moves from universal evidences to the particular revelation. 
Kraemerian natural theology, on the other hand, starts not with allegedly universal 
grounds, but with particular beliefs and practices as they are embodied m particular religious 
communities. It thai moves from the particular to the universal by seeking to locate particular 
beliefs and practices upon as large a concqDtual map as possible. Sudi a move necessarily takes 
place only at specific times and places as the adherents of Christian communities become familiar 
with the beliefs and practices of those of other communities and vice versa. Consider the following 
hypothdical account.'" A Buddhist monk partidpating in a monastic exchange with Dominican 
monastery in the United States, sharing in its life and worship, hears the word 'God' maitioned. As 
5 . Laura Garcia has summed it up as follows: 'Natural theology is the attempt to demonstrate certain 
tmths concerning God's existence and nature, operating from premises that are knowable by any rational 
person independently of divine revelation.' Laura L. Garcia, 'Natural Theology and tlie Reformed 
Objection,' in Christian Perspectives on ReUgious tCnowledge. ed. C. Stephen Evans and Merold Westphal, 
(Grand Rapids; Eerdmans, 1993), pp. 112-133. 
6 . Geivett and Philhps, 'A Particularist View,' p. 219. 
7 . Geivett and Phillips, 'A Particularist View,' pp. 220 - 222. 
8 . Geivett and Phillips, 'A Particularist View,' p. 225. 
9 . Geivett and Phillips, 'A Particularist View,' p. 226. 
10 . Adapted frorti DiNoia. The Diversity of Religions, pp. 127 -141. 
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time passes, he understands that 'God' signifies the person whom his Dominican hosts worship, 
love, and to whom they pray. Moreover, in these prayers, God is named Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit. This experience of particular behefs embodied in the particular practices of a particular 
Christian community, may lead him to ask. Who is this God whom you worship and to whom you 
pray? to whidi a brother well-versed in Aquinas, might reply, God is the Cause of all that is. Tlie 
move from the particular to the universal is clear. 
Reconcdved in this manner, the language of natural theology, including the classical 
thdstic arguments, demonstrates the universal scope of particular Christian clauns. It does not and 
cannot provide universal grounds for ways of life embodying the Christian m^anarrative, but 
presupposes its indwelhng as 'canonically and narrationally unified and internally glossed... 
caitered on Jesus Christ, and telling the story of the deahngs of the Triune God with his people and 
his worid m ways that are... applicable to the present.'" It sustains "the broadest possible context 
for Christian affirmation,''^ and in so doing, enables Christian theologians to raider these 
affirmations understandable to those outside the Christian community. As Kraemer puts it, 'The 
fijnction of natural theology will haiceforth be not to constme prqaaratory stages and draw 
unbrokei, continuous hnes of religious development ending and reaciiing thdr summitt in Christ, 
but. .. to uncover in the hght of the revelation of Christ the differait modes of God-, self- and 
worid-consdousness of man in his religious hfe.''^ By fijndamaitally reonaiting natural theology, 
postmodem orthodox theology of religions recognises its exphdtiy Christian nature without 
becoming sectarian. 
Second, Postmodem theology of rehgions appredates rehgious diversity as an integral part 
of the Christian metanarrative. It resists any final evaluation of the other's religious beUefs and 
practices for the sake of the open-eidedness of the Christian story itself We have already seai how 
Mddleton and Walsh appeal to texts of terror for an internal critique and anti-totalising elemait 
within the Christian metanrrative. Kraemer employs the story of the Noahic Covaiant in a similar 
way with regard to religions. For him, God's Covaiant with Noah (Gaiesis 8:8-17) 'is a Covaiant 
11 . George A. Lindbeck, 'Scripture, Consensus and Community,' p. 75. 
12 . DiNoia, The Diversity of Religions, p. 131. 
13 . CM, p. 125. 
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with mankmd as a whole and with every living creature. The rainbow, as a symbol of peace and 
harmony after the storm is the tokai of the everiasting (!) Covenant betweai God and "every livmg 
creature of all flesh that is upon the earth" .''" He continues: 
It is striking and deeply significant that before God's special revelational experiment 
with Israel begins in Chapter 12, in the story of God's election of Abraham and His 
Covenant with him (which is a Covenant between with the people of Abraham, with a 
universal perspective -12:1-3), tiie "everlasting Covenant between God and every living 
creature" is stated as an estabUshed and irremovable feet, governing tiie spiritual destiny 
of maiikind as a vAiole. This is of the greatest of significance for a BibUcally-based 
theology of rehgion" 
For postmodern theology of religions, the Noahic. Covaiant is a remmder that evaluations of the 
religious life of humanity are not final, for it reveals God's concern not for one nation or religion, 
but for the aitire human race. Thus the Bible itself prohibits any final declaration about how God 
must ad toward humankind and accordingly, any final judgement on rehgions. 
The religions, according to this perspective, remain part of God's providaitial plan for tiie 
human race in sudi a manner whidi does not threatai caitral Christian doctrines or da;ract fi-oni 
the uniqueness of the Christian community. On the contrary, 'The notion that otiier religions play 
some part m the divme plan accords with traditional Christian dodnnes about other religions, in 
whidi it has beai affirmed that they... may be the instrumaits of some divine purpose.'"^ Still, it 
must be clear that the religions are valued ndther because they are anonymous channels of 
Christian salvation nor because of the indq^endaitiy authentic ways of relating to Ultimate Reality 
they offer. Rather, according to the Christian Scriptures, thdr value lies in thar real if as yet 
unspedfiable role in the one 'divine plan to whidi the Chnstian community bears witness.'" To 
say more than this, dther a priori affirmations or negations, is to presume for one's self a God's-
eye-view of history: a presumption rooted in Onginal Sin - the desire to usurp tiie place of God. 
In this context, questions of salvation anse for i f other-believers are part of Gods plan to 
which the Church testifies, it would seem to follow that they share in the salvation it proclaims. 
14 . RCF, p. 253. 
15 . RCF. pp. 253 - 254. 
16 . DiNoia, The Diversity of Religions, p. 90. 
17 . DiNoia. The Diversity of Religions, p. 91. 
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This conclusion, however, is rendered susped by its failure to give suffident waght to the 
intratextuahty of Christian theology. If, as Lindbeck contaids, one must be fluait in the Christian 
language in order to experiaice dther Christian salvation or damnation, it would follow that ver>' 
littie can be said about the esdiatological destiny of those outside the linguistic community. This 
suggests an odd mconsistaicy betweai the gaieral thrust of his articulation of theology as grammar 
and his understanding of a postmortem encounter with Christ.'* He seems to assume that while 
there are many premortem rehgions, eadi with thar own language and grammar, in postmortem 
aicounters, the Christian language will prevail. This assumption is highly problematic, as Kai 
Sunn points out: 
How, m this "post-mortem" state, wiU someone who had in "this life" been a Hmdu, be 
able to "interiorize the language about Christ"? Are we justified in hopmg that there 
will be only one such "post-mortem" language? If there is, wtoch one wiU it be? Will 
our Hindu speak "about Christ" in the idiom of John Paul II or Oral Roberts? Or will 
she speak in the accents of St Augustine or Jonathan Edwards? Or will there just be one 
language, albeit an entirely new and pure language, an Ursprache, which all. Oral 
Roberts and Hindu alike, wiU speak? What are we hopmgyor when we are persuaded to 
think along the lines prescribed by the "prospective fides ex auditu" theory? We cannot 
even begin to contemplate wdiat 'the appropriate answers to these questions would be 
like, and this should be suflBcient indication that we have tiiis diEBculty because we 
cease to be feithful to the Judaeo-Christian Bilderverbot when we start to think about 
the "after-life" m such positive terms."* 
Rather, it seems that Kraemer's hopefiil agnostidsm dovetails better with Lindbecks understanding 
of theological language. While there are biblical grounds for locating the religions within the realm 
of God's providaice, hke all final judgemaits r^rdingtiiem, esdiatological destiny is left to God. 
To summanse, I argued above that a postmodem ortiiodox theology of religions, 
following Kraemer, Frd and Lindbeck, takes the Bible as its authority for interreligious evaluation. 
I thai contaided that this aitails recognising the openly Christian nature of theology of religions 
and that the rehgions are an i n t ^ a l part of the Christian story. I thereby sought to show that tiie 
Christian metanarrative need not necessarily resort to violence in its assessmait of those who stand 
outside it. This contaition is underscored whai one turns to Kraemer's second tiieme, the 
totalitarian approadi. 
18 . See chapter 2.2. 
19 . Ken Surin, '"Many Rehgions and tiie One Tme Faith": An Exammation of Lmdbecks Chapter 3.' in 
The Turnings of Darkness and Liglit. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 175 - 176. 
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7.2 The Totalitarian Approach and the Other 
The precedmg section observed that the Christian metanarrative contains resources which 
recognise and affirm the other. This section argues fijrther that Kraemer's totalitarian approach 
preserves 'essaitial "cthemess"'^ " by recognising that any attempt to understand the otiier is limited 
by one's own cultural and historical situation and is therefore never total. This requires 
explanation. Li diapter 6, Kraemer was shown to argue that the interprdation of a religious belief 
or practice necessarily occurs from a standpoint aitailing the interprder's own religio-cultural 
beliefs and practices. Further, to acknowledge this is not to affirm the validity of all interpraations, 
but to admit that the interprrter does not occupy a universally accessible standpoint. On the 
contrary, he or she remains as culturally and historically bound as that which he or she seeks to 
understand. 'To "understand" or to "comprdiaid" rehgjon or a religion, we conclude, means to 
interpret it. Interpretation is not solely, nor even mainly, an intellectual but an existaitial activity.'"' 
For this reason, any interpr^tion of the other is just that - an interpretation. Although genuine 
understandmg of the other is possible, it is never complete. 
The othemess of the other, then, is preserved because the totalitarian approadi remains 
aware of its unavoidable bias. It frankly acknowledges the difficulties aicountered whai an 
adherait of one religious totality attempts to make saise of anotiier. 'In saymg this, we are far from 
recommendmg or defending an unbridled subjectivity or putting all degrees of subjectivity on tiie 
same level. On the contrary, what we need is the dear recognition of the fad that... we are always 
partiy conditioned by the world in whidi we have our roots, and in the selecting of facts we are 
partiy led by our "subjectivity".''^ ^ To recognise this prejudice is the best way to guard against it. 
To reduce it to the smallest possible proportions requires not an intellectual ad of epoche, 'but a 
rnoral ad of resped for what is alien to us.' The totalitarian approach preserves the other 'because 
it is an evaluating presentation of an alien or different spiritual worid according to its own 
fijndamaital presuppositions and intartions. It is a congaiial entering into a differait universe of 
discourse, that has its own language.'^ ^ When so understood, the totalitarian approadi brings to a 
20 . AF, P- 5. 
21 . RCF. p. 51. 
22 . RCF, p. 47. 
23 . RCT, p. 49. 
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postmodem theology of religions a suspidon of universal and neutral evaluative criteria, a 
resistance to the metacntical quest for a core common to the rehgions, and an allowance tiiat ether 
rehgions may be successflil in bringmg 'salvation' to thar adhereits. The remaining paragraphs 
fmther develop each claim. 
First, in postmodem theology of rehgions, claims to universal and neutral evaluative 
critena concaved ather to vindicate one rehgion over others or to affirm several are to be met with 
suspidon. The latter view is Kdth Ward's who writes, 'a sd of fijndamaital values whidi are givai 
by the very nature of human being itself, and whidi are not merely convaitional or matters of 
arbitrary and wholly subjective preferaice' confirm the major religions.^ Harold N^and, who 
msists that 'some nonarbitrary criteria exist to evaluate various religious traditions and tiiat it is 
mdeed Intimate for a Christian to conclude that other rehgions vMdn embrace basic behefs 
incompatible with centrd taiets of the Chnstian faith are false,'^' exemphfies tiie former. Despite 
their opposmg aims, one might expect to find m thar contributions, cornmon critena or at least an 
acknowledgernait of overiappmg aims. However, one finds natiier. Rather, when subjected to a 
suspiaous analysis, both Ward and Netland are shown to disguise bias (albat unintaided) bdiind 
language of universahty and neutrahty.^ ** 
To abandon the seardi for universal and neutral evaluative critena, however, need not 
culminate in a distinctiy postmodernist fomi of relativism because it does not necessarily empty 
religious claims of thdr cognitive contait. Prima facie, rehgions make claims about the nature of 
reality whidi are capable of bang true or false and these claims must be takai seriously. Rather, 
by recognising that knowledge of the worid in the broadest possible saise is mediated by tiie 
tradition of the knower,^ ^ postmodem theology of rehgions r ^ r d s suspiaously any claim to 
24 . Keith Ward, A Vision to Pursue. Beyond the Crisis in Christianity. (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), p.i52 
25 . Netland, Dissonant Voices, p. 152. 
26 . For a comparison and critique of both approaches, see Gavin D'Costa, 'Whose Objectivity? Which 
Neutrality? The Doomed Quest for a Neutral Vantage Point from Which to Judge Rehgions,' in Religious 
Studies. 29 (1993), pp. 79 - 95. For a critique of Netiand, see T.S. Perry, 'A Critique of Harold Netiand's 
Universal and Neutral Defense of Exclusivisni," forthcoming in Calvin Theological Journal. 
27 . Though there are obvious paraUels here to the work of Thomas Kuhn in the pliilosophy of science and 
to Michael Polanyi in epistemology, it has been a cenfral tenet of the Dutch Reformed pliilosophy of 
Hemian Dooyeweerd. See Thomas Kuhn, The Stmcture of Scientific Revolutions, second edition, 
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umversal and neutral criteria as an attempt to prejudice discussion in favour of one tradition over 
against others. Here, the postmodern critidsm of modernity is judged to be essaitially correct: 
claims to privil^ed qjistemic access has led and can lead to the destruction of other rationalities. 
To reveal sudi claims to be historically and culturally situated is to deprive them of their universal 
and powerful status. This is not to embrace a radical relativism, but to acknowledge in the wake of 
modernity, a situation of radical relativity where many differait and divergent, yet potentially 
'rational' claims are being advanced. Where Ward's and Netland's claims to neutrality mask tiiar 
bias, Kraemer declares his at the outsd. His is a postmodern recognition of relativity without an 
adoption of postmodernist relativism. 
Second, postmodem theology of religions resists the metacntical quest for a core common 
to the religions, an example of whidi is provided by Paul Knitter below. 
If an explicit recognition of "sin" and divine "justice and wrath" are defined as 
prerequisites for admission into the circle of the elect, then admittedly few Hindus and 
Buddhists would qualify. But are Althaus and Brunner themselves limiting God by 
laying down such prerequisites? It appears that the reality behind the symbol of sin is 
caught by the Hindu symbol of avidya ("ignorance") or the Buddhist experience of 
tanha ("selfish craving"). Even though the Buddha did not speak about an infinite 
offense against divine justice, he perhaps has anotiier angle on what is wrong with the 
human condition when he announced that dukkha ("suffering") is universal and is 
caused by craving.^ * 
In this excerpt. Knitter seems to assume a privileged vantage point from whidi he can 'see' that sui, 
avidya and tanha are all more or less partial descriptions of the one human predicamait. In otiier 
words, he assumes that a more accurate insight into the true nature of reality is his, while that of the 
other (in the quotation above, dther 'Mainline Protestants,' Hindus, or Buddhists) is only partial. 
While this is not his mtention, sudi an assumption unavoidably leads to tiie implicit claim to 
understand the other's narrative bdter than he or she does. This being the case, it falls upon him to 
ailighten the Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists he has described above whose knowledge is 
incompld;e. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge. (London: Routiedge 
and Kegan Paul, 1957); and Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thouglit. 2 volumes, 
trans. David H. Freeman and WiUiaiii S. Young, (Pliiladelphia: Presbyterian and Refomied, 1953), esp. 
vol. 1, chapter ,2. 
28 . Knitter. No aher Name?, p. 118. 
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Givai the prima facie difference bdween these various explanations. Knitter's attempt at 
aihghtaiment.must be grounded in a theory whidi purports to uncover the one human predicamait 
behind them. As was shown m Chapter 1, this is predsely what John Hick attempts with his 
plurahstic hypothesis. He argues that the post-axial rehgions 'exhibit in thar different ways a 
soteriologial structure whidi identifies the misery, unreahty, triviality, and perversity of ordinary 
human hfe, affirms an ultimate unity of reahty and value in whidi or in relation to which a 
hmitiessly better quahty of existence is possible, and shows tiie way to realise that radically h&tex 
possibihty.'^ ^ Thus, the rehgions variously and partially describe the one human predicamait, one 
Ultimate Reahty and the one way to move fi-om one to the other and these in tum make up tiie core 
common to all the great rehgions. Hicks ambitious undertaking, thai, is no less than to constmct a 
theory whidi would make sense of all rehgious behefs and practices, in other words, a metacritical 
quest for a common rehgious core. 
From a postmodem perspective, this s t ra ta while admirably attempting to preserve tiie 
diversity of rehgions by granting to each a measure of tnrth, ultimately fails to take senously tiie 
very beliefs and practices whidi distinguish rehgious communities from eadi other. Hick, for 
instance, is right to argue tiiat in order for Christians to partidpate in his plurahstic theory, tiiey 
must first relinquish or radically reinterpret traditional Chalcedonian diristology. The Islamic 
belief ui the Qu'ran as the one infallible Word of God, the Orthodox Jewish doctnne of dection of 
Israel, Vedantic behef m Brahman/Atman and Zai belief in Nirvana must all be recast as at best 
partial and at worst mistakai apprehensions of reahty in order to be adopted into Hicks theory. 
Peter Byrne takes senously tins necessary reinterpr^tion whai he writes, 
someone who affirms doctrinal statements after going througli the reflective process 
wliich leads to embracmg plurahsm as a philosophical thesis cannot afi&mi doctrinal 
statements to be unequivocally, categorically true. " I believe" cannot man tiie same for 
such a person in " I beheve Jesus is tiie Son of God" as it means in " I believe tiiat grass is 
green".... This much must be conceded by tiie pluralist. It must be granted tiiat, despite 
all the cognitive pouit plurahst gives to doctrinal affirmations, it does not leave 
everything as it is. The doctrinal stance is altered by pluralism.^ " 
29 . iOR, p. 36. 
30 . Byrne, Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism, p. 202. 
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The question Knitter, Hick and evai Byrne fail to answer, however, is whether or not the 
radical reinterpretation of such beliefs does not aid up denying the religious diversity and 
particularity various pluralist hypotheses seek to preserve. S. Mark Heim writes, 'To accqDt the 
aflBrmation of their faith given by the pluralistic theologies, those of other religions need to agree 
first that it is actually still their faith whidi is aflBrmed whai it is in the translated form these 
theologies give it. Second, they need to be willing for their religious life to be cast in the mould 
pluralistic theology has set for it.'^' Pluralist theories, in other words, hold either explicitly (as ui 
tlie case of Byrne) or implicitly (as in the cases of Knitter and Hick) that the central beliefs which 
distinguish religious communities fi-om each other are as they stand indefoisible. Here Heim is 
blunt: 'Only as demythologised, adapted to the categories or critical historical thought, put in the 
context of Western understandings of qjistemology, and measured against modem concqjtions of 
equality and justice can these religions be pronounced valid.'^ ^ It thus seems that the metacritical 
approadi results m the preservation of a voieer of diversity and particulanty which fails to take 
either seriously. 
Postmodern theology of religions counters that these very beliefs, preasely because they 
distinguish religions from eadi other, make them interesting objects of study in the first place and 
therefore ought to be preserved. That differences, and sometimes ones of enormous significance, 
exist brtweai religions cannot be denied. Most Hindus and Buddhists believe in the karmic cycle of 
reincamation, orthodox Christians, Jews and Muslims do not; though they would differ about its 
significance. Christians and Jews are likely to agree that Jesus was crucified, whereas most 
Muslims would argue that he was not and others, e.g. Ahmadi Muslims, would argue fiarther that 
he moved to Kashmir, where he lived out his days. The question is whether it is more realistic to 
31 . S. Mark Heim, Salvations, pp. 108 - 109. Heim then goes on to recount the following anecdote. 'At 
one conference a well-known pluralist theologian said, in good humour, to a decidedly non-pluralist Jewish 
theologian, the veteran of long years of interfeith discussions, "With your views, you shouldn't be involved 
in dialogue." "Nevertheless, 1 am," he rephed; and suggested that it was perhaps the pluralist theory that 
ouglit to be adjusted and not the reality he represented. In any event, the Jewish theologian continued, 
when liberal Christians and liberals of other traditions get together to talk about their liberalism, he did not 
call that dialogue. This affible exchange was capped by another pluralist voice in the audience wlio 
allowed that though his Jewish compatriot might be able to dialogue "after a feshion," he would be unable 
to participate in autlientic dialogue until he had adopted a thoroughly plurahstic outlook Here it would 
seem that the old lamented triumphalist attitudes of Christians remain in vigorous health, if in different 
forms.' p. 109. 
32 . Heim, Salvations, p. 109. 
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suppose that these diflferaices are but minor historical and cultural variations on the one 
soteriologjcal structure pointing to one Ultimate Reality or that they are both prima facie and 
ultima facie diflferent and sometimes opposing interpretations of reality. Against the equation of 
surface similarities and metacritical theories, I argue that givai the available evidence, the latter is 
the more accurate answer. 
I f left here, in spite of the previous qualifications, the argument would again be left opai to 
diarges of relativism. More must be said. Hick, Knitter, Byrne, and one might add Netland, have 
developed theones on the assumption that religions are different ways of relating to the same 
reality. (Netland differs by arguing that only the Christian tradition offers its adheraits the proper 
relationship). Postmodern theology, by taking the differort descriptions of their vanous 'Ultimates' 
at face value, refuses to equate them as partial descriptions of the one Ultimate Realit>'." The 
available evidaice, vdi^er it is assessed in terms of 'values,' or 'satisfactory religious experiaice,' 
or 'truth claims' is at the very best, ambiguous. A legitimate, conclusive analysis on these bases 
would require a God's-eye-view whidi denies human cultural and historical finitude. With Heim, 
my position 'insists [that] there is only one reality and we are trying to know it. It is not committed 
to regarding other substantive views as equally valid, only as tenable from different perspectives. 
What IS fragmented is not truth but justification or warranted assertability.'" It is a description of 
relativity not a prescription of relativism. 
By applying Kraemer's totalitarian approadi in this way, postmodern theology of religions 
b^er preserves religious plurality and diversity and nowhere is this more evident than when 
looking specifically at their diverse soteriologies. I f the preceding argument is taiable, thai in 
soteriological contexts, it requires that one speaks no longer of salvation, but of 'salvations.' As 
Kraemer has written, 'it is indeed a fact that in Hinduism, many people have found salvation, witli 
deep satisfaction.'" The problem at which this quotation hints lies with the word 'salvation.' Most 
theologies of religions accross the typological spectrum have until now descnbed it monolithically. 
33 . Patrick Shaw, 'On Worshipping tlie Same God,' in ReUgious Studies, 28 (1992), pp. 511 - 532. 
34 . Heim, Salvations, p. 137; see also Nicholas Rescher, The Strife of Systems. (Pittsburglv University of 
Pittsburgli Press, 1985), p. 190. 
35 . RCF, p. 84. 
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In both inclusivist and exclusivist versions, salvation always means salvation in and through Christ; 
they diverge over wdi^er other religions are anonymous vdiicles of God in Christ's grace (Rahner) 
or ordinary ways of salvation (Kiing) or simply varidies of unbelief (Barth). Likewise, for plurahst 
proposals, despite 'all the speculation and professed radicalism, "salvation" remams a comfortable 
and unitary reference point.'^ *" For them, salvation is the transition of religious bebevers from self-
coitredness to Reality-caitredness (Hick) or the liberation of the poor and oppressed (Knitter). For 
the former, other traditions may or may not partiapate in the Christian soteriological scheme, while 
for the latter all are partial expressions of a common aid. In both, this end is singularly termed 
salvation or salvation/liberation whidi is to say 'a state of being that transcends the limitations of 
presait human existence and that is attainable through the form of life prescribed in [a] 
community's teadiings.'" 
From a Kraemenan perspective, this monolithic descnption of salvation is highly 
problematic for it fails to take senously the intemal significance of the soteriological claims of 
other traditions. I f the religions do not proffer differait descriptions of one human predicatmeit, 
one Ultimate Reality, but describe different predicamaits and Reabties, thai it logically follows that 
their soteriologies cannot be described exclusively in Christian or in pluralist terms, but in those 
whidi give full weight to the intemal significance of the structures by whidi the religions seek to 
overcome the predicament and relate to the Reality. One must speak, in other words, not of 
salvation, but of salvations. Grace Jantzai writes that '"Salvation", it tums out, is a slippery notion. 
It implies that there is somdhing to be saved from; what this is varies according to context 
One traditionally Chnstian description of salvation may be the fdlowship of a community of 
believers with the Tnune God culminating in the perfection of Heavai. As such, it assumes the 
reality of a personal God distinct from the bdieving individual. Theravadin salvation, however. 
36 . Heini, Salvations, p. 129. The exception to this observation is Raimon Panikkar, who writes. The 
center is neither the earth (our particular rehgion), nor the sun (God, transcendence, the Absolute...). 
Rather, each solar system has its own center and every galaxy tums redprocally around the other. There is 
no absolute center. Reality itself is concentric inasmuch as each being (each tradition) is the center of the 
universe - of its own universe to begin with.' Raimon Panikkar, 'The Jordan, the Tiber, and the Ganges,' in 
The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, p. 109. See also Raimon Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Experience: 
emerging reUgious consciousness, ed. Scott Eastham, (MaryknoU: Orbis, 1993). 
37 . DiNoia, The Diversity of Rebgions. p. 39. 
38 . Grace M. Jantzen, 'Human Diversity and Salvation in Christ,' in Religious Studies. 20 (1984), p. 579. 
My emphasis. 
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sees the existoice of God as irrelevant and culminates in the reahsation that there is no substantial 
individual. In the absence of convincing arguments to the contrary, it is unlikely that these 
'salvations' are in some way partial descriptions of the same event.^ ' 'It is therefore important, 
whai we turn to a rehgious context, that we do not assume without investigation a monolithic 
concqjt of salvation, either in terms of its antecedait condition (fi-om what we are saved), or its goal 
(to what we are saved). This is especially true in the face of the diversity of rehgions 
This does not pursue the issue far aiough: postmodern theology of rebgions not only 
acknowledges a plurality of salvations, but also allows that the various rehgions may in fact be 
more or less successfii in bringing their concq^t of salvation to their adherents. Because it r ^ rd s 
religions as complex systems of doctrines and practices that aicompass complete ways of life, 
'salvation' is interpreted in terms of this comprehensive pattem. Therefore, there is no reason not to 
assume that someone pursumg diligently the sotenological sdieme of a rehgious tradition may be 
r ^ rded as expenoicing the salvation offered by that tradition."*' Accordingly, one pursuing tine 
Noble Eightfold Path may experiaice in this life something that can only be termed 'Enlightenmait' 
and therefore aijoy 'salvation' in a Buddhist context. Because the soteriolpgical schemes differ 
markedly, such an experioice cannot be described either as an acceptance or a rejection of 
Christian salvation or as a transition from self-ceitredness to Reahty-caitredness. The Chnstian 
belief that 'there is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heavei given among 
men by whidi we must be saved' (Acts 4:12), thai does not necessarily preclude the possibility of 
other religions being mdqDaidaitly authaitic ways of salvation. There are, in other words, many 
rehgions and eadi is the only way of salvation.'*^ A postmodern theology of religions informed by 
the totahtarian approadi gives a more accurate account of the variations in soteriologies by 
retairung what DiNoia calls the 'internal significance' of these doctrines and practices while 
39 . DiNoia, The Diversity of Rehgions. p. 47. 
40 . Jantzen, 'Human Diversity and Salvation in Christ,' p. 580. 
41 . In the words of Mark Heim, 'Any particular religious tradition would regard someone as "saved" 
whose life liad been most fully shaped by the distinctive pattern it fosters.' Heim, Salvations, p. 162. 
42 . Thus, Pendipeddi Chenchiah can say, 'The supreme longing of the Hindu after escape from samsara 
is not satisfied by Christ. The gift of Rebuth as offered by Christ does not appeal to the Hmdu. On the 
contrary, Jesus kindles new hopes not felt before and kills some of the deepest and most persistent longings 
of man'. Cited in RCF. pp. 215-216. 
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debberately and opaily transposing them to Christian contexts of discussion. In so doing, it gives a 
more accurate account of the primafacie 'otherness' of other rebgjons. 
Finally, I want to address two potential defeaters of this argumait. Consider first of all 
Hick's soteriological criterion. I f one can grade the salvific efficacy of a rebgions according to its 
production of saints, thai a universal, empirically verifiable means of equating salvations exists. 
Recall that for Hick, the transition from self-centredness to Reality-caitredness can occur within 
any number of post-axial rebgions. It foUows, then, that salvific efficacy of a rebgion can be tested 
according to the bves of its adherents. To be fair, however, one must not focus on just any 
adherent, but those a givai rebgious community recognises as 'mudi further advanced' in the 
transformation to Reality-centredness - saints."^  These ranarkable individuals can be tested both 
spiritually and diiicaUy, according to thdr caitredness on Ultimate Reality and thdr embodimait of 
the universal ideal of compassionate goodwill for others, or 'Agape/Karuna.'*' In as mudi as these 
tests can be accurately applied. Hick concludes that no religion can claim superiority. Here, then, is 
a simple test whidi avoids metaphysical language and, i f it succeeds, undercuts my argumait 
compldBly. 
Upon closer inspection, however. Hick's criterion of saintiiness is deqjly problematic 
because it assumes that the rebgions focus on one Reality. I have already shown that this 
assumption cannot be estabbshed. Indeed, if we take thdr prima facie descriptions seriously, the 
religions focus on differait Ultimate Realities."*' How does this impact upon Hicks cntenon? 
Rebecca Pentz, in her critique of Hick, answers with the more mundane comparison betweai an 
American footbaU training camp and a Sunday Sdiool. Both indirectly build diaracter in 
individuals even though they are directly focused on the incommensurate goals of creating b^er 
football players or aithusiastic worshippers. Nevertheless, to test them accordmg to them the 
common, i f indirect goal of building diaracter is unfair. Here, it is worth quoting her at laigth. 
43 . Jolin Hick, 'The Non-Absoluteness of Christianity,' in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, p. 23. 
44 . lOR, pp. 299 - 342. 
45 . Rebecca Pentz, 'Hick and Saints; Is Saint-Production a Valid Test?' in Faith and Philosophy, 8 (1991), 
p. 98; see also Gerard Loughbn, 'Nounmenon and Phenomena,' in ReUgious Studies. 23 (1987), pp. 493 -
508 and John B. Cobb, 'Christian Witness in a Plurabstic Worid,' in The Experience of Religious 
Diversity, eds. John Hick and Hasan Askari, (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1985), p. 156. 
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Though I can't document this, I bet there is a much closer connection betwsen regular 
worsliip and character building than there is between football uainmg and character 
building. Because of this, even if we ascertain that our young worshippers have better 
characters than the... football players, we cannot conclude that there is more 
transforming power in our Sunday school that in the... training camp. The camp may 
very well have much more power to achieve its goal of producing better football players 
than our Sunday school has to achieve its goal of producing sincere worshippers."* 
Therefore, the football camp would unjustiy fail the test. Whai one compares rehgions, the same 
problem anses. It may be that a rehgjon is very good at adiieving its goal, but at the same time, 
places httie emphasis on agape/karuna. Or conversely, it may be that a religion produces many 
compassionate people, but fails with respect to its goal. I f we compare these two according to the 
saint-production test, the former religion would fail despite its salvific efficacy. Hick's test works 
'only i f the same d^ee of positive correlation holds b ^ e a i salvation and saint-production in the 
various rehgions to be tested.'^ ^ He has not shown this to be the case and until he does, saint-
production does not defeat the totalitarian approadi. 
Second, it may be objected by traditional Christian theologians that the recognition of 
'salvations' appears to undermine the universality and ultimacy of Christian salvation. It must 
therefore be made clear that in no way am I daiegrating the salvation which comes in and through 
Jesus Christ. I am saying simply that to reinscribe a non-Christian soteriolpgy m Chnstian terms 
daiies a priori the possibility that this 'salvation' is radically different, that it is beyond inscnption 
in a Christian vocabulary. Here an important distinction must be made. I am not arguuig for an 
eschatological plurahty as Tom Driver appears to do vdiai he writes, 
If there is a "salvation history" dehneated and forecast in Christian scripture, there are 
other "salvation histories" outside it; and in them God has different names, different 
identities, and moves in different ways. Inasmuch has different histories, then God has 
different "natures." In plurahst perspective, it is not sunply tiiat God has one nanire 
variously and madequately expressed by different rehgious traditions. It is that there are 
real and genuine differences within the Godhead itself, owing to the manifold 
involvements that God has undertaken with the great variety of human communities.''* 
On this point, I stand in compile agreement with Newbigin: 'All behef m the ultunate coherence of 
things has beai abandoned. Chaos has come agaui and there will be nothing left excqit the will to 
46 . Pentz, 'Hick and Saints,' p. 100. 
47 . Fentz, 'Hick and Saints,' p. 103. 
48 . Tom F. Driver, 'The Case for Plurahsm,' in The Myth of Christian Umgueness. p. 212. 
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power of the competing human projects '^' Thus, this objection appears to confuse Driver's 
prescriptive, esdiatologjcal account with my descriptive, historical account. To argue for the 
possibibty of salvations, is to counter on the one hand claims that bebefs and practices of different 
religious communities are somdiow indefensible as they stand. On the contrary, wdiai interprd;ed 
as within an entire rebgio-cultural framework, they are defensible. On the other hand, it likewise 
opposes those who argue that those outside one's tradition have because of this an imperfect 
experience or revelation. The rebgious belief and experiaice of those who are other is not an 
imperfect version of ours, it is differait. On pragmatic terms, thdr bebefs make saise and the 
expenences they offer may be deeply satisfying. Ndther contaition challenges the final universality 
and ultimacy of Christian claims. It simply acknowledges that these claims are being made in a 
rebgjously plural world vA\ere the evidaice is inconclusive. In so doing, it underscores the wisdom 
of Kraemer and those who foUow him in refusing to pronounce on the esdiatological destiny of the 
other. 
Li summary, this section argued the totabtarian approadi brings to a postmodern tiieology 
of religions a suspidon of universal and neutral evaluative criteria; a resistance to any equation of 
surface similanties betweai rebgions and the metacritical theories giving rise to them; and an 
allowance that other rebgions are successfii in bringing salvation to thdr adheraits. That none of 
tills affirms a strict incommensurability thesis vA^dn daiies the justification and translation of 
religious bebefs and practices is taken up in the final section. 
7.3 Adaptation, the Point of Contact and InconunensurabiUty 
A strict mcommensurabibty thesis, denying the possibibty of the external justification and 
gaiuine translation of rebgious bebefs and practices is contradided by Kraaner^s understanding of 
adaptation. Drawing on the Bible, Chnstian history and his own cross-cultural expenaice, 
Kraemer argues that the Christian message can be expressed botii in terms of and in conflict witii 
non-Christian religions. He thereby strives to demonstrate the universabty of the Christian 
language without lapsing into a priori emphases on the continuity or discontinuity of the Chnstian 
message with the culture in whidi it is being communicated. Against botii, he insists tiiat true 
adaptation, a bibbcally realistic, fully indigaious expression of Christian faitii will anse only slowly 
49 . Lesslie Ne\\bigin, 'Rebgion for the Marketplace,' in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered, p. 147. 
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and always m concrd:e interrehgious eicounters. When apphed to a postmodern context, tiiis 
understanding of adaptation resists incommensurabihty by underscoring the need for both 
comparative theology and apologetics. 
Consider the former. Earher, I ai^ed that postmodern tiieology of rehgions employs the 
language of natural theology to demonstrate the universal nature of Christian claims. To leave the 
matter here, however, might imply these claims can be translated into a philosophical language 
comprdiQisible to all r^rdless of specific rehgious aflfihations. This is not quite correct. It is not 
tiiat the language of natural theology is somdiow religiously neutral and can therefore be employed 
and understood by anyone. Rather, it is that particular claims, as they are advanced in 
confrontation and conversation with other traditions, will sometimes occupy the same logical space 
as some of tiie claims of that community. Return to the example givai in 7.1. Theones of 
causation 'play a crudal role in the Buddhist account of the conditions of human existaice tiiat need 
to be transcQided i f the round of re-births is to be escaped and Nirvana attamed.''" Furtiier, tiiey 
are equally significant for the Christian tradition whai describmg and providing rationality for 
thdstic behef. It is in the logical overiap, in tiiis instance betweai Christian and Buddhist tiieones of 
causation, that natural theology would take place. 
To recognise this logical overiap requires more than a passing knowledge of the particular 
claims of the other with whom one is aigaged: it demands botii an mtellectual and an existaitial 
famihanty with the behefs and practices of a givai community. Therefore, a postmodern tiieology 
of rehgions also uicorporates comparative theology. According to Franas Clooney, comparative 
theology is marked by 'its commitment to tiie detailed consideration of rdigious traditions otiier than 
one's own.''' I f this commitmait is to avoid charges of reductionism, it must be predicated upon a 
totahtarian and local understandmg of rehgious beliefs and practices: it must consider.beliefs and 
practices within thdr rehgio-cultural matnx as it is embodied in actual rehgious communities, hi 
Kraemer's words, comparative theology in the first instance 'is a congenial altering mto a drfferait 
universe of discourse that has its own language.'" 
50 . DiNoia, The Diversity of Religions, p. 132. 
51 . Francis X. Clooney, 'Comparative Theology: A Review of Recent Books (1989-1995),' in Theological 
Studies. 56(1995), p. 521. 
52 . RCF. p. 49 
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Comparative theology then attempts to adapt the Christian message into this language and 
m so doing, navigate b ^ e e i the Scylla of incomprehensibility and the Charybdss of assimilation. 
Adaptation is ndther the simpbstic transbteration of Christian claims, nor the co-option of sudi 
claims into the bfe and practice of the other. In the example, the Dominican's goal is not so to 
'adapt' the classical Thomistic argumait from causation such that it harmonises with the 
Theravadm understanding (which is bkely impossible), but to articulate this classical argumait for 
the existence of God in sudi a way that his Theravadin partner will understand, though not 
necessarily accept. A postmodem theology of religions, thus, will be done in critical dialogue witii 
adheraits of otiier rebgious traditions where these fraditions are shown to overiap in thdr 
interpretations of reabty in order to be understood. 
Finally, consider the purpose of this conversation. It is not done in search of a 'global 
theology* as aivisaged by Alan Race and Wilfred Cantwell Smith," by whidi they appear to mean 
'a theological "Esperanto", to aihance communication and translate [the rebgions'] discourse mto 
mutually accqatable language and symbols.''^  Natural theology, as I have rdnterprded it, is an 
attempt to secure the universal scope of Christian dauns. Comparative theology is tiie further 
endeavour to render sudi claims understandable to those outside the Chnstian community. In 
undertaking botii of these tasks, one is arguing for the trutii of these claims not only for Christians, 
but for all people, everywhere. Therefore, a postmodem theology of rebgions involves apologetics. 
Apologies can be divided into both negative and positive poles, with the former defined 
as a defeice of bebefs and practices from external attack while the latter, as an attempt to show the 
superiority of these to those of another community. Postmodem theology of rebgions involves both. 
Return to the example above. The Theravadin most likely holds to the foUowing belief: 'the claim 
that there exists an eternal, uncaused, omnisdent, omnipotait bdng who desires tiie welfare of the 
aitire human race is botii internally incoherait and produces undesirable effects m those who assait 
to i t . '" In so believing, he is at odds with the Dominican who bebeves preasely tiie opposite: 
53 . See Race, Christians and Rebgious Pluralism; Smith, Towards a Worid Theology. 
54 . Gavin D'Costa, 'The End of Systematic Theology,' in Theology, 95 (1992), p. 330. 
55 . Griffiths, An Apology for Apologetics, pp. 60 - 61. 
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namely, that this behef is coherent and desirable. By invoking St Thomas' argumait fi"om 
causation he has aigaged hunself in both na t i ve and positive apologies. Negativdy speaking, 
he is attempting to show that this behef is not necessarily incoherait or producing undesirable 
effects. Positively, he is going fijrther to show that Theravadin theories of causation are, in this 
respect, incorrect. 
hi a postmodern context, both forms are necessarily evidentialist: botii appeal to 
commonly recognised evidaice for support. Evidaitialist apologetics, espedally of the positive 
variety, have been dominated by three unfortunate assumptions. 'First, much of the discussion has 
takai it for granted that a good thdstic argument would have to me^ extremdy high standards of 
cogency and indeed be demonstrative ... Sudi an argumait would start from what is self-evidait 
and proceed majestically by way of self-evidentiy vahd argumait forms to its conclusion.'"' 
Second, it also assumes that sudi an 'argumait must have premises accqjted by neariy everyone, or 
neariy everyone who thinks about the topic, or neariy everyone who has a view on the topic.'" 
Finally it assumes that evidaice by definition is unviersally recognisable and available, hi a 
postmodem context, these assumptions can be seriously questioned. An argumait need not be 
demonstrative in order to be good or convincing and premises and evidence need only be accqjtable 
to all ui the conversation. Nevertheless, to question them is not necessarily to reject the need for 
apologetics entirely. 
In the absence of demonstrative arguments with universal premises and evidaices, 
postmodem theology of rehgions will be marked be the effort to persuade others of the truth of the 
Gospel. Haice, not only will negative and positive apologetics be evidaitiahst, tiiey will also be 
rii^orical. As David Cunningham writes, 'all we can do is to desire that our most successfijl 
moments of persuasion will be moments of faithfiil persuasion - momaits for the sake of the God of 
Jesus Christ, in whom we hve and move and have our being.''* Kraemer sums up the apologetic 
nature of theology of rehgions in the following way: 
56 . Alvin Plantinga, 'Augustinian Christian Philosophy,' in The Monist. 75 (1992), p. 293. 
57 . Plantinga, 'Augustinian Christian Philosophy,' p. 294. 
58 . David S. Cunningham, Faitiifiil Persuasion: In Aid of a Rhetoric of Christian Theology. (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), p. 257. 
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The encounter between Christian feith and rehgions, even when dehberately sought on 
the highest level of spiritual intercourse, always preserves traits of an apologia, of a 
defence, and of an attack or combat... This is more than dialogue, h is the spontaneous 
manifestation of., the dialectic character of the Bibhcal revelation, which means saying 
"yes" and "no" to the worid and all its spheres of life, which precludes in principle Uie 
programme of synthesis, and yet impels toward true "conmiunication".'' 
As was shown in diapter 6, the tensions betweai the implication of bibhcal realism and the 
totahtarian approadi (the incommaisurabihty of rehgious traditions) and the presumption of 
adaptation (the commensurabihty of rehgious traditions) was resolved through an appeal to 
dialectic. Resulting from the juxtaposition of bibhcal realism and the totahtarian approach over 
against adaptation, it was expressed in Kraemer's understanding of the point of contact: among tiie 
great rehgious systems, because of thdr incommaisurable presuppositions, there is no point of 
contact. Nevertheless, in the concrete aicounters betweai the adheraits of these systems, there may 
in fact be many.. The remaining paragraphs r ^ m to the problems of justification and translation 
assodated with the incommaisurabihty thesis to show that Kraemer's dialectical point of contact 
allows for gaiiune but always inconipld;e understanding of the behefs and practices of the otiier. 
Recall first of all the justification conclusion: there are no external criteria capable of 
evaluating the behefs and practices of a rehgious community according to standards of sudi 
accqDtabihty or verity that extaid beyond the boundaries of particular communities. This so 
emphasises the n a t i v e side of Kraemer's dialectic, as expressed m biblical reahsm and tiie 
totahtarian approadi, as to lapse into inconsistaicy. Whai held together in taision with the positive 
pole, however, it is an important reminder of two caveats for any postmodem theology of religions. 
First, it compels the reahsation that there is no set of universal and neutral critena entitiing 
judgemaits whidi has beoi agreed upon by philosophers and theologians across religious 
boundaries and that such a sd is unnecessary for sudi activity to take place. Such judgemaits, 
accordmg to Kraemer, can and should take place in practical engagement with adheraits of otiier 
rehgious communities. During sudi conversations, one need not appeal to universal critena, tiie 
adheraice to whidi defines rationahty, but ones whidi the interiocutors share. This is not to neglect 
or reject tiie importance of theory, but to accqit the inevitabihty of being condemned to history'. As 
59 . RCF, p. 322. 
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WiUiam Placher puts it, 'We cannot find an Ardiimedean point, a universal standard of rationabty. 
On the other hand, we are not utterly unprisoned within our own current horizons.'^ " 
Second, the justification conclusion is a reminder that the justification of beliefs and 
practices does not aitail agreemait. This does not deny the importance of evidaice and argument, 
be they historic or sdentific, for the justification of a specific bebef or practice, but does reject the 
notion that evidaitial aigumaits can and som^mes do constitute conclusive proof for one belief or 
evai one entire tradition over against otiiers. Speaking historically, that the 'evidaice' appears to 
support a number of traditions is borne out by thdr continued existence and evai flounshmg 
throughout miUainia in increasingly diverse cultural situations. Those traditions whidi cannot ui 
some way adapt to or make saise of these situations evaituaUy become historical artefacts. Thus, 
Kraemer's dialectic reminds postmodem theology of rebgions that in practical situations. Christian 
bebefs and practices can.be raidered rational and justifiable to the otiier, but daiies that he or she 
is tiierefore necessarily irrational or somdiow unjustified m rejecting them. 
Recall secondly the translation conclusion: no member of any particular religious 
community can effectively communicate the meaning of a bebef or practice to a member of another 
rebgious community. Once more, this so emphasises the na t ive pole of Kraemer's dialectic as to 
lapse mto inconsistency. Nevertheless, whai held m creative taision witii the positive pole, it is 
remmds a postmodem theology of religions of two fiarther caveats the first bang tiie mdetemunacy 
of meaning m the act of translation. In practical situations, whai transposmg a dortrine or practice 
caitral to the bfe of one rebgious community into the language of another, 'the "corred" translation 
will always be underddermined by the available data.'**' There will always be a range of 
translations apparently and equally reflective of an understanding of the meaning of the original. 
This is not to say that all translations are equally vabd, but once again, that the evidaice will 
possibly support several. The safeguard against uicorrect translations is the emphasis on 
attempting to understand a given doctrine or practice as it is concretely embodied ui a spedfic 
rebgious community. Second, the translation conclusion forces postmodem theology of religions to 
recognise the limits of its understanding. Quite simply, understanding is not a thing wliidi one 
60 . Placher, Unapologetic Theology, p. 112. 
61 . GrifStlis. An Apology for Apologetics, p. 24. 
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srniply does or does not have, but is a matter of degrees, hi this way, in order for an outsider to 
understand as mudi as is possible the nuances of a behef or practice of a given religion, he or she 
must interprd; it as it arises within the hfe and practice of a specific community. Some 
interpretations may in fact be shown to be incorred while otiiers may be affirmed.*'^  
To summarise, none of the four caveats, the lack of universal criteria, the plurality of 
justifiable positions, the indeterminacy of meaning, and the hmits of understanding, demand a strict 
(and mconsistait) incommaisurabihty thesis, but affirm the importance intrasystematic trutii as a 
componait m any extrasystematic trutii clarni. Sudi trutii, according to Kraemer's dialectic, cannot 
be discemed in isolation from actual religious communities, but only in practical, concrae 
confrontation and engagemait with them. 
Conclusion: 
The goal of this diapter was to show how Kraemer's key themes, as set out and defaided 
m chapter 6, can contribute to a spedfically postmodem theology of rehgions. The first argued that 
bibhcal reahsm aitails a recognition of the exphdtiy Christian nature of theology of religions and 
an affirmation of rehgious diversity as part of the Christian m^anarrative. The second contaided 
that the totahtarian approadi brings to a postmodem theology of rehgions a suspiaon of universal 
and neutral evaluative criteria, a resistance to any metacritical quest for a common religious core, 
and an allowance that other rehgions may be successfiil in bringing 'salvation' to thdr adherents. 
Finally, the third maintained that adaptation resists a strict incommensurability tiiesis by 
underscoring the need for both comparative theology and apologdics and that affirmed, througli 
Kraemer's dialectical point of contad. Intimate but incomplete communication betweai traditions. 
It is thus clear that whai critically re-appropriated, Kraemer's theology of rehgions continues to 
offer uisights to Christians wresthng with the problem of religions in a postmodem context. 
62. These and similar themes are currently being taken up by Lamin Sanneh in works such as 
Encountering the West: Christianity and the Global Cultural Process: the African Dimension. 
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 1993); Religion and the Variety of Culture, (Valley Forge: Trinity Press, 1996). 
and Translating the Message: The Missionary Impact on Culture. (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1989). 
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Conclusion 
This study argued for the critical re-appropriation of Hendrik Kraemer by contemporary' 
Christian theology of rebgions. First, it sought to reintroduce Kraemer into contemporary 
theological debate. Remembering his contribution is more oftai than not restricted to the 
missiologjcal wing of the Worid Coundl of Churdies, where his pioneering spirit, i f not his 
theology, is honoured. Gavin D'Costa is peiiiaps his only senous contemporary critic. This study 
assessed and responded to the major critiasms in order to show that his contribution is not as easily 
dismissed as some might think. Second, the study sought also to re-appropriate criticaUy Kraemer's 
theology of rebgions by presenting a defensible position aware of contemporary philosophical and 
theological difficulties and how they impinge upon the theology of rebgions. Of the two questions 
remaining, the first is whdher or not these aims have been met. 
In order property to respond, let us briefly survey the thesis. Through an application and 
suspiaous analysis of the conventional threefold typology. Part I liberated exclusivist and 
mclusivist theologies of rebgions from the highly emotive, nat ively diarged baggage ati:ributed to 
them in part through the typology. It cannot and should not be used, therefore, to prohibit reflection 
on and further development of openly traditional positions, an example of whidi is provided 
Haidrik Kraemer. Part I I , through both dironological and thematic surveys, thai 'rediscovered' 
Kraemer's theology of religions. AU of this introduced Part IE, where I attempted to re-appropnate 
critically Kraemer's position by first defaiding it from and modifying it in the light of critidsm and 
then developing it in the light of postmodem philosophy and theology. 
Chapter 5 briefly sketdied currait philosophical and theological themes, beginning witii 
postmodernism and postmodemity, and specifically the work of Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard. This first 
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section concluded that while his prescriptive response to the aid of modernity is deq l^y problematic, 
there is no reyersmg the postmodem turn. Second, it assessed the theological responses of Mark C. 
Taylor, John Milbank, and Hans Fra and George Lmdbeck to the postmodem turn. It argued that 
Taylor's deconstructive a/theology and Milbank's reconstructive theology were avoidable extremes 
v ^ e the postmodem orthodoxy of Frd and Lindbeck offered a more fiiiitfiil mediating position 
(albdt one mudi closer to Milbank than to Taylor). After condaising Kraemer's position into four 
key themes. Chapter 6 considered botii theological and plienomaiological critiasms. Only the first 
was dismissed outright; the rest were shown to set important hmits against extreme readings, with 
the final two resulting m a shght but not inconsequential modification m Kraemer's totalitarian 
phaiomaiology. 
In three sections, diapter 7 drew together the postmodem orthodoxy of diapter 5 and tiie 
key themes of diapter 6 in order to show that Kraemer's theology of religions continued to suggest 
ways of faithfiil theological creativity for Chnstians wrestimg with the problem of religions ui a 
postmodem worid. The first showed that for postmodem theology of rehgions, bibhcal reahsm 
aitails botii the recognition of the exphdtiy Christian nature of tiieolpgy of religions and tiie 
appreaation of rehgious diversity as part of the Christian m^anarrative. The second contaided 
that the totahtarian approadi brings to a postmodem theology of rehgions a suspidon of universal 
and neutral evaluative criteria, a resistance to the m^critical quest for a common religious core, 
and an allowance that other rehgions may be successftii in bringing 'salvation' to thar adherents. 
Finally, the third demonstrated how the theme of adaptation rules out a stnct (and inconsistait) 
uicommaisurability thesis by underscoring the need for both comparative theology and apologetics 
and how, through Kraemer's dialectical point of contad, l^tunate but incompld:e understanding 
betweai traditions is possible. 
On the basis of this summary I conclude first that Kraemer's theology of religions 
continues to merit serious analysis by theologians interested m the problem posed by religious 
plurahty. This is not to say that it is immune from critidsm, but that the position is deserving of 
fiirther mvestigation even i f only to formulate an opposing position. Kraemer cannot simply be 
dismissed. Second, and more miportantiy, because his position is defaisible, resonates witii tiiemes 
in currait philosophical and theological thinking, and is capable of further developmait, 1 conclude 
that it also ments critical re-appropriation. Thus the aims set out in the Litroduction have beai met. 
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Hendrik Kraemer's theology of rebgions successfully offers to tiieologians interested in the problan 
of rebgious plurality a way of faithfii theological creativity in a postmodem worid. Now let us 
consider the second question: What prospects does Kraemer's re-appropriated position hold for 
fiiture exploration? 
I bebeve it holds out interesting possibibties for three areas. First of all, it creates a 
discursive space for theological or rebgious phaiomenologies of rebgions. If the quest for a 
universal and neutral evaluative vantage point is in fad doomed, there is no reason to prohibit the 
Christian (or other) theologian from investigating religious phaiomena on the grounds that his or 
her rebgious bebefs will somdiow contaminate the 'sdeitific' nature of the researdi. On the 
contrary, it would seem that those phenomaiologjsts who are openly rebgious are m a position 
superior to thdr unbebeving counterparts for they will be able to recognise and therefore minimise 
the negative influaice of thdr theological or rebgious assumptions rather than remaining ignorant of 
them. This need not necessarily promote sectarianism, that is, the view that the home tradition has 
nothing of value to gain from prctraded contad with and study of another. Rather, it would seem 
to indicate predsely the opposite: that it is only through sudi interaction that the home tradition 
would continue to develop and to avoid stagnation. 
Second, Kraemer's views on adaptation (that the Christian story can be adapted into the 
terms of anotiier rebgious totabty) and the point of contact (tiiat there are many personal, as 
opposed to systematic, pomts of contad) furtiier underscore the importance and inevitability of 
contextual, comparative theology. As the Christian story is told and re-told throughout the plana, 
it is vital that sudi narration take place in terms the bsteners will understand though not necessanly 
accqDt. It must therefore be told in terms of, and in confrontation with, the dominant culture ui 
whidi it is found. Comparative theology in this sense opposes both those holding that the Christian 
story always stands over against religions and cultures and those attempting artifidal experimaits 
m rebgious and cultural accommodation. The need to emphasise contrasts or common areas will be 
ddermined only through slow, painstaking contact with the dominant culture. 
Finally, Kraemer's position also re-emphasises the need for both positive and negative 
apologetics undertakai in interreligious contexts. Being convinced of tiie truth and universality of 
tiie Chnstian story requires that one attempt to bnng otiiers to similar convictions. To do so is not 
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necessarily intolerant, but to refrain from it may in fact be a failure of cantos, of love and concern 
for the other. Sudi activity does not require a universally accessible vantage point from whidi to 
daermine and assess evidence or construct aiguments. Rather, it presupposes an understanding of 
the other suflHcient to drtermine what 'evidence' and aiguments will be recognised by all parties in 
the conversation. Moreover, it will focus not on demonstrative argumaUs or evidence, but on the 
ihaoncal, persuasive nature of both. These very brief remarks indicate that far from ending the 
Christian conversation with other religions, Kraemer opens new and expands existing avenues 
where it can and should take place. 
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